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TOBACCO INGREDIENTS AND SMOKE CONSTITUENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE LAWS: THE CASE FOR
EXPANSION

PATRICIA DAVIDSON*

INTRODUCTION

Tobacco ingredients and smoke emissions reporting and disclosure
laws should be expanded in three fundamental ways. First, reporting and
disclosure of specific quantities of ingredients and smoke emissions on a
brand-by-brand basis ought to be required. Current federal law merely
requires tobacco companies to submit aggregated lists of ingredients,
information which has literally no public health value. Second, expanded
tobacco product reporting and disclosure laws should also encompass
cigars. Although cigars are enjoying an unprecedented upswing in use,
especially by young people, the existing federal reporting law covers
only cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
Third, the primary purpose of recent proposals to expand tobacco
reporting laws in the United States, including most attempts by states to
fill the void in federal law, has been to obtain information about tobacco
constituents in their unburned state. While requiring reporting and disclosure of unburned ingredients in specific brands is a desirable public
health objective, shifting to a strategy directed at smoke emissions may
be more effective, at least as an initial step. Focusing on smoke emissions makes sense from a public health perspective because the harmful
effects of both mainstream smoke (inhaled by smokers) and side-stream
smoke (environmental tobacco smoke exposure)' are more readily docuStaff Attorney, Tobacco Control Resource Center, Northeastern University School of Law.
This material is based on work supported by a National Institutes of Health/National Cancer Institute
Award, Grant #1 ROI CA67805-01, titled "Legal Interventions to Reduce Tobacco Use." Any
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this Article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the prime sponsor. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Debra Jefferson, Emily McFarling, and Laura Hermer.
1. Environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") "is formed from the smoldering of a cigarette or
other [burning] tobacco product, and from smoke exhaled by the smoker." OFFICE OF ENVTL.
HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HEALTH EFFECTS OF

EXPOSURE TO ENVTL. TOBACCO SMOKE 1-2 (1997). Approximately one-half of the complex mixes
of chemicals formed, in weight, by smoking tobacco are emitted from the smoldering product as
at 2-2. Furthermore, "[o]ver [fifty]
side-stream smoke, which diffuses into the environment. See id.
compounds have been identified in tobacco smoke which are recognized as known or probable
human carcinogens." Id. at 2-4.
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mented and understood than the effects of unburned tobacco additives.
Moreover, from a legal perspective, the tobacco industry's trade secret
claims, (which it is asserting to fend-off more stringent reporting and
disclosure laws in the U.S. and Canada) may be more easily defeated
with regard to smoke emissions.
Furthermore, even if disclosure of ingredients and smoke emissions
have a limited effect on overall tobacco consumption (because users are
addicted), disclosure could be justified as a tool to encourage competitive
consumer comparison and create a genuine industry incentive to reduce
or eliminate harmful ingredients and emissions. The recent Winston "no
additives" advertising campaign indicates that tobacco companies believe consumers are influenced to change brands based on unproven
claims that their products are additive free.2 The tobacco industry may
well respond to enforceable, stringent reporting and disclosure requirements by altering their products, instead of just their advertising.
This Article consists of several sections, each of which explores a
particular development related to recent attempts to expand tobacco
product ingredients reporting and disclosure laws. In Part IA, the Article
describes the contours and severe limitations of the current federal ingredients reporting law and policy. Part IB discusses recent proposals to
strengthen federal law in this area, including those emanating from the
failed June 20, 1997 proposed national tobacco litigation settlement. In
Part II, the Article analyzes state laws enacted to fill some of the gaps in
federal tobacco products ingredients reporting and disclosure laws, and
the industry response to these efforts. Part III describes the very recent,
and thus far more successful, efforts by the Canadian government to obtain and (at least in British Columbia) release detailed information about
tobacco ingredients and emissions through new regulations. Finally, in

2. The Winston "no additives" campaign has reportedly revived a brand that had been
dropping in popularity for more than a quarter of a century. In a December 1997 article ("All-natural
killers"), Fortune magazine reported that Winston had grown from 5.4% to 5.8% in the third quarter
of 1997. It's not surprising that Mr[.] Goldstone was so "encouraged", especially when a single point
of market share equals US$80 million [sic] in pre-tax profits.
Stan Shatenstein, Thank you for not smoking additives, TOBACCO CONTROL, Summer 1998, at 187.
One of a series of Winston advertisements beckons "Thank you for not smoking additives," claiming
that Winstons are "100% Tobacco." Id. at 188. Another depicts a young man intently gazing at a
Playboy centerfold and boasts: "I don't know if they're real, but my smokes are." Id. At least one
state, Arizona, has filed suit against Winston's manufacturer, R.J. Reynolds, charging that the
advertising campaign violates consumer protection laws "because it implies that Winston is
somehow more healthful than competitors." Id. at 187. At this writing the FTC is poised to accept a
settlement of its deceptive advertising charges against R.J. Reynolds' "no additives" campaign for
Winston cigarettes. The Federal Trade Commission (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov>.
The Proposed Settlement would require Reynolds to include the following prominent disclaimers in
a variety of ads: "No additives in our tobacco does NOT mean a safer cigarette" or "No additives in
our tobacco does NOT mean safer." In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., File No. 992-3025,
Agreement Containing Consent Order, FTC (Mar. 3, 1999), enforced, In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., Docket No. C-3892, Decision and Order, FTC (Aug. 16, 1999).
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Part IV the author suggests strategies for maximizing the likelihood that
efforts to enhance tobacco ingredients reporting and disclosure laws will
produce useful results.
I. TOBACCO PRODUCTS INGREDIENTS REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
A. Current FederalReporting Requirementsfor Cigarettesand Smokeless Tobacco

The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA")3 requires cigarette manufacturers, packagers and importers to "annually
provide the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] with a list of the
ingredients added to tobacco in the manufacture of cigarettes which does
not identify the company which uses the ingredients or the brand of cigarettes which contain the ingredients."' Another federal law, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act ("CSTHE"),' imposes
similar reporting requirements on the manufacturers of smokeless tobacco. Additive lists required under both laws are of no public health
value, however, since they do not identify specific quantities, the tobacco
companies using particular ingredients, or the brands containing specific
ingredients.'
The federal laws also provide strong confidentiality protections for
the reported ingredients information. Specifically, the laws applying to
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco require any ingredients information
submitted to the Secretary to be "treated as trade secret or confidential
information subject to [United States Code] section 552(b)(4) of Title 5
and section 1905 of Title 18."' In addition, the Secretary is required to
maintain special written procedures for assuring the confidentiality of
reported data, including appointing a custodian to keep the lists locked in
a cabinet or file and "to maintain a complete record of any person who
inspects or uses the information."9
Both federal laws applicable to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco include weak Congressional reporting requirements with respect to the
aggregated information required from tobacco manufacturers.'" Not sur-

3. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).
4. Id. § 1335a(a).
5. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408
(1994).
6. See id. § 4403. The smokeless law also requires manufacturers to report nicotine
quantities. Id. § 4403(a)(l)(B).
7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335a; 15 U.S.C. § 4403(a)(l)(B).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(b)(2)(A) (1994). See also 15 U.S.C. § 4403(b)(2)(A).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(b)(2)(C); 15 U.S.C. § 4403(b)(2)(C).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a. § 1335a(b) provides:
(1) At such times as the Secretary considers appropriate, the Secretary shall
transmit to the Congress a report, based on the information provided
under subsection (a)of this section, respecting-
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prisingly, neither the FCLAA, the CSTHE, nor the legislative history of
either Act, acknowledge that the reporting system is virtually useless
from a public health perspective because it merely requires manufacturers to report aggregated ingredients lists, while shielding specific information about quantities and brands. Permitting companies to aggregate
reportable information compounds the difficulty of assessing health risks
and identifying potentially responsible parties." The legislative histories
of the current federal reporting laws articulate no rationale for protecting
tobacco companies 2 from adhering to any meaningful ingredients disclosure requirements.
The cigarette and smokeless tobacco industries subject to these laws
have gone to great lengths to guard against disclosure of ingredients information. Elaborate and presumably expensive procedures employed by
the industry to protect ingredients information throughout the reporting
process were cited by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion
upholding an order barring enforcement of a Massachusetts ingredients
reporting and disclosure law.'" Specifically, with regard to company aggregation of additive data, the First Circuit noted that manufacturers
"typically comply with the Labeling Act's strictures through an internuncio; they submit information to a law firm which acts as a clearinghouse .... The law firm maintains the secrecy of the ingredients used in
a particular brand from both the government and the brand's competitors."'" Smokeless tobacco manufacturers follow similar procedures,
utilizing law firms to protect against disclosure of their products' ingredients.'5

(A) a summary of research activities and proposed research activities
on the health effects of ingredients added to tobacco in the
manufacture of cigarettes and the findings of such research;
(B) information pertaining to any such ingredient which in the
judgement of the Secretary poses a health risk to cigarette smokers;
and
(C) any other information which the Secretary determines to be in the
public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 1335a(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 4403(b).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a. § 1335a(a) provides: "A person or group of persons required to
provide a list by this subsection may designate an individual or entity to provide the list required by
this subsection." See also 15 § U.S.C. 4403(a)(2).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 98-805 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3718; S. REP. NO. 99209 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7. Cf. the Kennedy Report discussed infra at notes 8891.
13. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 673 (lst Cir. 1998) (upholding a
preliminary injunction obtained by the tobacco industry to restrain enforcement of a state ingredients
reporting and disclosure statute based on the industry's trade secrets claim). See infra notes 110- 112
and accompanying text.
14. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d at 672.
15. See id. at 672 n.2.
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1. Applying Federal Ingredients Reporting Laws to Cigars
No federal law requires cigar manufacturers to report any type of ingredients information to federal health officials. Nothing in the statutes
or legislative history of either FCLAA or CSTHE suggests any reason
for excluding manufacturers of other tobacco products, such as cigars,
from ingredients reporting or regulation.
Indeed, the rationale articulated in the Senate Report accompanying
the enactment of the federal law regulating smokeless tobacco (requiring,
inter alia, reporting of ingredients lists) applies to cigars today." For
example, the Senate Report asserts that the hazards of smokeless tobacco
have been "neglected" and that the smokeless tobacco industry "has
staged a resurgence in recent years."' 7 Citing mounting evidence of the
health risks of using smokeless tobacco and "gains in production and
sales," the report states that it is essential for Congress and the federal
government to take action.'" Alarming increases in the use of smokeless
tobacco and youth consumption were the primary rationales for enacting
the law.' " Moreover, the report acknowledges that many young consumers of smokeless tobacco "are under the mistaken impression that the use
of smokeless tobacco carries no significant risk to health." 20
The parallels to cigars are obvious. First, cigars have historically
been neglected in federal, state, and local regulatory schemes. For example, on the federal level, cigars are excluded from labeling
requirements,"1 the prohibition on television and radio advertising, 22 FDA
jurisdiction,23 and ingredients reporting laws.' Second, new information

16. See generally S. REP. No. 99-209. pt. 1,at 1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7.
In addition to mandating ingredients reporting, CSTHE requires. inter alia, warning labels on
smokeless tobacco products. See id. at 2-3. See also 15 U.S.C § 4402(a)(1) (1994) (requiring
warning labels on smokeless tobacco products).
17. S. REP. No. 99-209, at 3 (1986).
18. See Id. Interestingly, as a justification for requiring, inter alia, reporting requirements and
warning labels, the Senate Report also expressly acknowledges the inherently harmful nature of
tobacco products. Id. "Tobacco products are unique in that. unlike other products which may be only
hazardous when misused, these products pose a health hazard when used as intended." Id. at 13. See
also Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 898-900 (1998) (discussing the curious
treatment of tobacco under product liability law).
19. See S. REP. No. 99-209, at 4 (1986).
20. Id.
21.
See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994);
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (1994). Recently,
companion reports issued by the Office of Inspector General recommend, inter alia, "pursuing a
collaborative effort with the Federal Trade Commission and Congress to initiate a Surgeon General's
Warning Label for cigars." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
YOUTH USE OF CIGARS: FEDERAL, STATE REG. AND ENFORCEMENT ii (1999); U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HuM. SERVS. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., YOUTH USE OF CIGARS: PATTERNS OF USE
AND PERCEPTION 25 (1999).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). Only cigarettes and "little cigars" are covered under the
electronic communication ban. See id. § 1332(7) (1994) for the definition of "little cigar."
23. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
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about the serious health risks of cigar smoking has emerged. A recent
report of the National Institutes of Health warned: "Cigar smoking can.
cause oral, esophageal, laryngeal and lung cancers."25 Third, cigar use has
risen dramatically since 1993, following a period of intensive, and apparently, successful marketing and promotion campaigns. 6 Fourth, startling
rates of cigar use by children and teenagers has been documented.27
Similar conditions prompted the federal government to treat smokeless
tobacco as a public health threat akin to cigarettes more than ten years

ago.
In short, significant expansion of tobacco ingredients reporting and
disclosure requirements is needed to ensure health officials and the
smoking and non-smoking public are better informed about the health
risks posed by all types of tobacco products, including cigars. In addition
to influencing smokers, non-smokers who must contend with environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS"), 2' and public health regulators, disclosure
of tobacco ingredients and emissions data could spark competition
among manufacturers to reduce or eliminate harmful constituents and
emissions. While the likelihood of meaningful federal action currently

24. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., CIGARS: HEALTH EFFECTS AND TRENDS 19
(1998)."Regular cigar smokers who inhale, particularly those who smoke several cigars per day,
have an increased risk of coronary heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease." Id. See
also Paolo Boffetta et al., Cigar and Pipe Smoking and Lung Cancer Risk: A Multicenter Study
From Europe, 91 J. OF NAT. CANCER INST. 697 (1999) (concluding that smokers of cigars and pipes
consume less tobacco than cigarette smokers, and therefore have less risk of lung cancer than
cigarette smokers); Carlos Iribarren et al., Effect of Cigar Smoking on the Risk of Cardiovascular
Disease, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Cancer in Men, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1773
(1999) (finding that cigar smoking raises the smoker's risk of smoking-related diseases, including
upper aerodigestive tract and lung cancers).
26. See David M. Bums, Cigar Smoking: Overview and Current State of the Science, in
CIGARS: HEALTH EFFECTS AND TRENDS 1, 1-3 (U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ed.,

1998). Some recent data suggest that "cigar sales have flattened, up only 0.4 percent in 1998 to 3.3
billion after three consecutive years of growth exceeding 10 percent." Ted Jackovics, Cigar With
NFL Tie Aims for End Zone, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 1999, at I. Notably, the figures were
generated and released by a cigar trade group that is publicizing this apparent slowing of sales."'The
bloom is off the rose. The craze is over,' said Norman Sharp, head of the Cigar Assn. of America,
which reported this week that net sales of cigars increased by just 0.4% in the United States last
year." Kurt Streeter, Sometimes a CigarCraze is Just a Fad, L.A. TIMES, Mar. I 1, 1999, at CI.
27. See David M. Bums, Cigar Smoking: Overview and Current State of the Science, in
CIGARS: HEALTH EFFECTS AND TRENDS 1, 13-14 (U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ed.,
1998); Karen K. Gerlach et al., Trends in CigarConsumption and Smoking Prevalence, in CIGARS:
HEALTH EFFECTS AND TRENDS 21, 42-48 (U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ed., 1998).
Moreover, while males are still more likely than females to smoke cigars, the gender difference for
teens is less pronounced than for adults. See Bums, supra, at 13.
28. See infra Part B. Focusing on emissions may be advantageous to regulators. For example,
even if disclosure of ingredients and emissions information has a limited effect on smokers, due to
their addiction, release of emissions information could galvanize non-smokers who have been the
driving force behind the growing number of ETS restrictions nationwide.
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appears to be low, 9 recent developments in the state of Minnesota, discussed below, are more encouraging." Ingredients reporting and disclosure may prove to be yet another area where the states lead the way in
pioneering effective tobacco control regulations."
B. Proposalsto Expand FederalReporting and Disclosure Requirements

Among its many controversial provisions, the proposed national tobacco settlement of June 20, 1997 (hereinafter Proposed Settlement or
June 20, 1997 Proposed Settlement), included significant changes to the
reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco under FCLAA and CSTHE 2 Essentially, under the
Proposed Settlement, cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers
would have been required to "disclose ingredient information to the public under regulations comparable to what current federal law requires for
food products, reflecting the intended conditions of use."" In an earlier
publication this author summarized the 1997 proposed revisions to federal ingredients disclosure laws and concluded: "while the new federal
requirements may be an improvement over the current federal reporting
system, the long delays, permissive substantive standards, burdens of
proof, and procedures appear to afford the tobacco industry significant
advantages.""
Further, the June 20, 1997 Proposed Settlement would have explicitly preempted state regulations and enforcement in a number of key areas, including ingredients reporting and disclosure. While states would
have been permitted to apply for exemptions from the federal ingredients
law five years after it became effective,"5 and states with existing laws
29. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text. Questions about federal preemption of state
laws governing tobacco ingredients reporting and disclosure could further arise if amendments to
federal law are proposed.
30. See infra Part 11for a discussion of the Minnesota ingredients reporting and disclosure
law.
31. See generally Russ Freyman, Butting In, GOVERNING, Nov. 1995, at 55 (describing
legislative measures passed in several states restricting places tobacco may be used).
1997)
modified
June
25,
Resolution,
(last
32. See
Proposed
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/smoke/smoke02.htm> [hereinafter Proposed Resolution]. The June
20, 1997 Proposed Settlement was superseded by a less comprehensive and more industry-favorable
multi-state settlement. Notably the multi-state settlement, otherwise known as the Master Settlement
Agreement ("MSA"), does not contain any provisions related to FDA authority or tobacco
ingredients reporting and disclosure. Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 20, 1998)
<http://www.naag.org/settle.htrn>.
33. Id.
34. Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson. Local and State Regulation of Tobacco: The
Effects of the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87, 104 (1998). For example,
the industry would have enjoyed a five-year moratorium on submission of safety assessments for
tobacco additives. See id.
35. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 32, at title (F) & title V(B)(2). For a thorough
discussion of the preemption issues embedded in the June 20, 1997 Proposed Settlement see Enrich
& Davidson, supra note 34.
36. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 35, at title V(B)(2).
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under which public
disclosure had already occurred would have been
"grandfathered, ''1 7 neither of these provisions would have adequately
preserved state authority to regulate ingredients in tobacco products." In
fact, this author's prediction that states with existing ingredients reporting laws would not enjoy any real protection under the grandfather
clause because the tobacco industry would continue to use dilatory tactics to prevent any meaningful public disclosure, has thus far been accurate.
In a comprehensive analysis of the Proposed Settlement, the Institute
for Health Policy Studies [hereinafter I.H.P.S.] also criticized both the
minimal existing federal reporting requirements for tobacco ingredients,
and the expansion contemplated by the Proposed Settlement. 9 First, the
report stated "[m]any have criticized the current process for disclosure of
tobacco ingredients as insufficient."' The report went on to conclude that
while the changes set forth in the Proposed Settlement "are a substantial
improvement over the status quo,"' the new procedures favored the industry and that the public disclosure requirements were inadequate for
public health purposes. The I.H.P.S. report also objected to the potentially preemptive effects the proposed change in federal law might have
on states with potentially stronger reporting and disclosure laws, such as
Minnesota and Massachusetts. 2
1. Covering Cigars Under Ingredients Reporting and Disclosure
Law
While neither the 1997 Proposed Settlement nor the I.H.P.S. Report
addressed the issue of including cigars in federal ingredients reporting
and disclosure laws, each recognized the need to expand reporting requirements and to mandate some public disclosure. The arguments supporting more detailed reporting of ingredients, health and safety assessments of tobacco additives, and public disclosure of health and safety
information apply to cigars as well as to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
37.

The proposed grandfather clause provided as follows: "However, manufacturers would be

required to disclose all ingredients which they have been compelled to publicv disclose with respect

to a particular brand in order to comply with a statute or regulation (e.g., MA Ch 94 § 307B)."
Proposed Resolution, supra note 35, at title I(F) (emphasis added).
38. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 35, at title I(F). See also Enrich & Davidson, supra
note 34, at 104-106.
39. See BRION J. Fox, ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA,

ANALYSIS OF THE

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATES

TOBACCO

LITIGATION (1997) [hereinafter I.H.P.S. REPORT].
40. id. at 29.
41. Id. at 30. Under the current federal system information about tobacco ingredients
submitted by cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services is not subject to any form of public disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (1984); 15
U.S.C. § 4403 (1994). See also supra Part I.A.
42. See Fox, et al., supra note 39.
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Indeed, another comprehensive analysis of national tobacco policy
released shortly after the terms of the June 20, 1997 Proposed Settlement
were announced, explicitly called for including cigars, as well as other
forms of tobacco, in the FDA's regulatory framework." The KoopKessler Report strongly opposed federal preemption of state and local
authority to regulate public health, preferring instead that states have
ample room to develop and enforce their own ingredients and smoke
constituent reporting and disclosure laws.'
The American Medical Association ("AMA") also called for including cigars in the federal regulation of tobacco products in its analysis
of the Proposed Settlement." "All tobacco products should be subject to a
single, comprehensive, regulatory scheme."' Moreover, the AMA Report
commented on the recent rise in cigar smoking, particularly among
youth, and suggested that settlement-induced price increases for cigarettes could have the undesired effect of accelerating the cigar trend.47
Cigars were not expressly excluded from the terms of the June 20,
1997 Proposed Settlement. However, it is highly unlikely that the drafters intended the settlement to cover them. Notably the proposal called for
legislation that "would supersede the current often-criticized federal ingredient law and confirm FDA's authority to evaluate all additives in
tobacco products." 8 But the ingredients disclosure provisions of the Proposed Settlement did not define the term "tobacco products" or mention
cigars."

Finally, nothing in the Preamble to the Proposed Settlement suggests that the drafters considered cigars. Indeed, references to the pending lawsuits against manufacturers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco

43.

See C. EVERETT KooP & DAVID A. KESSLER, ADVISORY COMM. ON TOBACCO POL. AND

PUB. HEALTH, FINAL REPORT (1997)

[hereinafter Koop-Kessler Report].

44.

See id. at 16.

45.

See TASK FORCE ON THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, AMERICAN

MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ANALYSIS, REPORT, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1997).

46. Id. at 5.
47. See id. Notably, a Senate bill purporting to implement the terms of the June 20, 1997
Proposed Settlement (which was ultimately rejected by the Senate) also apparently recognized the
possibility that underage smokers might switch to cigars and pipes if deterred by new restrictions on
cigarettes. Senate Bill 1415 provided: "The Secretary shall notify the Congress if the Secretary
determines that underage use of pipe tobacco and cigars is increasing." S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 7
(1998). See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
48. Proposed Resolution, supra note 35, at Title I (F). Moreover, as discussed herein, the
"often-criticized federal ingredient law" referred to is limited to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 4403 (1994).
49. However, the section of the Proposed Settlement pertaining to regulation of tobacco
product development and manufacturing expressly adopted the FDA rule's definition of "tobacco
products" and also would have covered "Roll Your Own. Little Cigars, Fine Cut, etc." Proposed
Resolution, supra note 35, at Title I(E). Compare the various definitions of "tobacco products"
contained in proposed federal legislation intended to implement the June 20, 1997 Settlement. See
infra discussion accompanying notes 56-69.
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and the 1996 FDA Rule,"0 which did not cover cigars," strongly suggest
that cigars were not intended to be included in the terms of the Proposal. 2
The FDA's 1996 jurisdictional statement noted:
The proposed rule would not apply to pipe tobacco or to cigars because the agency does not currently have sufficient evidence that
these products are drug delivery devices under the act. FDA has focused its investigation of its authority over tobacco products on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products, and not on pipe tobacco or cigars, because young people predominantly use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.53
Furthermore, in testimony before Congress regarding the 1997 proposed national tobacco settlement, Norman Sharp, President of the Cigar
Association of America, relied on the absence of FDA jurisdiction over
cigars to buttress his argument that cigars should not be subject to the
provisions of comprehensive tobacco legislation.' Mr. Sharp characterized the FDA position as follows:
The FDA specifically chose not to regulate cigar and pipe tobacco
products, most importantly, because it found no credible evidence
that children and adolescents use these products to any significant degree. It also cited no evidence of nicotine manipulation and indeed
concluded cigars and pipe tobacco were not nicotine delivery
devices.55
2. Legislation Proposed to Implement the June 20, 1997 Deal
Federal legislation filed to implement the terms of Proposed Settlement varied considerably, inter alia, with regard to the treatment of ci50. On August 28, 1996, the FDA published a final rule titled "Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents," 61
Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801). However, based on an industry appeal,
the rule was struck down by a three-panel judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which decided that the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir. 1998). The United States Supreme
Court recently upheld the Fourth Circuit ruling in a 5-4 decision. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
51. See 21 C.F.R. 897.1 (1998). With regard to nicotine levels in cigars, a subject beyond the
scope of this Article, a petition has been filed with FDA seeking regulation of nicotine in cigars.
ASH Petitions FDA to Also Regulate Nicotine in Cigars, II MEALEY'S LIT1G. REP.: TOBACCO 24
(1997).
52. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 32, at 4. The recently invalidated FDA Rule, which is
listed as the "source/precedent" for the proposal's advertising and marketing restrictions did not
cover cigars. See id. at title I(A). See also 60 Fed. Reg. 41,313, 41,322 (1995) [hereinafter FDA's
Jurisdictional Statement].
53. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,322 (1995).
54. See Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcomm. of the House
Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Norman F. Sharp, on behalf of the Cigar Ass'n
of America, Inc. and the Pipe Tobacco Council, Inc.).
55. Id. Notably, since the FDA Rule was promulgated, new data documenting alarming rates
of youth cigar use has emerged. See supra note 53. Moreover, any lack of evidence to support
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gars. For example, one of the first bills filed, Senate Bill 1530, clearly
did not intend to cover cigars in any way. 6 The bill contained no definition of or reference to any type of cigar. Furthermore, key terms such as
"tobacco product" and "manufacturer" included only cigarettes, cigarette
tobacco and smokeless tobacco. 7

Similarly, Senate Bill 1415, the McCain Committee Bill, evinced no
legislative intent to cover most types of cigars. " However, the bill did
include little cigars" in its definition of "tobacco products," thereby extending some of its regulatory provisions to this discrete class of cigars.'
For example, Senate Bill 1415 would have apparently banned vending
machine sales of little cigars, along with cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
Notably, however, S. 1415's definition of the key term "tobacco
product manufacturer" was limited to manufacturers of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco.' Thus the bill would have excluded even little cigars
from many of its provisions, including its expanded ingredients reporting
requirements.

jurisdiction over cigars as a drug delivery device could arguably be attributed, at least in part, to their
exemption from ingredients reporting and disclosure laws, as well as the alleged dearth of proven
testing protocols. A recent report of the Inspector General on youth use of cigars called for
additional research to determine "whether the FDA should initiate the investigatory process for
asserting jurisdiction over cigars comparable to that exercised by the FDA over cigarettes and/or
have Congress expressly affirm FDA's authority to regulate cigars." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., YOUTH USE OF CIGARS: FEDERAL, STATE REG. AND
ENFORCEMENT 17-18 (1999).

56. See Placing Restraints on Tobacco's Endangerment of Children and Teens Act, or the
"PROTECT Act," S. 1530. 105th Cong. (1997). Notably. the bill's ingredients reporting and
disclosure provisions, which were limited to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, would have
potentially preempted state regulations and enforcement in this area. Id. §§ 900, 902, 904, 910. See
also PETER D. ENRICH & PATRICIA A. DAVIDSON, IMPACT OF S. 1530 ON STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, (Tobacco Control Resource Ctr. Working Paper No.

7, 1998) (discussing the potentially preemptive effects of Senate Bill 1530).
57. See S.1530. 105thCong.§5(1997).
58. See generallv S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997) (addressing only "little cigars" as the type
of cigars relevant under this bill).
59. "Little cigars" were defined by S. 1415 in accordance with the "Little Cigar Act of 1973"
(Pub. L. 93-109 § 3) which amended the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
("FCLAA") to include little cigars in its ban on electronic advertising. S.1415, 105th Cong. § 6(9)
(1997). See also FCLAA. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
60. National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act, S.1415, 105th Cong. (1998)
(Manager's Amendment of May 18, 1998). Senate Bill 1415 was the only piece of legislation
purporting to implement the 1997 Proposed Settlement that was debated and voted on by Congress.
It was defeated in the Senate on a procedural vote, after the tobacco industry disavowed the bill and
spent millions of dollars campaigning against it. on June 17, 1998. See generally Graham Kelder,
Fight the Future-Or Everything You Always Wanted To Know About How The Tobacco Industry
(a.k.a. The Cigarette Smoking Men) Killed the McCain Bill But Were Afraid To Ask, 2 TOBACCO
CONTROL UPDATE 5 (1998) (detailing the argument that the tobacco industry was responsible for the
defeat of the McCain Bill).
61.
See S. 1415. 105thCong.§6(1997).

62.

See id. § 904.
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By contrast, another Senate bill purporting to implement the June
20, 1997 deal, Senate Bill 1638, included cigars in its definition of "tobacco products""' and would have established some significant federal
regulatory authority over cigars. For example, immediately following
sections establishing FDA authority to issue new, detailed warning label
requirements for cigarettes ' and smokeless tobacco,6" the bill provided
that "[tihe Secretary may prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to establish warning labels for other tobacco product packaging, labeling
and advertising.' ' The FDA title of the bill also explicitly defined tobacco products to include cigars. 7 Hence, under Senate Bill 1638, cigars
could have been be subjected to packaging, labeling, and advertising
regulations.
Similarly, FDA authority to establish performance standards which
could, inter alia, include the reduction or elimination of nicotine, "other
constituents" or "harmful components" also would have applied to all
tobacco products, including cigars, under Senate Bill 1638.68 Notably, the
bill's new detailed requirements for reporting and disclosure of tobacco
and non-tobacco ingredients would have applied to cigars by virtue of
the expansive definition of tobacco products. Moreover, Senate Bill 1638
would have apparently preserved state and local authority in a number of
areas regulated by the FDA, including ingredients reporting and disclo61
sure provisions.
3. Other Recent Federal Cigar Legislation
In addition to prompting the introduction of a series of complex,
multi-issue bills purporting to implement the terms of the June 20, 1997
Proposed Settlement, the spotlight on the Attorneys General litigation
may have inspired the introduction of other tobacco legislation in the
mid-to-late nineties. A number of these more narrowly focused bills included cigars in their definitions of tobacco products. While only one of
the bills contained ingredients reporting and disclosure requirements (and
new warning labels for packages as well as advertising)," the strategy of
sweeping cigars under federal law through a shift in definitions is in63. S. 1638, 105th Cong. § 4(20) (1997). Cigarillos. little cigars, and pipe tobacco were also
defined as "tobacco products." Id. Unlike the other bills discussed above, Senate Bill 1638 did not
separately define "tobacco product manufacturers." Id.
64. See id. § 575(a).
65. See id. § 575(b).
66. Id. § 575(c).
67. See id. § 203(a)(3).
68. Id. § 573(a). Moreover, the performance standard provisions also explicitly authorized the
Secretary to "require that a manufacturer test, report and disclose tobacco and tobacco smoke
constituents, including labeling and advertising disclosures related to such constituents, including,
but not limited to, tar and nicotine." Id. § 573(b).
69. See id. § 576. warning labels on packages are the only notable exception to Senate Bill
1638's express preservation of state and local authority in this area. Id. § 575(e).
70. See H.R. 1244, 105th Cong. § 3(11) (1997). See also S. 527, 105th Cong. § 3(11) (1997).
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structive.7' For example, a highly restrictive advertising bill, which would
have virtually prohibited tobacco advertising and placed severe limits on
tobacco promotional activities, applied to cigars and little cigars as well
as cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.72 Moreover, at least one proposed
federal youth access bill, which would have prohibited tobacco vending
machines (except in adult-only facilities), defined tobacco products to
encompass cigars and little cigars. 3 However, Congress did not pass any
of these bills, including the ingredients disclosure/warning bill.
Interestingly, nearly ten years ago, Congress had before it a relatively comprehensive tobacco bill covering cigars that would have, inter
alia, expanded federal ingredients reporting and disclosure
requirements. 4 Specifically, the bill would have required tobacco manufacturers, importers, and packagers to provide the Secretary of Health
and Human Services with a complete list of:
(A) each tobacco additive used in the manufacture of each tobacco
product brand name that such person manufactures, imports, or packages; and
(B) for each such additive, the range of the quantities of such additive
used by such person in all tobacco product brand names manufactured, imported, or packaged by such person.
While neither the proposed brand nor the quantity reporting requirements appear to be as stringent as some of the recently enacted state
ingredients reporting statutes," passage of the bill might have been a step
forward. For example, under the bill the Secretary would have been
authorized to request information "regarding the impact of such additives
on health" from the manufacturer, importer, or purchaser. The Secretary
also would have been required to issue regulations setting forth "requirements for manufacturers to place information on packages of tobacco products or in package inserts ...

so that the public will be ade-

quately informed of the tobacco additives contained in any brand or variety of tobacco products . ..

.""

71. See, e.g., H.R. 3298, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 1244, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 527, 105th
Cong. (1997); H.R. 762, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2795, 101st Cong. (1990).
72. See H.R. 762, 105th Cong. (1997). Section 3 of the bill sets forth advertising and
promotion restrictions applicable to tobacco products and Sections 5(l)(a) and (b) define tobacco
products to expressly include, inter alia, cigars and little cigars. Id. §§ 3, 5(l)(A) & (B).
73. See H.R. 3298, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
74. See S. 2795, 101st Cong. (1993), which was originally numbered S. 1883 (136 Cong. Rec.
D396-02; 1990 WL 46785). See also S. REP. No. 101 -338 (1990).
75. S. 2795, 101st Cong. § 1551(a)(1) (1993) (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1997): MINN. STAT. § 461.17 (1999); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.251-255 (1991). See discussion infra Part 11.
77. S. 2795. 101st Cong. § 1551(b).
78. Id. § 1551 (c)(l). However, spices, flavorings, and colorings need only be listed as such,
without specific names. See id.
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Finally, the Secretary would have been empowered to prohibit the
use of particular additives, or require reductions in additive levels, if the
Secretary determined "that any tobacco additive in a tobacco product,
either by itself or in conjunction with any other additive, significantly
increases the risk of the product to human health ....
""
These requirements, among others, would have applied to the manufacturers, importers, and packagers of cigars and little cigars, as well as
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, snuff pipe tobacco, "and any other product
that contains tobacco and is intended for human use""' under a remarkably broad definition of tobacco products. Notably, neither the bill, nor the
accompanying Senate bill report, provide any clues about the overall
rationale for including all forms of tobacco, including cigars, in the proposed regulatory scheme. However, the President of the Cigar Association testified in opposition to the bill's inclusion of cigars." Noting that
the purpose of the bill "is 'to encourage cessation of tobacco use' among
young people and to strengthen laws limiting sales of tobacco products to
minors, ' 2 the cigar industry representative asserted "cigars are not youthoriented products."83 In a statement reminiscent of declarations made for
decades by cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers, he added,
"the cigar industry disapproves of advertising designed to encourage
cigar smoking by those under 21 years of age.""
Furthermore, the cigar industry representative specifically objected
to requiring cigar manufacturers to report quantities of constituents to the
federal government."5 The cigar spokesman based this objection on the
alleged lack of "recognized testing methodology for measuring the constituents of cigars or their smoke (as distinguished from other tobacco
products)."8 These two themes, a denial of youth cigar use and complaints about the lack of a uniform protocol for testing cigar constituents,
were echoed in the cigar industry's testimony opposing inclusion of ci-

79. Id. § 1551 (c)(2). The risk determination would have been made pursuant to regulation as
well. See Id.
80. S.2795, 101st Cong. § 1561(10) (1990).
81. See Tobacco Product Education & Health Protection Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 1883
Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990) (statement of the
Cigar Association of America). The testimony refers to S. 1883, an apparently re-numbered version
of the original bill. The bill was also re-filed in 1991 with some amendments. Amendments related
to ingredient-reporting and disclosure are discussed infra note 94.
82. Tobacco Product Education & Health Protection Act of 1990: Hearing on S.1883 Before
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990) (statement of the Cigar
Association of America).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
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gars in the FDA rule and under comprehensive tobacco settlement legislation."
The Senate Report addressed the cigar industry's concerns by acknowledging that there are differences among the various tobacco products, and that cigar and pipe tobacco manufacturers may find it more
difficult to comply with the bill.88 In fact, the Committee Report suggested that cigar and pipe tobacco manufacturers might need additional
time to satisfy the new reporting and disclosure requirements. " Nonetheless, the Report concluded that all tobacco products should be subject
to the reporting and disclosure requirements contained in the bill.'
With regard to ingredients reporting and disclosure, the Senate Report also sheds some light on the Committee's view of the competing
interests of informing the public of the health risks of tobacco product
additives and the industry's concern with protection of trade secrets.
First, the Committee acknowledged that the legislation attempted to
strike a balance. The Committee asserted "disclosure of additives to the
public and to the Secretary is required in a manner that does not disclose
specific quantities of additives to specific brands. Rather disclosure of a
range of quantities for each company is required."9 '
Moreover, the Committee Report concluded that the current additive
reporting system provides no useful information from which the Secretary of Health and Human Services can assess health risks.2 It asserted
that:
[I]t was the intent of Congress in 1984, when P.L. 98-474 was signed
into law, to provide the Secretary with useful information for which
to make the kind of judgment it requested. Clearly that objective was
not achieved by the reporting requirement that was established. The
Committee believes that it is time to follow through on the intent of
87.

See supra note 55.

88. See EDWARD KENNEDY, THE TOBACCO PRODUCT EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROTECTION
ACT: COMMITEE VIEWS, S. REP. No. 101-338, at 35 (1990).

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. Apparently the committee believed that reporting quantity ranges would protect
information that might reveal the exact formulation of a particular product, while permitting the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to gather data for an initial assessment of health risks. Id. at
34. Notably, the bill itself prohibited, inter alia,
[tihe using by any person to the advantage of such person, or revealing, other than to the
Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the courts when relevant in
any judicial proceeding under this title, any information acquired under authority of this
title concerning any method or process that as a trade secret is entitled to protection. This
paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit disclosure of information to Congress.
S. 2795, 101st Cong. § 2741(a)(5) (1991). However, this prohibition is significantly less protective
than the current law governing reporting and disclosure of additive lists for cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 992-3025 (1999) (showing R.J. Reynolds' willingness to enter into an agreement containing a consent order by the Federal Trade Commission).
See also supra note 2.
92. See S. REP. No. 101-338, at 34-35 (1990). The lack of information about quantity, brand,
and company were specifically cited as problematic. Id. at 34.
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Congress as indicated by the passage of the earlier legislation. The
reporting requirement contained in this bill should result in useful information so that judgments about the risk of individual additives or
combinations of additives will be technically feasible.9'

Neither this bill, nor an amended version filed the following year,'
were enacted however. Even if the legislation had been adopted, it is not
clear that the reportable information-ranges of additive quantitieswould have been sufficient to permit the Secretary to conduct health assessments, or to exercise his authority to prohibit the use (or to reduce
quantities) of additives.
Quite recently, and apparently in response to the dramatic new
health warning label and tougher tobacco ingredients and smoke constituent reporting laws being considered in Canada " Senator Lautenberg
and others filed federal legislation to replace and strengthen existing U.S.
warning and reporting laws. The bill, S.2125, would cover cigars and
pipe tobacco, along with cigarettes and smokeless tobacco."
While the warning requirements are stronger than the current U.S.
provisions, they are not nearly as bold as the Canadian plan.97 Furthermore, it is not clear that S.2125's reporting provisions would yield new
health information9" or whether such information would be disclosed to
the public.99 Notably, the bill, which repeals FCLAA and CSTHEA one
year after enactment, does not expressly preempt state and local laws or
address preemption of liability claims.'"

93. Id.at 35.
94. The second bill, S. 1088, amended, inter alia, the additive reporting requirements to
include "the levels of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide for each brand." S. 1088, 102d Cong. §
2751(a)(1)(A) (1991). Thus, it would have added smoke constituent reporting to the federal statute.
The public disclosure provisions were also amended to add information about tar, nicotine, and
carbon monoxide to the mandatory packaging regulations. Id. § 2751 (c)( I).
95. S.2125, "Smoker's Right to Know and Truth in Tobacco Labeling Act," 106th Cong., 2d
Sess. (200); see also "Lautenberg & Lugar Propose Bipartisan Tobacco Labeling Bill," Government
Press Releases by Federal Document Clearing House, Jan. 19, 2000.
96. See id.
97. See 134 (14) C. Gaz. 961-988 (2000).
98. See S. 2125, sec. 6(a) which states in part, "Each person that manufactures, packages, or
imports into the United States any tobacco product shall annually report in a form and at a time
specified by the Secretary by regulation--(]) the identity of an added ingredient or constituent of
the product other than tobacco, water, or reconstructed tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco; and
(2) the nicotine, tar, and carbon monoxide intake from such product for average consumers based on
standards established by the Secretary by regulation; if such information is not information which the
Secretary determines to be trade secret or confidential information subject to Section 552(b)(4) of
title 5,United States Code, and Section 1905 of title 18, United States Code .... (emphasis added).
99. See S. 2125, sec. 6(b)."The Secretary shall review the information contained in each report
submitted under subsection (a) and if the Secretary determines that such information directly affects
the public health, the Secretary shall require that such information be included in a label under
Sections 3 and 4."
100. See id.sec. 9.
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Hiding tobacco-ingredient information and other data concerning
the health risks of its products is a longstanding tobacco industry practice. Such allegations of industry fraud were at the heart of the recently
settled Attorney Generals Medicaid reimbursement cases." It is possible,
if more of those cases had 2gone to trial, that secret tobacco ingredients
might have been disclosed.'
II. STATE LAWS

At the present juncture, it appears that a couple of states are likely to
obtain more information about tobacco additives and smoke constituents-including cigars-under their own laws than Congress will demand. As discussed below, to date the states of Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Texas have taken action to fill the void, with varying, and at
this stage, uncertain results.' 3 Particularly in the absence of federal action, the outcome of industry challenges to these state laws is critical to
the development of momentum for accessing tobacco product ingredients
and smoke emissions data in the United States. Even a trickle of information about a limited set of ingredients or emissions from one jurisdiction could open the door for more aggressive regulation requiring disclosure of health-related information. In turn, such a development could
lead to increased product regulation and public education campaigns in a
number of jurisdictions.
A. The Massachusetts IngredientsReporting and Disclosure Law

Massachusetts was the first state to adopt its own tobacco ingredient
reporting-and-disclosure law."' With the notable exceptions of limiting

101. See, e.g., Edward Correia & Patricia Davidson, The State Attorney Generals' Tobacco
Suits: Equitable Remedies, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 853 (1998).
102. See 12.3 Tobacco Products Liability Reporter 3.278 (1997) (discussing Massachusetts v.
Philip Morris Inc., No. 95-7378. (Mass. Super. 1998) and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Humphrey
(D. Minn. 1997)) [hereinafter TPLR].
103. In Massachusetts, the industry has pursued an aggressive, and to date, relatively
successful, litigation strategy to block enforcement of the state ingredients law. See infra notes 110112 and accompanying text; See also Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir.
1998). In Minnesota and Texas the tobacco industry, including cigar manufacturers, has besieged the
state public health agencies (charged with implementing the laws) with critical comments and
proposed amendments to reporting forms and (in Texas) regulations. While a lawsuit by the tobacco
industry, facially challenging the Minnesota statute, was dismissed shortly before the state's
successful Medicaid suit went to trial, the industry has not been fully cooperative about providing
the information specifically called for by the reporting forms issued pursuant to the statute. See infra
discussion accompanying notes 146-58. The state of Utah recently enacted an unusual law requiring
its health department to "obtain annually publicly available information regarding cigarettes and
tobacco products from other states and sources" regarding the list of substances reportable under the
Minnesota statute (in burned and unburned states) and nicotine yield ratings. UTAH CODE § 26-43102 (1999).
104. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 94, § 307B (1996). The state of New Hampshire passed a
similar law in 1998, requiring the New Hampshire department of health to "obtain annually from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Health, or other sources if they become
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its scope to unburned ingredients' 5 and particular classes of tobacco
products (cigarettes and smokeless tobacco)," the Commonwealth
adopted an extensive reporting and disclosure system. Specifically, the
Massachusetts statute requires cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers to report "[t]he identity of any added constituent other than
tobacco, water or reconstituted tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco,
to be listed in descending order according to weight, measure or numerical count" for each brand sold in the state to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.'7 This brand specific reporting of specific quantities of non-tobacco ingredients is a significant departure from existing
federal law.' 8
Moreover, the reported ingredients and nicotine-yield information is
subject to public disclosure. Specifically, if the state public health department determines that there is "a reasonable scientific basis for concluding that the availability of such information could reduce risks to
public health," and the state attorney general advises that such a disclosure would not constitute a taking, the reported information is a public
record. "
However, the tobacco industry has succeeded in thwarting implementation of the Massachusetts ingredient reporting-and-disclosure pro-

available, a public report containing the list of additives for each brand of tobacco products sold."
N.H. REV. STAT. § 78:12-e (1998).
105. See infra discussion accompanying notes 113-119 on cigarette smoke constituent reporting
regulations proposed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.
106. However, in 1998, more than a year after the Massachusetts Cigarette and Smokeless
Tobacco Ingredient Statute was enacted, cigar ingredients/warning regulations were proposed by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (proposed Amendments: 105 CMR 650.000). The state
Department of Public Health regulations would have imposed a limited testing and reporting
obligation oin certain cigar manufacturers as part of a warning label system. Specifically, cigar
manufacturers with more than 2% of the national market would be required to test for and report
nicotine, carbon monoxide, and tar level yields under a specified testing protocol. See 105 CMR
650.106. The reported information would be featured on a new cigar warning label comparing cigar
yields for these substances to cigarette yields. See id. However, this proposal was apparently
dropped in favor of a set of cigar regulations, recently promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney
General's Office. See 940 CMR 22. The new state regulations feature warning label requirements for
cigar packages and advertisements, some youth-access retail restrictions, and outdoor advertising
limits. See id. However, they do not include any cigar testing or ingredient reporting requirements.
See id. Similar companion regulations pertaining to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco were
simultaneously adopted. See 940 CMR 21. The regulations, which were to take effect August 1,
1999, were promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General's authority to define and halt unfair or
deceptive marketing practices. The regulations were challenged by a number of cigarette, smokeless,
and cigar manufacturers, along with a cigar retailer. The consolidated cases are currently before the
1st Circuit Court of Appeals. Consolidated Cigar Corp., et al. v. Thomas Reily, No. 00-1107, U.S.
Court of Appeals (1st Cir.); Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, No. 00-1117, U.S. Court of Appeals
(lst Cir.); U.S. Tobacco Co. v. Thomas Reilly, No. 00-1118, U.S. Court of Appeals (lst Cir.).
107. See MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 94, § 307B (1996).
108. See supra Part I(B) for a discussion of the FCLAA and CSTHE ingredients reporting
requirements.
109. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996).
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visions of the statute, claiming that enforcement would destroy trade
secrets in violation of the U.S. Constitution.'"' On appeal, the court refused to vacate or modify the preliminary injunction, agreeing that the
plaintiff tobacco companies were likely to succeed on the merits of their
takings claim, and that they faced irreparable harm if the statute became
operational before their challenge was fully heard.'' Shortly before this
article went to press the federal district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement
of the ingredients provisions of the Massa2
chusetts statute.1
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts statute, and the state's ability
to defend it in court when faced with a trade secrets challenge, might
have been improved by including smoke-emission testing, reporting, and
disclosure provisions. The Massachusetts Department of Public Health
("D.P.H.") has proposed such regulations, independent of the ingredients
statute.'" Specifically, the regulations would require testing and reporting
' 4 Both mainstream
of numerous, specified cigarette smoke constituents.
'5
and side stream smoke would be covered.

110. See Philip Morris. Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998). The First Circuit
refused to vacate or modify the preliminary injunction granted by the lower court, based on the
industry's argument that the statute's ingredient reporting and disclosure provisions violate
constitutional prohibitions on government takings without compensation under the Takings Clause.
Id. at 680. The nicotine yield reporting requirements of the statute, however, were not challenged
and therefore are in effect. Id. at 673 n.3. Earlier the First Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling
rejecting the industry's federal preemption challenge to the Massachusetts statute. Philip Morris Inc.
v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 87 (1st Cir. 1997).
Ill. See Harshbarger, 159F.3dat673.
112. See Philip Morris. Inc. v. Reilly, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12947 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2000).
113. See 105 CMR 665.000 ("Testing and Reporting of Constituents of Cigarette Smoke"). At
the industry's initiative, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health ("DPH") negotiated with
cigarette manufacturers in an effort to commence a voluntary smoke constituent testing and
reporting program, which would (at least initially) encompass only a limited number of cigarette
brands. Telephone interview with Howard Saxner, Gen. Counsel, Mass. DPH (Mar. 18, 1999). As of
March 22. 1999. the DPH agreed to defer further action on the proposed regulations until the
cigarette manufacturers complete a six to eight month benchmarking study of a sample of cigarette
brands. The industry study will examine smoke constituent levels for selected brands and the
functional relationship between smoke constituent and tar levels. Reportedly, 25 cigarette brand
styles will be studied for mainstream smoke yields, and 12 brand styles will be studied for sidestream smoke yields. The new Massachusetts smoke-yield testing parameters (45 ml. puff of two
seconds duration every 30 seconds) will be used, and raw data will be shared with the DPH when the
industry study is completed.
Cigarette manufacturers proposed to conduct the benchmark study to create a mechanism
for predicting smoke-constituent yields of brands sold in Massachusetts, without having to
individually measure smoke yields of each brand on the market. Reportedly, the companies objected
to the regulatory plan to annually test each individual brand claiming, inter alia, that the testing plan
was unwieldy because of the number of brands involved. They also cited anticipated methodological
differences between the various company laboratories as an obstacle to testing. Telephone interview
with Howard Saxner, Gen. Counsel, Mass. DPH (June 18, 1999).
114. See l05 DMR 664.000.
115. See id. at 665.003,665.200, 665.201.
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Under the Massachusetts proposed regulations, the specified smoke
constituents ' 6 must be reported "on the basis of the average yield per
cigarette for each brand, sub-brand and non-branded generic product."" 7
Moreover, the regulations contain a fairly broad disclosure provision,
apparently permitting the Massachusetts D.P.H. to release or distribute a
smoke constituent report (or information contained in such a report) "[i]f
the Department determines it is in the public interest to do so. ... ""'
Ironically, shortly before the recent settlement of the Massachusetts
Medicaid reimbursement case a Massachusetts judge hearing pre-trial
arguments ordered the defendant tobacco companies to disclose ingredients to counsel and experts for the Commonwealth."9 The settlement
apparently foreclosed another opportunity for disclosure of tobacco ingredients.
B. The Texas Tobacco ProductIngredientReporting and Disclosure Law

The Texas and Minnesota laws, which both cover cigars by virtue of
their definitions of tobacco products, may fare better than the Massachusetts statute.' 21 On its face, the Texas statute's reporting requirements are
quite similar to the Massachusetts law. The Texas statute requires each
cigarette and tobacco product manufacturer'2 ' to file an annual report with

116. See id. at 665.200. 665.201. Constituents of mainstream smoke to be tested include
ammonia, aromatic amines, benzoapyrene, volatile carbonyls, hydrogen cyanide, mercury, toxic
trace metals, nitric oxide, tobacco specific nitrosamines, selected basic semi-volatiles, phenolic
compounds, tar, and carbon monoxide. See id. at 665.200. Side-stream smoke constituents to be
tested under the regulations include ammonia, aromatic amines, benzoapyrene, selected volatile
carbonyls, hydrogen cyanide, mercury, toxic trace metals, nitric oxide, tobacco specific
nitrosamines, selected basic semi-volatiles, phenolic compounds, tar, selected volatiles, and carbon
monoxide. See Id. at 665.201.
117. Id. at 665. 100(B).
118. Id. at 665.102.
119. See Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-07378, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 438
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1998). Reportedly, Superior Court Justice Martha B. Sosman "rejected
defense attempts to keep the lists away from the commonwealth's Department of Health, which is
appealing a federal court injunction preventing enforcement of a recently enacted disclosure law."
Mass. Lawyers Can Get Cigarette Ingredients If Case Goes Ahead, 12 No. 14 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REPORT: TOBAcco 6 (1998) (citation omitted).
120. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.3 (1999), amended by 24 Tex. Reg. 3509, 3511 (May 7,
1999); MINN. STAT. § 461.17 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 609.685 (1987 & 1999) (defining tobacco to
include cigars); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996 & 1999). The Texas law has been
challenged and reshaped at the agency level though tobacco industry comments objecting to
reporting forms and the proposed regulations. As a result, implementation of the laws has been
repeatedly delayed. In Texas the effective date for reporting has now been pushed back to December
1999. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.3 (1999), amended by 24 Tex. Reg. 3509, 3511 (May 7,
1999). The prior amendment called for reporting to commence "on or before March 1, 1999." 25
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.3.

121. The statute provides that the term "'tobacco product"' has the meaning assigned by TEX.
TAX CODE § 155.001 (1998) which in turn defines "tobacco product" to include cigars. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.251 (1999); TEX. TAX CODE §§ 155.001(9), 155.001(14)(A) (1999).

1999]

TOBACCO INGREDIENTS

the department of health for the cigarette and tobacco products it distributes in the state, stating:
(1)the identity of each ingredient 22 in the cigarette or tobacco product, listed in descending order according to weight, measure or numerical count, 2 other than:
(A) tobacco;
(B) water; or
(C) a reconstituted tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco;
and
(2) a nicotine yield rating for the cigarette or tobacco product established under 161.253.f

The language of the Texas statute appears to subject cigarettes and
all tobacco products, including cigars, to identical requirements. However, the implementing regulations exempt cigars from the nicotine yield
reporting requirements and create a separate
section delineating the in25
gredients reporting standards for cigars.'
The Texas regulations also set forth detailed disclosure criteria and
elaborate procedures for making and challenging disclosure decisions.

122.

The Texas statute "does not require a manufacturer to disclose the specific amount of any

ingredient in a cigarette or tobacco product if that ingredient has been approved as safe when burned
and inhaled by the United States Food and Drug Administration or a successor entity." TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 161.252(b) (1999).

123. The reporting forms require tobacco manufacturers to submit this information by chemical
name and number, for each brand and sub-brand. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.4(l) (1998).
124. Under this Section the state health department must adopt standards for nicotine yield
rating which must reflect "as accurately as possible. nicotine intake for an average consumer of the
cigarette or tobacco product." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.253 (1999). In October 1999 the
Texas Health Department repealed its proposed rule for nicotine reporting and substituted standards
modeled on the Massachusetts nicotine yield reporting system. See 24 Tex. Reg. 8705 (1999); 105
CMR 660.004. The industry petitioned for this change, arguing that following the Massachusetts
model would save the industry "more than $1500 annually for each brand style exempted from the
new rule. 24 Tex. Reg. 8706 (1999). The new Texas rule is more flexible than the original, with
testing and reporting requirements varying based on brand market shares. Reportedly, the Texas
Department of Health agreed to alter the rule in exchange for the industry's withdrawal of its petition
to modify the regulatory definition of the term "ingredient." Telephone Interview with Dr. Phillip
Huang, Texas Department of Health (November 1, 1999).
125. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.3(a) (1999) (exempting cigars from nicotine yield
reporting); § 101.4 (delineating reporting requirements for cigars). Although neither the published
comments nor the agency response to those comments explains the rationale for excluding cigars
from the nicotine reporting requirements, it is clear that the cigar industry lobbied aggressively for
special treatment and exemptions. See 23 Tex. Reg. 5687, 5688, 5691 (1998). Indeed, although the
Health Department declined to grant the cigar industry's request to exempt or reduce small
manufacturers or "small sales" from the ingredients reporting requirements at this time (citing a lack
of market share data), it explicitly expressed sympathy for the industry and invited it to suggest
changes in the rule which would allow for verification of market share in Texas. 23 Tex. Reg. 5691
(1998).
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These provisions appear to be significantly more protective of tobacco
manufacturers and "trade secret" information than the statutory language
requires. For example, the statute essentially provides that reported information is available to the public unless one of the three following exceptions applies. First, reported information is protected as confidential if
the' Texas "attorney general determines that the disclosure of particular
information would constitute a taking of property . . . .""' Second, reported information is deemed confidential "if the department determines
that there is no reasonable scientific basis. for concluding that the availability of the information could reduce risks to public health.'

27

These

two criteria are similar to the provisions of the Massachusetts statute.
The third Texas exception, however, could conceivably swallow the
disclosure rule. Under the statute, reported information "is confidential
under Chapter 552, Government Code, if the information would be excepted from public disclosure as a trade secret under state or federal
law.' ' 2' The Chapter 552 or Texas Open Record Law exception could

prove to be quite wide. First, the substantive scope of the exception is
generous." A trade secret or commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential by statute or judicial
decision is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021,,129 Second, the multi-layered procedures set forth under the Texas Open Records Law provide ample opportunity for the tobacco industry to challenge and at a minimum delay any disclosure. '

126. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.254(b) (1999).
127. Id. § 161.254(c).
128. Id. § 161.254(d).
129. TEX. Gov'T CODE § 552.110 (1994). According to open records decisions issued by the
Texas Attorney General, the state of Texas follows the Restatement of Torts definition of "trade
secret." See 1988 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. 494 (1988); 1990 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. 554 (1990). Under this
definition a six factor test is used to determine whether information qualifies as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the company's business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the company's
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of its
information; (4) the value of the information to the company and to its competitors; (5)
the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing [the] information
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
1988 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. 494 (1988) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939)).
See also 1999 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. 661 (noting that the broad Restatement definition of trade
secret "would also be the principal test applied in a determination by this office under
subsection (b) of Section 161.254 as to whether disclosure of ingredient information reported
to the department would be an 'unconstitutional taking."').
Section 552.110 of the Texas Open Record Law also excepts certain types of
"commercial or financial information" that may not qualify as a trade secret. TEX. Gov'T CODE §
552.110.
130. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.10 (1998). See TEX. GOv'T CODE § 552,306 (1992 &
Supp. 1999) (delineating procedures to be followed by the Attorney General); id. § 552.304
(regarding public comments); id. § 552.305 (allowing those whose property interests are at stake
have a special statutory right to participate in the process).
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Furthermore, the Texas regulations require the department of public
health to take a number of steps before releasing reported information. In
practice these requirements shift the burden of proving whether reported
information may be disclosed to the public health department and state
attorney general instead of requiring the industry to dispel the statutory
presumption of disclosure.
Specifically, in response to tobacco industry criticism and comments regarding confidentiality protections..'
the following new section
32
was added to the Texas regulations:'

(e) Before releasing any information, the department shall:
(I) submit the information to the attorney general with a request that
he/she make the determinations called for under subsection (b)"' and
(d)'34 of this section and Government Code sec. 552.110;
(2) submit the information to the attorney general in accordance with
procedures set out in the Government Code, Chapter 552, and the attorney general's Open Records Handbook;
(3) contemporaneous with each submission under this subsection,
notify the person who submitted the information, so they may exercise their rights under Government Code sec. 552.110; and
(4) following an opinion from the attorney general under this subsection which would allow the release of any information, the submitter
shall be immediately notified and the department shall delay release
for 30 days to allow:
(A) the department to make the determination called for in subsection
(c)"' of this section; and
(B) the submitter of the information opportunity
to obtain judicial re63
view of the attorney general's opinion.

131. See 23 Tex. Reg. 5687, 5690-5691 (1998).
132. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.10 (1998).
133. Subsection (b) provides:
The department may not disclose information ... until the department has obtained the
advice of the attorney general under this section with respect to the particular information
disclosed. If the attorney general determines that the disclosure of particular information
would constitute an unconstitutional taking of property, the information is confidential
and the department shall exclude that information from disclosure.
25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.10(b) (1998).
134. Subsection (d) provides: "Information included in a report filed under this subchapter is
confidential under Government Code, Chapter 552, if the information would be excepted from
public disclosure as a trade secret under state or federal law." Id. § 101.10(d).
135. Subsection (c) provides: "Information included in a report filed under this subchapter is
confidential if the department determines that there is no reasonable scientific basis for concluding
that the availability of the information could reduce risks to public health." Id. § 101.10(c).
136. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.10(e) (1998). Under Section 552.303 of the Texas
Government Code the government agency holding the disputed information may not disclose the
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Moreover, the industry sought and obtained an Open Records Decision from the Texas Attorney General that narrows the scope of required
tobacco ingredients disclosure.1 7 The decision clarifies a number of issues pertaining to the disclosure process and to standards for confidentiality. The clarifications primarily benefit the industry. While it acknowledges that generally the Attorney General must examine a particular report or document in order to determine whether disclosure would constitute a taking, the decision also provides a safe harbor for all ingredients information submitted under the Texas statute which would be considered confidential under the two relevant federal statutes, FCLAA and
CSTHEA.
However, because the definition of the term "ingredients" set forth
in the Texas regulations'3" differs from the definitions contained in
FCLAA and CSTHEA, (which refer to ingredients "added to" tobacco in
the manufacturing process),'" certain information not covered under the

federal laws may well be discloseable in Texas. For example, under the
Texas definition of ingredients, information about pesticide residue present in tobacco products may be disclosed.
Furthermore, because neither of the federal laws providing confidentiality protections to ingredients information applies to cigars, none of
the ingredients data reported by cigar manufacturers will be automatically deemed confidential.
C. Minnesota's Tobacco and Smoke ConstituentReporting and
DisclosureLaw

The Minnesota ingredients reporting statute, in contrast to the Massachusetts and Texas laws, covers a relatively short list of constituents in
both a burned (emissions) and unburned state. Specifically it requires:
Each manufacturer of tobacco products' 40 sold in Minnesota shall

provide the commissioner of health with an annual report. . . for each
brand of such product, [if] any of the following substances [is] pres-

information "until the attomey general makes a final determination or, if suit is filed under this
chapter, until a final determination that the information is public has been made by the court with
jurisdiction over the suit .... ," unless a protective order is obtained under Section 552.322 of the
Texas Government Code. TEX. Gov'T CODE § 552.303(a) (1999).
137. See 1999 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. 662 (1999).
138.

See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.2(7) (1999). The Texas regualtion defines "ingredient"

as "1any ingredient, substance, chemcial or compound other than tobacco, water or reconstituted
tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco, which all is present in the product including but not

limited to, flavorants, processing aides, casing sauces, contaminants, combustion modifiers, and
packing materials, to the full extent the manufacturer is aware of the presence of any such
ingredient." Id. (emphasis added).
139. See 15 U.S.C. 1335a(a); 15 U.S.C. 4403(a)(l)(A).
140. Minnesota law defines tobacco products to include cigars. See MINN. STAT. §
609.685(l)(a) (1987 & 1999).
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ent in detectable levels in the product in its unburned state and if the
product is typically burned when consumed, in its burned state:
(1) ammonia or any compound of ammonia;
(2) arsenic;
(3) cadmium;
(4) formaldehyde; and
4

'
(5) lead.1

The reporting forms issued by the Minnesota Department of Public
Health require testing and reporting of particular quantities of the five
specified substances'4 2 in mainstream smoke, side-stream smoke and in
unburned states for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, cigars and pipe (or
"roll your own") tobacco.' 41 Moreover, the disclosure provision of the
Minnesota law is quite broad and general: "Reports under this section are
public data. ' According to the statute, the Minnesota Health Commissioner is also required to share copies of tobacco industry reports with
local governments if the locality requests the report "to assist in the enforcement of local ordinances."'45
R.J. Reynolds Co. ("RJR") filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the
Minnesota statute immediately after it was enacted, claiming, inter alia,
that it was preempted by FCLAA and that it violated the takings clause
of the U.S. Constitution by forcing disclosure of trade secrets.'" In contrast to the aggressively litigated, multi-company Massachusetts lawsuit,

141.

MINN. STAT. §461.17(l)(1999).

142. These five substances are particularly harmful:
Doug Blanke, consumer policy director for the Minnesota attorney general's office, said
the five substances were included in the disclosure law partly because they are known for
"being bad for you."
They also play well-researched roles in smoking, Blanke said. Tobacco industry
documents released in the Minnesota trial revealed that ammonia may increase the "kick"
of nicotine, much the way that "freebasing" cocaine increases its potency, he said.
Leslie Brooks Suzukamo, Marketing of 'Pure' Cigarettes May Face Obstacles: State's Disclosure
Law
Could Undercut
Firms'
Promotional Strategy
(visited
Nov.
24,
1998)
<http:/lwww.pioneerplanet.com/news/mtcdocs/O 13626.htm>.
143. The reporting form sparked a variety of industry complaints, including objections to
testing requirements and the inclusion of cigars. With regard to testing, some tobacco manufacturers
apparently claim that the Commissioner has exceeded her statutory authority by mandating testing
and reporting of specific quantities of the listed substances (in their burned and unburned state).
Instead, the industry argues that under the statute it need only indicate whether the five substances
are present in a particular tobacco product. Telephone Interviews with Richard A. Wexler,
Minnesota Assistant Attorney General, Manager, Health Division, State of Minnesota, Office of the
Attorney General (December 16, 1998).
144.

MINN. STAT. § 461.17(3) (1999).

145. Id. § 461.17(2).
146. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Humphrey, 12.3 TPLR 3.278, paras. 1, 3-4, 23-24, 2930 (D. Minn. 1997).
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the Minnesota case was filed by, and ultimately dismissed,47 at the request of a single cigarette manufacturer plaintiff.'48 This single company
strategy is curious considering that the Minnesota law encompasses virtually all tobacco products, including cigars.'49

Notably, as part of the ensuing settlement of the state of Minnesota's Medicaid reimbursement suit (which was the most favorable state
settlement from a public health perspective), the defendant companies
promised not to "facially challenge the enforceability or constitutionality
of existing Minnesota laws or rules relating to tobacco control, including,
but not limited to Minnesota Statutes Section 461.17 regarding the disclosure of certain ingredients in cigarettes.""'5 However, this settlementinduced promise does not cover cigar manufacturers, who were not parties to the Medicaid suit.'"' It also may not protect the state of Minnesota
from a variety of other industry challenges to the letter and spirit of the
ingredients reporting statute, including, for example, suits claiming that it
is unenforceable or unconstitutional as applied.

147. The court granted RJR's motion to dismiss without prejudice under the condition that it
pay the state of Minnesota $10,000 in attorneys' fees if the company "commence[s] a subsequent
action in state or federal court asserting claims substantially similar to those in this action."
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, R.J. Reynolds v. Humphrey (D.Minn. 1997) (No. 97-1317). In
proceedings leading up to the dismissal the state of Minnesota sought unconditioned attorneys' fees
in excess of $40,000 and argued that RJR was required to provide specific reasons for moving to
dismiss the case under Rule 7(b)(1 ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' Response
to Plaintiff's Motion for Dismissal, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Humphrey (D.Minn. 1997) (No.
97-1317).
Although the court did not apparently order RJR to specify its reason for seeking
dismissal, the company filed a responsive pleading objecting to an award of attorneys' fees and
asserting that itwished to suspend its lawsuit against the Minnesota ingredients law "due to two
significant developments which occurred after the complaint was filed." Id. (emphasis supplied).
First, RJR cited the state announced delay in requiring tobacco companies to file ingredients reports
until at least the spring of 1998. See id. Second, the company acknowledged that potential
congressional action on the June 20, 1997 Proposed Settlement, which authorized the FDA to
expand ingredients reporting, militated in favor of delaying the lawsuit. See id. "The possibility that
Congress may act in an area addressed by the State law challenged in this case, before the reports
required by the State law would have been filed, argues in favor of suspending the instant litigation
at this time." Id.
148. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Dismissal, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Humphrey (D.Minn. 1997) (No. 97-1317). The state of Minnesota raised this point in seeking
attorneys' fees as a condition of dismissal, noting that RJR could easily avoid paying fees
conditioned on a future lawsuit challenging the statute "by having one of the other tobacco
companies be named the plaintiff." Id.
149. See supra note 140.
150. Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CI-94-8565, Settlement Agreement and Stipulation
for Entry of Consent Judgment, Section IV.A.2, p. 15 (2d Dist. Ct. Minn. County, May 8, 1998).
Arguably the industry did not promise to forgo other types of challenges to the ingredients disclosure
law, including, for example claims that the law is unconstitutional or should not be enforced as
applied to the industry. As part of the settlement the industry also made other limited promises not to
challenge certain types of tobacco control laws, including at least one pertaining to cigars.
151. See PhilipMorris, CI-94-8565, Settlement Agreement, at Section I.C.4.
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As part of the Medicaid reimbursement settlement the tobacco industry also made other limited promises not to oppose passage of certain
types of laws in Minnesota, "intended by their terms to reduce tobacco
use by children"'' 2 including, for example, "[liegislation to expand the
self-service-sale restrictions of the youth access to tobacco law and to
remove the current exception for sales of cigars."'' 3 Notably the industry
carved out a wide exception that may swallow the rule." The foregoing
does not prohibit Settling Defendants from resisting enforcement of, or
suing for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to any such legislation or rule on any grounds."'" Analogous qualifying language may severely limit the value of similar promises the industry made to the remaining states pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement.'"
At this writing the Minnesota ingredients reporting and disclosure
law has yielded some limited data. As of March 9, 1999 the State Department of Public Health had received thirty reporting forms from tobacco manufacturers, including cigar manufacturers.'56 According to a
department spokesperson the returned forms vary considerably in their
degree of completion. As anticipated, many of the larger cigarette manufacturers responded with only a "yes" or "no" to questions on the form
about the five specified ingredients, indicating only whether or not the
substance is present in a tobacco product.' 7 These companies did not
report any information about quantities of the specified substances. They

152. Id. at Section IV.A.2.
153. Id. at Schedule B. State and local laws limiting the use of vending machines dispensing
tobacco products have been deployed nationwide in an effort to block youth access. PETER D.
JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS: IMPLEMENTATION AND
ENFORCEMENT 15 (1997). The recent rise in cigar smoking among youth, along with the
glamorization of cigars in a variety of media has been well documented. Most recently reports of
increased production and placement of cigar vending machines have emerged. PRNewswire,
International Industries to Double Number of Company-Owned Cigar Vending Machines (visited
Sept. 3, 1998) <http:/lwww. SureTrade.com>. Reportedly the cigar vending machines will dispense
the lower-priced mass marketed cigars ($2.00), more likely to be purchased by youth, as well as
expensive premium cigars ($35). Id.
154. Philip Morris, Inc., Cl-94-8565, Settlement Agreement at Section IV.A.I.
(listing eight categories of state and
155. See Master Settlement Agreement at Section II.F.
local legislation the industry pledged not to oppose, including bills or rules encompassing cigars in
the definition of tobacco products). Id. at Section 111(m) (attaching qualifying language and four
express exceptions to the no lobbying pledge). Furthermore, cigar manufacturers are not parties to
either settlement and therefore are not subject to their terms. The Master Settlement Agreement can
be viewed in its entirety on the Internet. Master Settlement Agreement (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.naag.org/settle.htm>.
156. Telephone Interview with Janet Olstad, Office of the Commissioner, Minnesota
Department of Health (March 9, 1999). The state of Minnesota distributed reporting forms to 636
tobacco manufacturers but it is not clear how many of the manufacturers on the list actually sell
tobacco products in Minnesota and therefore are subject to the state law. In an effort to improve its
list and manufacturer accountability the state is sending out a second series of letters asking the 636
manufacturers to clarify whether they sell tobacco products in Minnesota or not. Id.
157. See e.g., Brown & Williamson Corporation, Minnesota Tobacco Substance Report:
Cigarettes, February 1999 (visited March 24, 2000) <http://www.health.state.mn.us>.
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also failed to provide any information about the quantities or properties
of the five poisons when burned.
Moreover, some tobacco manufacturers added gratuitous language
indicating that the ingredients are present in food, air, water, etc.' 8 A
complete set of returned forms have been posted on the Minnesota Department of Public Health's web site: http://www.health.state.mn.us.
III.

CANADIAN INGREDIENTS AND SMOKE CONSTITUENTS REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE

The government of Canada has adopted a significantly more expansive set of tobacco constituent and smoke emissions reporting regulations
than has been contemplated to date in the United States, or anywhere else
in the world.'59 On June 10, 1998, Health Canada issued an Information
158. For example, reports for a number of cigar brands, including inter alia, Dunhill and
Montecruz, simply state:
The five substances (amonia or any compound of amonia, arsenic, cadmium,
formaldehyde and lead) named in Minnesota Statutes (sic) § 461.17,
Subdivision I, are prevalent in nature, and scientific literature is replete with
studies indicating the presence of these substances in air, food, water and,
indeed, in many everyday consumer products, including tobacco products.
Therefore, trace amounts ... may be present in either the unburned state or
the burned state, or both, of the subject brand, but tests have not been conducted to make that determination.
Minnesota Tobacco Substance Reporting Form, Cigars, Brand: Dunhill; Sub-Brand:
European-Slim Panatellas (visited March 24, 2000) <www.health.state.mn.us>.
159. The nationwide Canadian regulations were proposed shortly before the Province of British
Columbia adopted a stringent Tobacco Testing and Disclosure Regulation. <http://www.cctc.ca/bcreports> (visited September 15, 1999). The British Columbia regulations "require
tobacco companies to both reveal the additives and ingredients in each brand of cigarettes, and to
provide a detailed chemical analysis of the smoke of each brand of cigarettes." Id. Recently the
British Columbia Ministry of Health released brand (but not quantity) specific information reported
by tobacco companies to the public through its homepage web site, announcing:
[t]his marks the first time brand-specific information on the additives and ingredients of
cigarettes sold in a jurisdiction has been released publicly by a government. It is also the
first time such detailed information on the toxicity of cigarette smoke has been released
by a government to the public anywhere in the world.
Id. While some manufacturers, including Imperial Tobacco and Benson & Hedges have agreed to
comply with regulations, RJR Macdonald filed suit against the government of British Columbia in
October
1998
challenging
the
constitutionality
of
the
regulations.
<http://www.newswire.ca/releases/October 1998/30> (visited Dec. 29, 1998). One news report
indicated that the company claimed that smoke constituent information is protected as a trade
secret."The RJR-Macdonald writ claimed the province exceeded constitutional authority by
requiring tobacco companies to reveal trade secrets, such as the chemical ingredients in cigarette
smoke." Id. "Canada: RJR-Macdonald Sues British Columbia Government, Tobacco Reporter 1998."
Id. However, the writ itself distinguishes between additives and ingredients reporting and smoke
constituent reporting. RJR-Macdonald, Inc. v. Attorney General of British Columbia, Writ of
Summons and Statement of Claim, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Oct. 1998. A trade secret
claim is asserted with regard to reporting of additives and ingredients information, but is not raised
with regard to smoke constituent reporting. Id. at 8. Rather, objections to the smoke constituent
regulations are primarily based on an argument that such mandatory, and costly, analysis and testing
by a single province is "ultra vires" as a barrier to inter-provincial trade. Id. at 15. Notably, RJRMacdonald alleged, inter alia:
[miaking public information about the presence of such constituents and the yield ratings
thereof in cigarette smoke is misleading without making public the presence of the same
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Letter outlining proposed tobacco reporting regulations and soliciting
comments (hereinafter I.L. No. 819).'" Specifically, Health Canada proposed to expand reporting requirements to collect information about an
extensive list of ingredients and emissions for many classes of tobacco
products. 6'
Reporting requirements for ingredients and emissions under the
proposed regulations would cover "over 50 chemical compounds, including those found in whole tobacco (unburned),'62 mainstream smoke
(inhaled by the smoker)'63 and side-stream smoke (inhaled by nonsmokers)."'" 4 Total smoke emissions for the same categories of chemicals
must also be reported. 65
Furthermore, emissions data would be collected under two distinct
methodologies: "1) the existing standard smoking machine method; and
2) a 'maximum' emission method, designed to provide data that reflects
the emissions that are actually available to the consumer."' 66 An analysis
of data reported under each of these proposed testing parameters could

constituents and the yield ratings thereof in the food we eat, the water we drink and the
air we breathe, as well as in a host of other consumer and industrial products to which the
public is exposed ....
Id. at 11. Similar language appears in some of the ingredients and smoke constituent reports
submitted by tobacco manufacturers in the State of Minnesota. See supra note 159.
160. HEALTH PROTECTION BRANCH. HEALTH CANADA, INFORMATION LETTER No. 819,
PROPOSED TOBACCO (REPORTING) REGULATIONS (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter I.L.No. 819].

161. Seeid.at2-3.
162. See id. at 3. The following classes of tobacco constituents must be reported for all tobacco
products, including cigars: nicotine alkaloids, ammonia, pH, nitrosamines, toxic trace metals,
nitrates humectants, plasticizers and preservatives. Id. at Table A. The I.L. explains that under the
current law cigarette manufacturers only report "the ingredients they added" while the new
regulations cover many components of the tobacco itself, as well as papers, filters, tubes, etc. Id. at
3-4. See also Proposed Tobacco Reporting Regulations, 134(14) C. Gaz. 1006-1007 (April 1, 2000)
(providing a list of data collection methods for tobacco constituents). A discussion of the chemistry
and toxicology of tobacco products is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of cigar
chemistry and toxicology, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., CIGARS: HEALTH EFFECTS
AND TRENDS 55-97 (1998).

163. Under the proposed regulations Canadian cigar manufacturers must report mainstream
smoke emissions for the following categories: tar, nicotine, carbon monoxide, polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons, carbonyls, phenolics, ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, basic, semivolatiles, pH, toxic
trace metals, nitrosamines, aromatic amines, Nox, eugenol, and miscellaneous organics. See I.L. No.
819, supra note 160, at Table B. However, quite recently Health Canada amended its proposed
regulations to exempt pipe tobacco and cigars--other than small cigars-from the emissions
reporting requirements. See Proposed Tobacco Reporting Regulations, Sections 1 and 14, id. at 989,
997-1000.
164. Id. at 3. The same categories of side-stream smoke emissions must be reported. Id. at
Table C.
165. See id. at Table D.
166. Id. at 3. Additional information about the proposed methods is available from Office of
Tobacco Control, Environmental Health Directorate, Health Protection Branch, 7th Floor, Brooke
Claxton Building, Address locator 0907D1, Tunney's Pasture, Ottawa, Ontario, KIA 0K9. Tel.
(613)941-2423. Id. at 8. See also Proposed Tobacco Reporting Regulations, Schedules 1, 2, and 3,
134(14) C. Gaz. 10006-1010 (April 1, 2000).
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prove to be very useful to scientists studying tobacco emissions and policy-makers concerned about health effects.
The proposed Canadian regulations would also require manufacturers of all tobacco products, including cigars, to annually provide "lists of
studies on the toxicity and on the health effects of tobacco products; lists
of studies on the tastes and flavor of tobacco products; lists of studies
relating to the modification of tobacco products; and, lists of studies on
ingredients of tobacco products."'67 Moreover, the regulations propose
new requirements for reporting promotional and sponsorship activities,
as well as information about certain advertising expenditures (e.g., the
cost to manufacturers of point-of-sale product displays and the amount of
display fees paid to retailers) and sales.'68
However, details about the scope of public disclosure of information
reported by tobacco manufacturers under the new regulations are not
articulated in the I.L. No. 819, which simply states:
It is the intention of Health Canada to release selected items of reported data in the form of an annual report. The data to be released
will include the currently released sales data and emission data. Proprietary information, such as ingredient lists and other trade secret information will not be released. 9
It is not yet clear how proprietary information will be defined under
the Canadian regulations. However, the distinction between ingredients
information and emissions data is worth noting. While unburned constituent or ingredients data is likely to be protected (or at least claimed to
be so by the tobacco industry), emissions data is apparently not considered proprietary by Health Canada. American jurisdictions faced with
industry "trade secret" challenges may wish to consider adopting a similar model, thereby ensuring (or at least increasing the likelihood of) public release of brand specific emissions data.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has a woefully inadequate tobacco ingredients reporting legal policy, requiring only cigarette and smokeless tobacco
manufacturers to submit aggregated lists of ingredients in their unburned
state. Several states have stepped forward in an attempt to require reporting relating to other tobacco products, such as cigars, and to obtain
quantity and brand specific ingredients, and in one state: Minnesota,
emissions information. These states have faced multi-faceted industry
challenges to their laws. To date the industry's trade secrets arguments,

167.
168.
169.

ld. at4.
See id. at 4-6.
Id. at 6-7.
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made in both judicial and regulatory forums, have effectively delayed or
weakened implementation of the laws.
The results of state experimentation with ingredients reporting/disclosure laws, which has been the model for development of tobacco regulations in a variety of spheres (i.e., youth access prohibitions,
advertising restrictions), could influence tobacco policy in the United
States for the foreseeable future. 7 ' Particularly during this experimental
phase, American jurisdictions attempting to enforce tobacco ingredients
or emissions reporting laws, as well as those contemplating adopting
them, could find it useful to look to leadership from our Canadian neighbors. Consistent with the Canadian model, it is possible that adopting
regulations requiring testing, reporting, and disclosure of smoke constituents, at least as a preliminary step, will shore up legal defenses to
industry challenges to such laws."' Legally defensible releases of information about toxic smoke constituents produced by tobacco products,
including cigars, coupled with reporting requirements for (unburned)
ingredients could pave the way for more comprehensive tobacco products ingredients reporting and disclosure laws and policies. "2
Of course a focus on emissions will bring testing issues and debate
about testing methodology to the forefront. Cigarette testing for tar,
nicotine and carbon monoxide, the only tobacco emissions ever seriously
examined by the U.S. government, has a long and controversial history. " '
Although a discussion of the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") cigarette testing is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that at a
1994 national conference convened to examine the validity of the existing and highly criticized protocol, a National Cancer Institute Expert
Committee (hereinafter Committee) explicitly considered whether constituents other than tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide should be added
to the protocol."4 The Committee concluded that "to avoid confusing
smokers, no smoke constituents other than tar, nicotine and carbon mon170. At this writing, the emergence of a comprehensive national ingredients reporting and
disclosure law, particularly one that covers cigars, does not seem likely. See supra discussion of S.
2125 in Part I.B.3.
171. In the U.S. the tobacco industry has aggressively protected tobacco ingredients
information as a trade secret. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 673 (lst
Cir. 1998). However, reporting of smoke emissions data was not in issue in that case and may be
harder for the industry to win. Philip Morris, 159 F.3d at 672. Reportedly in Minnesota the industry
has claimed that the emissions reporting (testing) requirements exceed statutory authority. See supra
discussion accompanying note 146.
172. Alternatively, severability provisions could protect emissions requirements if provisions
related to unburned ingredients are struck or stayed.
173. For a detailed description of some of the testing and the issues involved see NATIONAL
INST. OF HEALTH, THE FTC CIGARETTE TEST METHOD FOR DETERMINING TAR, NICOTINE, AND
CARBON MONOXIDE YIELDS OF U.S. CIGARETTES (1996) [hereinafter FTC CIGARETTE TEST]. See
also John Slade & Jack E. Henningfield, Tobacco Product Regulation: Contest and Issues, 53 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 43 (1998); Jeffrey S. Wigand, Cigarette Testing Methods, Product Design, and
Labeling: Time to Clean Up the Negative Baggage, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 336-337 (1998).
174. See FTC CIGARETTE TEST supra note 173, at vi.
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oxide be measured and published at the present time. Smokers should be
informed of the presence of other hazardous smoke constituents with
each package and with all advertisements. These constituents should be
classified by toxic effects."'75 However, portions of a report of Committee
deliberations about smoke constituents and possible changes to warning
labels suggest the reverse.
The concept of full disclosure of cigarette characteristics is entirely consistent with the current Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) method.... One might object
that such detailed disclosure of cigarette characteristics
will confuse the smoker. Such an assertion is unscientific and unfair. To publish a label that discloses, for example, the tobacco-specific nitrosamine contents of a
particular brand of cigarettes is no more confusing or
complicated than printing a label that discloses the riboflavin and potassium yields of a particular brand of
breakfast cereal. It would be remarkable to discover cereal manufacturers or consumer advocates arguing that
the vitamin contents or trace metal levels of cereals
should be withheld from consumers because vitamin E
and zinc levels might correlate-at least roughly-with
dietary fiber contents.'76
The Committee went on to acknowledge that there is no data, "at
least in the public domain," on the impact of providing smokers or would
be smokers with additional information about cigarette contents.'" However, it added that while the effect on the demand side of the equation is
unknown, it seems likely that such disclosure would have a salutary effect on the supply side." Enhanced and complete disclosure of cigarette
characteristics by a standardized label would create a basis for more effective competition among manufacturers."' 78
Apparently the 1994 U.S. testing methodology conference sparked
research in Canada leading up to the development of a new testing protocol which is being implemented under a British of Columbia cigarette
law designed regulate what smokers actually draw into their lungs.' This
new methodology, developed at the Labstat International laboratory in

175. Id.at vii.
176. Id. at68.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 70. In a question and answer section of the report, one committee member opined
that even if a consumer does not choose among tobacco products based on the level of a particular
chemical, "the disclosure of such contents provides an incentive for manufacturer to try to reduce
that component." Id. at 72.
179. See Jane Armstrong, Research Burns Light Cigarettes:New Testing Methods Account for
Low-nicotine Smokers Puffing Harderand More Often, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 28, 1998, at

1999]

TOBACCO INGREDIENTS

Kitchner, Ontario under the direction of Dr. William Rickert,' ° will also
be relied on under the broader tobacco products ingredients and emissions regulations proposed for the entire nation by Health Canada.'8 '
Fully engaging and resolving the testing controversy,'82 however,
may be necessary to the development of coherent national and perhaps
ultimately international tobacco products regulation of ingredients and
smoke emissions. Furthermore, the recent proliferation of ETS restrictions in the United States, which are concerned with side-stream smoke,
may provide a useful context in which to build broad-based public support for such a policy.

180. Id.
181. See 134(14) C. Gaz. Tobacco Reporting Regulations Schedules 2 and 3 (April 1, 2000).
182. One of the testing issues which arose in the course of negotiations to defer implementation
of cigarette smoke constituent testing regulations in favor a benchmarking study between the Mass.
Department of Public Health and cigarette manufacturers is the reported lack of sufficient testing
facilities needed to produce contemporaneous data for all 600 cigarette brands which would be
subject to the proposed testing regulations. Telephone conversation with Howard Saxner, General
Counsel. Massachusetts Department of Public Health (March 18, 1999).

DIbJA Vu ALL OVER AGAIN: WHAT To Do WHEN THE
OCTOGENARIAN REALLY Is FERTILE AND OTHER LEGAL
CONUNDRUMS WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE CLONING
OF HUMAN BEINGS
KEVIN H. SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

I must begin with a confession. Despite many hours of diligent work
during my first semester of law school, I have mentally misplaced the
detailed (and hard-won) knowledge I once possessed concerning the intricate workings of The Rule Against Perpetuities. I have not, however,
forgotten the fertile octogenarian, the unborn widow, and the other hypothetical situations which the professor used to demonstrate the subtle
operation of that ancient and venerable doctrine. Indeed, a recent television news story concerning the technical feasibility of cloning human
beings has motivated me to reconsider the hypothetical situations, albeit
in a new light.
Cloning animals is scientific fact.' Cloning human beings is scientific possibility. 2 Despite the current rules in many states and countries

that forbid cloning human beings,' the much greater expense which will
* Associate Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The University of
Memphis; B.A., Drake University, 1977; M.A., The University of Iowa, 1981; J.D., The University
of Iowa, 1983; Ph.D., The University of Iowa, 1994.
I.
See Maia Weinstock. Send in the Clones, SCi. WORLD, Oct. 19, 1998, at 7 (discussing the
technique used to clone fifty mice from one original mouse); Laura Tangley, Carbon-Copy Cows,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 21, 1998, at 55 (indicating that sheep, mice, and cows have been
cloned using the cells of adult animals).
cloning [of
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-239, pt. 1. at 2 (1997) (recognizing that "the ...
'Dolly'] raised the prospect of a similar procedure for humans."). In addition, many articles cited in
this Article are premised on the possibility of cloning human beings. Whether the cloning of a
human being already has occurred depends upon one's definition of cloning. If, as I contend it
should, the definition of cloning includes embryo splitting, then the cloning of human beings already
has been accomplished in the laboratory. When writers, legislators, and the general public envision
cloning, however, they appear to define it-at least implicitly-as the production of a born alive
genetic twin of an adult human being. No reliable report of this event exists. For a discussion of
alternative definitions of cloning and of cloning techniques, see infra Part I.
3. A number of issues and controversies are raised by the various proposed and enacted
regulatory schemes. See generally I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION at i-v (1997) [hereinafter CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS] (summarizing the ethical, legal, and policy considerations of human cloning in two
volumes); Lori B. Andrews, The Current and Future Legal Status of Cloning, in 2 CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS, at F-I, F-18-36 (describing existing and proposed state and federal cloning regulations);
Jennifer Cannon & Michelle Haas. The Human Cloning Prohibition Act: Did Congress Go Too
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Far?, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 637, 639-43 (1998) (describing the events surrounding the thenproposed Human Cloning Prohibition Act); Jason T. Corsover, The Logical Next Step? An
InternationalPerspective on the Issues of Human Cloning and Genetic Technology, 4 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 697, 715-56 (1998) (discussing existing and proposed legislation around the world);
Charlene Kalebic, The ConstitutionalQuestion of Cloning Humans: Duplicationor Procreation?An
Examination of the ConstitutionalRight to Procreate,S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229, 237-245 (1998)
(analyzing the constitutionality of proposed state and federal regulation of cloning); M. Cathleen
Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15, 17-26 (1999)
(describing the probable shortcomings of a laissez-faire attitude towards cloning and emerging
reproductive technologies); Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a
FederalBan on Cloning, 87 Ky. L.J. 277, 331-55 (1999) (framing the cloning issue in the context of
"personal privacy" and speculating on the United States Supreme Court's likely approach to
resolving the "right" to clone); Matthew M. Merrill, The Sheep Heard 'Round the World: Legislation
vs. Self-Regulation of Human Cloning, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 169, 185 (1998) (concluding a
"non-legislative, self-imposed moratorium by scientific and medical communities" is the proper
approach, at least until a thorough public debate has been completed); Elizabeth C. Price, Does the
FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 629-42 (1998)
(analyzing whether the Food and Drug Administration has statutory authority to regulate human
cloning); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1371, 1433-53
(1998) (discussing public policy concerns involved in the cloning of human beings); Kimberly M.
Jackson, Comment, Well, Hello Dolly! The Advent of Cloning Legislation and Its Constitutional
Implications, 52 SMU L. REV. 283, 302-03 (1999) (making the case for continued cloning research
with reasonable regulation); Paul Tully, Comment, Dollywood is Not Just a Theme Park in
Tennessee Anymore: Unwarranted Prohibitory Human Cloning Legislation and Policy Guidelines
for a Regulatory Approach to Cloning, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1385, 1414-21 (1998) (proposing
policy recommendations to guide lawmakers); Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through
Human Cloning: Is There a FundamentalRight?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1473 (1998) (asserting
"that married persons have a fundamental right to procreate through the use of cloning
technology.").
The most complete congressional look at cloning appears to be H.R. REP. No. 105-239, published on
August 1, 1997, as an examination of the Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act. See H.R. 922,
105th Cong. (1997). The Committee on Science recommended that the bill, which would have
prohibited the expenditure of Federal funds to conduct or support research on the cloning of humans,
be passed with minor amendment. Section 2 of the bill stated:
(a) Prohibition. None of the funds made available in any Federal law may be obligated or
expended to conduct or support any project of research that includes the use of human
somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to produce an embryo.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section
(1) the term "human somatic cell nuclear transfer" means transferring the nucleus of a
human somatic cell into an oocyte from which the nucleus has been removed or rendered
inert; and
(2) the term "somatic cell" means a cell of an embryo, fetus, child, or adult which is not
and will not become a sperm or egg cell.
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). Section 4 of the Act would have protected various
forms of scientific research, and stated in relevant part:
Nothing in this Act shall restrict other areas of scientific research not specifically
prohibited by this Act, including important and promising work that involves(1) the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone
molecules, DNA, cells other than human embryo cells, or tissues; or
(2) the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques to create animals other than
humans.
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
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be involved in cloning
a human being versus creating a human being the
"old-fashion way,"4 and the likelihood that the "old-fashion way" of creating human beings will continue to enjoy a certain attractiveness, the
cloning of human beings will occur.' The relevant questions are when,
where, how, and by whom?6
All can agree that the cloning of human beings will raise ethical
concerns.7 All can agree that the threshold legal issue regarding the

4. See, e.g., Mary Midgley, Double Trouble: Even if We Could Clone Human Beings, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 25, 1997, at 15, available in 1997 WL 2367848 ("Existing ways of
producing more people are much cheaper and more reliable than anything in the laboratory.").
5. See generally, Ronald Bailey, The Twin Paradox: What Exactly is Wrong with Cloning
People?, REASON, May 1, 1997, at 52 ("There's no reason to think that a law against cloning would
make much difference anyway. 'It's such a simple technology, it won't be ban-able,' says [Baylor
Professor of Medicine H. Tristaml Engelhardt. 'That's why God made offshore islands, so that
anybody who wants to do it can have it done."'); Midgley, supra note 4, at 15 ("Existing ways of
producing people are far cheaper and more reliable than cloning. Research into cloning will
nevertheless be particularly attractive to funding agencies. This is because any topic which touches
on a primitive fantasy that carries a strong suggestion of magic creates great public excitement.");
Virginia Morell, A Clone of One's Own, DISCOVER, May 1998, at 82, 84. Morell notes:
Human cloning ... will happen ... far sooner than one would have guessed before Dolly
trotted onto the world's stage. "It's no longer in the realm of science fiction," says Lee
Silver, a Princeton geneticist and the author of Remaking Eden, a book about cloning and
other reproductive technologies. "The technological breakthrough has already happened,
although the details of how to do this with human cells still need to be worked out. Once
they're refined, it'll be just a matter of time."
Id.
See Morell, supra note, 5 at 88 ("Despite the difficulties, says [St. Barnabas Medical
6.
Center embryologist Steen] Willadsen, 'the technique will be-is being-perfected' . . . somewhere.
And once that happens, it's only a matter of time before we see the first cloned humans .... "). A
number of scientists have announced plans to clone a human being or announced that they have
already succeeded in doing so. See Michael A. Goldman, Human Cloning: Science Fact and Fiction,
8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 103 (1998) (discussing the intention of physicist Richard Seed to clone a
human being); Did South Koreans Clone a Human?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 28, 1998-Jan.
4, 1999, at 10 (reporting the claims of South Korean scientists); Steve Farrar & David Lloyd, Rebel
Baby Maker Plans the First Human Clone, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 25, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Group File, The Times and Sunday Times (UK) File (discussing the claims of
embryologist Severino Antinori).
7. This Article does not deal with the ethical considerations involved with cloning human
beings. Those considerations are extensively covered in the literature, however. See, e.g., 2 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at D-49-51 (citing sources): Symposium on Human Cloning: Legal,
Social, and Moral Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (1999);
Cloning Symposium, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1997); Symposium, Cloning Humans: Dangerous,
Unjustifiable & Genuinely Immoral, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 633 (1998); Symposium, The Future of
Human Cloning: PrescientLessons from Medical Ethics Past, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167 (1998);
Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive
Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 383-389 (1999) (discussing concepts of harm and
identifying harm to future children); M.A. Roberts, Cloning and Harming: Children, Future
Persons,and the "Best Interest" Test, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 43-56 (1999)
(discussing the legal and moral significance of whether cloning causes harm); Robertson, supra note
3, at 1404-33 (discussing the fears and reality of human cloning); Karen H. Rothenberg, Being
Human: Cloning and the Challengesfor Public Policy, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 644-47 (1999)
(examining a large number of ethical and practical issues which are raised by human cloning, but
practical issues which are less concrete than those raised in the hypothetical situations set forth in
this Article); Morell, supra note 5, at 88 (examining such problems as whether "damage from aging
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cloning of human beings is whether the practice should be permitted.8
And all also should be able to agree that when cloning human beings
occurs-whether widespread9 or not, or lawful or not-a number of
novel legal issues will need to be addressed. Rather than adopting a reactive approach, as was common with the use of surrogate mothers and
in vitro fertilization, the legal community should be proactive and begin
now to consider and to debate the range of cloning-related legal issues.
This should include addressing issues related to both the permissibility of
cloning human beings and issues resulting from the presence of cloned
individuals in the everyday economic and social world. This Article is
concerned only with the latter set of legal issues.
Part I contains a brief introduction to cloning. The introduction is
intended to aid the reader in understanding cloning techniques and the
unique attributes of each method by which the cloning of a human being
might occur. In Part H, hypothetical situations are used to demonstrate
the legal issues which cloning will raise. Just as the fertile octogenarian
and unborn widow were designed to demonstrate the somewhat unusual
applications of The Rule Against Perpetuities, the hypothetical situations
in Part II are designed to demonstrate the sometimes exotic and peculiar'"
legal issues that will be raised by the cloning of human beings."

DNA may be passed on to the cloned infant"); Oliver Morton, FirstDolly, Now Headless Tadpoles,
,SCIENCE, Oct. 31, 1997, at 798 (describing the British reaction to the "cloning" of Dolly); Joe
Queenan, Cloning? I Don't Think So. (The Dangersof Cloning Celebrities),PLAYBOY, Sep. 1997, at
60 (providing a satirical-and scary-look at cloning celebrities such as John Tesh and Adam
Sandier); Harold T. Shapiro, Ethical and Policy Issues of Human Cloning, SCIENCE, July 11, 1997,
at 195, 195 (summarizing the National Bioethics Advisory Commission's report on human cloning);
Wray Herbert et al., The World After Cloning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 10, 1997, at 59,
61-62 (discussing, among a variety of ethical and practical topics, the positions regarding the cloning
of human beings taken by several major religious groups).
8. This Article neither concerns nor discusses current or proposed regulatory schemes
regarding the cloning of human beings. For references to literature dealing with those topics, see the
sources cited supranote 3.
9. Research into human cloning will continue, and the cloning of human beings is almost
certain. However, the frequency with which human beings will be cloned is impossible to forecast.
First, the old-fashioned method of creating human beings will continue to enjoy considerable
popularity, if only because of the parents' desire to create children who share both parents' genes.
Second, the cost of cloning, at least in the foreseeable future, will be prohibitive. Third, the
increasing sophistication of other reproductive technologies will present individuals with less costly
reproductive alternatives.
10. I intentionally have included hypothetical situations that some individuals will
undoubtedly consider to be patently absurd, capable of easy resolution, or both. I decided to include
these hypothetical situations because history suggests that attorneys will make almost any argument,
no matter how absurd, in the absence of contrary case, statutory, or regulatory authority. I believe,
therefore, that all of the hypothetical situations eventually will have to be addressed-at least onceby a court, statute, or regulation.
11. This Article's purpose is to spark debate by providing specific examples of the legal issues
that will be raised by the cloning of human beings. This Article is not intended to provide suggested
resolutions for each issue; there are far too many issues, and, with the exception of the most patently
absurd issues, each issue is worthy of a full law review article. On several occasions, however, I use
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I. A PRIMER ON CLONING12
Cloning refers to an assortment of artificial processes by which one
or more genetically identical" genes," cells, groups of cells, whole

a footnote to comment on some aspect of a legal issue that I find particularly interesting or
compelling.
12. The title for Part I is derived from Michael P. Roberts, A Primer of Genetic Engineering
11: Gene Cloning, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 11'(1994). An understanding of the legal problems
which cloning human beings will create requires that the reader have at least a basic understanding
of genetics and cloning procedures. "Basic understanding" is the key phrase, and the discussion in
Part I fulfills the need. The material in Part I is derived from sources of varying levels of complexity.
To promote readability, I have not provided specific citations regarding matters which I judge to be
"common knowledge" among those who are versed in the technical aspects of genetics and cloning.
Rather, I simply state that Part I represents an amalgam of material obtained from the following
sources:

RICHARD DAWKINS,

THE SELFISH GENE (n.ed. 1989) (discussing the nature of genes,

chromosomes, and their impact on human development, as well as the possible relationship between
an individual's genetic makeup and predisposition towards certain types of emotions, thoughts, and
behaviors); Goldman, supra note 6 (discussing the nature, history, techniques, and potential usesincluding as a reproductive technology--of cloning); Morell, supra note 5 (discussing one
researcher's efforts to clone a monkey); Rothenberg, supra note 7 (discussing the elements of adult
cell cloning and the resulting challenge to the definition of human); Thomas A. Shannon, Cloning
Myths: Time to Take Thought, COMMONWEALTH, Apr. 10, 1998, at 10 (noting the confusion created
by the popular media through the use of imprecise cloning terminology); Shapiro, supra note 7
(describing somatic cell nuclear transfer); I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 13-33
(discussing the methodologies employed in cloning). Of course, I provide specific citations to
quotations and toinformation which I do not deem to be "common knowledge" amongst the group
of writers to which I have just referred.
13. Whether a clone truly is genetically identical depends upon the specific cloning technique
that is used. It is fair to say that by all but the most exacting standards any method of cloning will
produce a clone genetically identical to the original. However, when dealing with the cloning of
certain organisms, including human beings, particular cloning techniques may result in slightly
different genetic material being present in the clone than was present in the cloned organism. As
Herbert et al., point out:
Even biologically, a clone [produced using certain cloning techniques] would not be
identical to the "master copy." The clone's cells, for example, would have energy-processing machinery (mitochondria) that came from the egg donor, [who may] not
[be the same person as the person who donated] the nucleus [of the cell, which contains
the overwhelming majority of genetic material]. But most of the physical differences
between originals and copies wouldn't be detectable without a molecular-biology lab.
The one possible exception is fertility.
Herbert et al., supra note 7, at 60.
14. "Gene cloning" is:
The production of a population of multiple copies of a DNA fragment. Cloning
involves the isolation of a fragment of DNA from a chromosome and the copying of the
fragment. The fragment of interest will usually code for a gene, such as the gene for
cystic fibrosis, or will be closely linked to a gene of interest.
The cloned fragment has several uses. If the cloned fragment codes for the gene,
itself, the clone can be used to identify the gene's product. Identifying the gene's product
assists in the study of disease. Additionally, the cloned gene can be placed in another
individual (this activity is called genetic transformation). The individual receiving the
cloned DNA is called transgenic. Finally, the fragment can be used as a probe to
determine if a given individual in a population carries the gene.
Jeffrey L. Gellner & Wendy L. Weaver, A Glossary of Genetic Terms, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 119, 124 (1994). See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-3 ("Molecular cloning:
the process whereby identical fragments of DNA are produced by insertion of a DNA fragment into

a host vector followed by amplification to produce many thousands of copies in a host cell, usually a
bacterium."). See also Mary K. Howett, A Primer of Genetic Engineering IlI: Identification and
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plants, or whole organisms are created.'5 This Article examines only the
situations in which, and the techniques by which, whole human organisms might be cloned.'"
Human cells contain genetic'7 information comprising DNA.'" The
totality of the DNA contained in a cell is the individual's genotype.9
Manipulation of Genes in Humans, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 17 (1994) (discussing, among
other topics, gene cloning). Roberts describes the process as follows:
When a molecular biologist talks about cloning, he or she is generally referring to
gene' cloning. Gene cloning is the isolation of a gene or a DNA fragment and the clonal
propagation of that fragment as a recombinant DNA molecule.
This is not the same as cloning organisms. So there's a distinction to be made
between cloning organisms . . . and cloning genes. In gene cloning, the goal is the
production of genetically identical recombinant DNA molecules.
Roberts, supra note 12, at 11. For a discussion of what constitutes a "gene," see infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
15. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 104. Goldman provides the following definition:
The term cloning finds broad meaning in biology. In its most general sense, cloning
is the production of a number of genetically identical cells or organisms, whether they are
the cells of my hand, a pair of identical twins, human cells grown in culture, bacterial
cells grown in culture, or a field of dandelions.
Id. (emphasis added); 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, A-I ("Clone: A precise copy of a
molecule, cell, or individual plant or animal."). Shannon also notes:
[T]hree distinct types of cloning-gene cloning, cellular cloning, and whole-organism
cloning-have sometimes been fused in media coverage, leading to widespread confusion.
Gene cloning multiplies identical copies of various genes; cellular cloning, a more
complicated technique, replicates whole cells; and whole-organism cloning-the most
complicated-reproduces whole organisms.
Shannon, supra note 12, at 10.
16. Organism cloning using the genetic material from an adult animal is the latest scientific
breakthrough, and it is the scientific breakthrough which makes realistic the possibility of cloning an
entire human being from genetic material supplied by an adult human being. Shannon notes:
Gene and cell cloning are well-established, standard biotechnical research methods
and must be distinguished and discussed separately from organism cloning. Organism
cloning, a la Dolly, signaled a dramatic scientific breakthrough because Dolly's cloning
was accomplished with cells that were six years old and fully differentiated. The common
wisdom until then was that such cells could not be reprogrammed to generate a new
being.
Shannon, supra note 12, at 10. See generally Roberts, supra note 12, at I I (discussing the cloning of
genes, but touching on, and distinguishing, the cloning of organisms). To reiterate the point made in
footnote 2, if embryo splitting falls within the definition of cloning, then the events surrounding the
creation of Dolly merely make possible the cloning of adult human beings as opposed to the already
possible cloning of human beings through embryo splitting.
17. The use of "genetic information" begs the issue of what constitutes a "gene." As the
definition of a legal term may differ depending upon the context (e.g., substantive "due process"
versus procedural "due process"), the definition of "gene" depends upon the perspective of the
scientist who is providing the definition. It is fair to assert that those scientists who focus on discrete
pieces of genetic information and their impact in individual human beings use a narrower definition
of gene than do scientists who deal with questions concerning evolutionary trends and species-wide
changes in population gene frequency. Several representative, and different, definitions of "gene"
follow. Gellner and Weaver state that: "[tihe simplest definition [of "gene"] is the basic unit of
inheritance, or heredity. Alternately, a gene is a particular sequence of nucleotides along a molecule
of DNA that represents a functional unit of inheritance. Genes determine the heritable characters
observed in the phenotype of an individual." Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 124. See also I
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-2 ("Gene: a working subunit of DNA. Each of the
body's 100,000 genes carries the instructions that allow the cell to make one specific product such as
a protein."). Richard Dawkins, who looks at genes at an evolutionary level, offers several definitions
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"Genes are found in chromosomes, which, in turn, are found in the nuclei
of cells. It is a simplification, though a useful one . . . to think of the
genes in a chromosome as arranged like beads on a string. Some species-including humans-have chromosomes in pairs. Such species are
said to be diploid."'

of "gene." See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at I I ("I shall argue that the fundamental unit of selection,
and therefore of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is
the gene, the unit of heredity."). Dawkins writes that "[a] gene is defined as any portion of
chromosomal material that potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural
selection." Id. at 28. However, Dawkins also notes that because "genes" do not work in isolation,
they must be considered in a larger context for evolutionary purposes:
The manufacture of a body is a cooperative venture of such intricacy that it is almost
impossible to disentangle the contribution of one gene from that of another. A given gene
will have many different effects on quite different parts of the body. A given part of the
body will be influenced by many genes, and the effect of any one gene depends on
interaction with many others. Some genes act as master genes controlling the operation of
a cluster of other genes.
Id. at 24. Arguments have been made that the definition of gene should include cellular material not
normally thought of as genetic. See, e.g., ELLIOTr SOBER, PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 4 (1993). Sober
notes:

[Glenes are found in chromosomes, which are located in the nuclei of cells. However, it
has been known for some time that there are bodies outside the nuclei (in the cytoplasm)
that can provide a mechanism of inheritance. Mitochondria influence [the physical
expression of certain] traits, and the DNA they contain is inherited. If a population
changes its mitochondrial characters while its chromosomal features remain the same, is
this an instance of evolution? Perhaps we should stretch the concept of the gene to
include extrachromosomal factors.
Id. (citation omitted).
18. DNA is shorthand for deoxyribonucleic acid. DNA is:
The molecule that stores the "instructions" for development. DNA is comprised of two
helical strands which are bound together by hydrogen bonds between pairs of nitrogenous
bases. Each strand is a polymer. (many copies of a monomer) of four nucleotides. Each
nucleotide (the monomers) is comprised of one of four nitrogenous bases, the same
deoxyribose sugar, and phosphoric acid. The specific sequence of nitrogenous bases
determines which gene is present. Within each strand the nucleotides are bound together
by phosphodiester links. That is, the ribose sugars of two adjacent nucleotides are bound
together through a phosphate molecule.
Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 122. See also I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-1
("DNA: Deoxyribonucleic acid, found primarily in the nucleus of cells (some DNA is also found in
the mitochondrion). DNA carries the instructions for making all the structures and materials the
body needs to function.").
19. See Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 125 (A genotype is "[tihe particular assemblage
of genes possessed by an individual. The effects of genotype and environment determine an
individuals [sic] phenotype."). The difference between genotype and genome is that "[tihe entire list
of possible gene locations is the genome. The entire combination of genes for a single individual is
its specific genotype." SOBER, supra note 17, at 4.
20. SOBER, supra note 17, at 2. See also Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 121:
Chromosome: A single DNA molecule with its associated proteins, some of which are
called histones. The structure of a chromosome has several levels. The DNA molecule,
itself, is a double helix. In eukaryotic organisms, including humans, DNA is coiled
around several histones to form nucleosomes. The nucleosomes are in turn folded among
themselves to form a supercoiled molecule called a chromosome.
Id. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission provides the following definition:
Chromosomes: nucleic acid-protein structures in the nucleus of a cell. Chromosomes are
composed chiefly of DNA, the carrier of hereditary information. Chromosomes contain
genes, working subunits of DNA that carry the genetic code for specific proteins,
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Broadly speaking, the DNA contained in an individual's genotype
contains genetic information which accomplishes two functions. DNA
instructs cells in the developing organism when and how to differentiate
(i.e. develop in different ways) so as to produce skin, bone, muscle, organs, and all the other different types of cells required to form a human
being. 2' DNA also regulates the operation of numerous biochemical processes that occur in both a developing and a mature human being. By processes not fully understood, specific cells differentiate and specific bodily processes are regulated by accessing information located at, or being
influenced by information located at, the relevant portion or portions of
the DNA. For example, liver cells differentiate as a result of having access to, or being influenced by, only that part (or those parts) of the
genotype which concerns the development of liver cells.
Richard Dawkins offers the metaphor of an architect's plans for 2the
role of DNA and genes in the development of an individual organism:
A DNA molecule, which is part of an individual's genetic material,
is itself made of a chain of building blocks, molecules called
nucleotides.23 A pair of nucleotide chains twists together into a double
helix to form DNA. 2 ' Despite the complexity of the DNA molecules
making up the genetic material, only four kinds of nucleotide building
blocks make up DNA.' For convenience, the nucleotides are abbreviated
as A26, T,22 C, 2' and G. 2' These four building blocks make up the genetic
material in both plants and animals? °

interspersed with large amounts of DNA of unknown function. A normal human somatic
cell contains 46 chromosomes; a normal human germ cell contains 23 chromosomes.
I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-1. Diploid refers to "a cell such as a somatic cell
having two chromosome sets, as opposed to the haploid situation of eggs and sperm which have only
one chromosome set." Id.
21. "Differentiation: the process whereby an unspecialized early embryonic cell acquires the
features of a specialized cell such as a heart, liver, or muscle cell." I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS,
supra note 3, at A- 1.
22. The next several pages rely on Dawkins' metaphor, and they represent a mixture of
paraphrase and quotation. To promote readability, I have written them as normal text. I hereby
attribute the ideas and most of the wording to DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 22-23.
23. Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 122.
24.

DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 22.

25. See id.
26. "Adenine (A) [is olne of the four nitrogenous bases present in DNA. Adenine is a purine,
as is guanine another one of the bases. In the DNA helix, adenine is always connected to, or 'paired'
with, thymine by two hydrogen bonds." Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 119.
27. "Thymine (T) [is o]ne of the four nitrogenous bases present in DNA. Thymine is a
pyrimidine, as is cytosine another one of the bases. In the DNA helix thymine is always connected
to, or 'paired' with, adenine by two hydrogen bonds." Id. at 130.
28. "Cytosine (C) [is o]ne of the four nitrogenous bases present in DNA. Cytosine is a
pyrimidine, as is thymine another one of the bases. In the DNA helix cytosine is always connected
to, or 'paired' with, guanine by three hydrogen bonds." Id. at 122.
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The nucleotides that make up DNA are identical for plants and animals.' An A nucleotide is identical in a person, a squirrel, and an oak
tree. 2 The differences between plants and animals, species of plants and
animals, and individual members of particular species of plants and animals are the result of differences in the number, sequencing, and combinations of these building blocks.3 Only identical twins (also identical
triplets and quadruplets) have identical numbers, sequencing, and combinations of the building blocks.'
With some minor exceptions (mainly gametes: eggs and sperm),35
every cell in a person's body contains a complete and identical copy of
his or her individual DNA. 6 The DNA is a set of instructions for construction and operation of a particular body, written in a unique combination of the A, T, C, and G nucleotides.
Dawkins' metaphor illustrates the point:
It is as though, in every room of a gigantic building, there was
a bookcase containing the architect's plans for the entire
building. The "book-case" in a cell is called the nucleus.38 The
architect's plans39 run to 46 volumes in man-the number is
different in other species. The "volumes" are called chromosomes. They are visible under a microscope as long threads,
and the genes are strung out along them in order. 4°
The pages of the volumes represent genes, which contain specific
instructions.'

29. "Guanine (G) [is o]ne of the four nitrogenous bases present in DNA. Guanine is a purine,
as is adenine another one of the bases. In the DNA helix guanine is always connected to, or "paired"
with, cytosine by three hydrogen bonds." Id. at 125.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
cell.").
36.
37.
38.

See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 22.

See id.
Seeid. at 21.
See id. at 22.
See id.
See I CLONING HUMAN

BEINGS,

supra note 3, at A-2 ("Gamete: a mature sperm or egg

See DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 22.
See id.
The nucleus is that part of a cell in which the chromosomes are located. See I CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-3 ("Nucleus: the cell structure that houses the chromosomes, and
thus the genes.").
39. Dawkins states that: "[T]here is of course no 'architect.' The DNA instructions have been
assembled by natural selection." DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 23. Of course, the existence of an
"architect" and whether the DNA instructions have been assembled by natural selection alone or
natural selection aided by an "architect" are ontological questions which are far beyond the scope of
this Article.
40. Id. at 22.
41. See id. Dawkins actually states that: "'Page' will provisionally be used interchangeably
with gene, although the division between genes is less clear-cut than the division between the pages
of a book." Id.
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Once a person reaches physical maturity, he possesses one hundred
trillion cells.42 All these cells originated from a single cell, which was
given a single "master copy" of the architect's plans.43 As this original
cell divided, each subsequent cell received its own copy of the architect's
plans." From these plans, a person's body (the building)4" is constructed. 6
In human sexual reproduction, each parent contributes a part of the
DNA/architectural plans. The parts fuse to produce the unique combination of genetic material that constitutes the genotype (the architect's
plan) contained in the fertilized 7 egg. 8 "The normal chromosomal constitution in humans is two sets of twenty-three chromosomes for a total
42. See id. at 23.
43. See id.
44. Mistakes in copying undoubtedly occur along the way. As a result, not every cell has a
completely identical set of genetic information. However, the number of copying errors is so small
that it is permissible to state that with the exception of a few cells (e.g., gametes), all the cells in a
person's body possess identical genetic information, an identical set of the architect's plans. The
process of cell division is described as:
The mechanism by which a single cell divides into two daughter cells. Cell division
is the final stage of a cell's life. The normal cell cycle, or life, is divided into four phases.
During the first phase, named Gap 1, the cell grows in preparation for the Synthesis
phase. During the Synthesis phase the chromosomal material is duplicated (DNA is
synthesized). The cell then prepares for nuclear division during the Gap 2 phase. During
Mitosis, the final phase, the doubled chromosomal material divides followed by division
of the whole cell. The consequence of the doubling and subsequent division is that each
daughter cell receives the same amount of chromosomal material as the mother cell.
Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 120.
45. The specific methodology by which DNA builds and operates the body is not completely
understood. For the interested reader, however, I include Dawkins' explanation:
It is one thing to speak of the duplications of DNA. But if the DNA is really a set of
plans for building a body, how are the plans put into practice? How are they translated
into the fabric of the body? This brings me to the second important thing DNA does. It
indirectly supervises the manufacture of a different kind of molecule-protein. . . . The
coded message of the DNA, written in the four-letter nucleotide alphabet, is translated
into a simple mechanical way into another alphabet. This is the alphabet of amino acids
which spells out protein molecules.
Making proteins may seem a far cry from making a body, but it is the first small step
in that direction. Proteins not only constitute much of the physical fabric of the body;
they also exert sensitive control over all the chemical processes inside the cell, selectively
turning them on and off at precise times and in precise places. Exactly how this
eventually leads to the development of a baby is a story which will take decades, perhaps
centuries, for embryologists to work out. But it is a fact that it does. Genes do indirectly
control the manufacture of bodies ....
DAWKINS, supra note 12, at 23.
46. See id. In one respect, Dawkins' metaphor seems inadequate for our purposes. Although it
explains the development of the body, it does not directly recognize the role of DNA in regulating
the on-going operation, maintenance, and reconstruction and repair of the body. Thus, I would
amend the metaphor to include the observation that the pages in the architect's plans also include
instructions concerning how to operate, maintain, and repair the building. This amendment is
consistent with Dawkins' observation that DNA, operating through proteins, "exert[s] sensitive
control over all the chemical processes inside the cell, selectively turning them on and off at precise
times and in precise places." Id.
47. "Fertilization [is] the process whereby male and female gametes unite; it begins when a
sperm contacts the outside of the egg and ends with the formation of the zygote." I CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-2.
48. See id. at A-2 ("Egg: the mature female germ cell; also call ovum, or oocyte.").
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of forty-six chromosomes. One set is donated from the mother, and the
other set is donated by the father." 9
As the fertilized human egg divides, the first eight cells are undifferentiated; that is, they are identical and unspecialized. 0 If one of the
cells splits off from the others, it is capable of growing into a genetically
identical twin." After a group of cells reaches eight in number, the cells
begin to differentiate and parts of the architectural plans contained in
each cell cease to be accessible to or to influence the development of that
cell and its daughter cells. In adult human beings, cells are highly differentiated. 2 As a result, all but a small portion of the DNA in the cell has
been rendered "off limits" and has no impact on the development and
operation of the cell. It is as if most of the volumes of architectural plans
have been locked or the pages glued together. 3
This discussion suggests that two general methods of cloning organisms are theoretically possible." The first method is called "embryo
49. Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 121; Sober describes the process, albeit a bit
unromantically, as follows:
Now I come to sex. This is a common but by no means universal mode of
reproduction. A diploid organism forms gametes, which contain just one of the two
chromosomes that occur in each chromosomal pair: The gametes are haploid [that is, they
have their chromosomes as singletons]. The process by which diploid parents produce
The nonsex cells (somatic cells) in an individual
haploid gametes is called meiosis....
are genetically identical with each other (ignoring for the moment the infrequent
occurrence of mutations), but the gametes that an individual produces may be immensely
different because the individual is heterozygous at various loci. Diploid parents produce
haploid gametes, which come together in reproduction to form a diploid offspring.
SOBER, supra note 17, at 2-3.
50. See, e.g., Morell, supra note 5, at 86 ("Sheep, calves, monkeys, and humans all reach the
eight-cell stage before they start differentiating .... ); I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at
23 ("In mammals, unlike many other species, the early embryo rapidly activates its genes and cannot
survive on the components stored in the egg. The time at which embryonic gene activation occurs
varies between species-the late 2-cell stage in mice, the 4-8 cell stage in humans, and the 8-16 cell
stage in sheep.") (citations omitted).
51. These cells are "totipotent." See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-3
("Totipotent: having unlimited developmental capacity. The totipotent cells of the very early embryo
have the capacity to differentiate into extraembryonic membranes and tissues, the embryo, and all
postembryonic tissues and organs.").
52. Depending upon the time in the development process in which they are removed, cells
which are taken from embryos for use in somatic nuclear transfer may not be fully differentiated. See
generally 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 13-22 (presenting an overview of the history
of scientific inquiry into cellular characteristics and processes which progresses from early
investigations into the properties of cells through the cloning of Dolly).
53. See id. at 17. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission provides this description:
Nearly every cell contains a spheroid organelle called the nucleus which houses nearly all
the genes of the organism. Genes are composed of DNA, which serve as a set of
instructions to the cell to produce particular proteins. Although all somatic cells contain
the same genes in the nucleus, the particular genes that are activated vary by the type of
cell. For example, a differentiated somatic cell, such as a neuron, must keep a set of
neural-specific genes active and silence those genes specific to the development and
functioning of other types of cells such as muscle or liver cells.
Id.
54. See id. at 15 ("[Another] type of cloning aims to reproduce genetically identical animals.
Cloning of animals can typically be divided into two distinct processes, blastomere separation and
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splitting" or "embryonic cloning" or "blastomere separation."55 This
method involves the creation of one genetically identical copy or more
than one genetically identical copies of an organism from an egg which
was fertilized through sexual reproduction, albeit in vitro. 6 As this

nuclear transplantation cloning.") (emphasis added). A blastomere is "each of the cells produced
when the fertilized egg cleaves into 2, then 4, 8, and 16 cells." Id. at A-I. Some writers have limited
their definition of cloning to nuclear transplantation cloning. See, e.g., Josie Glausiusz, Splitting
Heirs, DISCOVER, Jan. 1994, at 84, 84:
True cloning implies reproduction without sex. It would mean creating an exact copy of
an adult human-by taking a single cell from that person, placing it inside a human egg
cell that has had its own genes and indeed its entire nucleus removed, and allowing that
single cell to grow into a new adult as a normal embryo would.
Id. In addition, the proposed federal regulations reproduced supra note 3, and the state statutes
reproduced infra note 63, focus on nuclear transplantation cloning. I adopt the definition of cloning
used by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, supra, which Ibelieve represents the more
prevalent view among scientists. In addition, if cloning is defined as the creation of (nearly)
genetically identical individuals through artificial processes, then both embryo splitting/blastomere
separation and nuclear transplantation procedures constitute cloning.
55. An embryo is "the developing organism from the time of fertilization until significant
differentiation has occurred, when the organism becomes known as a fetus." I CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS. supra note 3, at A-2. A blastomere is "each of the cells produced when the fertilized egg
cleaves into 2, then 4, 8, and 16 cells." Id. at A-I.
56. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 7 (discussing embryonic cloning, among other
topics, and referring to real-world examples of embryo splitting performed in the laboratory).
Rothenberg describes the process of embryo splitting as follows:
Unlike the adult cell cloning technique used by Dr. Wilmut and his colleagues, embryo
splitting uses as its "raw material" an embryo, rather than an adult cell. In embryo
splitting, clusters of cells of very early embryos are separated and grown into individual
embryos. Cells at this state have not yet begun to differentiate into specific tissues, such
as bone or muscle, and therefore carry their full genetic complement for development.
Each separated embryo may therefore be implanted and carried to term. In effect, embryo
splitting is an in vitro replica of the natural process by which identical twins are created.
Embryo splitting does not share .. . three features of adult cell cloning ....First,

embryo splitting requires human embryos which must have been created by the
fertilization of an egg by a sperm. Second, because only embryos are used, embryo
splitting does not provide those involved with the same knowledge of an adult expression
of the genetic material. Finally, embryo splitting can produce only a limited number of
duplicates to the original.
Id. at 643. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission provides this description of embryo
splitting:
In blastomere separation, the developing embryo is split very soon after fertilization
when it is composed of two to eight cells ....Each cell, called a blastomere, is able to
produce a new individual organism. These blastomeres are considered to be totipotent,
that is they possess the total potential to make an entire new organism. This totipotency
allows scientists to split animal embryos into several cells to produce multiple organisms
that are genetically identical.
I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 15. See also Glausiusz, supra note 54 (detailing the
process of splitting human embryos in the laboratory). The following is a description of the
methodology employed in scientists Jerry Hall and Robert Stillman's successful attempt at cloning
human embryos:
When one of those single-celled embryos divided into two cells, the first step in
development, the scientists quickly separated the cells, creating two different embryos
with the same genetic information. (This sometimes happens naturally inside a mother,
and the result is identical twins.) In the process, though, the researchers had to strip away
an outer coating, called the zona pellucida, that is essential to development. Then came
the trickiest part of the procedure. Over the years, Hall had been working with a gel
derived from seaweed that could serve as a substitute for the zona pellucida. When Hall
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method begins with sexual reproduction, it involves the combination of
the biological parents' different DNA. The "Original" is an "unknown
entity" in the sense that there is no way to know what the adult will look
like and act like if the fertilized egg were permitted to develop to term
and the resulting infant were raised to adulthood.57
Cloning at this early stage of development presents several possibilities. A fertilized egg could be permitted to divide until there were,
say, six cells. A scientist could then remove one cell (Copy #1), two
separate cells (Copy #1 and Copy #2), or more separate cells, permitting
each one to develop to fruition on its own after implantation into the
uterus of the woman or women who will carry the clones to term. The
Original, the fertilized egg, would directly result in one or more copies.
Another procedure would permit the fertilized egg to divide until
there were, say, two cells. A scientist could then remove one cell (Copy
#1) and let it divide until there were, say, four cells. A scientist could
then remove one cell (Copy #2), two cells (Copy #2 and Copy #3), or
more separate cells, permitting each one to develop to fruition on its
own. The Original (the fertilized egg) would directly yield one copy
(Copy #1), which itself would be copied in a second generation (Copy #2
or more).
Finally, copies of copies of copies might be made. For example, a
fertilized egg could be permitted to divide until there were, say, two
cells. A scientist could then remove one cell (Copy #1) and let it divide
until there were, say, two cells. The scientist could then remove one cell
(Copy #2), which would be permitted to divide until it reached the twocell stage, at which time another cell would be removed and permitted to
develop into a two-cell group (Copy #3), and so on. 8

put the artificial coating around the cloned embryos, they began to grow and develop.
The experiment was a success.
The scientists replicated their procedure many times, producing forty-eight clones in all.
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw The Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 64, 66.
57. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 6, at 112. Goldman notes:
The production of twins, or higher multiple births, by splitting embryos is a simple
extension of the natural process of twinning. The individuals produced are genetic
replicas of one another, not the genetic replicas of living (or dead) adults. But in embryo
splitting, the exact genetic nature of the source embryo-the embryo that was splitrepresents the same roll of the dice we see in any traditional new birth.
Id. It might be possible to discover a great deal about the probable physical phenotype of the adult if
one of the cells were removed and its DNA were analyzed. See generally VICTOR A. McKuSICK,
MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN (10th ed. 1992) (listing and discussing known genetically-linked
phenotypes); Aubrey Milunsky, The "New" Genetics: From Research to Reality, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1307 (1993) (discussing the nature and frequency of genetic disorders). However, without this
process, the physical phenotype of the adult would be just as speculative as the old-fashioned
method of imagining the combination of the two parents' DNA.
58. Cloning from the original through embryo splitting, however, cannot go on indefinitely in
this manner. As Morell writes:
You might expect that geneticists could divide each embryo into eight blastomeres,
wait for each blastomere to grow into an eight-cell embryo, and repeat the process
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The second general method of cloning, known as "somatic nuclear
transfer" or "nuclear transplantation cloning,"" involves the use of cells
which are partially or fully differentiated, that is, cells from an embryo in
which cells have begun to differentiate or cells from an adult. The theoretical difficulty for whole-organism cloning is that with partially differentiated cells part of the genotype is thought to be inaccessible to, or to
no longer be capable of influencing the development of, subsequent cell
division and operation.' Thus, an attempt to create a whole organism

indefinitely. But that's not possible, says Wolf, because the embryo's cells begin
differentiating into limbs and organs after a certain amount of time has passed since its
development began, regardless of how many cells it has. An embryo grown from a
blastomere will have only an eighth as many cells to work with as an entire embryo; if
you divided it again, it would have only a sixty-fourth as many cells."As development
proceeds, when time for it to differentiate arrives, it doesn't have enough cells for the
job," says Wolf, and even a blastomere will be less viable than an entire embryo. Because
the cues to develop come from the cell's cytoplasm-the material that fills the cell-rather
than the nucleus, the blastomere's clock can be reset by transferring its genetic material
to a new egg full of fresh cytoplasm.
Id. The numerical limits of embryo splitting have not been established. And, one supposes, whatever
limitations initially exist might be overcome, at least to some extent, as scientific processes become
more advanced. It also is possible that the limitations discussed in this paragraph could be overcome
through cytoplasm transfer. See Karen Wright & Sarah Richardson, Human in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction, DISCOVER, May, 1998, at 74, 80. Wright and Richardson providing the
following definition: Cytoplasmic transfer: The cytoplasm-the material in a cell that surrounds the
nucleus-is extracted from a younger woman's egg and inserted into an older woman's egg.
Cytoplasm from a young egg may reduce errors in the genetic material of the older woman's egg,
enhancing the chance of successful fertilization. Id.
59. See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-3 ("Nuclear transplantation cloning: a
type of cloning in which the nucleus from a diploid cell is fused with an egg from which the nucleus
has been removed. The DNA of the transplanted nucleus thus directs the development of the
resulting embryo."). The National Bioethics Advisory Commission also defines "somatic cell
nuclear transfer" as the technique "of nuclear transplantation using nuclei derived from somatic cells
other than those of an embryo or fetus." Id. at 1.
60. See Morell, supra note 5, at 85. Morell describes the problem as follows:
Before Dolly, researchers thought that adult cells could not be induced to produce a
clone because they are already differentiated. As a fertilized egg develops into an adult, it
divides into two, then four, then eight identical cells. Soon, however, the cells begin to
specialize, becoming bone or skin, nerve or tissue. These differentiated cells all share the
§ame DNA-the blueprint of the body-but they follow different parts of the instructions it
contains. "In a sense, they're programmed," says Wolf, and as they age, it becomes more
and more difficult to reprogram them, to make them switch functions. That's exactly
what the Scottish team did when they produced Dolly: they took the genetic material
from a differentiated adult cell and made it behave like the genetic material in a newly
fertilized egg. Their success, however, does not mean that it is now easy to reprogram a
human adult cell. If anything, notes Wolf, researchers suspect that every species is unique
in its requirements for setting its cellular clock back to zero.
Id. Confirmation of the importance of Dolly's existence comes from the description of the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission:
The new development in the experiments that Wilmut and colleagues carried out to
produce Dolly was the use of much more developed somatic cells isolated from adult
sheep as the source of the donor nuclei. This achievement of gestation and live birth of a
sheep using an adult cell donor nucleus was stunning evidence that cell differentiation
and specialization are reversible. Given the fact that cells develop and divide after
fertilization and differentiate into specific tissue (e.g., muscle, bone, neurons), the
development of a viable adult sheep from a differentiated adult cell nucleus provided
surprising evidence that the pattern of gene expression can be reprogrammed. Until this
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from such cells would fail because the full range of required cells could
not be created.' The process of somatic nuclear transfer, however, apparently has made possible the use of differentiated cells.62 Attempts to prohibit the cloning of human beings have focused on this method, as embryo splitting could be seen, at least in limited numbers, as a legitimate
technique for increasing the chance of success in in vitro fertilization.63

experiment many biologists believed that reactivation of the genetic material of
mammalian somatic cells would not be complete enough to allow for the production of a
viable adult mammal from nuclear transfer cloning.
I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 16. See generally Goldman, supra note 6 (discussing
the history of cloning research); 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 7, at 16-22 (presenting an
overview of the history of scientific inquiry into cellular characteristics and processes which
progresses from early investigations into the properties of cells through the cloning of Dolly).
61. As the discussion suggests, one other obstacle stands in the way of either type of cloning:
at the current stage of technological development, a womb must be available to carry the cloned
organism to term. The references in this Article to the use of wombs to bring clones to term should
not be misconstrued either as a indication that I am unaware of the ethical concerns surrounding the
use of surrogate mothers or that I believe women are mere baby factories.
62. Somatic cells are cells which have begun to differentiate or which have completed the
process of differentiation. See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at I n.l ("A somatic cell is
any cell of the embryo, fetus, child, or adult which contains a full complement of two sets of
chromosomes; in contrast with a germ cell, i.e., an egg or a sperm, which contains only one set of
chromosomes.").
63. Some states have undertaken to ban the cloning of human beings, although cloning tends
to be defined as involving the procedure of somatic nuclear transfer. For example, California
statutory law provides:
Cloning of human beings; purchase of ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for cloning human
beings prohibited
(a) No person shall clone a human being.
(b) No person shall purchase or sell an ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for the purpose of
cloning a human being.
(c) For purposes of this section, "clone" means the practice of creating or attempting to
create a human being by transferring the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source
into a human egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of, or to
implant, the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth of a
human being.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (1999). As another example, Michigan statutory law
provides:
Prohibition of human cloning; exceptions; penalties; right of action; definition
(1) A licensee or registrant shall not engage in or attempt to engage in human cloning.
(5) As used in this section:
(a) "Human cloning" means the use of human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to
produce a human embryo.
(b) "Human embryo" means a human egg cell with a full genetic composition capable of
differentiating and maturing into a complete human being.
(c) "Human somatic cell" means a cell of a developing or fully developed human being
that is not and will not become a sperm or egg cell.
(d) "Human somatic cell nuclear transfer" means transferring the nucleus of a human
somatic cell into an egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed or rendered inert.
MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 333.16274 (1999).
Rhode Island has a particularly sophisticated definitional and conceptual structure in its statutory
scheme, and it is worthy of quotation. The statute begins by noting the contributions made by certain
forms of genetic and cellular cloning:
Whereas, recent medical and technological advances have had tremendous benefit to
patients, and society as a whole, and biomedical research for the purpose of scientific
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Somatic nuclear transfer involves the removal of the DNA-laden
nucleus' from an oocyte (an unfertilized egg),65 which results in an enuinvestigation of disease or cure of a disease or illness should be preserved and protected
and not be impeded by regulations involving the cloning of an entire human being; and
Whereas, molecular biology, involving human cells, genes, tissues, and organs, has
been used to meet medical needs globally for twenty (20) years, and has proved a
powerful tool in the search for cures, leading to effective medicines to treat cystic
fibrosis, diabetes, heart attack, stroke, hemophilia, and HIV/AIDS;
The purpose of this legislation is to place a ban on the creation of a human being
through division of a blastocyst, zygote, or embryo or somatic cell nuclear transfer, and
to protect the citizens of the state from potential abuse deriving from cloning
technologies. This ban is not intended to apply to the cloning of human cells, genes,
tissues, or organs that would not result in the replication of an entire human being. Nor is
this ban intended to apply to in vitro fertilization, the administration of fertility enhancing
drugs, or other medical procedures used to assist a woman in becoming or remaining
pregnant, so long as that procedure is not specifically intended to result in the gestation or
birth of a child who is genetically identical to another conceptus, embryo, fetus, or human
being, living or dead.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-1 (1998). The statute goes on to state:
(a) No person or entity shall utilize somatic cell nuclear transfer for the purpose of
initiating or attempting to initiate a human pregnancy nor shall any person create
genetically identical human beings by dividing a blastocyst, zygote, or embryo.
(b) Definitions.
(1)"Somatic cell nuclear transfer" means transferring the nucleus of a human somatic
cell into an oocyte from which the nucleus has been removed;
(2) "Somatic cell" means any cell of a conceptus, embryo, fetus, child, or adult not
biologically determined to become a germ cell;
(3) "Oocyte" means the female germ cell, the egg; and
(4) "Nucleus" means the cell structure that houses the chromosomes, and thus the genes.
(c) Protected research and practices.
(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict areas of biomedical,
microbiological, and agricultural research or practices not expressly prohibited in this
section, including research or practices that involve the use of:
(i) Somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone molecules, DNA,
cells, and tissues; or
(ii) Mitochondrial, cytoplasmic, or gene therapy; or
(iii) Somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques to create animals.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit:
(i) In vitro fertilization, the administration of fertility-enhancing drugs, or other medical
procedures used to assist a woman in becoming or remaining pregnant, so long as that
pregnancy is not specifically intended to result in the production of a child who is
genetically identical to another human being, living or dead;
(ii) Any activity or procedure that results, directly or indirectly in two or more natural
identical twins.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (1998).
Some definitions of cloning are more general. See, e.g., the Missouri law which states:
No state funds shall be used for research with respect to the cloning of a human
person. For purposes of this section, the term "cloning" means the replication of a human
person by taking a cell with genetic material and cultivating such cell through the egg,
embryo, fetal and newborn stages of development into a new human person.
Mo. ANN. §1.217 (1999). A review of the summaries of bills introduced into Congress and into the
various state legislatures indicates numerous attempts to ban cloning. The summaries also indicate
that cloning frequently is defined as somatic nuclear transfer, rather than being defined more broadly
to include embryo splitting. However, taken together, the bills summaries reveal a desire by the
various sponsoring legislators to outlaw the range of cloning techniques.
64. See Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 127 (the nucleus of a cell is that part of the cell in
human beings that "contains the chromosomes. The nucleus is bound by a membrane."). The
removal of the nucleus "leaves the cytoplast-that is, the egg's membrane and the material that once
surrounded its chromosomes." Morell, supra note 5, at 87 (although the author was speaking of the
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cleated egg.' The DNA, which was removed, is then replaced with the
nucleus of a somatic cell (a body cell, a differentiated cell)." When done
in the proper fashion,' this process results in a Copy that is genetically
identical to the Original. 9

procedure being performed on rhesus monkeys, the language is appropriate for human beings, as
well).
65. See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-3 ("Oocyte: the mature female germ
cell; the egg.").
66. See id. at A-2 ("Enucleated egg: an egg from which the nucleus has been removed.").
67. Somatic cells are "[aill cells that are not germline, egg, or sperm cells." Gellner &
Weaver, supra note 14, at 129. A germline cell is "[an ancestral cell to any cell that develops into
the gametes, that is, the egg and sperm cells." Id. at 125.
68. The placement into the enucleated egg of the nucleus of the somatic cell may be
accomplished through a variety of specific methods. In general, two methods may be used. First,
once removed from the somatic cell the nucleus may be injected directly into the enucleated egg. See
generally Weinstock, supra note 1, at 7 (describing a technique in which the nucleus from a somatic
cell was removed and injected into an enucleated egg, which was then chemically stimulated to
develop). Second, the egg and the somatic cell may be induced to fuse through the use of
electrofusion. Nuclear transfer through electrofusion has been described as follows:
Recent experiments have used nuclear transfer into enucleated unfertilized eggs ....
Using these very early stage eggs prolongs the period of possible reprogramming before
the donor nucleus has to undergo the first division. And the advent in the last few years of
electrofusion for both fusion of cells and activation of the egg has been another major
advance, because activation and fusion occur simultaneously. Because these experiments
use fusion of two cells and not simple injection of an isolated nucleus, all of the cellular
components are transferred. Thus, the mitochondria, which contain some genes of their
own, are transferred along with the nucleus. Because an enucleated egg also contains viva
mitochondria, the result of a fusion experiment is a cell with a mixture of mitochondria
from both the donor and the recipient. Since the mitochondrial genes represent an
extremely small proportion of the total number of mammalian genes, mixing of
mitochondria per se is not expected to have any major effects on the cell. However, if the
nucleus donor suffers from a mitochondrial disease, and the egg donor does not, then the
mixture of the mitochondria may significantly alleviate the disease.
I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 19-20.
69. See I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 13 (stating that cloning results in "a
genetic twin" of the original from which the differentiated somatic cell has been taken). "Proper
fashion" as used in the text should be taken in context. In somatic nuclear transfers, the nuclear DNA
is transferred into an unfertilized egg. If the nuclear DNA is derived from a man or from a woman
other than the woman donating the unfertilized egg, there will be small difference in the DNA
possessed by the Original (the donor of the nuclear DNA) and the Copy. The non-nuclear contents of
the unfertilized egg contain small amounts of DNA material; if the unfertilized egg does not come
from the Original (which always must be the case when the Original is a man), then these bits of
DNA will be slightly different than those contained in the non-nuclear material in the Original. See
SOBER, supra note 17, at 4. Sober notes:
[G]enes are found in chromosomes, which are located in the nuclei of cells. However, it
has been known for some time that there are bodies outside the nuclei (in the cytoplasm)
that can provide a mechanism of inheritance. Mitochondria influence various phenotypic
traits, and the DNA they contain is inherited. If a population changes its mitochondrial
characters while its chromosomal features remain the same, is this an instance of
evolution? Perhaps we should stretch the concept of the gene to include
extrachromosomal factors.
Id. (citations omitted). See also I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-2 ("Mitochondrion:
A cellular organelle that provides energy to the cell. The mitochondrion contains some of its own
genes.").
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The procedural difficulty has been to find some way to prepare the
somatic cell in order that the full complement of DNA would be available to the cloned organism. As one writer described the process:
[The scientists who cloned Dolly] introduced the idea of
starving the donor cells to arrest the nucleus in a state thought
to be more compatible with life in the egg cytoplasm.0 Thus
"synchronized," the donor cell is fused to an egg whose own
nucleus has been removed, and development begins." This
staging of the donor nucleus is the technical innovation that
made "Dolly" possible.
In cloning "Dolly," Wilmut and colleagues removed the
nucleus from the egg of a sheep (the recipient oocyte) and inserted the nucleus obtained from a mitotically arrested somatic
cell derived from the udder of another adult sheep (the DNA

donor animal), and successfully reared a lamb-Dolly-that
was the younger identical twin of the donor animal. From a
detached scientific perspective, the Wilmut team's accomplishment was nothing short of a miracle. Cloning a mammal
from an adult cell was thought to be impossible, or, at the very
least, decades away. It is now clear to developmental biologists that the mammalian genome72 undergoes no irreversible
changes during development and can be "reset" to its ground
state. Mammalian cloning, with the birth of Dolly, moved out
of the domain of science fiction and into the realm of the possible, 3
70. Cytoplasm is "the cellular material within the plasma membrane which contains the
organelles but excluding the nucleus which contains the chromosomes." Gellner & Weaver, supra
note 14, at 121; 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at A- I ("Cytoplasm: the contents of a cell
other than the nucleus. Cytoplasm consists of a fluid containing numerous structures that carry out
essential cell functions.").
71. Rothenberg reports the method of fusing as follows:
Dr. Wilmut's Dolly was cloned using an adult cell. News reports state that in Dr.
Wilmut's technique, a spark of electricity causes an adult cell to fuse with an unfertilized
egg from which the nucleus had previously been removed. Molecules in this egg then
program genes in the adult cell to produce an embryo. The embryo is implanted into a
surrogate mother and brought to term. The resulting offspring is a clone of the adult cell
donor. It is thought that the cloning of humans may be possible through use of the same
technique.
Rothenberg, supra note 7, at 641.
72. The genome is "the complete genetic makeup of a cell or organism." 1 CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS, supra note 3, at A-2.
73. The success in cloning Dolly was the result of tremendously difficult work punctuated by
many more failures than the one success. As Goldman describes the ordeal:
The Dolly experiment began with 277 oocytes, 247 of which were fertilized to
produce twenty-nine early embryos that were implanted into thirteen surrogate mothers.
The end result was one single successful live birth. The low success rate, unimpressive in
scientific terms, has been called "an anecdote, not a result" by Sgaramella and Zinder.
These authors noted that there is no definitive proof that Dolly is in fact a clone from a
somatic cell of the donor rather than from a stray embryonic cell in the donor (she was
pregnant at the time the cells were taken). I do not think that we have been completely
misled by accounts of the Dolly clone, but at least one of the objections raised by
Sgaramella and Zinder is serious: If the donor cell was an embryonic cell from Dolly's
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Cloning which is accomplished by embryo splitting results in copies
that are genetically identical to the original. Cloning by somatic nuclear
transfer results in copies containing identical nuclear DNA to the original, but possessing whatever subtle differences that result from the particular chemistry and attributes of the unfertilized egg into which the
DNA was introduced." Somatic nuclear transfer may be used to begin the
growth of cells that then could be induced to produce identical copies
through embryonic splitting." Somatic nuclear transfer also could be
used to create clones from clones.76
Without regard to how the growth of a copy is initiated, genetically
identical copies will develop with slightly different physical
phenotypes." Identical original phenotypes of human beings will not
DNA parent, then Dolly is really a clone of the fetus, not the adult. Embryonic cells as a
source for donor nuclei have been used successfully for some time, and the successful use
of these cells would not be scientifically very startling. Moreover, if Dolly was cloned
from an embryonic cell, she is certainly not the living proof that cloning from adult cells
is possible.
Goldman, supra note 6, at 106-07. Even Goldman notes that "[m]any of the claimed repetitions of
the Dolly experiment actually involve either embryo splitting ... or somatic nuclear transfer using
embryonic rather than adult cells." Id. at 107, n. 12. Goldman states that he believes:
[l1t is more likely that Dolly arose from the nucleus of an adult "stem cell." These are
cells that are relatively undifferentiated, so the scientific accomplishment is not as
exciting as it would be if a fully differentiated donor cell were involved. However, the
practical meaning is unchanged; it would still mean that we can rear an exact genetic
duplicate of an adult.
Id. at 107 n.13. Cf Shapiro, supra note 7, at 195 (describing the cloning of Dolly as involving "a
new technique that had never before been fully successful in mammals, The technique involved
transplanting the genetic material of an adult sheep, apparently obtained from a well-differentiated
somatic cell, into an egg from which the nucleus had been removed."); I CLONING HUMAN BEINGS,
supra note 3, at I (indicating that the cloning of Dolly had "demonstrat[ed] that nuclei from cells
derived from an adult animal could be 'reprogrammed' or that the full genetic complement of such a
cell could be reactivated well into the chronological life of the cell ... [a feat which set] the results
of th[e] experiment apart from prior work.").
74. If both the egg and the nuclear DNA come from the same woman, then all of the DNA
will derive from one person. Otherwise, the nuclear DNA will derive from the donor of the somatic
cell and the non-nuclear DNA will derive from the donor of the enucleated egg.
75. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 112 n.19 ("The press and the public frequently confuse
embryo splitting for cloning by somatic nuclear transfer. In fact, embryo splitting does not involve
nuclear transfer and produces embryos that are identical to each other, not to a preexisting adult.").
76. See Weinstock, supra note 1, at 7 (indicating that in mice cloned through somatic nuclear
transfer, "clones of clones seemed to be just as healthy as the clones of normal mice.").
77. The phenotype is the individual expression of a particular physical, emotional, or
behavioral attribute. The phenotype is a combination of a genotype and environmental forces. It is
for that reason that cloning will never produce more than superficially identical reproductions of the
original genotype. Gellner and Weaver explain the concept of phenotype as follows: Phenotype [is
tihe observed expression of a trait, or character, in an individual. Usually, the phenotype is
determined, or influenced, by both an individual's genes and the environment of the individual.
Symbolically, this relationship can be expressed:
Phenotype = Genotype + Environment
An example of the interaction of genotype and environment to produce a phenotype
is alcoholism. Assuming a genetic component exists for alcoholism, an individual may

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

develop identically even if they are raised in essentially an identical environment. In a gross sense, at a macro level, the neurophysiology, neurochemistry, and general biochemistry are hardwired. Thus, entities sharing
a common genotype will share a common macro-level phenotype and
will share phenotype-related attitudes, values, opinions, beliefs, predispositions, emotions, instincts, movements, and behaviors. At a micro
level, however, the neurophysiology, neurochemistry, and general biochemistry are plastic. Different intellectual, physical, and social experiences will result in slightly different developments and hardwiring of the
brain, the nervous system, and those phenotype-related chemical systems
influencing attitudes, values, opinions, beliefs, predispositions, emotions,
instincts, movements, and behaviors.
At least with respect to the cloning of human beings, while Nature
converges, Nurture diverges. From the moment the organism's growth
begins, differences in environmental factors will cause phenotypic divergence. If, for example, two copies are implanted in the same woman's
womb, one copy may be implanted in a spot where it will receive slightly
better nutrition. And, for example, if one copy is implanted into the
uterus of a woman who eats highly nutritious food and does not smoke,
drink, or take illicit drugs, the copy is likely to fare better than another
copy which is implanted into a woman who eats junk food, smokes two
possess the genes for alcoholism but not express the disease if raised in an environment
without access to alcohol. In such a situation an individual would not have the phenotype
of alcoholism but would possess the genotype.
Gellner & Weaver, supra note 14, at 127. See also SOBER, supra note 17, at 2 (referring to the
"phenotypes of organisms . . . [as] . . . their morphology, physiology, and behavior."). Sober also
notes that differences between individuals' phenotypic "expression may be due to genetic factors, to
environmental factors (such as nutrition), or to a combination of changes in genetic factors and
changes in environmental factors." Id.
In common usage, we speak of cloning as making a copy of the original. For plants and for
many non-human organisms, this may approximate reality. Cloning copies or reproduces the
original's genotype. Except for minor variations caused by environmental factors, the genotype
determines the physical manifestation of the organism, that is, its phenotype. In plants and in nonhuman living organisms in which perception, feeling, and behavior is essentially hard-wired, the
phenotype or physical manifestation may produce an essentially identical copy. In anatomical,
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and general biochemical attributes, the original and the clone
would be virtually indistinguishable from each other. However, even in this situation, the copy is
physically separate and is developmentally distinct from the original. Even in this situation, we
would not in common experience consider the entities to be the same entities. We would, however,
consider the clone to be copies or essentially identical in all meaningful ways.
The situation is more problematic when human beings are involved. Take a naturally
occurring process analogous to cloning: the development of identical twins or identical triplets. The
process by which identical twins or identical triplets develop begins with the fertilization of an egg
by sperm; instead of the fertilized egg developing into a single organism, an identical twin develops
when an undifferentiated cell from the initial zygote splits off and begins developing on its own, and
an identical triplet develops when an undifferentiated cell from one of the two original zygotes splits
off and begins developing on its own. In such cases, barring mutation, the resulting zygotes share an
identical genotype. Subject to in-development mutation, accident, and environment-related
influences, the identical genotype will produce identical physical manifestations, that is, will
produce identical original phenotypes.
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packs of cigarettes and drinks a six-pack of beer every day. Further, even
copies which received relatively similar intrauterine treatment may be
subjected to different environmental conditions (nutrition, exercise, rest,
etc.) after birth. Thus, initially identical genetic identity may nonetheless
result in different phenotypic development.
Part I provided an introduction to genetics and cloning. Two types
of cloning were examined: embryo splitting and somatic nuclear transfer.
With this background on the feasibility and reality of cloning human
beings, Part II will examine the legal issues that will arise as human
clones take their place in society.

II.

CLONING HYPOTHETICALS

The cloning of human beings will raise legal issues as many and as
varied as there are situations in which, and motivations for which, cloning occurs. This part of the Article sets forth and discusses nowhypothetical cloning situations that may occur and that certainly would
raise legal issues. The hypotheticals were created by thought experiments
in which I imagined the use of a particular cloning technique and then
imagined the clone in real-world situations.
Taken as a set, the hypothetical situations raise legal issues which
fall into four categories; taken individually, a specific hypothetical may
raise issues which fall into more than one category. The categories of
issues are captured by the following questions:
1) Is there any situation in which Original and Copy"8 constitute one
legal person, or do they always constitute two legal persons?
2) How should the relationship between the individual who provides
the nuclear DNA and the clone be characterized? What should be
the respective rights and responsibilities of the person who provides
the nuclear DNA and of the clone?
3) How should the relationship between the clone and various third
parties be characterized? What should be the respective rights and
responsibilities of the clone and of various third parties?
78. The cloning of human beings will require either new terminology or the adaptation of old
terminology to new situations. I will use "Original" as the proper name of the human being that
provided the nuclear DNA. I will use "Copy" or "Copy" followed by a number to refer to clones of
Original. See Herbert et al., supra note 7, at 61. Herbert et al., describe the issue as follows:
How would a human clone refer to the donor of its DNA? "Mom" is not right, because
the woman or women who supplied the egg and the womb would more appropriately be
called Mother."Dad" isn't right, either. A traditional father supplies only half the DNA in
an offspring. Judith Martin, etiquette's "Miss Manners," suggests, "Most honored sir or
madame." Why? "One should always respect one's ancestors," she says, "regardless of
what they did to bring one into the world." That still leaves some linguistic confusion.
Michael Agnes, editorial director of Webster's New World Dictionary, says that "clonee"
may sound like a good term, but it's too ambiguous. Instead, he prefers "original" and
"copy." And above all else, advises Agnes, "Don't use 'Xerox."'
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4) How should the relationship between clones be characterized?
What should be the respective rights and responsibilities of the
clones towards each other?
A.

The Case of the Killed Clone

Original clones herself using an enucleated egg that she provides.79
Original raises Copy until Copy reaches the age of 22. At that time,
Original becomes jealous of Copy's "youth" and, in a premeditated act,
shoots Copy through the heart. Copy dies. Is Original's action murder,
partial suicide, or partial self-mutilation?
Would a reversal of roles affect the outcome? Assume Copy became
jealous of the success and position which Original had attained by virtue
of Original's greater age, and, in a premeditated act, Copy shot Original
through the heart. Original died. Would Copy's action be murder, partial
suicide, or partial self-mutilation?
In the first situation, Original destroys a copy of Original's own
DNA, a copy which she "created." May Original exercise such prerogative with respect to "her" unique genotype? Does Original's initial "possession" of the genotype give her complete control over the existence of
any expression of the genotype, even an expression of the genotype
which is fully-grown? Parental relationships based on sexual reproduction provide no direct guidance. The genetic relationship between Original and Copy is different from the genetic relationship between a parent
and a child who is created by sexual reproduction. The child produced
through sexual reproduction does not share an identical genotype with
either parent; thus, a parent of a child created by sexual reproduction
could never make a claim based on prior possession of a unique genotype.
The relationship between Original and Copy also is different than the
relationship between identical twins." Identical twins are born into a
situation in which an identical genotype exists through a natural, albeit a
rare, occurrence (a) not of their making and (b) which results in the twins
gaining possession of the genotype at essentially the same time. The
separate manifestations of the genotype is not the result of one person
"artificially" creating another person who shares the same genotype; put
79. When the individual to be cloned is a man or is a woman who is incapable of carrying a
child, a surrogate mother will have to be used." Surrogacy is unregulated on the federal level and
remains subject to a confusing patchwork of state statutes and contract principles." Rothenberg,
supra note 7, at 646. Rothenberg notes that cases have held that a surrogate mother is not a child's
legal mother, Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786-87 (Cal. 1993), and that the guiding principle is
not contract law, but the child's best interests, In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (N.J. 1988).
Rothenberg also raises the legitimate question of whether "the particular features of adult cloning
call for federal guidance?" Rothenberg, supra note 7, at 646.
80. Identical twins do not share an identical genotype with either parent. Therefore, neither
parent could claim prerogative over the twins based on prior possession of the twins' genotype.
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a different way, one twin cannot claim any type of prerogative over the
other twin based on prior possession of the genotype.'
Assuming one concludes Original does have complete dominion
over her unique nuclear DNA, 2 would Original's ability to act be limited
in the situation in which the enucleated egg from which Copy developed
did not come from Original? Would the donation of an enucleated egg by
a woman other than the Original give the donor of the egg some prerogative with respect to Copy's existence? On what grounds?
In the second situation, the situation in which Copy kills Original,
Copy cannot claim dominion over a unique genotype by virtue of initial
"possession." Further, Copy cannot claim that she created Original or in
any manner gave physical expression to Copy's genotype. Although
Copy might be seen as an extension or appendage of Original, the opposite cannot be true.
B. The Case of the Double's Troubles
The first hypothetical raised the issue of whether the person to first
possess a genotype (Original) has the right to control the existence of
person later created with her identical genotype (Copy). Are the rights of
one person to control her genotype different when the issue is whether to
permit the creation of a copy of a genotype rather than to terminate the
existence of a copy of a genotype? Put in a more concrete manner: Does
one identical twin have the right to veto (or somehow restrict) an act of
cloning by the other identical twin? Two hypothetical situations demonstrate what might occur.
First hypothetical: Original 1 and Original 2 are identical twins.
Original 1 wishes to clone herself using both an enucleated egg that she

81. The first-born and, thus, the "older" twin may argue that she has dominion over the
genotype. Historically, the law has not accorded the older twin this right. In addition, there is no way
to tell whether the "older" twin actually was the first to "possess" the genotype. that is, the twin who
developed directly from the fertilized egg, rather than from a cell which split off from the cells
which developed directly from the fertilized egg.
82. The purpose of this Article is to set forth hypothetical situations in order to promote
discussion, not to provide "answers" to them. I feel compelled offer an opinion concerning the
resolution of this hypothetical, however. A distinction must be drawn between Original's right to
replicate her genotype and her right to control the actions and existence of the person who results
from the replication of Original's genotype. If somatic nuclear transplantation is lawful, then
Original has an affirmative right to replicate her genotype. However, precisely because the essence
of cloning is the replication of a genotype, Original's decision to clone herself should act as a full
and irrevocable grant to Copy of the right to possess and use that genotype. In addition to this quasiproperty analysis, Copy's status as an entity to be accorded the full panoply of human rights is
ensured by Copy's attributes as an organically independent, sentient being who possesses
independent consciousness, independent moral decision-making ability, and independent attitudes,
values, opinions, beliefs, emotions, and preferences. Both prior to and after Copy reaches the age of
majority, Original should possess only those fights to control Copy's existence and activities that a
parent should have to control the existence and activities of a child created by sexual reproduction.
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will provide and one of her own somatic cells."3 Original 2 seeks a court
order enjoining Original 1 from cloning herself. Original 2 argues that
she has an interest of some type that should prevail over Original l's
desire to clone herself.
Original 2 could argue that Original I's act of cloning herself would
be the same as forcing Original 2 to reproduce against her will. ' Original
2 would have to concede that she would not be forced to engage in activities such as carrying Copy to term, giving birth to Copy, or raising
Copy, all of which normally would be consequences of Original 2's decision to reproduce. However, Original 2 could argue that a core principle
involved in the right to control one's reproduction is the right to control
the propagation of one's genotype. Original 2 may feel it would profoundly violate her sense of individuality and distinctiveness for there to
be another copy of her genotype in existence.85 This right is brought into
stark relief by the ability of Original 1 to clone herself. The right could
not have been put to the test prior to the ability to clone an adult human
being. Should the injunction be granted, particularly if Original 1 is
willing and able to engage in successful sexual reproduction?
Second hypothetical: Original 1 and Original 2 are identical twins.
Because of their identical genotype, both twins possess the physical attributes and innate musical abilities to develop world-class opera voices.
However, when she was in college, Original 1 decided not to pursue a
career in opera, a decision she now regrets. Original 2 studied and practiced diligently, and she achieved worldwide fame.
Original 1 realizes she will never be able to enjoy a career similar to
the career enjoyed by Original 2. However, Original 1 desires to live
vicariously through a clone possessed of similar talents and guided by
Original 1 as the clone's "stage mother." Original 1 knows that a clone
would come into her prime as a singer at just the time Original 2 would
be retiring from singing. Original 1 believes a person with an appearance
and a voice substantially identical to those possessed by the young
Original 2 would be able to take advantage of the name recognition and
"voice loyalty" which Original 2 has achieved. In addition to the emo83. Original 1 might desire to clone herself because she is unable or unwilling to engage in
successful sexual reproduction or because she simply wants to bring a life into the world that is her
genetic duplicate.
84. Of course, Original I likely would argue that denying her the right to clone herself would
be the same as denying Original 1 an equally fundamental right: the fight to control her reproductive
decisions.
85. Original 2 would not be precluded from making this argument by the existence of Original
1. Original 2 may view Original I's existence as "natural," unlike the existence of an "artificially
produced" clone. Alternatively, Original 2 may not like that her unique identity is diminished by the
presence of Original 1, but she may accept the situation as fait accompli; although law and morality
prevent Original 2 from destroying the copy of her genotype, Original 2 may consider it to be an
open question whether Original I may be prevented from producing another identical copy of the
genotype.

1999]

DtJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN

tional satisfaction Original I hopes to enjoy from this imagined vicarious
existence, Original 1 plans to serve as the clone's manager and to be
compensated for that role. To fulfill her desires, Original I intends to
clone herself using an enucleated egg provided by her and one of her
own somatic cells.
Original 2 seeks a court order enjoining Original 1 from cloning herself. In addition to the argument that she possesses a privacy right to
control the propagation of her genotype, Original 2 argues that she has a
commercial property interest in the genotype possessed by the twins and
that Original l's act of cloning herself would be an infringement on that
commercial interest. Original 2's direct commercial interest in her genotype is its ability to produce the phenotype of her physical appearance
and voice. 6 In addition, Original 2 alleges she has an indirect interest in
her genotype (and the resulting phenotype) because she has worked to
turn the phenotype expression into a marketable commodity. Original 2
argues that any clone of Original 1 would be exploiting Original 2's
name, voice, face, and good will. Should the injunction be granted, particularly if Original 1 is willing and able to engage in successful sexual
reproduction?
C. The Case of the Truly Fertile Octogenarian

Original is eighty years old and is not capable of conceiving and
bearing a child through sexual reproduction. Original has no living relatives. She has herself cloned using an enucleated egg from a woman who
also serves as a surrogate mother. 7 The surrogate mother relinquishes
custody of Copy to Original upon Copy's birth, and Original raises Copy
with the help of a nanny. When Original is eighty-five-years-old and
Copy is slightly over four years old, Original dies. What would happen in
each of the following situations?
First hypothetical: Original had $10,000,000 in an individual savings
account at the time Original died. Would Copy have ownership of the
account on the theory that Copy simply is a "younger" version of Original (i.e., a genotype identical to, and a phenotype similar to, Original at a
86. Although he was discussing protecting DNA information, the following statement
indicates the protection already, afforded to phenotypic expressions under the law.
State and federal circuit courts have extended the privacy right to encompass a
variety of infringements against the particular manifestations of a person's identity
besides the paradigm cases of unwarranted intrusions into his diary, personal records, or
private behavior. Such infringements include expropriation of a person's name,
photograph, or likeness; his signature; and his voice or even a likeness of his voice.
Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood,and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 179, 18889 (1998) (footnote omitted).
87. It might be possible to extract a viable unfertilized egg from Original. However, given
Original's age, the use of an unfertilized egg from a surrogate mother is a more realistic possibility.
The reader should consider whether the answers to the questions posed in this hypothetical would be
altered should Original use one of her own unfertilized eggs and use a surrogate mother to carry
Copy to term.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

younger age)? " What if in the application for the account Original did
not put a name but only a reference to an attached document which contained her complete genotype or a sufficient number of genetic markers
that only a person who possessed the Original's exact nuclear genotype
would be able to match the "name?"
By comparison, consider a much more common occurrence. When
Original was thirty-five years old, she inherited $250,000 when a rich
aunt died. Original opened a savings account in her own name and deposited all of the money in the account. Original exercised restraint and
did not withdraw any funds from the account. When Original is eightyfive, she decides to withdraw some of the funds. Fifty years have elapsed
since the account was opened. Original (eighty-five years old) is genetically identical to the thirty-five-year old Original who opened the account. The eighty-five-year-old Original's phenotype (the physical expression of genetically influenced traits) is likely to be profoundly dissimilar to her phenotype at thirty-five. The attitudes, values, opinions,
beliefs, emotions, preferences, and the like of the eighty-five-year-old
Original are likely to be profoundly different than those of the thirtyfive-year-old Original who opened the account. Indeed, both the physical
phenotype and the mental and emotional attributes of the two versions of
"Original" may be as different as between Original and Copy. However,
the eighty-five-year-old Original would be entitled to the money. Why
should the eighty-five-year-old Original receive the money from the account in this example? How is her situation similar to or different from
the situation of Copy in the first hypothetical?
Second hypothetical: Original dies without a will. Would an estate be
created? Without the operation of intestate succession would Copy own
the assets that normally would comprise Original's "estate"? 9 If an estate
would be created by Original's death, under existing intestate statutes
would the assets of the estate pass to Copy? If so, what designation
would Copy take? Would Copy be considered Original's twin (but much

88. The possibility of a person desiring to leave money to himself has been recognized. See
Bailey, supra note 5, at 52. Bailey describes the issue:
What about a rich jerk who is so narcissistic that he wants to clone himself so that he can
give all his wealth to himself'? .... Today, rich people, and regular people too, make an
effort to pass along some wealth to their children when they die. People will their estates
to their children not only because they are connected by bonds of love but also because
they have genetic ties. The principle is no different for clones.
Id.
89. This hypothetical raises the issue of whether the Original-Copy relationship is sufficeitnly
dissmiliar from a parent-child or identical twin-identical twin relationship that a new property estate
should be created. Like joint tenancy or tenancy in the entireties, the estate would permit the
immediate passage of the property interest from Original to Copy upon Original's death. Unlike joint
tenancy or tenancy in the entireties, Copy would not possess more than in inchoate interest in
Original's property during Original's lifetime. This new interest might be called "genetic tennancy"
or "genotypic tenancy."
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younger) sister? daughter?' or simply a general family member based on
genetic lineage? 9' If Copy is permitted to take Original's assets directly,
that is, without the assets passing through an estate, how would--or
should-the assets be taxed? Does there need to be a separate estate tax
when the recipient is a clone? If Copy is treated as the same being as
Original for ownership purposes, what impact will this have on those
individuals who otherwise might have been able to claim a share of the
assets? Has a death occurred which requires Original's will to be probated? If Original had married, should her husband have the right to
"elect against the will" if there is no need to probate the will?
Third hypothetical: Assume Original cloned herself when she was
sixty, not eighty, years old. Assume, further, that twenty-five years later
Copy kills Original in a premeditated manner. Finally, assume the relevant state possesses a statute that prohibits murderers from taking by
intestate succession. Would Copy be permitted to take Original's estate?
Would the killing of Original be murder, partial suicide, or partial selfmutilation?
Finally, is there any reason to consider Original and Copy to be one
person for the purpose of wealth transfers at death even though one
might not consider Original and Copy to be one individual for the purpose of Original exercising control over Copy's actions and existence?
D. The Case of the Infant "Spouse"
Original married Allen. The couple wants to have children, but
Original is unable to conceive, either naturally or through in vitro fertilization. Original has herself cloned using one of her own enucleated eggs,
and she carries Copy to term. 2 From the moment of Copy's birth, Allen
acted as her father, that is, Allen formed an emotional attachment to
Copy, engaged in feeding, dressing, and cleaning Copy, and purchased
items such as clothing, food, and diapers for Copy. Six months after de-

90.

See Katheleen R. Guzman. Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the

Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997) (discussing the inadequacy of current legal
models when technology and other developments render it obsolete); Christine A. Djalleta,
Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: ProposedAmendments to the Uniform Probate Code in
Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 354 (1994).

91. This hypothetical raises the issue of whether the Original-Copy relationship is sufficiently
dissimilar from a parent-child relationship that a new category of inheritance would need to be
created for statutes of intestate succession. The issue would not appear to be relevant if Copy were
the only surviving family member. However, how should property be distributed if Original's
husband were living? if children produced by sexual reproduction between Original and Original's
husband were living, but Original's husband had died-either before or after Copy was created and
bom?
92. Other writers have suggested this scenario. See, e.g., Rothenberg, supra note 7, at 641
(discussing the implications of the situation in which "a child could be conceived and carried by one
person. A woman could have one of her adult cells fused with one of her own unfertilized eggs from
which the nucleus had been removed. The resulting embryo could be implanted in her womb and
carried to term.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

livering Copy, Original dies. Allen has taken no steps to "adopt" Copy.
Should Copy be considered to be Allen's wife? daughter? an in-law? or a
complete stranger?93
Notwithstanding any legal presumption which might exist that any
child born during a marriage is the product of the marriage, this hypothetical clearly indicates that Copy has no biological ties to Allen. The
method of "conception" is such that there would be little doubt that Copy
is not genetically related to Allen.
Measured by genotype, Copy is identical to Original, Allen's deceased wife. Copy is not Allen's daughter in any biological sense. Although Copy was born into a situation in which Allen treated Copy as a
daughter, Copy is biologically no more of a daughter than would be any
infant found on Allen's doorstep, taken into the home, and raised by Allen. Should Allen be assumed as a matter of law to have parental responsibility for any clones created by Original during their marriage unless he
seeks a court order freeing him from responsibility or takes some public
action in which he repudiates the responsibility? Should Allen be free
from parental responsibilities unless he specifically accepts them, either
through court action or some form of public recognition (such as signing
a birth certificate)? Should the action of caring for Copy constitute the
basis for establishing a parental relationship, particularly since there
would be no biological parent other than Original?
Should the treatment of Copy be any different if Copy were the result of somatic nuclear transfer using Original's enucleated egg and the
DNA from Allen? Would Copy be Allen's twin (but much younger)
brother? son? Copy certainly would be related biologically to Allen.
Copy would be a product of the marriage in the sense that both partners
would have contributed DNA to the initial cell which developed into
Copy, although Allen's contribution to Copy's DNA would have been
significantly greater than Original's contribution and would have been
significantly greater than Original's contribution in traditional reproduction.9'

93. See Id. at 645. Rothenberg notes:
Adult cell cloning upsets our notion of familial relationships. Creation of a child by
cloning requires the contribution of DNA material, an unfertilized egg, and a ready
womb. What language will we use to describe this "family"? By what criteria will we
determine the claim of parental status of each of the contributors to the cloning process?
Id. See also Bernadine Healy, Ian Wilmut: Breaking The Clone Barrier, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, at 176,
176 ("What is the role of clones in society? Are they an asexual variant on incest? Can they become
human slaves or organ donors? Who are their parents? Who is their family?").
94. Assuming that same-sex marriage is legalized, the question of parentage may be faced
where one woman provides an unfertilized egg and the other woman provides the nuclear DNA. Is
the resulting copy a daughter? Whose daughter?
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E. The Case of the Supportive Father
Allen and Original are married. The couple is unable to conceive due
to Allen's fertility problems. The couple decides against in vitro fertilization using a sperm donor. Instead, Original has herself cloned using
one of her own unfertilized eggs, and she carries Copy to term. Allen
takes no steps to adopt Copy, but treats Copy as his daughter. Five years
later, Original divorces Allen. Does Allen have the same custody or
visitation rights normally accorded to biological fathers? If Allen does
not have a father's custody or visitation rights, should Allen be treated as
Copy's father for the purpose of child support?
As in the previous hypothetical, notwithstanding any presumption
that any child born during a marriage is the product of the marriage,
Copy has no biological ties to Allen. Copy is not a daughter in any biological sense. Although Copy was born into a situation in which Allen
treated Copy as a daughter, Copy is biologically no more of a daughter
than any infant who found on Allen's doorstep. Should Allen be assumed, as a matter of law, to have parental responsibility for any clones
created by Original during their marriage unless he seeks a court order
freeing him from responsibility or takes some public action in which he
repudiates the responsibility? Should Allen be free from parental responsibility unless he specifically accepts them, either through court action or
some form of public recognition (such as signing a birth certificate)?
Should the action of caring for Copy constitute the basis for establishing
a parental relationship?
Again raising the questions from the previous hypothetical, should
Allen's rights and responsibilities be any different if Copy was the product of somatic nuclear transfer using Original's enucleated egg and the
DNA from Allen? Would Copy be Allen's (much younger) twin brother?
Allen's son? Copy certainly would be related biologically to Allen. Copy
would be a product of the marriage in the sense that both partners would
have contributed to the initial cell which developed into Copy. Copy
would be a product of the marriage in the sense that both partners would
have contributed DNA to the initial cell which developed into Copy,
although Allen's contribution to Copy's DNA would have been significantly greater than Original's contribution and would have been significantly greater than Original's normal contribution.
F. The Case of the Child (?) Mistress
Assume Allen and Original are married. Allen is a member of the
armed services, and he is assigned to a one-year overseas mission. During this time-and without his knowledge (and, therefore, without his
agreement) 95-Original has herself cloned using one of her own enucle95. The consent to which I refer is not the consent to Original's general decision to procreate.
Nor do I refer to consent to terminate a pregnancy. Rather, I merely refer to Allen's agreement to
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ated eggs, and she carries Copy to term. When Allen returns from his
tour of duty, he is surprised by the presence of Copy. Consider your responses to the questions in the previous hypotheticals. Then consider
whether your responses would be any different if-as in this situationCopy had been created without Allen's knowledge or agreement?
Now, consider a variation on this hypothetical. Assume that prior to
Allen's return, Original sends Copy to be raised by a college friend of
Original who lives 2,000 miles away. Copy is raised by Original's friend
as if Copy were the friend's own daughter. Allen is never told of Copy's
existence. Copy is never told about either Allen or Original.
Twenty years later, Allen still has no knowledge of Copy's existence, and Allen and Original are still married. Through a twist of fate,
Allen and Copy meet, fall in love, and have sexual relations. Is Allen
committing adultery? Is Allen committing incest? With respect to
whether Allen is committing adultery or incest, would-or should-it
make any difference whether Allen knew that Copy was genetically related to Original?96
G. The Case of the GenerationalClones97

Assume Original is unmarried. Original wants to raise several children, preferably children who are genetically related to her. Original also
participate in a venture which might give rise to Allen having a set of profound and long-term
parental rights and, more to the point, responsibilities.
96. A variation of this hypothetical involves "The Case of the Unknowing Cloning." In this
scenario, DNA from an Original is collected without Original's knowledge and permission. The
DNA is then used to complete a somatic nuclear transfer. This hypothetical would most likely arise
when the person who is seeking to accomplish the cloning is either infatuated with Original (such as
a fan who wishes to go one better than having Original's baby) or believes there to be some profit
from cloning Original (such as an individual who cloned an elderly billionaire in the hope that the
clone would inherit or take by intestate succession when the elderly billionaire died). Situations of
unknowing cloning raise the same panoply of issues. First, what is the legal relationship, if any,
between Original and Copy? Second, what are the "parental" rights and responsibilities, if any, of
Original? Third, what are Copy's rights, if any, to seek child support, take by intestate succession,
and the like. Other writers have suggested this general scenario. Consider the following statement:
Could cloning be criminally misused? If the technology to clone humans existed today, it
would be almost impossible to prevent someone from cloning you without your
knowledge or permission, says Philip Bereano, professor of technology and public policy
at the University of Washington. Everyone gives off cells all the time-whenever we
give a blood sample, for example, or visit the dentist-and those cells all contain one's
full complement of DNA. What would be the goal of such 'drive-by' cloning? Well, what
if a woman were obsessed with having the child of an apathetic man? Or think of the
commercial value of a dynasty-building athletic pedigree or a heavenly singing voice.
Even though experience almost certainly shapes these talents as much as genetic gifts, the
unscrupulous would be unlikely to be deterred.
Herbert et al., supra note 7, at 61-62.
97. Other writers have suggested the possibility of multiple generations of clones. See, e.g.,
Goldman, supra note 6, at 115 (discussing the use of cloning as an alternative method of
reproduction, the author states: "If there is a genetic basis for the infertility, then the cloned
'offspring' would likely be infertile as well. In a few generations, we would be seeing
great-grand-clones.").
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decides she wants to complete childbearing at one time. To achieve these
goals, Original participates in the following cloning procedure:
Step #1: A somatic cell is taken from Original and, using one of
Original's enucleated eggs, the doctor stimulates the development of Copy #1. Thus, Copy #1's genetic material is completely derived from Original.
Step #2: After the cells that will develop into Copy #1 have be-

gun to divide but before they have begun to differentiate, the
doctor removes one of the cells and stimulates it so that it begins
to develop into Copy K." Copy #2 is an embryonic clone, that
is, a clone created from an undifferentiated embryonic cell
through embryo splitting. Because Copy #1's genetic material
was completely derived from Original, Copy #2's genetic material also is completely identical to the genetic material possessed
by Original.
Step #3: After the cells that will develop into Copy #2 have begun to divide but before they have begun to differentiate, the
doctor removes one of the cells and stimulates it so that it begins
to develop into Copy #3. Copy #3 also is an embryonic clone,
that is, a clone created from an undifferentiated embryonic cell
through embryo splitting. Copy #3's genetic material also is
completely identical to the genetic material possessed by Copy
#1 and Copy #2.
Step #4: The three groups of cells are implanted in Original's
womb, where they develop normally.
How are Original and the three clones related? Are there Original
and three identical clones/siblings, each of whom should be considered
to be part of a single generation?99 Proceeding backwards, is there a
great-grandchild (Copy #3), a grandchild (Copy #2), a child (Copy #1),
and a parent (Original)? If there is Original and three generations of
clones, how are the generations to be measured for legal purposes such
as inheritance? Should clone generations be measured by order of "conception/creation" or by order of birth? What would happen, for example,
if the clones were born in reverse order of "conception/creation?"' ' It
would be possible for Original's great-granddaughter (measured by time

98. 1 am going to offer no arguments regarding when "life" begins. I assume that those
individuals who believe that "life" begins at conception would take the position that Copy #1 is a
human being, although barely begun in its development. I assume that those individuals who believe
that "life" begins at the time a fetus is viable would take the position that Copy #1 is not a human
being until the point of viability. I am going to make the assumption that for determining the lineage
of clones for legal purposes that clones created at the same time would either be considered siblings
or they must be considered in generations.
99. Although one must look at the molecular level to find them, there undoubtedly are slight
differences between the initial cells that produced the three clones.
100. The birth order of the clones might be difficult to determine if they all are implanted in,
and carried to term by, Original. However, no such problem would present itself if the three different
clones were kept separate and implanted into, and brought to term by, three different women.
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of creation) to be born before Original's daughter (again, measured by
time of creation).
To illustrate the problem: What would happen if Original died intestate on the first anniversary of the birth of the clones? Assuming that
the clones were to be assigned designations used in existing intestate
succession statutes, would all three clones be considered siblings, with
Original's estate passing equally to all three clones? If this were not the
outcome, which clone would be considered to be Original's daughter for
the purpose of intestate succession? Would Copy #1 be considered to be
Original's daughter because Copy #1 was the first clone to be conceived/created? Or would Copy #3 be considered to be Original's
daughter because Copy #3 was the first clone to be born?
H. The Case of the Grandmother Who Never Had a Daughter

Assume the initial facts of the previous hypothetical. Doctors create
three clones: Copy #1, Copy #2, and Copy #3. Prior to implanting the
developing cells into Original's womb, Copy #1 and Copy #3 die in
petri. Only Copy #2 is implanted into Original's womb,"' and Copy #2
grows to term and is born alive and well.
What is Original's relationship to Copy #2? Assuming Copy #2 is
not treated as being Original for legal purposes, is Copy #2 Original's
daughter? To all but the doctor who assisted Original, it would appear so.
However, if the source of the genetic material which created Copy #2 is
considered as being the dispositive factor, then Copy #2 is akin to Original's granddaughter. The oddity in this situation is that Original would
have a granddaughter without ever having had a daughter born alive; and
Copy #2 would have a grandmother without ever having had a mother
born alive.
The objection may be raised that for legal purposes a clone should
not be considered to be a person unless it is born alive or at least until it
has reached the point, of being viable. Consider, then, the situation in
which all three copies are implanted in Original and grow to the point of
viability. What would be the relationship between Original and Copy #2
should Copy #1 be still born? What would be the relationship between
Original and Copy #2 if Copy #1 was born alive, but died immediately
thereafter, and Copy #2 was subsequently born alive? 2

101. Because the deaths of Copy #1 and Copy #3 occurred in petri, the doctor could be certain
that it was Copy #2 who resulted from the cells implanted in Original.
102. Many permutations of these facts could be proffered, but the hypothetical situations in the
text raise the main point: Could there be situations in which an Original has a granddaughter without
ever having had a daughter born alive? Could there be situations in which a clone could ever have a
grandmother (or, in Copy #3's case, a great-grandmother) without ever having had a mother (or
grandmother) born alive?
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L The Case of Vehicular Confusion
Assume that in the previous example Original had herself cloned
only one time. Assume further that during the eighth month of her pregnancy (a time by which Copy was viable), Original was involved in an
automobile accident caused entirely by a drunk driver. Unfortunately, the
accident resulted in Original's death. Fortunately, Copy was delivered
alive by caesarian section. With what crime should the drunk driver be
charged? Would the drunk driver prevail in the argument that no charge
of vehicular manslaughter should be filed because Copy really "is"
Original due to the fact that Original and Copy share identical DNA?
J. The Case of the Cloned Criminal

Assume Original is convicted of first-degree murder and is sentenced
to die. Original has herself cloned using one of her own enucleated eggs,
and she carries Copy to term. Should Copy be considered to be the same
entity as Original and be executed along with Original? If Copy dies
prior to the time Original is scheduled to be executed should Original be
deemed to have died, and should Original be released? Would the State
have to accept Copy to be executed if Original were to offer Copy for
execution in lieu of Original?
K. The Case of the Cloned Cadaver 3
Assuming deceased individuals can be cloned--either by immediate
intervention or by recovering a sufficient amount of undecayed DNAthree scenarios seems possible. Should these scenarios be permitted? If
they are permitted, what is the relationship of Copy to Original for intestate purposes, as a "child" in a will, and the like?
First hypothetical: Original, a man, dies in an accident. Susan, Original's distraught spouse, wants to have a child by Original even though he
103. Other writers have discussed this hypothetical. See, e.g., Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew
Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analvsis, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 571, 580
(1998):
Although the scenarios here border on science fiction, it is no longer technically
inconceivable to imagine someone's preserved somatic cell lines being used to
reconstitute a genetic replicate of that individual. The possibility that one's genetic
"twin" might be brought into being long after one's death dramatically illustrates the
observation that DNA can be used at any time in the future, with or without one's
consent, to reveal intimate, identifying facts about an individual.
Id.; Herbert et al., supra note 7, at 59:
Will it be possible to clone the dead? Perhaps, if the body is fresh, says Randall Prather, a
cloning expert at the University of Missouri-Columbia. The cloning method used by
Wilmut's lab requires fusing an egg cell with the cell containing the donor's DNA. And
that means the donor cell must have an intact membrane around its DNA. The membrane
starts to fall apart after death, as does DNA. But, yes, in theory at least it might be
possible.
Id.; Howett, supra note 14, at 17 ("It's possible to analyze three individual hair follicles, you can
recover enough DNA from this, tissue fragments from both intact or pieces of decayed corpses, or
specimens that have embedded in paraffin in hospitals and kept for long periods of time.").
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is deceased. Susan decides to have Original cloned rather than to conceive a child in vitro using one of her unfertilized eggs and sperm stored
by Original in a sperm bank or sperm obtained from Original post mortem. At Susan's request, some of Original's somatic cells are taken from
Original's body immediately after his death and are preserved. Later,
Susan uses one of her enucleated eggs and undergoes a somatic nuclear
transplant procedure using DNA preserved from Original.
Second hypothetical: Original, a woman, dies in an accident. Allen,
Original's distraught spouse, wants to have a child by Original even
though she is deceased. Original decides to have Original cloned instead
of providing sperm to be mixed with an unfertilized egg which Original
had stored at a fertility clinic. At Allen's request, some of Original's somatic cells are taken from Original's body immediately after her death
and are preserved. Later, Allen has Original cloned using somatic nuclear
transfer involving both Original's unfertilized egg and the DNA obtained
from the somatic cells taken from Original after her death. Allen employs
the use of a surrogate mother to carry Copy to term, at which time Copy
is born healthy.
Third hypothetical: Original, a well-known rock star, dies. During
an autopsy, somatic tissue is preserved in order to provide samples for
further testing, should it be required. Susan, a devoted fan of Original,
works at the hospital at which Original's tissue is being preserved. Susan
obtains a small amount of the tissue and, using one of her unfertilized
eggs, has a somatic nuclear transfer procedure performed using the DNA
from Original. The resulting cells are implanted in Susan's uterus, she
carried Copy to term, and Copy is born alive.

CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth a number of hypothetical situations to
build a framework for policy makers and others in considering the practical legal issues that will be raised by the cloning of human beings. The
hypothetical situations reveal that in addition to the legality of human
cloning, four broad categories of issues exist. Rather than reacting to the
cloning of human beings, policy makers, particularly legislators, should
proactively consider each of the possible legal issues and provide a comprehensive statutory scheme to allow specific resolution of these issues.

WHEN DAUBERT GETS ERIE: MEDICAL CERTAINTY AND
MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL COURT
ROBIN KUNDIs CRAIG*

SUMMARY

When the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. in 1993, it changed the process and standards
for admitting expert testimony in federal court. Since that decision, most
federal courts have assumed that the Daubert analysis is the only standard governing the admissibility of expert testimony in federal courteven in diversity medical malpractice and medical products liability
cases. However, Daubert did not modify, or even significantly discuss,
the Erie doctrine, leaving questions unanswered regarding the
admissibility of expert medical testimony when federal courts sit in
diversity. In particular, states often impose medical certainty
requirements on expert medical testimony that can affect that testimony's
admissibility, the expert's competence to testify, or the plaintiff's burden
of proof. This article argues that because these state medical certainty
standards generally are substantive enough under Erie to apply in
diversity cases and do not directly conflict with the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the Daubert analysis, federal courts sitting in diversity
should apply the relevant state standard as well as the Daubert analysis
in diversity cases that involve medical experts.
I. INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice cases and certain kinds of medicine-related
products liability cases-those involving pharmaceutical drugs or medical devices, for example-generally require expert medical testimony on
the issue of causation: can, and did, the doctor, drug, or device cause the
plaintiff's injuries? In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubertv.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' and established a new analysis pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for the admissibility of expert
medical testimony on causation in federal court. Under the Daubert rul-
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Rule 702 provides that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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ing, a federal trial judge "must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."3 The focus
of a Daubert analysis is on an expert's methodology, not on his or her
conclusions 4-that is, Daubert asks whether the proffered testimony is
grounded in scientific knowledge, not whether it is sufficient to prove
plaintiff's case.'
Federal court medical malpractice and products liability cases, however, are almost always diversity cases asserting state law claims, 6 and
state law often imposes special standards of certainty for the reliability of
expert medical testimony. In some states, medical experts must testify
"to a reasonable degree of medical certainty," 7 while in others they must
testify "to a reasonable degree of medical probability," ' that the doctor,
drug, or device caused the plaintiff's injury or condition. Throughout this

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
4. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
5. See id. at 589-90, 595.
6. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bosco, 120 F.3d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Dow Coming Corp.,
114 F.3d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1997); Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184,
189 (1st Cir. 1997). The most common exception is medical malpractice cases against medical
personnel who are federal government employees, such as hospital personnel at Veterans
Administration hospitals. These claims are only cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994), and thus are matters of federal question. The Supreme Court, however, has
construed the Tort Claims Act as requiring federal courts to apply state law. Molzof v. United States,
502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7, 11 (1962); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-19
(1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65, 68-69 (1955); United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 370 (1949)). Several federal circuits have explicitly extended
this principle to medical malpractice actions against federal employees. Zuchowicz v. United States,
140 F.3d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Taylor v. United States, 121 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1997));
Abraham v. United States, 932 F.2d 900, 902 (1 lth Cir. 1991); Campbell v. United States, 904 F.2d
1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990); Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Shaw
v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984)); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1243
(6th Cir. 1988) (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-20 (1957)); LeMaire v.
United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Holler v. United States, 724 F.2d 104, 105
(10th Cir. 1983); Collins v. United States, 708 F.2d 499, 500 (10th Cir. 1983)); Ayers v. United
States, 750 F.2d 449, 452 n.l (5th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1963); Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972
(1976)); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Kington v. United
States, 396 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1968); Kossick v. United States,
330 F.2d 933, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964); Hungerford v. United
States, 307 F.2d 99, 101-02 (9th Cir. 1962); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234, 235-40 (5thCir.
1962)). Therefore, state law only rarely does not govern a medical malpractice case.
7. See, e.g., Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff failed to show that job stress caused his heart disease when no doctor "opined
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that job stress was a causative factor in the disease
claimant suffered").
8. See, e.g., Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998) (holding that a doctor was not
qualified to testify as to causation when he could not say that any medication most probably caused
the plaintiffs tinnitus).
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article these standards are referred to collectively as "state medical certainty standards." State courts will generally exclude expert medical testimony that does not meet the applicable medical certainty standard. As a
result, the Erie doctrine presents a potential wrinkle for the Daubert
analysis regarding medical expert testimony in federal court.9 Under
Erie, federal courts hearing state-law claims must apply state substantive
law. Should a federal court sitting in diversity admit expert medical testimony that satisfies Daubert if that testimony does not meet the state-law
medical certainty standard?
Most federal courts to date have answered that question in the negative, deeming Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert the exclusive
measures of whether a medical expert's testimony is admissible, even in
diversity cases.'" This article explores the various kinds of certainty standards that states impose on medical expert testimony, the Erie ramifications of those standards, the Daubert analysis in federal court, and the
intersection of Daubert gate keeping and state-law medical certainty. It
will illustrate that the most difficult issues arise when a state medical
certainty standard governs the admissibility of expert medical testimony,
but it argues that because state standards rarely conflict absolutely with
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or the Daubert screening requirements,
federal courts can, and should, apply those standards in conjunction with
their Daubert analysis, in keeping with the Supreme Court's most recent
Erie jurisprudence.
II.

STATE MEDICAL CERTAINTY STANDARDS

Medical malpractice and products liability are two common statelaw causes of action that plaintiffs use when they have been injured in
the course of medical treatment. Both require the plaintiff to prove that
the alleged problem-the doctor's technique, a medical device's design,
a drug's side effect-is medically capable of causing the plaintiffs injury. Thus, in both medical malpractice and products liability cases, causation-the link between the doctor, drug, or device at issue and the
harm or injury complained of-is critical for a plaintiff trying to prove
his or her case, particularly if the link between the alleged cause and the
injury is not obvious or generally accepted. As one court has noted, "[n]o
matter how negligent a party may have been, if his negligent act bears no
relation to the injury, it is not actionable.""

9. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that federal courts sitting
in diversity must apply state substantive law, both statutes and common law). See also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (holding that whether the choice between state and federal law
is outcome determinative should be viewed with respect to whether the choice leads forum shopping
and the inequitable application of laws); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)
(holding that state law applies in diversity cases if the choice of law is outcome determinative).
10. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. Shegog v. Zabrecky, 654 A.2d 771, 776 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
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Unlike many kinds of tort cases, medical malpractice and products
liability cases can involve two levels of causation issues: general causation and specific causation." To prove specific causation, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant doctor's negligence or the defendant manufacturer's defective drug or device caused the plaintiff's injury. 3 General
causation, on the other hand, presents the issue of whether the alleged
cause is capable of ever causing the alleged injury to anyone." If a drug is
incapable of causing cancer, for example, neither doctors nor manufacturers
can be liable for a plaintiff's cancer regardless of their conduct in relation to
that drug. When applicable, therefore, lack of general causation can be a basic
defense in medical malpractice and products liability suits.
Most states require that plaintiffs prove medical causation through
expert testimony'5 unless it is obvious to a layperson that a problem
12. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
14. See, e.g., Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 669 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
lower court's finding of general causation by outlining the presented evidence of the hazards of
benzene to establish a sufficient causal connection between benzene and the claimed injuries);
Snyder v. Upjohn Co., 172 F.3d 58 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that evidence of general causation cannot
be used to establish cause and effect); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that proof of general causation does not prove individual causation for tobacco class
action members); Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that testimony on specific causation has legitimacy only after admissible evidence shows that the
drug in question is generally capable of causing birth defects); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 52 F.3d at 1131 (stating that the first element of causation that must be established in a toxic
tort action is general causation, or the causal link between the implicated product and the claimed
injury); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 797-800 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding that defendant's
failure to disclose that an expert witness would be testifying to both general and specific causation
resulted in prejudice requiring a reversal and remand); Heller, 167 F.3d at 155 (stating that "a
medical expert [need not] always cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably
conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness.").
15. See e.g., University of Ala. Health Servs. Found. v. Bush, 638 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1994));
Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1416 (Cal. Ct. App.1995); Kunst v.
Vitale, 680 A.2d 339, 343-44 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease
Compensation Trust Fund, 596 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. 1991); Woldeamanuel v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 703 A.2d 1243, 1244 (D.C. 1997); McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 582-83 (D.C.
1996); Duran v. Cullinan, 677 N.E.2d 999, 1010 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997); Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn
Co., 572 N.E.2d 1030, 1036, 1038-40 (I11.App. Ct. 1991); Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994); Bazel v. Mabee, 576 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (citing Thomas v.
Fellows, 456 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1990)); Hare v. Wendler, 949 P.2d 1141, 1143, 1145 (Kan.
1997); Russo v. Bratton, 657 So. 2d 777, 785 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Lally v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Rohde v. Lawrence Gen. Hosp., 614
N.E.2d 686, 688 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346,
1364 (Miss. 1990); Brickey v. Concerned Care, 988 S.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
Lashmet v. McQueary, 954 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Doe v. Zedek, 587 N.W.2d 885,
891 (Neb. 1999); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 107-08 (Nev. 1998); Jacques v. New
York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984); Hightower-Warren v. Silk, 698 A.2d 52. 54 (Pa.
1997); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Fulton v.
Pfizer Hosp. Prod. Group, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995); Greene v. Thiet, 846 S.W.2d 26, 33 (Tex. App.
1993); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Reeves v. Geigy
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would have occurred. 6 State standards governing expert medical testimony and medical causation, however, vary. In some jurisdictions, such
as Pennsylvania, the expert must be able to testify "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the doctor's or manufacturer's actions
caused the plaintiffs injuries." Other jurisdictions, like Virginia, similarly use a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard, but apply it
more broadly to the plaintiff s overall burden of proof.'"
More commonly, the standard is some form of medical probability
that can again apply either to the expert's testimony or to the plaintiff's
overall burden of proof.'9 In Ohio medical malpractice cases, for example, "the plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony
in terms of probability to establish that the injury was, more likely than
not, caused by the defendant's negligence."20 In Connecticut, experts2
must testify to a standard of "reasonable degree of medical probability;" '
in South Carolina, the medical expert must testify that the purported
cause "most probably" caused the plaintiffs injury; 22 and in Massachu-

Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 477
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Guile v. Ballard Community Hosp., 851 P.2d 689, 693 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993).
16. See, e.g., Bowman v. Beghin, 713 N.E.2d 913, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Bazel, 576
N.W.2d at 387; Hare, 949 P.2d at 1147; Lally, 698 N.E.2d at 35-36; Rohde, 614 N.E.2d at 688;
Brickey, 988 S.W.2d at 596; Cobo v. Raba, 495 S.E.2d 362, 366 (N.C. 1998); Morgan v.
Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Robinson v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 691 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying New Hampshire law); Wingo v.
Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 722, 734 (111.App. Ct. 1997); Soper v. Bopp, 990 S.W.2d 147,
150-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Jacques v. New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984);
Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
18. Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 515 S.E.2d 557 (Va. 1999) ("[C]Iaimant had the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that his condition arose out of and
in the course of his employment.").
19. See, e.g., Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1286 (N.M. 1999) (noting that proximate
cause must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical probability); McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987) (noting that the medical probability standard applies to
the whole case); LeNotre v. Cohen, 979 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting that proximate
cause must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical probability).
20. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio 1996). Accord
Bobo, 706 So. 2d at 765; Owens Coming v. Bauman, 726 A.2d 745, 767 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999);
Taylor v. Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 43 n.10 (S.C. 1996).
21. Borkowski v. Sacheti, 682 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). Accord Eisenbach v.
Downey, 694 A.2d 1376, 1384 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997); Bondi v. Pole, 587 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Dolen v. St. Mary's Hosp., 506 S.E.2d 624, 628 n.10 (W. Va. 1998).
22. Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998). "Before expert medical testimony is
admissible on the question of causation between the plaintiffs injuries and the acts of the defendant,
the testimony must satisfy the 'most probably' rule." Id. The "most probably rule" states:
It is not sufficient for the expert... to testify merely that the ailment might or could have
resulted from the alleged cause. He must go further and testify that taking into
consideration all the data it is his professional opinion that the result in question most
probably came for the cause alleged.
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setts the expert must testify "that the purported cause, more probably
than not, caused the injury."2 Texas does not require that individual
medical experts testify to the reasonable medical probability standard,
but "the substance of the evidence must show a reasonable probability"
to support an ultimate finding of causation.24
Jurisdictions requiring individual medical experts to meet either the
reasonable medical certainty or medical probability standard do not usually require experts to use those "magic words" in their testimony.25
However, these courts will usually exclude the expert's testimony if the
expert will only testify as to possibilities.26
Finally, some jurisdictions use a "substantial factor" standard,
which takes two forms: (1) the "substantial factor" requirement modifies
"reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable medical probability"; or,
(2) the entire standard is the "substantial factor" test. These tests can be
phrased many ways. For example, the California Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff may prove causation by showing that the alleged cause

Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 410 S.E.2d 537 (S.C. 1991). The standard changes slightly
when a plaintiff "relies solely upon the opinion of medical experts to establish a causal connection
between the alleged negligence and the injury." In that case, the experts must, "with reasonable
certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the injuries complained of most probably resulted
from the defendant's negligence." Ellis v. Oliver, 473 S.E.2d 793, 795 (S.C. 1996) (emphasis
added).
23. Cusher v. Turner, 495 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
24. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927, 938 (Tex. App. 1997). But see Hemandez v.
Calle, 963 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that in summary judgment, expert testimony
as to causation must be based on reasonable medical probability).
25. E.g., Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 173 (N.D. 1994) ("Hypertechnical words are not
necessary for the admission of an expert medical opinion; the test for admissibility is whether the
expert's testimony demonstrates the expert is expressing a medical opinion that is more probable, or
more likely than not."); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585-86 (Pa. 1997) ("We do not, however,
require experts to use 'magic words' when expressing their opinions. . . . Instead, we look at the
substance of their testimony."); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1998) ("Wyoming does
not require that an expert use the magic words 'reasonable medical probability' in order for his
opinion to be considered a competent medical opinion.").
26. See, e.g., Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 484 S.E.2d 257, 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that "a possibility that the alleged negligence caused the death is not sufficient to establish
proximate cause .... Certainty is not required, but the plaintiff must show a probability rather than
merely a possibility that that alleged negligence caused the injury or death."); Koontz v. Ferber, 870
S.W.2d 885, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a "physician's opinion that the lab reading 'may'
reflect acidosis is not the same as an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the lab
reading does reflect acidosis" and therefore that exclusion of the testimony was not an abuse of
discretion); Kunnanz, 515 N.W.2d at 172 (noting that expert medical opinions must "be expressed in
terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability, not mere possibility."); Vitrano v. Schiffman,
702 A.2d 1347, 1351 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) ("'[M]edical opinion testimony must be
couched in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability; opinions as to possibility are
inadmissible."') (quoting Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 416 A.2d 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1980)); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471 (holding that in proving causation in a medical malpractice
action, "[a]bsolute certainty is not required," but "mere possibility or speculation is insufficient");
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Kendrick, 491 S.E.2d 286, 287 (Va. 1997) (holding that a medical
opinion based on "possibility" is inadmissible).
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was, to a reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in contributing to the plaintiff's injury.27 Other jurisdictions, such as New Jersey,
use the substantial factor test for all causation issues." In the First Circuit's formulation of this test, "the plaintiff can carry her burden by
showing a 'substantial possibility' that the harm would have been averted
had the defendant acted in a non-negligent manner. 29 So phrased, the
substantial factor test imposes a far less taxing burden on plaintiffs than
either medical certainty or medical probability."
Beyond their sheer variety, state medical certainty standards create
several potential interpretive pitfalls when plaintiffs file their medical
malpractice or products liability actions in federal court. First, states differ regarding the exact evidentiary consequence of meeting-or not
meeting-their medical certainty standards. In some states, the standard
determines whether an individual medical expert's testimony is admissible.' In other states, the standard governs the expert's competency to
testify. 2 Finally, as previously noted, in some states the medical certainty
standard defines the overall burden of proof for a medical malpractice or

27. See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997):
Plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the
plaintiffs exposure to defendant's asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical
probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the
plaintiff inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer,
without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant's particular product were
the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.
Id. See also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("In
evaluating whether exposure was a substantial factor in causing asbestos disease, the standard should
be the same as used in other cases: is there a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony that the defendant's conduct contributed to plaintiff's injury.").
28. See Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying New
Jersey law). See also Roses v. Feldman, 608 A.2d 383, 385-86 (N.J, Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(noting that in medical malpractice cases, the jury decides whether the deviation in care is a
substantial factor in producing the injury but requiring medical experts to testify to a reasonable
degree of medical probability whether this deviation increased the risk of harm) (citing Battenfeld v.
Gregory, 589 A.2d 1059, 1063-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
29. Blinzler, 81 F.3d at 1152 (citing Hake v. Manchester, 486 A.2d 836, 839 (N.J. 1985)).
30. See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219 ("The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad
one, requiring only that the contribution of an individual cause be more than negligible or
theoretical.").
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Milfield, 869 P.2d 748, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Schrantz v.
Luancing, 527 A.2d 967, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Koontz v. Ferber, 870 S.W.2d 885,
890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (S.C. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. v. Kendrick, 491 S.E.2d 286, 287 (Va. 1997); Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286 (Wash. 1995)
(en banc).
32. See, e.g., Eisenbach v. Downey, 694 A.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Conn. Ct. App. 1997). See also
Joyce v. Boulevard Physical Therapy & Rehabilitation Ctr., 694 A.2d 648, 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(stating that in Pennsylvania, "if a witness has an reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on
a subject under investigation he may testify, and the weight given to his testimony is for the jury.").
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medical products liability case, while individual experts can testify to a
lesser degree of certainty.33
Next, a court cannot assume that "reasonable medical certainty"
imposes a higher standard than "reasonable medical probability," although that is the usual assumption.34 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' definition of "reasonable medical certainty" illustrates the
problem: "reasonable medical certainty[] reflects an objectively wellfounded conviction that the likelihood of one cause is greater than the
other; it does not mean the expert is 'personally certain' of the cause or
that the cause is discernible to a certainty."35 The Fifth Circuit has
equated "reasonable medical certainty" and "reasonable medical probability" by holding simultaneously that plaintiff must prove causation to
a reasonable medical certainty "but need only establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence the reasonable medical probability" of
causation.36 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted Colorado law to
equate the two standards.37
Finally, not all jurisdictions that purport to use the same standard"reasonable medical certainty," for example-actually agree on what that
standard means or impose the .same evidentiary burden. For example, the
Sixth Circuit distinguished Tennessee from other jurisdictions that rely
on "reasonable medical certainty":
Whereas numerous jurisdictions have rejected medical experts' conclusions based upon a "probability," a "likelihood," and an opinion
that something is "more likely than not" as insufficient medical proof,
the Tennessee courts have adopted a far less stringent standard of
proof and have required only that the plaintiffs prove a causal connection between their injuries and the defendant's tortious conduct by
a preponderance of the evidence. While, in accordance with Tennessee common law, plaintiff's proof by reasonable medical certainty requires them only to establish that their particular injuries more likely

33. See, e.g., Jacques v. State, 487 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1984); McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987); Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927,
937 (Tex. App. 1997); City of Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 493 S.E.2d 661, 667 (Va. Ct. App.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 515 S.E.2d 557 (Va. 1999).
34. E.g., Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 307 (1st Cir. 1988); Hovermale v. Berkeley
Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 S.E.2d 335, 340 (W. Va. 1980).
35. District of Columbia v. Watkins, 684 A.2d 395, 402-03 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Clifford v.
United States, 532 A.2d 628, 640 n.10 (D.C. 1987)).
36. Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1218 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. See Zerr v. Trenkle, 454 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 1972). Accord Schrantz, 527 A.2d at
969 (accepting either reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability); Dellenbach v.
Robinson, 642 N.E.2d 638, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting that reasonable medical certainty and
reasonable medical probability are "essentially the same standard"); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471
(accepting either "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable medical probability" but stating that
"[a]bsolute certainty is not required, however, mere possibility or speculation is insufficient.").
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than not were caused by [the alleged cause], their proofs may be neither speculative nor conjectural."
Given these variations among the states, the determination of exactly what kind of expert witness testimony the forum state requires can.
be critical to a plaintiff's success in his or her medical malpractice or
products liability action. However tempted federal courts sitting in diversity might be to avoid this state-law quagmire and to simply apply Daubert without regard to any state medical certainty standards, the Erie
doctrine generally requires them to apply the relevant state standard as
will be discussed. " This places a burden on the courts to first identify an
Erie conflict, then to apply both Daubert and the appropriate state standard in determining the admissibility of expert medical testimony.
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A.

The Erie Doctrine in General

Because medical malpractice and products liability are generally
state-law claims, federal courts usually hear them through diversity jurisdiction.' As such, these claims are subject to the Erie doctrine, named
for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.' The Erie Court held that, "[e]xcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the state," and that the law of the state included
both statutes and state common law.4 ' This holding has been interpreted
to mean that, in federal diversity cases, state law governs substantive
issues and federal law governs procedural issues.
Later Supreme Court decisions have refined this basic Erie rule,
particularly in terms of resolving the distinction between substantive
issues and procedural issues. In 1945, for example, the Court announced
an "outcome determinative" test for deciding whether state law is substantive enough to apply in diversity actions. 3 In Guaranty Trust Co. v.

38. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188. 1201 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Estate of
Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 505 S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) ("Thus,
'reasonable medical probability' has no greater meaning than a preponderance of the evidence, and
the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence as to medical causation.").
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g.,-Goldman v. Bosco, 120 F.3d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Dow Coming Corp.,
114 F.3d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1997); Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184,
189 (lst Cir. 1997).
41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Federal courts have applied the Erie doctrine to diversity medical
malpractice or products liability cases. See, e.g., Cortes-Irizarry, Ill F.3d at 189; Free v. Carnesale,
110 F.3d 1227, 1230 (6th Cir. 1997); Boburka v. Adcock, 979 F.2d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 1993).
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In so holding, the Court overruled the
prior rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which had held that state statutes but federal common
law governed in diversity cases. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
43. Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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York, the Court faced the question of whether a federal court sitting in
diversity could, in effect, ignore a state statute of limitations. " The Court
announced that:
since a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State. 5
Thus, the question for a federal court to ask
is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or
whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect
that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a
State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by
the same parties in a State court?('
In other words, the Erie doctrine ensures that "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
State court."47 Thus, because the New York statute of limitations at issue
in Guaranty Trust would completely bar recovery, the federal court sitting in diversity was bound to apply it in order to avoid a different outcome under the federal law."
Thirteen years later, the Court modified the outcome determination
test to take account of important federal interests." In Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative," the Court considered whether a diversity

plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial in federal district court to determine
his status as a statutory employee under South Carolina's worker's compensation laws.' Under South Carolina law, such a finding would render
the defendant immune from straight tort liability. 2
The South Carolina courts had held that this issue of immunity was
a matter of law and as such was for the judge to decide." The Supreme
Court, in addressing this question, considered whether, under Erie, this
rule was part of state created "rights and obligations," which would thus

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
See id. at 110.
See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 533-34.
Id. at 528.
See id.
See id. at 534 (citing Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957)).
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require its application in federal court.' The Court determined that the
judge-decision rule was "not an integral part" of the rights and obligations created by the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Act."5 Further, that the rule appeared "to be merely a form and mode of enforcing
the immunity." 6
While acknowledging that cases following Erie had held that federal
courts should apply state rules of form and mode where such rules might
have a substantial impact on the outcome of the litigation, the Byrd Court
added to the Erie analysis the consideration of the federal interest at
stake and thus backed away from the outcome determination test. 7 The
Byrd Court cited to "a strong federal policy against allowing state rules
to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." 8 Stating that
"[an essential characteristic of [the federal system] is the manner in
which... it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under
the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns
the decisions of disputed questions of facts to the jury," the Court decided that the state rule must yield to a federal jury trial. 9
The Supreme Court further modified the outcome determination test
in 1965 when it decided Hanna v. Plumer.6' Hanna involved a Massachusetts statute that required delivery in hand or service upon the executor or administrator of an estate within one year of a decedent's death.'
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, in contrast, allowed service by leaving
a copy of the complaint at the defendant's dwelling house. When plaintiff filed her complaint in federal court, she followed Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4 in effecting service and left copies of the complaint
with the deceased defendant's wife, who was not the executor or administrator of the estate, at the decedent's residence 3 The defendant moved
54. Id. at 535 (referring to Erie's holding that "the federal courts must respect the definition of
state created rights and obligations by the state courts." ld. See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938)).
55. Id. at 536 (distinguishing the case at bar from Dice v. Akron, 342 U.S. 359 (1952), "where
this court held that the right to trial by jury is so substantial a part of the cause of action created by
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., that the Ohio courts could not apply, in
an action under that statute, the Ohio rule that the question of fraudulent release was for the
determination by a judge rather than by a jury." Id.).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 536-37.
58. Id. at 538.
59. Id. at 537. The Court additionally found that the likelihood of a different outcome was not
"so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield
to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome." Id. at 540.
60. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (footnote omitted).
61. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 197, § 9 (1958)).
62. See id. at 46. "Service shall be made as follows: . . . upon an individual other than an
infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him
personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing within." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)).
63. See id.
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for summary judgment on the grounds that the Massachusetts statute was
controlling."' Despite the fact that the choice of rules was obviously outcome determinative, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 controlled."
First, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 clearly
related to the "practice and procedure of the district courts" and thus did
not exceed the congressional mandate of the Rules Enabling Act.' All
rules promulgated pursuant to that Act, the Court held, are valid if they
"regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." 7 Second, the Court refined what the outcome determination test
meant by holding that the test "cannot be read without reference to the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 8 In this context, the
Court found the conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and
the Massachusetts statute not truly outcome determinative because the
differing means of service did not present the kind of choice that would
encourage forum shopping at the time a plaintiff filed suit. 9 Finally, the
Court held that Erie was not intended as a means of invalidating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that when there is a direct
conflict between a valid Federal Rule and a state law, the Federal Rule
must control."
B. The Erie Doctrine and the FederalRules of Evidence
Although the Supreme Court has applied the logic of Hanna v. Plumer to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,7' it has never explicitly

64. See id. at 461-62.
65. See id. at 463-64.
66. Id. at 464. The Rules Enabling Act provides that: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of
appeals. Such rule shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1994). For an extensive discussion of the substantive rights limitation in the Rule Enabling Act, see
Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998). See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1797-1803 (1994)
(discussing "substance, procedure, and evidence law"); see generally Paul D. Carrington,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 (1989) (providing a
thorough discussion of the meaning of "substance" and "procedure" under the Rules Enabling Act
through illustrating both in the context of statutes of limitations).
67. Hanna,380 U.S. at 472.
68. Id. at 468.
69. See id. at 468-69.
70. See id. at 469-74. For further refinements of the Hanna analysis and the Federal Rules, see
discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
71. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987).
In Hanna v. Plumer,... we set forth the appropriate test for resolving conflicts between
state law and the Federal Rules. The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly
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decided how the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
Congress enacted in 1975, interact. Surprisingly, lower federal courts
demonstrate considerable differences of opinion on this issue.72 Because
the Federal Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
derived originally from the Rules Enabling Act, 3 federal courts quite
simply could have extended the Hanna v. Plumer analysis and held that
the evidentiary rules are "rationally capable of classification" as procedural." Thus, the Federal Rule of Evidence would trump if there is a conflict between a state and federal rule." While some federal circuit courts
construed, the scope of Federal Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 38 is "sufficiently broad"
to cause a "direct collision" with the state law or, implicitly, to "control the issue" before
the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law .... The [Federal] Rule
must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rulemaking authority,
which originates in the Constitution, and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Id.
72. Cf Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1306 (11 th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law, govern the admissibility of evidence in
federal court but that state law can be used in determining the materiality of evidence); United States
v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that when the Federal Rules of Evidence
and any state rule conflict, the Federal trump the state); Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271,
273 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[wihere a state and federal evidentiary rule conflict, the proponent
is entitled "to the benefit of the more favorable rule."); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d
344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that in diversity actions, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply; that
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it is "of consequence" to the suit,
FED. R. EVID. 401; and that, thus, relevancy in a diversity action is determined by "the underlying
substantive state law.").
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1999).
74. Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 904 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 751 (3d Cit. 1994); Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 485 nn.4-5
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
75. A full discussion of whether and how the Erie doctrine applies to the Federal Rules of
Evidence is beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that the issue is potentially
more complicated for the Federal Rules of Evidence than for either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
First, Congress enacted the evidentiary rules as statutes, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, implying that the Supremacy Clause plays a role in the analysis as well as the Erie
doctrine. See Dudley, supra note 66, at 1798 (stating that "[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act, with its
prohibition on modification of substantive rights, was the only available vehicle for federal evidence
reform, scholars debated intensely the question of whether evidence law as a whole could be
classified as 'procedural,' despite the various purposes served by the evidentiary rules," and arguing
that congressional enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence independent of the Rules Enabling
Act ended this argument that the rules were, by definition, procedural); Kenneth J. Lorge, Note,
Hottle v. Beech Aircraft: Confusion Surrounding the Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Actions
Persists as the Fourth Circuit Applies State Evidentiary Law in the Face of a Conflicting Rule of
Federal Evidence, 26 Sw. U. L. REV. 135, 147-49 (1996) (arguing that the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply in diversity cases through the Supremacy Clause as long as the law is arguably
procedural). Second, however, in adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress made it clear
that it intended to give effect to at least some aspects of the Erie doctrine. See Kelleher, supra note
66, at 82-83 ("Notably, [in the enacted Federal Rules of Evidence], the proposed Rules on privileges
were completely revised to require the application of state law whenever state law provides the
substantive rule of decision.").
In addition, three points argue against a simple extension of Hanna v. Plunzer to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. First, as will be argued infra in Part IV.B.2.a, later Erie jurisprudence
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have indeed followed this logic,76 most that have addressed the
Erie/FederalRule of Evidence issue are in a least basic agreement that
some state evidentiary rules are so substantive
that federal courts sitting
77
in diversity must take account of them.
The Federal Rules of Evidence "apply generally to civil actions and
proceedings. 78 Most federal courts apply the Federal Rules of Evidence
rather than state rules to all evidentiary questions in diversity cases. 79 The
Rules themselves eliminate many potential conflicts between state and
federal evidentiary rules-and hence eliminate many Erie issues-by expressly providing that when state law provides the rule of decision, state
law also applies in determining presumptions, privileges," and the competency of witnesses.82
State law also can affect the admissibility of evidence in diversity
cases in two other ways. First, when state law supplies the rule of decision, it sets out the boundaries of what evidence is relevant. The Federal
emphasizes harmonizing state and federal provisions rather than choosing between them. Second,
the argument can be made-indeed, has troubled numerous federal courts-that evidentiary rules are
far more likely than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to affect substantive rights, thus
distinguishing the Hanna v. Plumer analysis for the Federal Rules of Evidence. Many scholars note
that Hanna's "rationally capable of classification as procedural rule" is subject to excessively broad
interpretations that go too far in allowing Federal Rules to displace state law. Professor Dudley
points out: "The interference with the independent administration of the federal system - that is, the
impact on the accuracy of fact-finding - occasioned by the application of a [state-law evidentiary]
rule in a diversity case arguably is not sufficient to justify disregarding a substantive state policy in
applying state law." Dudley, supra note 66, at 1797-1803; Carrington, supra note 66, at 297-99. See
also Kelleher, supra note 66, at 78-79 (arguing that the federal interest in determining what
evidence should be available is less compelling in diversity actions). Third, at least half of the
federal circuits addressing Erie/Federal Rules of Evidence problems have determined that the Erie
doctrine applies in their analysis of whether they should take account of state evidentiary rules.
76. See, e.g., Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1306 ("The admissibility of evidence in a federal
[diversity] action is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law."); United States v.
Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (lth Cir. 1999) ("[Sltate rules on any subject, cannot trump the
Federal Rules of Evidence."); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that under the Erie doctrine the admissibility of expert medical testimony in a
Bendectin case was a procedural issue). See also Daniel C. Hohler, First CircuitApplication of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Diversity Jurisdiction: A Return to Hanna Analysis, 1 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOC. 49, 52-54, 61-64 (1995) (distinguishing the Erie and Hanna analyses
and implicitly approving the Hanna analysis for the Federal Rules of Evidence).
77. See Conway v. Chemical-Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1976);
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Carter, 716 F.2d
344, 347 (using Texas products liability law to determine relevance of evidence); Adams, 820 F.2d
271, 273 (using Missouri products liability law to determine relevance of evidence).
78. FED. R.EVID. 1101(b).
79. See e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1995); Hottle v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995); Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994); Washington v. Department of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 1993);
Grossheim v. Freightliner Corp., 974 F.2d 745, 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d
1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989); Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 944-45 (10th Cir. 1987).
80. See FED. R. EvID. 302.
81. SeeFED.R.EvID.501.
82. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
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Rules create a general premise that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible" and that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." 3 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' Because in
diversity cases the underlying state-law claim or defense establishes
which facts are "of consequence to the determination of the action," 5
state law necessarily influences the court's application of the Federal
Rules.86
Second, when a state evidentiary rule embodies, reflects, or gives
effect to a state substantive policy, many federal courts will apply that
state rule pursuant to Erie. For example, in a case decided not long after
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth Circuit discussed the potential Erie problems of dual-natured--evidentiary and
substantive-state rules that conflict with the Federal Rules of
Evidence." In that 1978 diversity case, an injured automobile driver
sought to admit evidence that the manufacturer of his car had violated a
federal safety standard." The Fourth Circuit performed an Erie analysis
to determine whether the state or Federal Rules governed the admissibility of the evidence. 9 In the end, it applied the Federal Rules, but only
because South Carolina substantive law was silent on the issue:
[I]n the absence of any indication of any policy in South Carolina, we
should be guided by the literal terms of the [Federal R]ules and admit
relevant evidence unless there is some reason not to do it. We do not

83.

FED. R. EVID.402.

84. FED. R. EVID. 401.
85. Id.
86. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, after determining that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in
diversity actions, nevertheless concluded that "[tlo determine relevancy in a diversity case we must
look to the underlying state substantive law." Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347
(5th Cir. 1983). It looked to Texas law to determine whether evidence of industry custom was
relevant-and hence admissible-in a strict products liability case. Id. at 347-48. Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit, after determining that the Federal Rules of Evidence "provide the standards of
relevancy of evidence," nevertheless turned to Missouri products liability law to determine whether
state-of-the-art feasibility evidence should be admissible. Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d
271,273 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d 1,9-10 (lst Cir. 1994)
(determining the relevance of prior accidents in a strict products liability action with reference only
to federal decisions, holding that "it is axiomatic that in determining whether evidence is relevant,
and therefore admissible in a diversity action, the Federal Rules of Evidence supply the appropriate
rules of decision"); Romaine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that "the
Federal Rules of Evidence should be applied in a diversity case in federal court to determine whether
evidence is relevant or prejudicial" and declining to follow state-law decisions that made pleas of
guilty in traffic offenses inadmissible).
87. See Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1978).
88. Stonehocker, 587 F.2d at 153 (citing Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969)).
89. See id. at 154-55 (noting that South Carolina law governed the existence of the
manufacturer's duty "and the Supreme Court of that State ha[d] imposed a duty on automobile
manufacturers to use due care in car design.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

imply that South Carolina can make no different rule; that is simply a
question not before us for she has not done so.9°

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits both hold "that there are State evidentiary rules so bound up with the substantive law of the State that a federal
court sitting in that State should accord it the same treatment as the State
courts in order to give effect to the State's substantive policy."'" In 1995,
the Fourth Circuit applied Virginia state law in a diversity products liability action where Virginia law provided that a party's private rules
were not admissible to prove negligence or to set a standard for that

party's duty of care. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit determined that a federal district court had to follow Texas law in a wrongful death diversity
action when Texas state law made evidence of a widow's remarriage
admissible and the non-admission of such evidence reversible error."
The Ninth Circuit has also held that under Erie some state evidentiary rules should apply in diversity cases.94 In Wray v. Gregory, the court
stated that "even though the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975 rendered the Erie analysis inapplicable to most evidentiary questions in diversity cases, it did not have the effect of supplanting all state

90. Id. at 155-56.
91. Stonehocker, 587 F.2d at 155 (citing Conway v. Chemical-Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540
F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976)). But cf., Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump
State Tort Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1838 (1994)
(arguing that evidence that would be admitted in many state courts will not be admitted in federal
court under Daubert: "So long as diversity of citizenship exists, the defendant will remove the
[products liability] case to federal court, if not originally filed there by plaintiff, in order to achieve
the radically different outcome resulting from the federal courts' more stringent evidence rules.").
92. See Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1995). Noting that
Virginia had made the policy of keeping private rules separate from the legal standard of reasonable
care as far back as 1915 and that "there is no countervailing federal interest compelling application
of the federal rules in this case," the Fourth Circuit concluded that "the Virginia rule is sufficiently
bound up with state policy so as to require its application in federal court." Id. at 110.
93. See Conway, 540 F.2d at 838-39. The court reasoned:
[W]e recognize in article 4675a [the Texas wrongful death statute at issue] one of those
rare evidentiary rules which is so bound up with state substantive law that federal courts
sitting in Texas should accord it the same treatment as state courts in order to give full
effect to Texas' substantive policy. Actions for wrongful death did not exist at common
law, and in Texas, as elsewhere, they are entirely the creation of statute .... [The
statutory provisions] remained constant for almost fifty years, until 1973, when the Texas
Legislature, doubtless to forestall further use of the tactics employed here to create a
misleading impression of continuing widowhood, enacted article 4675a and no other
amendment to the act at that session. Such a course of action evidences clearly that the
legislators considered the amendment a matter of significance and one necessary to
substantive policy in an area peculiarly within their control. As such, article 4675a
represents more than a mere rule of evidence; it is a declaration of policy by the creators
of the Texas wrongful death action that the sort of palming off theretofore practiced
would no longer be tolerated.
In such and similar circumstances, federal courts have long recognized an exception
to the inapplicability of Erie to evidentiary questions ....
Id. (citations omitted).
94. See Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417-19 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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law evidentiary provisions with federal ones."95 The court supported this
assertion by stating that "some state rules of evidence in fact serve substantive state policies and are more properly rules of substantive law
within the meaning of Erie."6
The First, Third, Seventh, and Eight Circuits similarly recognize the
substantive nature of some state evidentiary rules and have attempted to
define a substance/procedure distinction. In 1992, Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit, formulated a test for determining when state evidentiary rules are in fact substantive." In a diversity action against a car
manufacturer for personal injuries in an automobile accident, plaintiff
sought to exclude evidence that she had not been wearing a seatbelt
North Carolina law provided that evidence of not wearing a seatbelt was
generally inadmissible. 9 The Seventh Circuit reasoned:
Even in diversity cases the rules of evidence applied in federal
courts are the federal rules of evidence rather than state rules, save
with respect to matters of presumptions, privilege, and competency of
witnesses, Fed. R. Evid. 302, 501, 601, none of which is involved
here. If North Carolina's rule against the admission of testimony
about a failure to wear one's seatbelt is a rule of evidence, it is inapplicable to this case; and there is no counterpart rule in the federal law
of evidence.
Well, but is it a rule of evidence for purposes of the Erie doctrine, or is it a substantive rule and therefore binding in a diversity
case (or any other case in which state law supplies the rule of decision)? The difference is this. A pure rule of evidence, like a pure rule
of procedure, is concerned solely with accuracy and economy in litigation and should therefore be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of the particular judicial system, here the federal one; while a
substantive rule is concerned with the channeling of behavior outside
the courtroom, and where as in this case the behavior in question is
regulated by state law rather than by federal law, state law should
govern even if the case happens to be in federal court.'5 0
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the North Carolina rule was
"founded on the desire of the North Carolina courts not to penalize the
failure to fasten one's seatbelt, because nonuse is so rampant in the state
that the average person could not be thought careless for failing to fasten
his seatbelt."' The state rule thus regulated behavior outside the court
95.

Wray, 61 F.3d at 1417.

96. Id. at 1417 (quoting 19 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

4512, at 194-95 (1984)).
97. Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir. 1992).
98. See Barron,965 F.2d at 196-97, 198.
99. See id. at 198-99.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 200. See also Milam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity cases, "[b]ut where a state in
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and did not serve "solely [the] accuracy and economy" of the proceeding.
As a result, the rule was substantive law and, under Erie and Hanna, was
applicable in the determination of whether the evidence was
admissible.' 5°
Both the Third and Fifth Circuits followed similar reasoning in
finding that the admissibility of evidence of seatbelt and child safety seat
use were substantive issues. The Third Circuit reasoned that the admissibility of evidence of seatbelt use is a substantive question because the
evidence is, in itself, a defense having legal consequence and not merely
proof of some other fact.' °3 The Fifth Circuit similarly held that the admissibility of evidence of non-use of a child safety seat was a substantive
issue." Determining that the Arkansas Child Passenger Protection Act' 5
regulated behavior by placing a legal duty on certain persons to use a
child safety seat, the court found the issue of admissibility to be "a classic example of the type of substantive rule of law binding upon a federal
court in a diversity case.""
The First Circuit has adopted a slightly different analysis. In 1985,
the First Circuit in Mclnnis v. A.M.F. acknowledged that while Congress
was free to enact rules that, under Hanna, could rationally be characterized as procedural, "federal courts and Congress are constitutionally precluded from displacing state substantive law with federal substantive
rules in diversity actions."'0 7 Thus, the court stated in dicta that "Congress
did not intend the [Federal R]ules to preempt so-called 'substantive' state
rules of evidence such as the parole evidence rule, the collateral source
rule, or the Statue of Frauds."'0 8
In 1999, however, the First Circuit "disavow[ed] the Mclnnis dictum ''" in a case considering whether, in diversity actions, state evidence
rules "regarding compensation from collateral sources should displace
the Federal Rules of Evidence.""' The court first held that state law collateral source rules must apply in diversity actions because such rules are
furtherance of its substantive policy makes it more difficult to prove a particular type of state-law
claim, the rule by which it does this, even if denominated a rule of evidence or cast in evidentiary
terms, will be given effect in a diversity suit as an expression of state substantive policy."). But see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe federal rules of
procedure and evidence always apply in federal litigation, whether or not they determine the
outcome.").
102. Barron, 965 F.2d at 200.
103. See Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 952 F.2d 430, 434-45 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering
whether evidence of seat belt non-use was correctly admitted at trial in a strict products liability
action).
104. See Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994).
105.. See ARK. CODE § 27-34-101 et seq. (1999).
106. Potts, 882 F.2d at 1324.
107. Mcnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 1985).
108. Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 245.
109. Fitzgerald v. Expressway Sewerage Constr., Inc., 177 F.3d 71, 74 (1 st Cir. 1999).
110. Id. at 73-74.
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substantive.' The court then stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply whenever a "rule is sufficiently broad to control a particular
issue.""' 2 Thus, the court determined that "here, the Federal Rules of Evidence (and in particular Rules 401, 402, and 403) are malleable enough
to deal with the principal evidentiary issues contemplated by the collateral source rule: relevancy and unfairly prejudicial effect.""' 3 The effect
of this holding was that the Massachusetts collateral source rule barring
use of third party compensation was applicable in the determination of
damages, but the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed any other use of
collateral source evidence, provided the evidence satisfied the relevancy
requirements of the Rules."4
Thus, under the Erie and Hanna analyses, most circuits have
held that state evidentiary rules that have a substantive impact on the
decision will trump the Federal Rules of Evidence."' The tests or reasoning applied varies from circuit to circuit, but the general concept
holds that when a rule of evidence is significantly tied to a state substantive policy, that policy will override the Federal Rules and determine the
evidentiary issue before the court.
C. Erie and State Medical Certainty Standards: Three Analyses
Because states use medical certainty standards for three different
evidentiary purposes,' 6 these standards require three different analyses
regarding the interactions of state law, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the Erie doctrine.
1. Medical Certainty as a Burden of Proof
The Supreme Court has determined that burdens of proof are matters of state substantive law that must apply in diversity cases under the
Erie doctrine."' Therefore, in medical malpractice or medical strict prodIll. See id. at 74 ("Whether tort damages in a tort suit are mitigable by payments originating
with a third party depends, quite obviously, on substantive principles. Hence, the state-law collateral
source rule supplies the rule of decision.").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 74-76.
115. See, e.g., Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995); Dillinger v. Caterpiller,
Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 435-37 (3d Cir. 1992); Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, 965 F.2d 195, 19899 (7th Cir. 1992); Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d.271, 273 (8th Cir. 1986); Carter v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp.,
587 F.2d 151, 154-56 (4th Cir. 1978); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 46566 (2d Cir. 1962).
116. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
117. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) (holding that state law
presumptions and burdens of proof are substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine). Several
circuits have expressly held or noted that state law dictates the burden of proof in diversity actions.
See Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 593 (10th Cir. 1998); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d 782, 792
(10th Cir. 1997); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Merit Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248, 253 n.2 (7th Cir.
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ucts liability cases in federal court where a state uses a medical certainty
standard to define the plaintiff's burden of proof, those state standards
govern what the plaintiff must prove."8 For example, the Sixth Circuit
applied Tennessee's medical probability standard in a diversity medical
malpractice case, finding the defendant had not met the medical probability requirement in trying to assert a comparative fault defense against
a nonparty to the suit."9 Similarly, in a diversity products liability case,
the Eleventh Circuit imposed Florida's requirement that "plaintiffs
[must] prove by a preponderance of the evidence, with 'reasonable medical probability,"' that a manufacturer's alleged negligence caused the
patient's injury."2
While a plaintiff s overall burden of proof is governed by state law,
the circuits disagree as to whether other issues regarding the sufficiency
of evidence are also under the purview of state regulation.'2 ' For example,
the Fourth Circuit has held that the federal, not the state, medical certainty standard determines whether evidence offered to prove causation
in a medical products liability case is sufficient to create a jury
question.'22 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has held that state law governs

1996); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996); American Eagle
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 85 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1996); American Title Ins. Co. v. East W. Fin.
Corp., 959 F.2d 345, 348 (ist Cir. 1992); Wynfield Inns v. Edward Leroux Group, Inc., 896 F.2d
483, 491 (11th Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 n.22 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that New Jersey's standard "that a plaintiff show to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that defendant's conduct caused her injuries" was a burden of proof that governed in
federal diversity cases).
119. See Free v. Carnesale, 110 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant,
868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)).
120. Christopherv. Cutter Lab., 53 F.3d 1184, 1191 (llthCir. 1995).
121. For additional discussion of this conflict and an argument that state law should govern, see
Gottesman, supra note 95, at 1863-69.
122. See Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Even under diversity
jurisdiction the sufficiency of the evidence to create a jury question is a matter governed by federal
law."). Accord, Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1259 n.47
(10th Cir. 1999) ("While state law governs a party's substantive entitlement to damages in a
diversity case like this, it is well-established that federal law governs the grant or denial of a newtrial motion in diversity cases, and, at least in this Circuit, governs the determination whether
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict."); Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group,
Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1308 n.44 (1 th Cir. 1998) ("The sufficiency of the evidence to create a case for
the jury is a procedural issue to which we apply federal law.") (citing Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1980)); Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 130
F.3d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir. 1997) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the issue of whether the
evidence in a products liability action is sufficient to go to the jury); Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co.,
29 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1994) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the issue of whether the
evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment); Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. United Tech.
Corp., 35 F.3d 507, 510 (10th Cir. 1994) (in diversity cases, federal law controls the sufficiency of
evidence for judgment as a matter of law); Thrash v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 992 F.2d 1354,
1356 (5th Cir. 1993) (federal law governs the sufficiency of evidence in upholding a jury verdict in
diversity cases); ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distrib. Co., 374 F.2d 455, 460 (5th
Cir. 1967) ("[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury is controlled by
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the sufficiency of evidence to survive a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it is a substantive rule under Erie." Therefore, even if the state medical certainty standard defines a burden of
proof, the question of whether that standard governs a sufficiency issue
depends on the exact procedural posture of the case and the circuit in
which the case is being heard.
2. Medical Certainty as a Matter of Witness Competency
When state law characterizes the applicable medical certainty standard as determining a medical expert's competence to testify, the Federal
Rules of Evidence themselves provide that state law controls, eliminating
the need for a complex Erie analysis. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
601, "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State
law."''" Thus, in state-law medical malpractice actions, federal courts
must apply state evidentiary rules to determine a medical expert's competency to testify."n
3. Medical Certainty and Admissibility
The most complex Erie problem involving state medical certainty
standards arises when the state medical certainty standard governs the
admissibility of an expert's testimony. Here, the Federal Rules of Evidence and state law seem to conflict. State laws generally hold that the
expert's testimony is admissible if the expert testifies to the relevant state
standard, while Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.' 26
Two aspects of the state medical certainty standards support the
argument that state standards should be applied in diversity cases. First,

federal law."). But see Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 593 (10th Cir. 1998) ("When reviewing diversity
actions, we examine the sufficiency of the evidence on a particular issue by reference to the burden
of proof dictated by forum state law.").
123. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Accord Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., 151
F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the state-law standard of review to a Rule 50(b) motion for
judgment as a matter of law); Ashley v. R.D. Columbia Assocs. L.P., 54 F.3d 498, 501 (8th Cir.
1995) (in diversity cases, state law provides the standard for the sufficiency of evidence for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
124. FED. R. EvID. 601.
125. See e.g., LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1987); Geeslin v.
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. CIV. A. 1:97CV186-D, 1998 WL 527111, at *2-3 (N.D. Miss.
July 27, 1998) (applying state rules regarding witness competency pursuant to FED. R. EviD. 601).
126. See FED. R. EVD. 702.
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even when couched in terms of "admissibility," the requirement that a
medical expert be able to testify to a certainty standard is essentially a
competency requirement, as the Tenth Circuit has implicitly
recognized.'2 7 Under Colorado law, medical testimony "is admissible if
founded on reasonable medical probability."'28 The Tenth Circuit applied
state standard because, under 601, it was necessary to apply Colorado
law to determine "the competency of [the doctor's] testimony."'29 Indeed,
any line drawn between competency and admissibility in this situation
would necessarily be arbitrary: Is the medical expert an incompetent witness because his or her testimony is inadmissible for failure to meet the
requisite standard, or is that testimony inadmissible because the expert is
not competent under that standard to give an opinion? Therefore, in
many cases, the state standard will apply through Federal Rule of Evidence 601 even if couched as an "admissibility" requirement.
Second, state medical certainty standards governing admissibility
often are substantive evidentiary rules, requiring their application in appropriate diversity cases under Erie.'35 As noted, for Erie purposes, federal courts generally determine whether a state rule is substantive by
applying the "outcome determinative" test."' In the Supreme Court's
most recent formulation of this test, the question is: "Would application
of the [state] standard ... have so important an effect upon the fortunes
of one or both of the litigants that failure to apply it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or be likely to cause a
plaintiff to choose the federal court?"'32 For many states imposing a
medical certainty standard on the admissibility of expert medical testimony, the answer to this question is "yes," indicating that federal courts
should apply the state standard.'3
In many states, a medical certainty admissibility requirement serves
to ensure that an expert has a requisite degree of confidence in his or her
conclusion, particularly regarding medical causation. It leads state courts
to exclude expert medical testimony that identifies only medical "possibilities" or that avoids identification of a particular cause."M Thus, state
127. LeMaire, 826 F.2d at 954.
128. Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1999) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decisions in civil actions in the United States, in cases where they apply.").
131. See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
132. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 n.9 (1965)).
133. See Gottesman, supra note 91, at 1851-55 (discussing how state standards for expert
testimony differ substantively from that in Daubert).
134. For example, in Texas, "[a] possible cause only becomes 'probable' [for purposes of the
reasonable medical probability standard] when, in the absence of other reasonable causal
explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action." Williams v.
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medical certainty standards impose substantive obligations on expert
medical testimony.
Failure to meet the state standard can have an immediate substantive
effect on a particular case because exclusion of the expert's testimony
often leads to the failure of the plaintiff s prima facie case. For example,
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a lower court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs sole medical expert
witness failed to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
the plaintiff's fallopian tube could have been saved had her HMO allowed a transfer to another hospital.' "The only permissible inference
from the [expert's testimony] is that [plaintiff's] fallopian tube possibly
could have been saved had she remained at Bergan [Hospital] for surgery. Medical testimony couched in terms of 'possibility' is insufficient
to support a causal relationship."'36
Under more traditional distinctions between "substance" and "procedure," law is substantive if it creates, defines, or regulates legal rights
or duties.' As noted, state medical certainty standards often implicitly
impose content requirements on expert medical testimony. In addition,
most states require a medical malpractice or medical products liability
plaintiff to produce expert testimony on the issue of causation, and require those experts to testify to the requisite state standard.'38 In other
words, states partially regulate the availability of these torts through their
medical certainty standards. In Pennsylvania, for example, to establish a
prima facie case of malpractice, a plaintiff must present an expert witness who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the
acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered."' 39 Pennsylvania medical malpractice plaintiffs cannot avoid the
state law medical certainty standard by submitting other kinds of evidence. Thus, in Pennsylvania, for medical malpractice plaintiffs, the
submission of expert testimony that meets the requisite standard is a part
of their burden of proof-and burdens of proof, as discussed above, are
substantive law.

NGF, Inc., 994 S.W. 2d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App. 1999). Similarly, in Vermont, a psychiatric expert's
testimony met the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard when the expert positively
identified psychological rather than physical causes as the source of the plaintiffs pain after a fall.
Everett v. Town of Bristol, 674 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Vt. 1996).
135. See Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Neb. 1994).
136. Steineke, 518 N.W. 2d at 907-08.
137. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Bankers Trust Co., v.
Lee Keeling & Assocs., 20 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1994).
138. See Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 584 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. 1990). See also supra notes 15 & 16 and
accompanying text.
139. Id.
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State medical certainty standards thus effectively embody a policy
choice by certain states to limit the kind of medical testimony that a
medical tort plaintiff can use to prove his or her case. As discussed,
many states have determined that medical experts who are not willing to
testify to the requisite degree of medical certainty will not be allowed to
confuse the issue of causation by testifying to something less than the
threshold state standard. In these states, therefore, medical tort plaintiffs
cannot rely on sophisticated speculation to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Medical certainty standards thus serve as a
screening device for expert medical testimony. Notably, medical malpractice screening requirements have universally been held to be substantive rules of law by thefederal circuits that have addressed them.'4
By analogy, state medical certainty standards, as screening devices, are
also substantive rules that federal courts should apply in diversity cases.
D. The Problem: UncertainApplication of State Medical Certainty
Standards
The substantive character of most states' medical certainty admissibility standards and the federal circuits' general willingness to apply state
substantive evidentiary rules in diversity actions strongly suggest that
state medical certainty standards should apply in diversity medical tort
cases. However, only the Third Circuit has held that state medical certainty standards govern the admissibility of medical experts in diversity
actions. 4'
In In re Paoli, a 1994 products liability case, the Third Circuit first
noted that Pennsylvania law requires medical experts to testify to causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 2 It then decided that
this requirement, if viewed purely as a rule of admissibility, would be "in
conflict with [Federal Rules of Evidence] 702 and 703 which require a

140. In an effort to weed out non-meritorious medical malpractice claims, keep medical costs
down for insurance purposes, and encourage alternative dispute resolution, several state have
enacted medical malpractice screening requirements. These statutes generally require potential
medical malpractice plaintiffs to take their grievance before a panel or committee, and that panel or
committee's evaluation of the potential case is usually admissible into evidence. The six federal
circuits that have faced the question of whether federal courts sitting in diversity must follow these
state-law screening statutes have allanswered in the affirmative, concluding that the screening and
admissibility requirements are sufficiently substantive to require application under Erie. See Wray v.
Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1995); Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., 14 F.3d 684, 687-90
(1st Cir. 1994); DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem'l Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir.
1980); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603
F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1979).
But see Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580, 582-84 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (refusing, pursuant to the Erie doctrine, to apply Florida's statutory pre-suit requirements for
medical malpractice suits in a federal diversity action because state law directly conflicted with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 4 and 8).
141. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750-52 (3d Cir. 1994).
142. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750.
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reliable methodology ... but nowhere require a reasonable degree of
medical certainty."'' 3 As such, if the state rule was merely a "standard of
admissibility in conflict with Federal Rules of Evidence Pennsylvania's
rule would be 'rationally capable of classification as procedural' and the
Federal Rules of Evidence would govern."" Pennsylvania's medical certainty standard, however, was found not just a standard of admissibility, but
also part of plaintiff's burden of proof, because the Pennsylvania courts had
"strongly implied that, even if admissible, testimony with less than a reasonable degree of medical certainty was insufficient to prove causation."'' 5 Therefore, "Pennsylvania's rule is a substantive one, not in conflict with Federal
Rules of Evidence, and thus governs in federal court.""
Most other federal circuits have been unwilling to consider whether
state laws have a substantive effect on the admissibility of expert testimony. The First,' 7 Fourth,'48 Fifth,'49 and Eighth'" Circuits have each held
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and not state law, governs the admissibility of expert medical testimony.'"' In addition, outside of the context
of medical experts, the Sixth,'52 Seventh,' 3 and Tenth" Circuits have
143. Id. at 751; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-91 (1993)
(discussing what Federal Rules of Evidence 702 & 703 require).
144. Id. (quoting Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1988)).
145. Id. (interpreting Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991)).
146. Id. at 752. The Third Circuit has recently reaffirmed its approach, noting that in addition to
the Daubert analysis, "state rules on the degree of certainty required of an expert's opinion apply" in
diversity cases. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
147. See Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The exclusion or
admission of testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in diversity cases as well as in
all others.").
148. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1054 (4th Cir. 1986)("Unlike
evidentiary rules concerning burdens of proof or presumptions, the admissibility of expert testimony
in a federal court sitting in the diversity jurisdiction is controlled by federal law. State law, whatever
it may be, is irrelevant.").
149. See Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986).
150. See Clark v. Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). In a diversity medical
malpractice case regarding the explicit issue of whether a medical expert's testimony could be
admissible even though it did not meet the "reasonable medical certainty standard," the Eighth
Circuit held that "'[tihe question of whether expert testimony should be admitted or excluded is a
matter governed by federal, rather than state, law."' Id. (quoting Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253,
1255 (8th Cir. 1990)).
151. See id.
152. See Brooks v. American Broad. Co., 999 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The admissibility
of expert testimony is a matter of federal, rather than state, proedure.").
153. See Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering whether
expert testimony is substantive or procedural and finding that "the Federal Rules governing expert
testimony reflect a procedural judgment that juries are aided by hearing expert testimony and that
assistance enhances the accuracy of the entire process-even where an expert is not absolutely
certain about his conclusion."). See also United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir.
1977) (upholding Rule 702 as the sole measure of an expert's admissibility and refusing to impose a
medical certainty standard, and citing United States v. Wilson, 441 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1971), for
"the rule that an expert's lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its
admissibility."); Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F. Supp. 606, 611 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (citing
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stated categorically that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of experts in diversity actions because the issue is a procedural one. Thus, all but one of the circuits that have addressed the issue
have indicated that state medical certainty standards do not apply in a
diversity case to determine the admissibility of an expert's testimony.
IV.

THE DA UBERT COMPLICATION: FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
AND STATE MEDICAL CERTAINTY STANDARDS

702

A. Admissibility of Scientific Experts in Federal Court: The Daubert
Analysis
As has been discussed, medical malpractice and medical product
liability cases almost always involve the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove causation.' In federal courts, for almost 70 years, the guideline for
the admissibility of scientific and medical expert testimony was the Frye
test, which takes its name from the 1923 appellate court case of Frye v.
United States.'5 6 The question facing the Frye court was whether an expert witness's testimony as to the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, a type of lie detector test, was admissible against a criminal
defendant. 7 The court held that such testimony was inadmissible, creating a test of general acceptance for admissibility:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be

Stutzman, 997 F.2d at 295, for the principle that "[allthough federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction apply state law to substantive issues, the admissibility of expert testimony in diversity
suits is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence"); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Massachusetts Bay Ins.
Co., No. 90 C 2005, 1997 WL 51653, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5 1997) (citing Daubertfor the principle
that the "admissibility of [an expert's] testimony in federal court depends not on any state law but on
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1267,
1275 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that an Illinois rule rendering expert reconstruction testimony
inadmissible when eyewitness testimony was available did not apply in a diversity action because
state law rules of admissibility of expert testimony do not apply in federal court). But see Lovejoy
Elecs., Inc. v. O'Berto, 873 F.2d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "as a general rule federal
rather than state law governs the admissibility of evidence in federal diversity cases" but recognizing
exceptions when the Rules themselves so provide and when "substantive rules masquerad[e] as
evidence rules").
154. See Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 594 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The admission of expert testimony
in a federal trial is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 .... ).
155. See supra notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text; see also Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion
Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 191 (1st Cir. 1997); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
972 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that proof of causation in a products liability case involving a vaccine
"must be by expert testimony.").
156. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
157. Seeid.at1013
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sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs.'58

In 1993, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Frye general
acceptance test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' a

products liability case in which the child plaintiffs alleged that their
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy caused their birth defects." The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the
Frye test.'6 ' Specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 62' which governs
the admissibility of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," does not establish "'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility," nor was there "any clear indication that [Federal
Rule of Evidence] 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a 'general acceptance' standard."' 3 Noting that "Frye made 'general
acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony,"
the Court concluded that "[t]hat austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials."'"
While rejecting the Frye test, the Court nevertheless acknowledged
that the Federal Rules place "limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence.' 6' "[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.'"" According to the Court, this duty requires examination of two
issues: (1) Is the proffered evidence "scientific knowledge;" and (2) Will
the proffered evidence assist the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in issue?' 7
Scientific knowledge has "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and is "more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation."'"M While the subject of scientific testimony need not be
"known to a certainty," "an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method."'"M The scientific knowledge requirement, therefore,

158. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
159. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
160. See id. at 582.
161. See id. at 586-87.
162. FED. R. EVID. 702. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." Id.
163. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
164. Id. at 589.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 592.
168. Id. at 589-90.
169. Id. at 590.
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"establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."'" ° Assisting the trier of
fact, by contrast, "goes primarily to relevance'"'-a question of "fit."'" 2
"'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not
necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.""'
The Court delineated four factors for federal courts to consider
when screening scientific and technical evidence for admissibility: (1)
whether the theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested"; (2)
"whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication;" (3) "the known or potential rate of error" "and the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operations;"
and (4) "general acceptance.' 7 4 However, the Court also emphasized that
the inquiry into scientific evidence's admissibility is "a flexible one" and
that the focus "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."'7 5 Moreover, other Federal Rules of Evidence-such as Rule 403, which allows a federal judge to exclude otherwise admissible evidence "'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury,"' also play a role in the final decision of whether to
admit scientific evidence.' 6
Federal district and appellate courts have varied in their applications
of the Daubert standards, particularly regarding evidence of causation
and the role of experts' conclusions in the evaluation process. For example, on remand of the Daubert case, the Ninth Circuit excluded expert
witness testimony on both scientific knowledge and fitness grounds.'"
Some of the expert testimony on the issue of whether Bendectin can
cause birth defects was inadmissible because the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently establish the reliability of that testimony:
[P]laintiffs rely entirely on the experts' unadorned assertions that the
methodology they employed comports with standard scientific procedures. In support of these assertions, plaintiffs offer only the trial and
deposition testimony of these experts in other cases. While these materials indicate that plaintiffs' experts have relied on animal studies,
chemical structure analyses and epidemiological data, they neither
explain the methodology the experts followed to reach their conclusions nor point to any external source to validate that methodology.
We've been presented only with the experts' qualifications, their con-

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at591.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 593-94.
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 595 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharn., Inc. (Daubert11),
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clusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert,that's not
enough.1

8

The court found other expert testimony inadmissible because it
amounted merely to opinion. The only expert willing to testify that Bendectin caused the children's limb defects "asserte[d] only that Bendectin
is a teratogen and that he [had] examined the plaintiffs' medical records,
which apparently reveal the timing of their mothers' ingestion of the
drug."' 79 The expert offered "no tested or testable theory to explain, how,
from this limited information, he was able to eliminate all other potential
causes of birth defects, nor does he explain how he alone can state as a
fact that Bendectin caused plaintiffs' injuries.""'8 In the court's opinion,
these assertions amounted to personal opinion, not science, and thus were
inadmissible under Daubert.'"'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony on causation to be insufficient in terms of "fit."'' 2 Noting that
California tort law supplied the governing substantive tort standard,'83 the
court defined "fit" under the circumstances:
California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than
not caused their injuries. In terms of statistical proof, this means that
plaintiffs must establish not just that their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat the likelihood of birth defects, but that it
more than doubled it--only then can it be said that Bendectin is more
likely than not the source of their injury. '
Because "[n]one of plaintiffs' epidemiological experts claims that ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy more than doubles the risk of birth
defects," their testimony was inadmissible.'85 The Ninth Circuit thus took
a relatively aggressive stand regarding the court's gatekeeping role and
incorporated the state-law burden of proof into its Daubertanalysis.
In contrast, addressing the issue of whether Depo-Provera can cause
birth defects, the D.C. Circuit more conservatively emphasized that "the
Daubertanalysis does not establish a heightened threshold for the admission of expert evidence, but rather focuses on the court's 'gatekeeper'
role as a check on 'subjective belief and 'unsupported speculation.'"'"
Indeed, according to the D.C. Circuit, "the threshold for admissibility has
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
at 591).

Daubert H,43 F.3d at 1319.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1320.
Id. at 1320-21 (citations omitted).
Id.
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S.
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been lowered, both because of the liberal theory of admissibility adopted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence and because Frye's
'general accep87
tance' test is no longer dispositive of admissibility."'
The D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's fitness
evaluation for epidemiological evidence, holding that "[t]he dispositive
question is whether the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' . . . not whether the
testimony satisfies the plaintiff's burden on the ultimate issue at trial.'' 188
It admitted expert testimony that Depo-Provera "is capable of causing the
types of defects" that the infant plaintiff suffered even though that testimony failed "to establish the causal link to a specified degree of probability," because the testimony nevertheless "could aid the jury's resolution of the [plaintiffs'] claims."'' 9 As such, the D.C. Circuit eliminated
consideration of state-law burdens of proof from the Daubert analysis.'"
Thus, for the moment, how the Daubert analysis and state law interact for diversity medical malpractice cases is subject to circuit variations.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent opinions clarifying Daubert have
done little to resolve the issue. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,9' an
electrician of the City of Thomasville, Georgia, sued three chemical
manufacturers under a strict products liability theory, alleging that polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in electrical transformers and voltage
regulators caused his lung cancer.' 2 Before the Supreme Court, the issue
was a narrow one: "what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.."'9 The Court determined that "abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard."'9"
The Court emphasized that a court of appeals reviewing a district
court's decision "may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."' 95 Further, district
courts performing Daubert evaluations may not draw bright lines between methodology and conclusions.' Noting that "conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another," the court held
that it is within a District Court's discretion to conclude that an expert's
187. Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 134.
188. Id. at 135 (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EvmD. 702)).
189. Id. at 135-36.
190. See id. at 135 n.8 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's approach and noting that "[i]n
light of our
disposition, we have no occasion to consider whether the substantive tort law of California and the
District of Columbia are similar . .
191. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
192. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 528-29 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 520
U.S. 1114 (1997), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
193. Joiner,522 U.S. at 138.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 142.
196. See id.
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methodology is insufficient to support his or her proferred opinion.97
Thus, although the Joiner opinion gives lower courts no guidance on the
issue of what to do with state-law sufficiency standards in general or
with medical certainty requirements in particular, the Court indirectly
validated more broadly-focused Daubert inquiries such as that the Ninth
Circuit undertook in Daubert H. After Joiner,therefore, defendants remain
free to argue that when an expert's conclusion regarding causation is inadmissible or insufficient under the applicable state-law standard, it may simply not
"fit"the case at hand under Daubert's analytical framework.
98 the Supreme
More recently, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,'
Court expanded Daubert's applicability to not only "scientific" but also
"technical" expert testimony.'" The Court again emphasized that the
Daubert screening is "flexible" and specifically held that the Daubert
factors "do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test. ''' "°° Instead, the
Daubert inquiry ensures "that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field.""2 ' The Kumho Court, however, made no
mention of the Erie doctrine or of state substantive law. 202

B. When Daubert Gets Erie: FederalRule of Evidence 702 and StateLaw Medical Certainty
1. Daubertand State-Law Medical Certainty Standards
Because, in federal court, expert medical testimony must be based
on "scientific knowledge,"2 3 medical experts and their opinions on medi2 " Like the Erie
cal causation are subject to screening under Daubert.
197. See id. at 146.
198. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
199. Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1174.
200. Id. at 1175 (emphasis added) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
201. Id. at 1176.
202. See generally id. at 1167-80.
203. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (19993).
204. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999) (discussed supra, Part IV.A), eliminated many of the potentially hairsplitting decisions that
federal courts had been making regarding when the Daubert analysis applies. See, e.g., Desrosiers v.
Flight Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Daubert analysis may not
apply to testimony of accident reconstruction experts that did not involve scientific knowledge);
Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV (Cricket BV), 152 F.3d 254, 265 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Daubert does not apply to an electrical engineer's expert testimony based on his
experience and training in the absence of a challenge to his methodology or technique); Michigan
Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 920 (11 th Cir. 1998) (noting that Daubert applies
to expert testimony based on science, not experience, but holding that expert testimony regarding the
origin of a fire was subject to Daubert because it relied on scientific method); Carmichael v.
Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert applies only to
expert witnesses who claim scientific expertise and thus did not apply to the testimony of an expert
regarding tire failure); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
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doctrine, however, the Daubert analysis interacts with state medical certainty standards in potentially three ways, depending on how a particular
state uses its standard.
a.

Medical Certainty as the Burden of Proof: The Effect on
When Daubert Determinations Are Made

As discussed above, when state medical certainty standards define
the burden of proof, there is no question that they will apply in appropriate diversity actions. The issue regarding Daubert, therefore, is when
they apply: should the court consider burdens of proof as part of Daubert's fitness prong, or are those burdens more appropriately considered
after the Daubertrulings are made?
As the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits have demonstrated, the relationship between Daubert admissibility and the state-law burdens of proof in
diversity medical malpractice and products liability cases is not clear. In
Daubert II, the Ninth Circuit's application of a state-law burden of proof
in the "fitness" prong of the Daubert analysis became critical to the
plaintiffs' Bendectin case, resulting in the exclusion of plaintiffs' ex-

Daubert applies to polygraph evidence because it is scientific); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126
F.3d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 989-91 (5th Cir.
1997) for the principle that Daubert is not limited to "scientific knowledge" or "novel" scientific
evidence and holding that it applied to expert clinical medical testimony); Watkins, 121 F.3d at 98991 (holding that expert testimony in a products liability case regarding defective design was subject
to Daubert); McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies only to "scientific knowledge" and thus did not apply to a products liability product
design expert's testimony because that testimony was based on "technical or other specialized
knowledge"); Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert
does not apply when an expert relies on experience and training rather than a particular
methodology); Masayesva v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert does
not apply to an expert's relatively straightforward application of range economics); United States v.
Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert was not applicable to a police
expert's testimony regarding the reasons people hide guns because the testimony was not based on
scientific knowledge); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528,
534 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Daubert applies to the testimony of "social scientists as well as to
that of natural scientists"); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony but that survey evidence should generally
be found admissible); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific testimony); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82
F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that Daubert applies only when an expert relies on a
principle or methodology); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that Daubert applies only to scientific testimony).
Even before Kumho Tire, however, only two federal courts declined to apply Daubert to
expert medical testimony. Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Daubert analysis does not apply to a doctor's testimony regarding a seaman's
fitness for duty because it "does not constitute 'scientific' testimony but rather testimony based on
the doctor's training and experience"); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 934 F. Supp. 1068,
1087 n.10 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that the Daubert factors do not apply to clinical medical
testimony based solely on experience or training). It appears that after Kumho Tire, Daubert should
always apply to expert medical testimony.
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perts. 0 5 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court's decision to
exclude causation experts because the district court impermissibly failed
"to distinguish between the threshold question of admissibility and the
persuasive weight to be assigned the expert evidence."' State-law burdens of proof were simply not relevant."
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits' differences in approach reflect a
philosophical division among the circuits regarding the desirability of
early and active judicial management of cases involving complex causation issues, particularly class action products liability suits. As discussed,
Daubert sets forth a threshold standard of admissibility, based on methodology and reliability. Given the Federal Rules' emphases on
conferencing and early case management, 8 Daubert screenings often
take place before-sometimes long before-trial itself begins.2' For example, when a patient, on behalf of her minor son, brought a medical malpractice action against her obstetrician alleging that the obstetrician had
negligently post-dated her pregnancy and thus caused her son's brain damage, the First Circuit held that plaintiffs expert could be held to the Daubert standard of admissibility even at the summary judgment stage." '
Moreover, when Daubert rulings either recognize or createthrough exclusion of critical testimony-a gap in a plaintiff s primafacie
case, they can, as a practical matter, end the litigation and take a case
away from a jury."' In fact, since the Supreme Court decided Daubert in
1993, the circuits have demonstrated that its application clearly affects
when and how federal cases involving experts are resolved. Affirmation
or reversal of summary judgment in Daubertcases now often depends on
whether the appellate court agrees or disagrees with the trial court's
screening of a particular expert." 2 Affirmances and reversals of judgment
205. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
206. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
207. See id. at 135 n.8.
208. See FED. R. Evil. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court ... "); FED. R. CIr. P. 16(a), (c)(4) (authorizing the court to hold pretrial conferences in
order, among other things, to discuss "the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative
evidence, and limitations or restrictions on the use of testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence").
209. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
210. See Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, Ill F.3d 184, 187-88 (1st Cir.
1997).
211. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the testimony of the
plaintiffs' experts was inadmissible under Daubert).
212. See Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming
summary judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert witness); Mitchell v.
Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 780-84 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment because the
district court properly excluded as expert witness); Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert
witness); Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512, 515-18 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary
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as a matter of law/judgment notwithstanding the verdict show a similar
pattern. 2 ' Frye and the "general acceptance ' test had nowhere near this
effect of non-trial resolution of cases through the exclusion of experts: a
Westlaw search revealed only one federal circuit court decision between
1957 and 1993 (the year the Supreme Court decided Daubert)that rested

judgment because the district court properly excluded an expert witness); Target Mkt. Publ'g, Inc. v.
ADVO, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1141-45 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
because the district court properly excluded a business appraiser's report under Daubert); Cabrera v.
Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420-23 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when experts were properly excluded under Daubert for unreliability); Binakonsky v. Ford Motor
Co., 133 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant in part
because, contrary to the district court's decision, Daubert screening was inapplicable to a medical
examiner's non-expert testimony); Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir.
1997) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because, contrary to the district court's decision
excluding the expert, Daubert screening was inapplicable to the testimony of an expert on tire
failure); Dancy v. Hyster Co. 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant when the district court properly excluded pursuant to Daubert plaintiff's sole expert
witness); McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant because, contrary to the district court's decision excluding the expert,
Daubert was not applicable to a product design expert's testimony); Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus.,
Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly
excluded an expert's affidavit under Daubert); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in part when, contrary to district
court's decision to exclude expert, expert's testimony was admissible under Daubert); Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in part
when, contrary to district court's decision to exclude expert, expert's testimony was admissible
under Daubert); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment because the expert's testimony was not admissible under Daubert); Barrett v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when expert's testimony was inadmissible under Daubert); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89
F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment because the district court properly excluded
a causation expert under Daubert); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant because a physician causation expert's testimony was
inadmissible under Daubert); Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment when the district court properly excluded an expert pursuant to Daubert).
213. See Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1039-41
(8th Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment as a matter of law in part because the circuit court agreed with
the district court's exclusion of an expert pursuant to Daubert); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174
F.3d 661,668-72 (5thCir. 1999) (partially reversing judgment as a matter of law because the district
court had improperly excluded expert testimony under Daubert); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of
Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment on a jury verdict on
the basis of improper exclusion of evidence under Daubert); Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905,
907-08 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment on a jury verdict because a ceramic expert's opinion was
not sufficiently reliable under Daubert); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997)
(affirming the district court's granting of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the lower
court had properly excluded expert under Daubert); Raynor, 104 F.3d 1371 (affirming the district
court's granting of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it properly held experts' testimony
inadmissible under Daubert); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the district court's granting of judgment as a matter of law because it had properly held
expert testimony inadmissible under Daubert); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir.
1995) (affirming the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law because it properly
admitted expert testimony under Daubert).
214. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

1999l

WHEN DAUBERT GETS ERIE

its summary judgment decision on whether the district court had properly
excluded an expert under Frye's general acceptance test."'
Considering burdens of proof in the Daubert analysis only increases
the likelihood that the Daubert ruling will result in early judgment as a
matter of law rather than a jury trial. Unlike decisions regarding competency or admissibility, which lead to particularized rulings affecting one
piece of evidence at a time, burdens of proof necessarily raise issues of
overall sufficiency. Incorporating burdens of proof into a Daubert
screening thus forces the presiding judge to decide, often relatively early
in the case, whether a plaintiff has enough evidence to get to a jury-a
decision federal judges are generally reluctant to make even during or
after trial."6
Nevertheless, in the context of class action products liability cases
some judges have embraced Daubert screening as a means of exercising
judicial control over speculative science and the "improper" persuasion
of lay juries in order to avoid random jury verdicts. For example, in a
post-Daubert products liability action against the drug Bendectin's
manufacturer, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant following a Daubert screening
because the opinions of plaintiffs' experts, based on animal studies and
reanalyses of human epidemiological studies, were admissible but "'simply inadequate ...[to] permit a jury to conclude that Bendectin more
probably than not causes limb defects."' 2
Other judges resist what they see as judicial interference, favoring
jury resolution of such cases. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, has emphasized both that "Daubert governs whether evidence is admitted, not
how persuasive it must be to the factfinder,"2 ' and that "the Supreme
Court itself viewed Daubert as a liberalization, not a tightening, of the
rules controlling admission of expert testimony."2 9 As a practical matter,
215. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-16 (5th Cir. 1991).
216. Trial courts can grant motions for judgment as a matter of law during or after trial, for
example, only when "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
that party." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l). The persistence of the "scintilla rule," which allows jury
resolution if the non-moving party produced any evidence at all to support its position, testifies to
courts' reluctance to take decision making authority away from juries. See, e.g., Kentucky State
Police Prof I Ass'n v. Gorman, 870 F. Supp. 166, 168 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (applying the "scintilla rule"
in summary judgment decisions); Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 909, 913 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
(applying the "scintilla rule" to directed verdict decisions).
217. Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Turpin v.
Merrell-Dow Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)). The court
declined to address plaintiffs argument, raised only on appeal, that Tennessee law rather than
Daubert applied under the Erie doctrine to determine whether plaintiffs expert scientific testimony
was admissible to create an issue of fact on the issue of whether Bendectin could cause birth defects.
Id.at 1072. According to plaintiffs, Tennessee law did not allow courts to take the "hard look" at
scientific evidence that Daubert requires federal courts to take. Id.
218. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158(4th Cir. 1996).
219. Cavallo, 100 F.3dat 1158.
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therefore, more Daubert cases get to a jury in the Fourth Circuit than can
in the Sixth Circuit.
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit over the
role of state-law burdens of proof in the Daubert analysis thus reflects a
long-standing debate over judicial activism.22 While this controversy is
important and in need of further clarification from the Supreme Court, it
is purely a Daubert-notan Erie-problem.
b. Medical Certainty and Expert Competency
Timing is far less of an issue when state-law medical certainty standards govern an expert's competency or admissibility. Like Daubert,
state-law competency and admissibility standards deal with the issue of
whether a particular expert's testimony should be allowed into the case at
all. If a federal court applies these standards, therefore, it makes perfect
sense, from both a logical and a judicial efficiency perspective, for the
court to consider competency and state-law admissibility standards at the
same time that it undertakes its Daubertanalysis.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 601,22' state-law competency standards do not seem to present a Daubert/Erieproblem: not only does Federal Rule of Evidence 601 eliminate the need for an Erie analysis, it takes
the state-law competency issue out of the realm of Federal Rule of Evidence 702222 and the Daubert inquiry. Nevertheless, at least according to
220. The debate surrounding judicial activism dates back at least as far as Judge Weinstein's
decisions in the Agent Orange litigation. See In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1260-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing plaintiffs action against defendant chemical companies
for failure to prove causation under a "national consensus law" requiring plaintiffs to prove "but for"
causation by a preponderance of the evidence); See also Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?:
AGENT ORANGE N TRIAL: MASS Toxic TORT DISASTERS IN THE COURTS, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267,
1290-96 (1987); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Ct. L. REV 337 (1986) (discussing in detail the role of the judiciary in the Agent
Orange toxic tort settlement).
For the more recent debate on the judge's role under Daubert, see Edward W. Kirsch,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Active Judicial Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 213, 228-29 (1995) (stating that "Daubert represents the culmination of a trend in the
courts toward active judicial review of the admissibility and sufficiency of scientific evidence.");
Holley Davis Thames, Comment, Frye Gone, but not Forgotten in the Wake of Daubert: New
Standards and Proceduresfor Admissibility of Scientific Expert Opinion, 63 MISS. L.J. 473, 484-85
(1994) (arguing that Daubertrequires greater judicial activism in determining the scientific validity
of scientific evidence before putting that evidence in front of the jury); Linda Sanstrom Simard &
William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert
Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1457, 1464-65 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of the role of the judge
under Daubert in deciding relevance and reliability of scientific evidence).
221. FED.R.EVID.601.
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
222. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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some parties, Rule 601 potentially conflicts with Rule 702 when the
competency of medical experts is at issue.2 ' The Sixth Circuit, for instance, faced a situation where the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice
action argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 governed the admissibility of a defense expert on the standard of care and that Tennessee's
locality rule would render that witness incompetent, while "[d]efendant
argue[d] that 702 alone governs expert testimony and that state law is
inapplicable."2" However, the court did not decide this question because
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ruling allowing the expert's
testimony was anything other than harmless error.
No other circuits have faced this issue. District court discussion of
the purported conflict has also been limited, but most of the courts that
have addressed the issue have decided that Federal Rule of Evidence
601, not Federal Rule of Evidence 702, controls the issue of medical
expert competency when state law supplies the rule of decision. 26 Therefore, when a state law medical certainty or medical probability standard

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 188 (6th Cit. 1988) (outlining plaintiffs
and defendant's conflicting views on whether Federal Rule of Evidence 601 or 702 governed the
competency of expert medical witnesses, and declining to decide that issue "because plaintiffs
failed to show that this evidentiary ruling affected a substantial right as required by Federal Rule of
Evidence 103(a)(1).").
224. Ward, 838 F.2d at 188 (citations omitted). The Tennessee malpractice statute provided
that:
No person in a health care profession requiring licensure under the laws of this state shall
be competent to testify in any court of law to establish the facts required to be established
[in a malpractice action] unless he was licensed to practice in the state or a contiguous
bordering state a profession or specialty which would make his expert testimony relevant
to the issues in the case and had practiced this profession or specialty in one of these
states during the year preceding the date that the alleged injury or wrongful act occurred.
Id. at 184 (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (1975)).
225. Id. at 188. The Sixth Circuit has continued to refuse to decide whether Federal Rule of
Evidence 601 or Federal Rule of Evidence 702 controls the competency of a medical expert. See
Ralph v. Nagy, 950 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cit. 1991) ("These issues are moot because the jury expressly
found that the defendant did not breach his duty ot the plaintiff under the appropriate standard of
care."); Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745, 750 n.5 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Because neither
party has raised the issue of Dr. O'Day's competency as an expert, we again decline to consider" the
relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence 601 and 702.)
226. See Cronkrite v. Fahrbach, 853 F. Supp. 257, 259 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Tucker v. American
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 794 F. Supp. 240, 245 (W.D. Tenn. 1992); Slifcak v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc.,
No. 90-CV-565, 1991 WL 626469, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1991); Ralph v. Nagy, 749 F. Supp.
169, 172-73 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 950 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1991); Denton v.
United States, 731 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (D. Kan. 1990); Crumley v. Memorial Hosp., Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 531, 532 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'td 647 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1981). But see Peck v.
Tegtmeyer, 834 F. Supp 903, 910 (W.D. Va. 1992) (holding that Rule 702 governs the admissibility
of medical experts even if the question can be viewed as one of competency).
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governs an expert's competency, most federal courts will probably apply
that standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 601.227
c.

Medical Certainty and Admissibility

As noted, most federal circuits have held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is the exclusive measure of an expert's testimony's admissibility in a diversity case. Moreover, of the two circuits that have held that
state medical certainty standards do apply in diversity cases, only one,
the Third Circuit, has dealt with those standards in the context of a Daubert analysis. 9 In a products liability action involving plaintiffs' exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and their subsequent claims of
illnesses and injuries as a result, the Third Circuit first determined that
Pennsylvania's threshold admissibility requirement that experts testify to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty "is an element of plaintiffs
burden of proof'-a substantive requirement-and hence applied in the
diversity products liability case before it. 29 However, it resisted the temptation to see the Daubert analysis and the state medical certainty standard as
mutually exclusive. Instead, the court applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Daubert, Federal Rule of Evidence 703, and the state medical certainty
requirements sequentially to the expert testimony in controversy inreviewing
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 3
One of the experts, Dr. Sherman, whose testimony defendants challenged both generally and with regard to particular plaintiffs, can serve
as an example of how the Third Circuit combined the Daubertand medical certainty analyses. First, the court determined that Dr. Sherman was
generally qualified by training and experience to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.3 Second, the court looked at whether
some of the tests that Dr. Sherman relied on were "the type of data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field under Rule 703, ' ' 2 determin-

227. Federal courts facing this issue might well make use of Erie jurisprudence by analogy to
avoid finding an absolute conflict between Federal Rules of Evidence 601 and 702. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.2.a.
228. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3rd Cir. 1994). In an unpublished
opinion, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide whether Arizona's standard for admitting expert
testimony, rather than Daubert, should apply in a diversity case on the ground that a Daubert
analysis was unnecessary. See Arrendondo v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 1193, *1 (9th
Cir. 1997). However, the court upheld the district judge in excluding the expert's testimony on the
basis that it was unreliable-a criterion that enters Rule 702 only by way of Daubert. See id.
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit itself cited Daubert for the proposition that Rule 702 "demands that the
evidence be reliable." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
229. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 750-51.
230. See id. at 751.
231. See id. at 753. Although the court recognized that several factors undermined Dr.
Sherman's testimony, including mistakes while testifying and substantial employment as a plaintiffs
witness, it concluded that "a trained internist who has spent significant time reviewing the literature
on PCBs [can] testify as to whether PCBs caused illness in plaintiffs." Id. at 753-54.
232. Id. at 754. Rule 703 states that:
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ing that those tests did not satisfy that level of reliability and thus could
not be the basis of any of Dr. Sherman's medical conclusions as to causation if she were allowed to testify.233
The Third Circuit next addressed whether Dr. Sherman's reliance on
differential diagnosis was methodologically sound under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert, concluding "that sometimes differential diagnosis can be reliable with less than full information"2 so long as the
doctor engages in standard diagnostic techniques and can explain why
other causes do not explain the illness or injury. 3 The court finished its
analysis by evaluating Dr. Sherman's testimony with regard to each of
the relevant plaintiffs, excluding testimony when it was methodologically unsound under Daubert36 or insufficiently certain under Pennsylvania's reasonable medical certainty requirement,237 or both."
The Third Circuit thus incorporated both Daubert and the state reasonable medical certainty standard into a summary judgment screening
without making the state standard part of the Daubert analysis. The federal and state standards, in its view, were neither redundant nor mutually
exclusive; instead, the state-law standard was an alternative means of
screening expert testimony, requiring the court to evaluate certainty or
sufficiency in addition to Daubert's methodological reliability.239 The
Third Circuit's analysis thus demonstrates that federal courts can apply
both Daubert and state-law standards without doing violence to either.

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.

233. See In re Paoli,35 F.3d at 754.
234. Id. at 759.
235. See id. at 760.
236. See id. at 766 (excluding testimony that PCBs caused sinusitis because it relied heavily on
unreliable immunological data and was thus unreliable itself).
237. See id. at 767 (excluding testimony that PCBs were a significant factor in causing reduced
ankle reflexes because Dr. Sherman would not testify to causation to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty).
238. See id. at 766 (excluding testimony that PCBs caused pregnancy losses because Dr.
Sherman had not explained away alternative causes and because "Dr. Sherman's statement that
PCB's were a possible cause did not have sufficient scientific certainty to survive summary
judgment.").
239. See id. at 749 n. 19.
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So, Back to Erie Step One: Is There An Absolute Conflict Regarding Admission of Expert Medical Testimony?
a.

Recent Supreme Court Erie Decisions Emphasize that
State Law Should Apply in Diversity Cases Unless There
Is an Absolute Conflict with Federal Procedural Rules

Until now, this article, like most federal courts, has skipped the initial question in any Erie analysis: Is there a conflict between state and
federal law that requires the federal court sitting in diversity to choose
between the two? As the Supreme Court has repeatedly and recently emphasized, this is a critical threshold question for federal courts to ask
when faced with a decision of whether to apply state law in a diversity
action, particularly when Federal Rules are involved.2'
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not displace state law, as Hanna v. Plumer
required, unless there is a direct and absolute conflict between the two."'
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,2 for example, the Court held that both
an Oklahoma statute and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 could cogovern despite their apparent mutual exclusivity: 43 the state statute did
not deem an action "commenced" for statute of limitations purposes until
service of the summons was made upon the defendant,2' while under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, "[a] civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the cour.
The Supreme Court nevertheless found no absolute conflict. Noting
that "[t]he first question must . . . be whether the scope of the Federal
Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court,"'
it quoted as a general rule that "where 'the scope of the Federal Rule [is]
not as broad as the losing party urge[s], and therefore, there being no
Federal Rule which cover[s] the point in dispute, Erie command[s] the

240. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) ("The
dispositive question, therefore, is whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of
[New York Civil Practic Law and Rules] § 5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal
scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases."); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1987) ("The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule
[of Appellate Procedure] 38 is 'sufficiently broad' to cause a 'direct collision' with state law, or,
implicitly, to 'control the issue' between the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that
law."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) ("Application of the Hanna
analysis is premised on a 'direct collision' between the Federal Rule and the state law.").
241. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
242. Id. at 752-53.
243. See id. at 740.
244. Id. at 742-43 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971)).
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
246. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. See also Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 4-5 (citing
Walker for the same rule).
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enforcement of state law."' 7 The Court concluded that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3 was not sufficiently broad to exclude the state law:
There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute
of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling
rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in diversity actions [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3 governs the date
from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to
run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations.A4
It supported this conclusion by emphasizing the substantive component
of the Oklahoma statute:
In contrast to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3, the Oklahoma statute is a statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual
service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations...
. It is these policy aspects which make the service requirement an
'integral' part of the statute of limitations.... As such, the service
rule must be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations.
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3 does not replace such policy determinations found in state law. [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 3
and Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), can exist side by side, therefore,
each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without
conflict. 249
In contrast, seven years after Walker, the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Woods"0 found an absolute and

irreconcilable conflict between an Alabama statute and Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.' The Alabama statute imposed a mandatory ten
percent penalty when state appellate courts left money judgments substantially unmodified after enforcement of those judgments had been
stayed pending appeal. 2 In contrast, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 allowed, but did not require, federal appellate courts to award
damages and costs if an appeal is frivolous. "3 According to the Court:
the Rule's discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts
with the mandatory provision of Alabama's affirmance penalty statute. Moreover, the purposes underlying the Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statute to indi-

247. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)).
248. Id. at 750-51 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted).
250. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
251. See id. at 7-8 ("Federal Rule 38 adopts a case-by-case approach to identifying and
deterring frivolous appeals, the Alabama statute precludes any exercise of discretion within its scope
of operation.").
252. See id. at 4.
253. See id. at 3-4, 7-8 (comparing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986) with FED. R. APp. P. 38

(1982)).
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cate that the Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so. as to
preclude its application in federal diversity actions.'
Nevertheless, in 1996, in Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc.,"

the Supreme Court again demonstrated the extent to which it was willing
to go to avoid finding an absolute conflict between state and federal law
in a diversity case and to apply both state and federal law if the state rule
at issue has a substantive character. Gasperiniinvolved a New York law
that empowered appellate courts "to review the size of jury verdicts and
to order new trials when the jury's award 'deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation,"' a provision that conflicted both
with the Seventh Amendment and with the federal standard for reviewing
jury awards. 256 First, under the Seventh Amendment, "no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." 7 At common law, trial
judges-not appellate courts-make the initial determination of whether
a verdict is excessive. 8 Second, federal courts will not disturb jury
awards claimed to be excessive "unless the amount was so exorbitant
that it 'shock[s] the conscience of the court."' 59
Under Erie, the Court decided, the New York standard was both
substantive and procedural: "'substantive' in that § 5501(c)'s 'deviates
materially' standard controls how much a plaintiff can be awarded; 'procedural' in that § 5501(c) assigns decisionmaking authority to New
York's Appellate Division."" "The dispositive question, therefore, is
whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of §
5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial
and decision of civil cases."' 6'
The Court first addressed the conflict between New York's "materially deviates" standard and the federal "shock the conscience" standard,
observing that "New York state-court opinions confirm that § 5501(c)'s
'deviates materially' standard calls for closer surveillance than 'shock
the conscience' oversight." 62 Noting that a state rule's substantive character is judged by the "outcome determinative" test, "guided by 'the twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws,'
the Court determined that
254. Id. at 7.
255. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
256. Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
257. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
258. See Gasperini,518 U.S. at 422 (citations omitted).
259. Id. (citing Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012-13 (2d Cir.
1995)).
260. Id. at 426.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 424 (citing O'Connor v. Graziosi, 516 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (App. Div. 1987)). See
also Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1013; Harvey v. Mazal Am. Partners, 590 N.E.2d 224, 228 (N.Y. 1992).
263. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 427-28 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
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the New York standard was substantive because non-application of the
state statute could result in "'substantial' variations between state and
federal money judgments.""'2 As a result, "New York's check on excessive damages implicates" Erie's twin aims, and suggesting that federal
courts sitting in diversity should apply the New York law. 6
The Court then analyzed whether the Seventh Amendment's reexamination clause and the division of labor between trial and appellate
courts were "'[a]n essential characteristic of the federal-court system"'
that would prevent application of the New York statute. 6 Noting that
under the Seventh Amendment federal district courts could clearly overturn verdicts for excessiveness while the ability of federal appellate
courts to do so was a "relatively late, and less secure, development,"267
the court concluded that both New York's interest in the "materially deviates" standard and the federal court's interest in preserving its normal
division of labor could be satisfied by having the federal district court
apply the state standard. 68 District court decisions using New York's rule
would then be reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard at the
court of appeals. 9
The Gasperini Court thus avoided the "easy out" under Erie and
refused to hold that because federal procedure and the Seventh Amendment required a different division of labor than the New York statute,
that statute could not apply in federal diversity cases. Instead, it retained
as much of the state statute as it could, allowing the "materially deviates"
standard to govern in federal district court. Resolution of the procedural
end of the conflict in favor of the federal system, in other words, did not
have to entirely eliminate state substantive law from the analysis.
Consideration of Walker, Burlington Northern, and Gasperini provides federal courts with a powerful but under-utilized framework for
analyzing evidentiary Erie problems. Walker and Burlington Northern
instruct federal courts to look for but avoid finding absolute conflicts
between state law and the Federal Rules. This requires, at minimum, that
the federal court know what both the state and the federal rules require in
order to identify a conflict: if the state and federal rules agree that evidence is or is not admissible, the Erie "problem" disappears. If the two
rules disagree, the temptation for many courts would be to claim a Burlington Northern-type absolute conflict and to revert to the Hanna rule
that the Federal Rules govern if rationally capable of classification as
procedural. Two salient factors should be considered before such a determination is made, however. First, under Walker, a court must deter264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 430 (paraphrasing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68).
See id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 438.
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mine whether the federal rule at issue is broad enough to control the issue of whether evidence is admissible in a particular case. Second, the
court must determine whether the rule relates to the state's substantive
policy. The answers to these analyses will provide courts guidance in
whether to apply the federal rule, the state standard, or both.
b. There Is No Absolute Conflict Between Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, as Interpreted by Daubert, and State-Law
Medical Certainty Standards Governing Admissibility of
Medical Experts
At least three federal courts have recognized that the Daubert
screening standard could conflict with certain state-law standards for
expert medical testimony. 0 Nevertheless, Walker and Gasperini indicate
that state medical certainty standards often should apply in federal diversity
cases, even when those standards govern the admissibility of an expert's
testimony.
First, as has already been discussed, state law standards have a substantive character. Thus, as in Gasperini, they are both substantive and
procedural: substantive, because most states require a plaintiff to prove
its case with expert testimony that must meet this standard, making the
standard part of the burden of proof; and procedural, because the standards also define whether evidence is admissible. Under the Court's reasoning in Gasperini, therefore, federal courts sitting in diversity should
work hard to apply these state standards even when important federal interests-such as the Federal Rules of Evidence-require accommodation.
Second, the Third Circuit's conclusion in In re Paoli that a conflict
exists between medical certainty standards and the Federal Rules was
overly hasty."' Traditionally, federal courts have required medical experts to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, just as states

270. Arredondo v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 1193, *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting but
not reaching an Erie argument that Arizona still uses the Frye test and hence that a federal court
sitting in diversity should not use the Daubert analysis); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated
Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (stating:
If a federal evidentiary rule results in dismissal where the state evidentiary rule would
not, then, under Erie, the evidentiary ruling might be considered substantive rather than
procedural. If so considered, then the federal court would have to apply the state
evidentiary rule in a diversity case such as this. But Arkansas cases follow Daubert's
reliability inquiry. See Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 544-47, 915 S.W.2d 284, 292-94
(1996); Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991). Therefore, we are not
required to face that problem here.);
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 n.21 (D. Or. 1996) (noting the potential
Erie problem but deciding that the Oregon state analysis was the same as the federal Daubert
analysis).
271. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). See also supra
notes 127-131 & accompanying text. See generally Gottesman, supra note 85, at 1859-63 (arguing
that based on legislative history Congress did not intend Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to supersede
state substantive law).
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have."2 Prior to the Daubert decision, federal courts included medical
certainty as part of Federal Rule of Evidence 702's "assist the trier of
fact" requirement. For example, when a chiropractor testified "that he
could not state with a reasonable degree of certainty the extent and the
causes of [the plaintiff's] disability" and "could only guess as to the effects" of the purported cause, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court
in excluding the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because
"the expert's testimony would not have assisted the jury in determining
the extent of injury attributable to" the alleged cause." 3
Similarly, in several states that have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as part of their state evidence code, courts analyze admissibility under that rule by applying the relevant medical certainty standard.274
Indeed, the Illinois Court of Appeals has expressly held that Illinois's
adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705 does not
change the requirement that a medical expert testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.275 Accordingly, nothing in Federal Rule of Evi-

272. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Mayhew v.
Bell S.S. Co., 917 F.2d 961, 963-64 (6th Cir. 1990) (excluding expert testimony because the doctor
would not testify with certainty); Grant v. Farnsworth, 869 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1989)
(excluding a chiropractor's testimony as not assisting the jury because he could not state an opinion
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty): DaSilva v. American Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 361
(1st Cir. 1988) (admitting expert medical testimony because it "generally reflected a conclusion
based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty"). But see United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d
1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is no requirement of reasonable scientific certainty
in opinions).
273. Grant, 869 F.2d at 1152.
274. See, e.g., Thirsk v. Ethicon, Inc., 687 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
under Colorado Rule of Evidence 702, "[a] medical opinion is admissible if founded on reasonable
medical probability" (citing Houser v. Eckhardt, 450 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1969))); Bloching v.
Albertson's, Inc., 934 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Idaho 1997) (holding that under Idaho Rules of Evidence 701
and 702, the testimony of a physician expert "that it was 'possible' that the insulin blend could have
caused a reaction" was inadmissible because "expert medical opinion testimony must be based upon
a 'reasonable degree of medical probability' in order to be admissible."); Fugett v. Harris, 669
N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (in order to satisfy the purposes of Ohio Evidence Rule 702(A),
expert opinions on causation must be stated in terms of probabilities (citations omitted)); Trapnell v.
John Hogan Interests, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App. 1991) (reasoning that, under Texas Rule
of Civil Evidence 702, expert medical testimony is admissible when it is clear that the doctor's
opinion is based on a reasonable medical probability); Everett v. Town of Bristol, 674 A.2d 1275,
1277 (Vt. 1996) (holding that under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony that does not
meet a standard of reasonable probability or reasonable certainty is speculative, irrelevant, and
inadmissible and citing Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 563 A.2d 621, 623 (Vt. 1989)); Reese v.
Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding that, under Washington Evidence Rules
702 and 703, expert medical testimony is admissible if it is based upon a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, because such testimony must "rise above speculation, conjecture, or mere
possibility.").
275. See Colins v. Straka, 517 N.E.2d 1147, 1151-52 (Il. App. Ct 1987). But see Cherry v.
Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that North Carolina's adoption of
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 through 705 superseded the prior state requirement that experts
testify to a reasonable medical probability).
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dence 702 per se creates an absolute conflict with state-law medical certainty standards.276
Nor does the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert create such a
conflict, although federal circuits have, since Daubert, largely dropped
the federal medical certainty requirement for expert testimony. 77 Despite
some courts' assumption to the contrary2 8 Daubert did not resolve potential Erie issues for Federal Rule of Evidence 702. While Daubertwas
a diversity case, that fact played no part whatsoever in the Supreme
Court's opinion.279 Indeed, the Court deemed the only Erie argument that
it addressed irrelevant: petitioners argued that application of the Frye
rule would affect their substantive rights in violation of the Erie doctrine,
but the Court declined to apply Frye at all..2 " Daubert thus provides no
direct guidance as to the interaction of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
the Erie doctrine. However, the Daubert Court did expressly note that
other evidentiary rules might affect a federal court's final decision regarding the admissibility of an expert's testimony,' indicating that Daubert's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not the exclusive
filter for determining whether such testimony is admissible.
In some states, the medical certainty standard has become the substantive equivalent to the Daubertinquiry, eliminating any Erie conflict.
For example, the Texas Court of Appeals has held, pursuant to Texas
Rules of Civil Evidence 702, 703, and 705, that "[w]hen the phrase 'reasonable medical probability' is used, it will amount to some evidence
only when it represents the overall substance of the expert's opinion and
is based on more than purely speculative conclusions or personal opinion
ungrounded in scientific reality"; 82 "[r]easonable probability cannot be
created by the mere utterance of magic words by someone designated an
expert. 2 13 In Texas, therefore, the acceptance of an expert's reasonable
medical probability testimony effectively describes a Daubert-like con-

276. See, e.g., Schulz, 942 F.2d at 207 (holding that the district court should have admitted a
doctor's expert testimony regardless of whether New Jersey or federal evidence rules applied
because no conflict existed between those rules).
277. See, e.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing
the admissibility and sufficiency of expert medical testimony on causation purely in terms of
Daubert); Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1997), for the principle that under Rule 702, "'an
expert's lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its admissibility').
278. See, e.g., Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Daubert sets the standard for the admissibility of expert medical testimony in diversity cases, not
state law).
279. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
280. See id. at 589 n.6. For a more expansive discussion of the Erie arguments in the Daubert
litigation, see Gottesman, supra note 85, at 1846-48.
281. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. In addition, the Court stated that "[t]he inquiry envisioned
by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one." Id. at 594.
282. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W.2d 535,542 (Tex. App. 1994).
283. Id. at 542 (citation omitted).
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clusion that the expert's opinion is grounded in valid scientific knowledge. As a result, medical testimony in a federal case where Texas substantive law applies is likely to be admissible or inadmissible regardless
of whether the federal court applies Texas law or the Daubert analysis.
Similarly, the Eastern District of Arkansas has decided that Daubertpresented no conflict with Arkansas law because "Arkansas cases follow
2 '
Daubert's reliability inquiry.""
Even in states where the state medical certainty standard and Daubert present different rules for expert testimony's admissibility, they
rarely require the court to choose between them. For most states, the
state medical certainty requirement does not address the same concerns
as the Daubert analysis. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted by
Daubert, seeks to ensure that expert testimony is based on credible and
reliable science-that the expert can reach the conclusion stated through
proper scientific methodology-and that the opinion "fits" the case at
hand, a measure of relevance. In contrast, as has been discussed, states
generally impose certainty standards to ensure that the conclusion actually meets a required confidence threshold. 5 In particular, regarding the
issue of causation, the standard often ensures that the expert identifies the
most probable cause of the plaintiff's illness or injury given the facts at
hand"6 or that the expert testifies that the purported cause is more probably than not the actual cause.287
The difference is most obvious when the distinction between general and specific causation comes into play. For example, an expert could
testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty on the basis of differential diagnosis that a particular drug caused a particular plaintiffs condition, only to have the federal court exclude the testimony under Daubert because the relevant epidemiology did not demonstrate that the drug

284. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d 942, 949
n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
285. See, e.g., Anthony v. Chambless, 500 S.E.2d 402, 404-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
that, in a loss of chance medical malpractice action, testimony to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty serves to ensure that the decedent's prospects for survival were "more than a mere chance
or speculation"); Cherry v. Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
"'[r]easonable probability' was employed to increase the degree of certainty allowed" when experts
could not testify as to ultimate issues).
286. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Altenberg. 904 S.W.2d 734, 738-39 (Tex. App. 1995) (noting that
reasonable medical probability standard is met and testimony is admissible when an expert identifies
a "probable" cause in contrast to other "possible" causes); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 551
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 (Wyo. 1993), for the principle
that the requirement of reasonable medical probability ensures that the expert opinion represents that
expert's "professional judgment as to the most likely one among the possible causes of the physical
condition involved").
287. See, e.g., Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Neb. 1994)
(noting that "[miedical testimony couched in terms of 'possibility' is insufficient to support a causal
relationship" and citing Fuglsang v. Blue Cross, 456 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1990), for the rule that
expert medical testimony is still inadmissible speculation when "rendered on a 50-50 basis").
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increased the relative risk of acquiring that condition. Conversely, medical literature might clearly establish a drug's ability to cause a particular
condition, but the expert might be unwilling to testify to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the drug caused the condition in a particular plaintiff because associated risk factors were absent or another
cause seemed more medically probable.
Daubert and the state-law standards thus often address different
issues regarding expert medical testimony and provide two rationales for
excluding such testimony in federal diversity cases. Although the issues
of certainty and reliability are obviously related-an expert may be unwilling to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty because he
or she believes that the available medical evidence cannot support the
conclusion sought-the two standards nevertheless focus on different
aspects of the testimony: Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are
directed to the science and methodology behind the testimony, while the
state standards focus on the expert's actual conclusion. As in Walker,
therefore, the state and federal rules can function together: courts can
engage in a Daubert analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
apply the state-law medical certainty standard, just as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3 and service requirements for state statutes of limitations can function side-by-side.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Erie doctrine as interpreted by the Supreme Court
through 1996, state medical certainty standards should generally apply in
federal diversity medical malpractice and medical products liability
cases, regardless of whether those standards define an overall burden of
proof, impose a competency requirement for medical experts, or establish an admissibility threshold for expert medical testimony. However,
these standards' relationship to a Daubert analysis depends upon the
applicable state's view of the standard. If the standard defines the overall
burden of proof, a Daubert screening will often occur at an inappropriate
time to consider that standard. However, if exclusions under Daubert
have the result of clearly indicating that the plaintiff cannot meet the
state-law burden of proof, consideration of that standard may be immediately warranted, particularly in jurisdictions, such as the Ninth Circuit,
that willingly consider sufficiency in the Daubert analysis.
Competency and admissibility, in contrast, are issues that federal
courts should address in conjunction with, although not necessarily as
part of, the Daubert analysis, because they, like Federal Rule of Evidence 702, determine whether particular expert testimony will be allowed into evidence. When state-law medical certainty standards govern
an expert's competency to testify, Federal Rule of Evidence 601 provides
that those standards should govern in diversity cases. Moreover, statelaw admissibility standards that have a substantive character generally
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will not absolutely conflict with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and so,
under the Erie doctrine, they also should apply.
To date, however, federal courts have been largely unwilling to
wrestle with the conjunction of Daubert and Erie regarding the admissibility of expert medical testimony. The courts have announced general
rules based on federal law and Hanna v. Plumer rather than performing
an Erie analysis that considers Walker, Gasperini, and the individual
peculiarities of state evidence jurisprudence regarding expert medical
witnesses. At the very least, these poorly supported general rules fall to
recognize, contrary to the dictates of the Erie doctrine, that states varysometimes drastically-from each other, and from the federal courts, in
their standards for admitting expert medical testimony. The general rules
are also intellectually dishonest, given the federal circuits' willingness in
other contexts to allow state evidentiary rules to apply in diversity cases
when the state rules are substantive or bound up in substantive policies.
The Third Circuit has provided one model of how to combine the
Daubert analysis with consideration of the state medical certainty admissibility standard that preserves both state and federal interests without
overly complicating the overall admissibility question. Other approaches
certainly exist; indeed, once the Erie issue has been settled for a state, it may
be more efficient for a federal court sitting in diversity to perform the statelaw admissibility analysis before performing the Daubertanalysis.
The consideration of Erie's effect on the admissibility of expert
medical testimony regarding causation could (although almost certainly
will not) result in fifty different admissibility analyses for federal courts
hearing diversity medical tort cases. But that was the point of the Erie
doctrine: a state-law case in federal court should look as much like the
equivalent case in state court as possible to avoid forum shopping, discrimination, and unequal application of the state laws. Neither Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 nor the Daubert decision alter a federal court's
Erie responsibilities, a fact more federal courts may be forced to recognize if parties continue to be willing to argue that Erie has something to
say about the role of medical certainty standards in diversity medical tort
cases.

THE AMERICANS WITH "CERTAIN" DISABILITIES ACT:

TITLE I OF THE ADA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S RESULT
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INTRODUCTION
Michele recently began working as a certified public accountant for
a large accounting firm. She is epileptic, but fortunately she found a
medication that controls her seizures exceptionally well. Consequently,
she has remained seizure free for nearly ten years. While such medications sometimes cause serious side effects, she has experienced none
beyond drowsiness in the morning. However, her doctor has told her that
certain types of flickering lights can cause a seizure, particularly fluorescent lights. Unfortunately, the light bulbs in her office emit such a
flicker, and she is concerned that she may therefore experience a seizure.
Michele asked her employer to replace the bulbs with a different type of
bulb that would reduce the risk of seizure, but would cost approximately
seventy-five dollars more per year. Her employer refused, and as a result
of her request-which had the effect of informing her employer of her
epilepsy-Michele was turned down for a high profile assignment for
which she was well qualified, in favor of a less qualified colleague.
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Under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"),' Michele
would seemingly be entitled to the minimal accommodation she sought
and be protected from the discrimination she suffered. In fact-prior to
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,' and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg'-all three agencies charged with implementing the ADA, and most
of the courts that had addressed the issue of whether someone like Michele is covered by the Act, considered this threshold question a straightforward one:5 she would have been covered. Of course, that would only
be the beginning of the inquiry for she would still have to meet the other
provisions of the ADA to win her claim.'
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the Supreme Court's
recent decisions effectively preclude many individuals with impairments
that substantially limit a major life activity from coverage under the
ADA if their disabilities are controlled by mitigating measures such as
medications Therefore, because Michele's medication has kept her seizure free for years, and she suffers no serious side effects from her medication, it is now possible the ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
does not cover her.8 Thus, her employer need not accommodate her by
replacing the light bulbs, until of course, the current bulbs cause her to
have a seizure; at which point, Michele would likely be considered disabled under the Court's recent decisions and covered under the Act. If,
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). In determining
whether a plaintiff is covered under the ADA, the first issue is whether the individual has a
"disability," which is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). If this threshold question is
answered affirmatively, a court next considers whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a
disability." See infra note 6.
2. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
3. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
4. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
5. See infra notes 16 & 19 and accompanying text.
6. In the employment context the ADA prohibits discrimination against any "qualified
individual with a disability." Id. § 12112(a). After proving that she is disabled under the Act, a
claimant must also show that she is a "qualified individual" in that she can "with or without
reasonable accommodation . . . perform the essential functions of the employment position [she]
holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). The claimant must prove that the employer acted "because of' the
disability. Id. § 12112(a). The employer has several defenses available. See id. at § 12113. Assuming
Michelle can perform the essential functions of her job, the accommodation of replacing the light
bulbs in her office would appear reasonable.
7. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at
2168-69; See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text (discussing whether a person should be
determined "disabled" in their medicated or unmedicated state). In Sutton, Justice O'Connor
suggests that a well-controlled diabetic would not be covered under the Act-a scenario very similar
to Michelle's well-controlled epilepsy. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
8. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Bragdon might
provide the basis for an argument that Michelle is disabled for ADA purposes, but language from
Sutton is problematic in this regard. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
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under the Supreme Court's interpretation, she is not currently disabled,
her employer could discriminate against her in regard to promotions and
other benefits of employment because she is epileptic unless she can
prove she was "regarded as" 9 disabled; a task also complicated by the
Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy.'"
This is an odd result, as a primary motivating force underlying the
employment provisions in Title I of the ADA was the prevention of employment discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes of disabilities
and disabled individuals." Yet, the ADA's definition of disability under
the Court's approach does not necessarily cover individuals with wellcontrolled epilepsy, asthma, diabetes, or other conditions that are treatable with medication. This issue is further compounded by aspects of the
Court's approach that may make it harder for some individuals to be
covered under the ADA's provision protecting those "regarded as" having a disability.' 2
By removing individuals from the ADA's coverage in answering the
threshold question of whether they are disabled, the Court denies them
ADA protection entirely, thus denying them the opportunity to receive
accommodation and even to obtain redress when they are victims of intentional discrimination based on their condition. Even if an accommodation would help avoid problems related to the condition, as in Michele's case, if those problems have not yet occurred and the individual is
otherwise well-controlled by medication, prosthetics, etc., that individual
is not disabled under the Court's analysis, and thus can not get to the
issue of reasonable accommodation under the Act.'3 And, as the Court
also made it less likely that such individuals will meet the "regarded as"
having a disability standard, even an employer's use of broad-based
stereotypes may not be availing to such individuals.'4 This "one-two

9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). A person is "regarded as" having a disability if "(1) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149-50.
Essentially, the covered entity imposes its misperceptions onto the individual. See id.
10. See infra Parts I.A. & I.B. (analyzing the Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,415-40 (1991) (outlining the origins of the ADA).
12. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-52 (holding that in order to prove that they were regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, plaintiffs needed to show that they were
regarded as unable to work in a broad class of jobs); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137-39 (finding that
plaintiff "has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs" and thus that he
had not established that he is "regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working."
Id. at 2139).
13. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47. Of course, if the medication only partially controlled the
effects of the disability or has side effects, and as a result the individual still has an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, that individual would be covered under the Court's
approach. See id. at 2149.
14. See infra Part ll.B. (discussing the "regarded as" provision under the ADA).
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punch" effectively removes many employees with disabilities from coverage under the ADA, and may actually protect employers who discriminate based on unfounded stereotypes, misconceptions, or outright animus.15
All of this might be legally plausible if the text of the ADA, agency
interpretations, legislative history, or ordinary methods of statutory construction supported it. Strikingly-while the Court argues that the text is
clear on the subject-the interpretations of all three agencies charged
with implementing the ADA,' 6 and the seemingly clear intent of Congress embodied in the legislative history,'7 are diametrically opposed to
the Court's allegedly obvious interpretation.'" In addition, most of the
courts that have interpreted the ADA on this issue, 9 and the dissenting

15. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2)
(1999) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission stating that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures ....
");
28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A § 35.104 (1999) (Department of Justice stating that "[t]he question of
whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures ....
");49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1999) (Department of Transportation: a disability is "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual ....
").
17. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(stating "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures ....");H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1II), at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51 (stating "[t]he impairment should be assessed without considering
whether mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures .. ").
See also Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
18. In fact, the agency interpretations and legislative history mandate an approach opposite to
that of the Court in regard to the analysis of mitigating measures in disability determinations. See
supra notes 16-17.
19. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
determination of disabilities is made by evaluating the effect a person's impairment has on a major
life activity without considering mitigating measures); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 119 S.Ct. 2388
(1999) (holding that disabilities must be determined without considering mitigating measures);
Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
serious impairments should be considered in unmitigated state), cert. granted andjudgment vacated,
119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998)
(evaluating a condition without regard to the effects of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1 st Cir. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs diabetes should
be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated through medication or
other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (using the ADA and legislative history to support the decision to avoid considering mitigating
measures when assessing disability); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762-65 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing to the EEOC as a basis for deciding that mitigating measures will not be used for
disability determinations); Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
mitigating effects will not be considered when determining disability); Harris v. H & W Contracting
Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of mitigating measures shall be
considered on a case-by-case basis); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)
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Justices on the Supreme Court," did not interpret it in the way that the
Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg majorities did. A significant aspect of
this disparity may lie in the Court's presumption that there is an inherent
conflict between applying the individualized approach mandated by the
ADA and making disability determinations without regard to mitigating
measures.' This presumption by the Court is directly contradicted by the
interpretations of the agencies charged with implementing the Act and
the clear intent of Congress. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, in interpreting the Act this way the Court strays from several
generally accepted methods of statutory construction for civil rights statutes, and may create confusion regarding deference to agency interpretations. -3
The Court's approach seems to focus on supporting a particular result, especially given the factually appealing scenarios the Court chose to
hear. Unfortunately, the holdings, aside from perhaps Kirkingburg, are
quite broad and could apply to many situations where the facts are not as
appealing.' This Article will focus on the trio of cases, and some of the
concerns they raise under the ADA and in regard to judicial interpretation. It is essential to note that this Article is not an exhaustive discussion
of the ADA, its history, or its social context. Rather, it points out the
deep concerns regarding the contradictions raised by the questionable
and decontextualized approach applied in the majority opinions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg.
Part I of this Article provides a review of the Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg decisions. Part II addresses the connections and conflicts
between the Court's interpretation of the definition of "disability" and
the legislative history of the ADA, agency interpretations, and prior
cases. Part II also discusses the same conflicts concerning the Court's
interpretation of the ADA's "regarded as" having a disability provision.
Part III examines the Court's novel statutory construction in the trio of
cases and compares it with generally applicable methods of statutory
construction. Part III also analyzes the Court's approach in light of its
previous decisions regarding deference to administrative agency interpretations. Parts II and III demonstrate the apparently result/policyoriented nature of the Court's approach. Finally, Part IV explores the

(stating that EEOC regulations dictate that mitigating measures are not to be considered when
determining disability).
20. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
22. See supra notes 16-17. See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. These issues are discussed infra Part 111.
24. While the Court suggests flexibility in dicta, the holdings are rather broad. See, e.g.,
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149. The mitigating measures holding, combined with the other aspects of the
Court's interpretation of the term "disability," will exclude many individuals who would have
previously been considered disabled under the disability determination threshold.
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options remaining for individuals who are no longer "disabled" under the
Court's approach in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg.

I. THE CASES
This Part contains a brief overview of the Sutton, Murphy and
Kirkingburg cases. A more thorough discussion of the issues and concerns raised by those cases is contained in Parts H, HI, and IV. The purpose of this Section is to provide some context for the later parts of this
Article by giving a synopsis of the majority opinion in each of the three
cases, as well as introducing the apparent contradictions contained within
each decision.
A. Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.

Of the three ADA cases decided on June 22, 1999, Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc.25 may be the most significant because the other two cases
rely heavily on it.26 In Sutton, the majority decided that courts must consider corrective and mitigating measures in disability determinations
under the ADA.27 In doing so, it disregarded the holdings of the majority
of circuits that have considered the issue, 28 the long-standing interpretations of the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the
ADA, 9 and the bulk of the legislative history readily available (including
specific language in both the House and Senate Committee Reports
which clearly contradict the Court's findings). ° The Court also held that
the petitioners in Sutton could not support their claim that the respondent
airline "regarded" them as disabled in violation of the ADA.31 As will be
discussed below, the holding on the "regarded as" claim may have farther-reaching ramifications well beyond this set of facts.

25. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139.
26. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999).
27. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
28. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining a disability), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2399 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d
626, 629-30 (7th Cit. 1998) (holding that disabilities should be determined without reference to
mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff's diabetes should be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated
through medication or other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d
933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (using the EEOC Interpretative Guidance to decide that mitigating
measures will not be considered).
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
31. Sutton, at 2149-52.
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The petitioners in Sutton were twin sisters who applied to United Air
Lines for positions as global pilots. 2 Their applications were terminated
when the airline realized they each had severe myopia resulting in uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse.33 Although they both functioned
identically to individuals when wearing their prescription glasses, they
did not meet the airline's minimum requirement of 20/100-uncorrected
visual acuity.' Petitioners filed suit under the ADA, alleging that they
were disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), which defines "disability"
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
...major life activities."35 Petitioners further alleged that the respondent
airline impermissibly "regarded" them as disabled under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(C) because the airline found them unable to satisfy the requirements of the job of global pilot even though their impairments were
controlled with corrective devices.36
The Court essentially used the disability claim in Sutton to redefine a
major aspect of the definition of "disability" under the Act.37 According
to the reasoning in Sutton, in making disability determinations courts
must examine claims in light of any corrective or mitigating measures."
The Court based this aspect of its holding on three grounds. First, the
Court noted that "the phrase 'substantially limits"' in the definition of
disability is in the present indicative verb form.'3 The Court concluded
therefore that the language thus requires a person to be presently substantially limited in a major life activity, and that it is inappropriate to
determine substantial limitation in regard to whether an impairment
"'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken."' According to the Court, "[a] person whose
physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a
major life activity."'
Second, the Sutton Court determined that the definition of "disability" requires courts to make disability determinations on an individualized basis. 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that making disability
determinations based on an individual's level of impairment in an "uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized

32. Seeid. at 2143.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 2143-44.
36. Id.
37.. Id. at 2146-47.
38. See id. at 2146.
39. ld. at 2146.
40. Id.at2146-47.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)).
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inquiry mandated by the ADA."43 As a corollary to the Court's view of
the individualized analysis, the Court pointed out that in making disabil-

ity determinations based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated
state "courts and employers could not consider any negative side effects.

•. resulting from the use of mitigating measures."" The Court presumably believes that this new interpretation will be beneficial to the individual who will now be judged in her corrected state.
Finally, the Court found that because congressional findings "enacted as part of the ADA" refer to "some 43,000,000 Americans" having
one or more disabilities, Congress could not have intended the Act to
require disability determinations to be made in regard to an individual's
unmitigated state, because that would result in a number far greater than
the 43,000,000 figure stated in the congressional findings.45 The Court
essentially ignored the legislative history directly relevant to the mitiga-

tion issue.46
As will be explained in Parts II and III of this Article, each of these
points is specious, and is directly contradicted by agency interpretations,
legislative history, and numerous lower court interpretations. Ironically,
the Court used these same arguments to hold that the Act is clear on its
face, and that it is thus unnecessary to examine the legislative history or
follow the agency interpretations.4 ' This is circular reasoning. The Court
made numerous presumptions to support a disputed position it says is
clear, and then used that alleged clarity to avoid referring to otherwise
important sources that universally contradict the Court's presumptions4.
Next, the Court applied its new approach to disability determinations
to the life activity of working.49 Petitioners in Sutton based their claim on
the major life activity of working, rather than that of seeing." Basing
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2147-49.
46. See id. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 2146-49.
48. Justice Stevens' dissent powerfully drives home the discontinuity between the Court's
conclusion and the numerous sources that canons of statutory construction suggest should be
considered in this case, such as legislative history and agency interpretations. Id. at 2152-61
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also infra Part ILI.A (addressing the issues of statutory construction and
deference to administrative agency guidelines in greater depth).
49. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2150-52. As will be seen, working is generally considered the "weak
link" in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") definitions of life activities.
50. See id. at 2150. Petitioners originally claimed a disability under the major life activity of
seeing. The District Court held that while petitioners were impaired, the impairment did not substantially limit them in the life activity of seeing. The court stated that petitioners did not actually claim
any other restrictions for the life activity of seeing other than the ability to obtain the positions
sought, although the court does cite petitioners' allegations that they are impaired in everyday activities such as driving, etc. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., CIV.A.96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
The Tenth Circuit agreed that petitioners are impaired, but held that under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
of the ADA, whether such impairment rises to the level of a disability depends on whether
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their claim on work limited the possibility of relief under the ADA because the EEOC guidelines themselves suggest that claimants resort to
this activity only as a last resort, where no other viable claim exists." The
Court appeared to latch onto this point to further limit the availability of
a disability claim under subsection (A), at least where the claim is made
under the "life activity" of working. 2 The Court took advantage of the
lower courts' dismissal of petitioners' claimed disability in the major life
activity of seeing to avoid any in-depth analysis on this point. 3 The result
might have been different had the Court analyzed this argument, but Petitioners' visual condition was still controlled with the use of corrective/mitigating measures. Thus, adopting the Court's reasoning, the petitioners would not likely have prevailed under subsection (A) even under
the major life activity of seeing because the condition was mitigated. The
Court's approach diminishes the chances of being found disabled under
subsection (A) when one has a disorder that responds well to corrective
devices, no matter what "life activity" would be affected but for the mitigating measure. The Court clearly implies this in its analysis of the individualized nature of disability determinations.'
The best potential recourse left if a "controlled" disability is no
longer covered, would be to claim a violation of subsection (C), where
the employer must erroneously "regard" the individual as disabled or
regard the individual as still disabled despite the controlling measure.
The Court limited claims under subsection (C) that are based on the life
activity of "working" by holding that such claims must now be even
more specifically drawn to show that the individual is substantially limited to "a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes" (and
ironically used the EEOC guidelines for support)." From now on, the
applicant/worker will theoretically need to show an employer's unwillingness to hire him/her to perform any positions the employer may have,
even one which may be below the abilities and/or training of the applicant. 6 A trained secretary with a controlled disability might be denied a

petitioners are substantially limited in light of mitigating or corrective measures. Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 900 (10th Cir. 1997). The court held that petitioners' corrected vision
did not limit them in the life activity of seeing, and rejected as an incorrect interpretation petitioners'
reliance on the definition of "legal blindness" for purposes of Social Security disability benefits,
holding that that definition contemplates corrected vision. Id. at 900-10. Yet the Supreme Court
stated petitioners do not make the "obvious argument" that they are regarded as having a substantial
limitation in the life activity of seeing, only that they are regarded as having a substantial limitation
in the life activity of working. Sutton, at 2150.
51. Sutton, at 2150-51.
52. Id. at 2149-50.
53. Id. at 2150.
54. Seeid. at 2147.
55. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149-51.
56. As will be seen in Part II this might give employers a way to thwart claims under
subsection (C) regardless of the major life activity involved, because the employer can simply claim:
"We did not regard plaintiff as impaired in major life activity X, but rather we only considered her
impaired as to her specific job."
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position based on the employer's "regarding" her as still disabled in
some way for thatjob, but if the employer believes she could perform a
filing clerk's position it would seem the applicant might not be able to
show discrimination under subsection (C). 7
The Court did not even address whether the employer actually needs
to offer another position. The Court based its opinion in great part on the
fact that petitioners would meet respondent airline's visual test for other,
non-global, pilot positions, but made no mention of whether an employer
must offer another position.58 Indeed, in another example of the Court's
murkiness, on the issues, the Court declined to address whether United
Air Lines acuity requirements for global pilots, which differ from those
for other commercial pilots, has any relevance to the position and therefore to the airline's refusal to hire petitioners. As with the other two
cases, the Supreme Court might have upheld the lower court's holding in
Sutton on the basis that the petitioners were not qualified for the position
even with corrective measures, assuming United Air Lines could justify
those requirements. The Court, however, never reached this issue.
As noted above, the Court held that whether a person is disabled is
an individualized inquiry, which includes consideration of the positive or
negative effects on the individual from the measures used to control the
disability." At first blush this would seem a logical, perhaps even benevolent, interpretation of the Act. However, the Court applies this reasoning, in all three cases, in a manner which would appear to penalize
individuals who are able to control their disabilities at least to some extent, but who may be subject to unfounded stereotypes or need workplace
accommodation to effectuate total, or even further, control. The Court, in
trying to explain its position, uses a form of reasoning that ranges from
unclear to outright confusing, and seldom comes close to legitimizing its
holding.
For example, in its analysis of the individualized nature of disability
determinations, the Court states the following:
For instance, under [the view that disability determinations should be
made based on an individual's unmitigated state], courts would almost certainly find all diabetics to be disabled, because if they failed
to monitor their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they would
almost certainly be substantially limited in one or more major life activities. A diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities would therefore be considered disabled simply because he or
she has diabetes. Thus, the guidelines approach would create a system
in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of peo-

57.
58.
59.

Id.at2151.
See id. at 2150-51.
See id. at 2146-47.
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pie with similar impairments, rather than as individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.60
Prior to Sutton, in most jurisdictions, a diabetic would have met the definition of disabled; the level of control was used to determine whether she
was a "qualified individual with a disability." Thus, poorly and wellcontrolled individuals alike were protected from stereotype-based discrimination. The Court's approach, however, essentially disadvantages
the well-controlled individual by removing her from coverage, even if an
employer discriminates based on unfounded perceptions or generalizations about the disability, and through its analysis of the "regarded as"
clause the Court also limited the situations in which subsection (C) will
be an effective alternative.6' The broader implications of this will be discussed in greater detail in Part II of this Article.
First though, let us consider another all too plausible application of the
Court's decision here, this time based on an application of subsection (C):
Jason suffers from a moderate form of schizophrenia. He responds
well to medication, and has held a number of low-level clerking positions, receiving positive references. He applied for the position of customer service representative in a propane gas company, which pays an
advertised rate of $8/hour. The position would require Jason to deal with
both new and present customers in person at the service counter as they
come in to apply for service or inquire about problems with their accounts. Jason would be responsible for taking the correct information
from them, informing them of the company's services and policies, and
referring any problems to the appropriate company personnel. The job
description corresponds to those duties Jason has successfully fulfilled in
the past.
The hiring manager is aware of Jason's condition, and she is concerned that Jason will not be able to handle the pressure of the service
counter, which can become extremely busy during the winter months,
with customers frequently angry over service problems. She offers Jason
a position in the stock room instead, which pays minimum wage.
Before Sutton, Jason would likely have been able to bring a claim
showing: 1) that he is disabled under the ADA, because he has a disability which substantially limits one or more life activities, including, but
not necessarily limited to, that of working; and, 2) that the potential employer "regards" him as disabled despite the fact that he can show a work
history which supports his ability to do the customer service job. Now,
however, it is questionable whether he could do either. Under subsection
(A), if his schizophrenia is controlled by medication, it is unlikely that a
court would find him substantially limited in a major life activity at this

60.
61.

Id. at 2147.
Id. at 2158-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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time.62 He may also be unable to show discrimination based on subsection
(C) because the employer found he could do another job in the "broad
range" of the employer's jobs, albeit at a lower level of responsibility
and pay. Although Jason has been precluded from a position based on
nothing more than his disability, the Court's decision in Sutton and its
progeny could well leave him without recourse. This is an all too likely
result of the Court's murky approach.
When you add to the mix the Court's justifications for disregarding
settled administrative law, and the legislative history relevant here, one
has to wonder whether Sutton will prove to be the Lopez" of administrative law, with the lower courts left never quite sure how, when, or if,
Sutton applies. Whether the Court will acknowledge this and seek to
clarify its holding--or whether Congress will do it for them-remains to
be seen. The ramifications for administrative law will be discussed in
Part III of this article.
B. Murphy v. United ParcelService, Inc.

In Murphy, the Court held that a mechanic with chronic and severe
hypertension whose job required him to drive commercial vehicles was
neither disabled nor "regarded as" disabled under the ADA.' The mechanic erroneously received Department of Transportation ("DOT")
health certification although he did not meet the requirements for those
who drive commercial vehicles. 5 In the time between the erroneous grant
of certification and the discovery that he did not meet the certification
requirements, Murphy apparently performed his job without incident.'
Upon discovering the error, however, United Parcel Service, Inc.
("UPS") terminated Murphy's employment because he did not meet the
DOT requirements. 7 The Court primarily relied upon the reasoning from
Sutton in holding that Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, but
expanded on the Sutton reasoning in addressing the "regarded as" disabled issue 8
Significantly, the case could have been decided on the "qualified individual with a disability" issue, particularly in light of the contempora-

62. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
63. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (effectively reversing a half-century long trend of
giving great deference to Congress in Commerce Clause cases by holding that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority). Just as Lopez reversed a half-century
long trend of giving great deference to Congress on Commerce Clause cases, Sutton effectively
overturns years of precedent giving deference to administrative agency decisions-without actually
saying so. We are left to wonder how the lower courts will deal with this implicit change.
64. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 2137-38; See supra Part I.A. (summarizing the Sutton opinion).
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neous decision in Kirkingburg,69 but the Court eliminated Murphy's
claim at the threshold issue of whether he was covered by the ADA at
all. The reasoning used to reach this result involved presumptions and
inconsistencies in logic that will be discussed in greater depth in Parts II
and III. The remainder of this subsection will simply provide an overview of the decision in Murphy.
In finding that Mr. Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, the
Court explained that the holding in Sutton resolved the issue because
"when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially
limit him in any major life activity."'7 Thus, as the Court did in Sutton,
the Murphy Court seemingly eliminated an entire class of individuals
from ADA protection without ever reaching the question of whether such
individuals are "qualified individuals with disabilities" or whether they
need reasonable accommodation.7 While this might be less troubling to
some given the facts in Murphy, which involved DOT certification requirements, the holding is not so limited.72
Still, there is one significant limitation in the decision:
Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking
medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider
whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite
his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether,
under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities
should be made without consideration of mitigating measures."
As will be discussed later in this Article, when considered in light of
aspects of the Court's holding in Bragdon v. Abbott," this language could
bring more individuals within the definition of "disability" under the
ADA.
Given the holding in Sutton, however, many individuals with treatable and well-controlled chronic hypertension, epilepsy, diabetes, myopia, and other conditions, would not be covered under the ADA as a
threshold matter. Thus, this limiting language from Murphy would not be
helpful to Michele in the example above until the lights (and the failure
to provide accommodation) actually caused her to have a seizure.
Moreover, that language would not be helpful to an individual with such
well-mitigated conditions even where an employer acts on inaccurate
69. See infra Part I.C. (summarizing the Kirkingburg opinion).
70. Id.
71. Compare Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143 (holding that courts should make disability
determinations with reference to mitigating measures) with Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (explaining
that, with medication, petitioner is not substantially limited in one or more major life activities).
72. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
73. Id. at 2137.
74. 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
75. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
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stereotypes regarding a disability, because such individuals are no longer
considered disabled, and thus can not challenge discriminatory conduct
unless they can support a claim that the employer "regarded" them as
disabled or discriminated based on a record of disability. This is where
Murphy becomes especially problematic, because it also limits the opportunity for individuals like Mr. Murphy and Michele to prove they are
"regarded as" disabled by their employers, and thus limits the best alternative means for gaining coverage under the ADA.76
In addressing the "regarded as" issue, the Murphy Court again relied
on the reasoning from Sutton. Significantly, as did the petitioners in Sutton, Mr. Murphy alleged that working was the major life activity in
which he was limited." The Court held that in order to meet the "regarded as" element in an ADA claim, an employee must show that her
employer regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.6 If an employee alleges that an employer "regarded"
her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the employee must demonstrate that she was regarded as "being precluded from
more than one job."79 The Court assumed, without holding, "that the
EEOC regulations regarding a disability determination are valid.""° Those
guidelines (which were also a significant focus in Sutton) state that to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an employee
must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities."6 In addition,
the Murphy majority states that courts should consider "the number and
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
to the individual,
within the geographical area reasonably accessible
82
disqualified.1
also
is
individual
the
which
from
Applying this definition to Mr. Murphy's claim, the Supreme Court
held that UPS simply regarded Mr. Murphy as "unable to meet the DOT
regulations," and thus as precluded only from his particular job because
he was able to perform other jobs that did not require him to drive commercial vehicles.83 Thus, according to the Court, UPS did not preclude
Mr. Murphy from working in a "class of jobs"; a requirement that a
plaintiff must meet in order to establish that he or she is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.' This was fatal to Mr. Murphy's "regarded as" claim, as it was to the claims in Sutton. Still, as in
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2138; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)).
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1998)).
Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
Id.at 2139.
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Sutton, the Court only considered the major life activity of working.
Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Court's approach would apply
to a claim where another life activity is at issue. There are, however, two
significant points to be made in this regard.
First, while the Court has only considered the major life activity of
working, and has acknowledged the unique hurdles a complainant must
overcome to demonstrate an impairment in regard to that major life activity, its holdings in Sutton and Murphy have ramifications for all claims
based on the "regarded as" element (as well as claims based on the disability element). This is because in analyzing the "regarded as" claims in
those cases, the Court required the complainant to demonstrate that the
employer regarded him or her as substantially impaired in a specific
major life activity or activities." Thus, an employer who does not understand a given impairment well enough to know what life activities might
be affected, or an employer with an aversion or animus toward those
with an impairment, could discriminate without "regarding" an employee
or applicant as substantially limited in any major life activity other than
working at the particular job the individual seeks or holds. As a result,
unless an employer regards an employee's impairment as substantially limiting in regard to a specific life activity or activities, the employer can discriminate based merely on the perception that the employee cannot perform
a particular job. That is exactly what occurred in Sutton and Murphy."
Second, the Court's focus on working might actually limit its holding, and provide a means by which some employees with impairments
that substantially limit another major life activity, but who are not so
impaired with mitigating measures, can successfully bring a claim when
their employers treat them as though they are so impaired. As noted
above, the Sutton Court hinted that it might have responded differently to
a claim based on the major life activity of seeing. 7 This possibility will
be discussed in greater depth in Parts II and IV of this Article. As also
discussed in those Parts, the Sutton plaintiffs would probably have lost at
the next level of inquiry-whether they were qualified individuals with
disabilities. That is the appropriate issue on which to consider these
cases, but the Court eliminated the claims at the threshold issue of
whether petitioners were covered under the ADA. For individuals like
Michele, Jason, and Mr. Murphy, this approach could make it exceedingly hard to ever get to the discrimination issue.
C. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
Kirkingburg involved an employee who lost his job as a truck driver
for Albertsons, Inc. because his visual acuity did not meet DOT require-

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2137; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151-52.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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ments.9 He suffered from a condition called amblyopia that resulted in
20/200 vision in his left eye, which effectively left him with monocular
vision." Significantly, the DOT had implemented a waiver program, and
Mr. Kirkingburg ultimately received a waiver. Albertsons nevertheless
refused to rehire him because the waiver program was experimental and
Kirkingburg did not meet the basic DOT vision requirements absent the
waiver.'
The Court applied the reasoning from Sutton, and held that Mr.
Kirkingburg was not disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)9 because
he was not substantially limited in a major life activity given his innate
ability to compensate for the poor vision in his impaired eye through
natural adjustments.92 The majority reinforced the Sutton holding that
courts should make disability determinations under the ADA on an individualized basis in light of any mitigating measures. 3 In determining that
Mr. Kirkingburg was not disabled, the Court held that whether a mitigating measure is artificial, such as medication or prosthetics, or naturally created, "consciously or not, with the body's own systems," is irrelevant to the importance of the mitigating measure in the disability
determination.94
Another significant aspect of the case arose from the definition of
"significantly restricts" in the EEOC interpretation of the substantial
limitation element of claims of disability under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A)." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that Mr.
Kirkingburg's impairment substantially limited him in regard to the major life activity of seeing, because Mr. Kirkingburg "demonstrated that
'the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in
which most people see.' "" The Supreme Court held, however, that this
was an improper interpretation of the substantial limitation element as
defined in the EEOC regulation relied upon by the Ninth Circuit.97
The EEOC regulation defines "substantially limits" to require an impairment to significantly restrict the manner in which an individual can
perform a major life activity as compared to the manner in "which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity."9 The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in equating
88. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2165-66 (1999).
89. Id. at 2164-66 (describing Mr. Kirkingburg's "monocular vision" as "an uncorrectable
condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye").
90. Id. at 2166.
91. Id. at 2168-69.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2169.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2168.
96. Id.at 2167 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)).
97. Id.
at 2168.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (1998).
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"significant difference" with "significant restriction," because doing so
improperly limited the ADA's "requirement that only impairments
causing 'substantial limitations' in individuals' ability to perform major
life activities constitute disabilities."99 Thus, as interpreted by the Court, a
significant difference between the way an impaired individual can perform a major life activity and the way most people can perform the same
activity is not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in that major
life activity."
The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred in not assessing Mr.
Kirkingburg's disability on an individualized basis as outlined in the
holding in Sutton.'"' Nevertheless, the Kirkingburg Court is arguably
more generous in its interpretation of this issue. The Court stated: "While
some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a
major life activity we cannot say monocularity does."'' 2 Although only
dicta, this statement implies a less rigid approach concerning some impairments which might be considered virtually per se disabilities. Given
Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court in Sutton and Murphy, however, it remains to be seen if this possible flexibility suggested in Justice
Souter's opinion for the Kirkingburg Court will come to fruition. Still,
almost immediately following this language, the opinion suggests that
many monocular individuals will meet the definition of disability so long
as they can prove that their impairment is substantially limiting.' °3 Further, the Court suggests that people with monocular vision will "ordinarily" be considered disabled.'"
This could prove significant because the Sutton and Murphy Courts
addressed only the major life activity of working. This language implies
that it may be substantially easier to satisfy the Court's new approach to
disability determinations when a life activity other than working is alleged. Of course, even then, if mitigating measures make the impairment
less than substantially limiting, as in Michele's case, this language adds
nothing. If this language were applied to claims based on being "re5 it
garded as" disabled, an issue not before the Court in Kirkingburg,"'
might be even more significant. As for Mr. Kirkingburg, the Court held
he did not make the proper showing that the impairment was substantially limiting in his case.'"4
Ironically, the main issue in Kirkingburg was not whether Mr. Kirkingburg was disabled, but whether he was a "qualified individual with a

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2168.
See id.
See id. at 2169.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167 n.9.
Id. at 2169.
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disability," because he did not meet the DOT requirements.107 It is quite
interesting, in light of the treatment of the agency regulations in Sutton
and Murphy, that the Court in Kirkingburg is quite deferential to the
DOT regulations.' 8 Nonetheless, there is nothing new or surprising about
the holding that when an individual does not meet government safety
requirements for a specific job, that individual is not qualified for the job.
If, for example, the DOT required uncorrected visual acuity of at
least 20/100 in each eye for commercial drivers with no exceptions, anyone who did not meet that requirement would not be qualified to be a
commercial driver. The employer could not accommodate the employee/applicant, because even if the employer believed there to be a safe
accommodation, the employer would still be in violation of the government regulation by allowing the person to drive a commercial vehicle."8
The DOT waiver program made Kirkingburg a tougher case.
The Court held that the employer need not hire a driver based on the
fact that he or she could receive a waiver under the DOT's new program.
It reasoned that the employer was entitled to rely on the clear mandate of
the safety regulation, regardless of the availability of a waiver under an
explicitly experimental program."' The waiver program, the Court stated,
"did not rest on any final, factual conclusion that the waiver scheme
would be conducive to public safety" to the same extent as the general
visual acuity standards in the DOT regulation."' Nor did the waiver program modify the substance of the regulation; rather it "was simply an
experiment with safety ...

whose confirmation or refutation in practice

would provide a factual basis for reconsidering the existing standards.""'2
Thus, it would be inappropriate to force Albertsons to hire Mr. Kirkingburg simply because he received an experimental waiver of an otherwise
binding safety regulation.'
This aspect of the case is less problematic for purposes of this Article
because it is factually limited to cases involving government safety
regulations."' Moreover, as will be discussed in Part II of this Article, by
addressing whether an employee or applicant is a "qualified individual
with a disability," the Court is addressing the appropriate issues at the
appropriate stage of the ADA analysis. It was in analyzing the threshold
disability determination that the Kirkingburg Court, as well as the Sutton
and Murphy Courts, erred by coming to a conclusion contrary to the leg-

107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 2169-70.
Id. at 2169-70 n. 13; see infra PartlIl.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
Id. at 2171-74.
Id. at2173.
Id. at 2174.
Id.
See id. at 2070-74.
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islative intent of the ADA," the interpretations of the agencies charged
with implementing the Act, and most of the courts that have analyzed the
issue."6
H. LET'S PRETEND: AN INTERPRETIVE MORASS

As the brief overview in Part I suggests, the three cases exhibit an
almost surreal disregard for the legislative history, agency interpretations, and context of the ADA. Justice Stevens' dissent in Sutton does an
excellent job of pointing this out. ' 7 Many of those involved in the process of drafting, passing, interpreting, and enforcing the language in the
ADA came to the exact opposite conclusion from that of the Court.
Given that fact, the authors of this Article were somewhat stunned by the
Court's holding that "by its terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow
courts to ignore mitigating measures in making their disability determinations; thereby implying that the "plain meaning" of the Act dictated
the outcomes in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg."' It would seem that
what was "plain" to the Court was not so evident to the members of
Congress who passed the ADA, the agencies charged by Congress to
implement it, and most of the courts to consider the issue.
A. Defining "Disability" Under the ADA
The first point of concern arising from the Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg cases arises from the definition of "disability" in the ADA.
Specifically, it stems from whether courts should make disability determinations with or without regard to mitigating measures such as medications and medical devices. As the above hypotheticals involving Michele
and Jason demonstrate, the answer to this question can have significant
ramifications for both employers and employees.
The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.""' 9 The focus in this section will be
on part (A) of the definition. As explained above, the Court held that in
making disability determinations courts should consider the effects of
any mitigating measures on the individual's impairment.'2" In Sutton, the
Court essentially held that the plain meaning of the statutory language

115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
117. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Infact, the dissenting opinions of
Justices Stevens and Breyer raise several of the concerns discussed in this Article. Id.; Id. at 2161-62
(Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id.at 2146-47.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
120. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2145-46; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2137
(1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999).
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supported this result."' As noted in Part I.A. of this Article, there were
three primary bases for this conclusion: 1) the grammatical form of the
phrase "substantially limits" requires that an impairment "presently"
substantially limit an individual; 2) the statutory language refers to "individuals with disabilities," rather than undifferentiated disability categories; and, 3) legislative findings in the Act refer to 43,000,000 individuals
with disabilities, yet if all persons impaired in a major life activity in
their un-medicated state were included, a dramatically larger number of
people would be within the Act's purview.'22 Ironically, the Court, which
dismisses the need to explore the legislative history regarding the mitigating measures issue because of the supposed clarity of the statutory
text, uses the legislative
history to support its third basis for finding that
23
text to be so clear.
If, as the Court suggests, these three bases really do mean that "by its
terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow courts to make disability determinations without regard to mitigating measures,'24 the Court's conclusions on this issue would seem correct, perhaps even inescapable. Thus, a
closer examination of the Court's bases for this conclusion is essential to
determining whether the Act's language really does mandate the conclusion the Court reaches. When examined, each of the Court's bases proves
tenuous or specious. It is not that the Court's reasoning is not plausible
under some reading of the Act, but that the Court's reading is not the
only, or even the best, reading of the Act.
As will be discussed further in Part III of this Article, under such circumstances the Court ordinarily looks beyond the text of the statute, to
sources that may clarify the meaning of the statutory language.'" However, in this case the Court cannot afford to do that because such sources
confirm that the Court's interpretation of the statutory language is
weak. 26 Thus, by pretending the statutory language mandates its conclusion, and does not permit the alternative, the Court is able to avoid considering equally plausible alternative interpretations.
1) The Present Indicative Verb Form
The first basis for the Court's conclusion-that the grammatical form
of the definition of disability requires that an impairment "presently"
substantially limit an individual, and thus mandates consideration of
mitigating measures-is not the most logical reading of the Act especially when its purpose, structure, and legislative history are

121.
122.

Sutton, 119S. Ct. at2146.
Id. at 2146-49.

123.

Id. at 2149.

124. Id.at2146.
125. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
126. See generally supra notes 16-20; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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considered.'27 The statutory language the Court relies upon here comes
from 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A), which defines a disability as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual."'28 Based on this definition, the Court
holds that:
Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in the
present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read
as requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A
"disability" exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. A person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently "substantially limits" a major life activity. 2 9
Yet there is no inconsistency between the statutory definition of disability and the making of disability determinations without regard to
mitigating measures. The fact that Congress used the term "substantially
limits" in the statute, rather than another form such as "substantially limited," does not support the Court's interpretation any more than it supports the opposite interpretation. A basic grammatical analysis demonstrates this. Both of the following would seem perfectly appropriate: 1) a
disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities" of an individual despite the use
of mitigating measures (essentially the Court's view); 2) a disability is "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities" of an individual without regard to mitigating
measures (essentially the view expressed in the legislative history and
administrative agency interpretations).
The use of the present indicative verb form says nothing about
whether courts should consider the individual in a mitigated or unmitigated state. The implication of the Court's interpretation is that the verb
form implies determinations should be made in regard to an individual's
present condition, and therefore must refer to the mitigated state.' 3° While
even this presumption seems highly questionable as a structural matter, it
still does not support the Court's conclusion. An individual's disability
could "presently" be evaluated in regard to his or her unmitigated state
(in many instances a doctor could easily assess the person's condition in
an unmitigated state and, in many cases, readily available medical information would make such an assessment obvious even to an untrained
observer). After all, as the term would suggest, "mitigation" of the un-

127.
128.
129.
130.

Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
Sutton, 119S.Ct. at2146.
Id.
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derlying condition (as opposed to curing) means that the underlying condition still exists in a clinical state. The Court presumes that requiring an
analysis of whether the person "might," "could," or "would," be disabled
in an unmitigated state necessitates a hypothetical analysis that is inconsistent with the definition. 3 ' As the two grammatical examples above
demonstrate the Court is hanging a heavy presumption on a very thin
thread.
Moreover, the Court's interpretation goes against an obvious structural interpretation based on the definition of "disability" as a whole.
Subsection (B) of the definition specifically covers those who have a
"record of ...an impairment" that substantially limits a major life activity or activities.'3 2 This is a specific acknowledgment that those whose
impairment is not a "present" impairment, are covered by the Act.' Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Sutton:
Subsection (B) of the definition, in fact, sheds a revelatory light on
the question whether Congress was concerned only about the corrected or mitigated status of a person's impairment. If the Court is
correct that "[a] 'disability' exists only where" a person's "present"
or "actual" condition is substantially impaired, there would be no reason to include in the protected class those who were once disabled but
who are now fully recovered. Subsection (B) of the Act's definition,
however, plainly covers a person who previously had a serious hearing impairment that has been completely cured. Still, if I correctly
understand the Court's opinion, it holds that one who continues to
wear a hearing aid that she has worn all her life might not be covered-fully cured impairments are covered, but merely treatable ones
are not. The text of the Act surely does not require such a bizarre result.
The three prongs of the statute, rather, are most plausibly read together not to inquire into whether a person is currently "functionally"
limited in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an impairment-present or past-that substantially limits, or did so limit,
the individual before amelioration. This reading avoids the counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals make themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to
overcome their physical or mental limitations.14
Moreover, subsection (B) of the definition uses the terminology "a rec'
ord of such an impairment." 35
The word "such" refers back to subsection
(A) and its present indicative verb form, despite the fact that subsection
(B) refers to past conditions (of course, the Court might respond that the

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994); See Sutton at 2154 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
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record addressed in subsection (B) must by definition "presently"
exist). "6 Because the Court's interpretation is not the only possible interpretation of the statutory language, the legislative history would be helpful in interpreting the term, and canons of statutory construction would
support looking at that history here.'37 Of course, such analysis would
suggest that the Court's interpretation is incorrect.
2) The Individualized Approach
The second basis for the Court's conclusion is quite important given
the ADA's individualized approach and concern about disability-based
stereotypes. There is a great deal of merit to the Court's approach of assessing claims on an individualized basis. After all, no one should judge
disabled individuals based on presumed traits associated with their disability. For example, it would be wrong to treat a well-controlled diabetic
like a poorly controlled diabetic in most situations. Yet, as will be explained below, the Court's reasoning turns the purpose of this individualized approach on its head by excluding from coverage well-controlled
individuals and others whose impairments can be mitigated.
Ironically, the structure and text of the Act make it unlikely that the
Court's approach is in keeping with the ADA, and the legislative history
confirms this." There is no question that the ADA requires consideration
of mitigating measures to determine whether an individual is a "qualified
individual with a disability," which is the next level of analysis in an
ADA claim.' To be "qualified" under Title I of the ADA, an individual
must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation.' 0 At this level of analysis, mitigating measures such as medications and devices are clearly relevant because they go
to whether an individual can perform the essential functions of the job
and to what accommodation may be necessary, if any.' 4 ' In fact, this is
the level of analysis where the Court's concept of the "individualized"
approach under the ADA is most relevant.'42
If, however, mitigating measures are considered in the initial disability determination the result is the removal from ADA coverage of
disabled individuals who are capable of performing the essential functions of their jobs with little or no accommodation. Such individuals may
still be the victims of stereotyping and employment action based on such

136. id.
137. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
139. See42U.S.C.§ 12112 (1994).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
141. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of a
hearing aid mitigated an impairment so that a person could perform essential job functions).
142. Justice Stevens suggests exactly this point in his Sutton dissent. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2156
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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stereotypes, evils Congress designed the Act to combat. 3 These individuals would thus be removed from coverage before they ever get a
chance to prove they were victims of discrimination. This is exactly the
consequence of the Sutton decision.'" Moreover, individuals like Michele, from the hypothetical above, who are not disabled under the Court's
definition, may need an accommodation to avoid problems related to
their disabilities. Yet, under the Court's approach they are not entitled to
accommodation because they is not disabled.'45
The Court presumed that an individualized assessment must be
made in light of any mitigating measures. The Court reasoned that in an
unmitigated state, the way one might respond to mitigating measures is
unknown.' 6 The Court also implied that many disabilities affect individuals identically in an unmitigated state; essentially bringing everyone
with a particular disability, regardless of the mitigated level of impairment, within the Act's coverage.' 7 The legislative history and agency
interpretations seem to indicate this is exactly what Congress intended by
enacting the ADA.'8
Of course, this makes perfect sense because it is equally clear that
the analysis of whether someone is "qualified" will address the Court's
concerns. In fact, an individual whose impairment is completely mitigated is unlikely to ask for an accommodation, because she can perform
the essential functions of her job without accommodation. Consequently,
this individual will most likely raise ADA claims when subjected to disparate treatment or a hostile work environment based on her disability
(or perceptions of that disability)."9 There is no question that one of the
purposes of the ADA is to prevent such stereotype based disparate treatment,' ° but the Court's approach effectively removes from ADA coverage many of those intended to be protected from such conduct.'"' Even a
cursory examination of the legislative history and agency interpretations
demonstrates that the ADA is meant to protect individuals against disparate treatment even if their disabilities can be successfully and effectively
treated through mitigating measures, again rendering the Court's hold-

143. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994); Burgdorf, supra note 11 at 436, 452.
144. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2147.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
149. Disparate treatment discrimination violates the ADA as it did the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)); 42 U.S.C. §
12112 (1994). Hostile work environment is also actionable under the ADA, but raises some unique
questions not raised under Title VII. See Frank S.Ravitch, Beyond ReasonableAccommodation: The
Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action For Workplace Harassment Under the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 1475, 1488-89 (1994).
150. 42U.S.C.§ 12101, 12112 (1994).
151. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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ings unsupportable.'52 The alternative means of bringing such individuals
within the Act's protection, the "regarded as" disabled test, will be discussed in Parts ll.B. and IV below.
The majority opinions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg foster
this problem by relying on the supposed clarity of the statutory
language.'5 3 The claimed clarity enabled the Court to avoid analyzing and
applying the legislative history and agency regulations. As was pointed
out above, however, while it may be clear that courts must consider mitigating measures in regard to the "qualified" analysis, there is no basis to
presume that even under the individualized approach of the ADA courts
must consider such measures at the initial disability determination stage.
It is just as consistent to consider whether an employee/applicant is "disabled" in her un-medicated state-and then to consider whether she is "a
qualified individual with a disability" based on his ability to perform the
job in a medicated state. In fact, this is far more consistent with the Act's
focus on remedying and preventing adverse employment decisions made
on the basis of stereotypes.'" It is hard to believe Congress intended the
ADA to preclude discrimination rooted in stereotypes that have evolved
based on the unmitigated characteristics of a given disability, and yet
excluded from coverage those subjected to job actions based on such
stereotypes if they are able to mitigate the impact of their impairment.
When, as the authors of this Article suggest is the case here, the
"plain language" of the statute does not "plainly" support an interpretation of that statute, courts, including the Supreme Court, often look to
agency interpretations and legislative history for guidance on how best to
interpret the law.'55 As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent in Sutton,
neither the agency interpretations nor the legislative history support the
Court's interpretation.'56 The EEOC, DOJ, and DOT-the three agencies
charged with implementing the Act-have each issued guidelines that
state that disability determinations are to be made without regard to mitigating measures.' 7 While agency guidelines do not bind the Court, they
are generally given a great deal of deference, even when only one
agency's interpretation is relevant to an issue. ' In fact, the Court specifically stated this general rule in Bragdon v. Abbott, a recent case involving the public accommodation provisions of the ADA.'

152. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
153. Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-50
(1999).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 12112(1994).
155. See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
156. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Part Ill (discussing deference to agency regulations).
159. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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The Court avoided this issue by holding that none of the three agencies is "empowered" to interpret the "definition" provisions of the
ADA.'" The Court determined that Congress charged each agency only
with enforcing specific titles of the Act; none of which includes the provision defining "disability."' 6 ' Still, as Justice Breyer points out in his
Sutton dissent, the term "disability" is used frequently in each of the titles,
and thus the agency that interprets and enforces a specific title must be
able to define "disability."'62 As all three agencies agree on the mitigation
issue, their interpretations of this issue are, at a minimum, probative.'63
Significantly, the agency interpretations had great support in the
legislative history of the ADA. Both the House and Senate committee
reports reflect the fact that Congress intended courts to make disability
determinations without regard to mitigating measures." In fact, the clarity of the legislative history and the unusually clear record of agreement
in Congress on the meaning of a significant provision in a civil rights
statute are surprising, given the Court's holdings in the three cases.
Moreover, Congress intended that law developed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, "5 be used in interpreting claims under Title 1 of
the ADA, where the provisions of the acts are consistent. 6 The definition
of "handicap" (the Rehabilitation Act uses the term handicap instead of
disability) under the Rehabilitation Act is almost identical to the definition of "disability" under the ADA.' 7 The Rehabilitation Act arguably
protects individuals with impairments that can be mitigated by medication or other means.' 6 Where the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title I of the ADA do not conflict, courts should apply the interpretation

160. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
164. See supra note 17.
165. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); See also Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the decisions made
regarding regulations of the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act can be used to interpret the same
terms under the ADA).
167. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
168. Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.C. 1997) (specifically holding that the
Rehabilitation Act does protect individuals with impairments that are mitigated by medication and
applying the EEOC interpretive guidelines for the ADA to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act); see
also Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding a hearing impaired
individual, who alleged his hearing impairment could be mitigated, to be a "handicapped person"
under the Rehabilitation Act). Strathie actually demonstrates one of the potential problems with the
Sutton analysis. Strathie had to allege his condition could be effectively mitigated in order to prove
he was "qualified," and that he could be accommodated under state requirements for school bus
drivers. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231. Thus, the Third Circuit considered the mitigation issue at the
logical stage of analysis, i.e., the "qualification" stage. id. Under Sutton, Strathie might never have
gotten to that issue, because his ability to mitigate might remove him from protection because he
would not be considered disabled.
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of the former to interpret the ADA.'69 Moreover, Congress was aware of
the broad definition of "handicap" in the Rehabilitation Act when it used
that definition as the template for the definition of "disability" under the
ADA.'7" This is yet another indication that the Court erred in its interpretation on the mitigation issue.
It is also important to point out that most federal appellate courts to
consider the issue prior to the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements,
held that disability determinations should be made without regard to
mitigating measures.'' While even a substantial number of lower court
opinions do not bind the Supreme Court, when those interpretations are
added to the agency interpretations, legislative history, and the law developed under the Rehabilitation Act, it becomes apparent that the Court
erred.
A corollary to the Court's "individualized" assessment analysis is
the suggestion that allowing courts to make disability determinations
without regard to mitigating measures would lead to "the anomalous
result" that side effects of medications could not be considered in the
disability determination. This is a very weak argument: If an individual
with a disability is taking medication, and the medication causes severe
side effects, the underlying disability is likely to be substantially limiting
without regard to the mitigating measures. If the side effects of the medication treating an impairment are more severe than the impairment itself,
it is unlikely an individual would be prescribed such treatment. The
Court might counter that a progressive or fatal disease that poses few
outward limitations may be slowed or cured by a course of treatment that
causes significant limitations in other major life activities. To the extent
that such situations arise, Bragdon would seem to suggest that the underlying condition would still be substantially limiting in regard to a
major life activity(s).' 3 Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in regard
to the Court's analysis on this point:
It seems safe to assume that most individuals who take medication
that itself substantially limits a major life activity would be substantially limited in some other way if they did not take the medication..
.To the extent that certain people may be substantially limited only
when taking "mitigating measures," it might fairly be said that just as
contagiousness is symptomatic of a disability because an individual's
'contagiousness and her physical impairment each [may result] from
the same underlying condition, side effects are symptomatic of a dis-

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1998).
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153, 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra note 19.
Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at2147.
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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ability because side effects and 7a physical impairment may flow from
the same underlying condition.11
Thus, this position adds little to the Court's assertion that "by its terms,
the ADA cannot be read" to require disability determinations to be made
based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated state. 75'
3) Legislative Findings
Ironically, the Court attempts to strengthen its argument, that mitigating measures must be considered in disability determinations by relying on the Act's legislative history which states that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.' 76 If
disability is determined without regard to mitigating measures, the number of individuals covered is likely to be much higher.17 This is the
Court's third basis for its holding. The Court relied, at least in part, on
the legislative history of the Act to find that Congress intended the ADA
to cover the approximately 43,000,000 citizens cited in the reports.'7 8 If,
as the Court asserts, the legislative history is not relevant to the mitigation issue due to the "plain language" of the statute, it would also be irrelevant to how many people were intended to be covered in light of
mitigation.'79 In essence, the Court is utilizing legislative history on a
tangential point to avoid the legislative history that directly contradicts
its reading of that issue. '
Without the legislative history used by the Court, we are left with
the figure of 43,000,000 contained in the Act.'"' This figure is contained
in a broad legislative findings section of the Act, and not in any specific
provision. While the use of this figure in the Act would seem to support
the Court's position, it is not a specific provision, and is a weak basis for
countering all of the countervailing evidence outlined in this Article.
Moreover, the language surrounding this figure-i.e., "is growing,"
demonstrates that Congress intended the number to be flexible.'82 Additionally, in deriving its interpretation based on the figure, the Court relies
in part on an Article (and studies cited therein) written by Professor Robert Burgdorf, a key figure involved in drafting the ADA.'8 3 As a general

174. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
175. Id.
at 2146.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
177. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
178. Id.
179. This demonstrates the odd way in which the Court deals with the legislative history and
agency interpretations in Sutton. See also infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
180. Compare Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48 with supra note 17.
181. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2147-48.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994).
183. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2147.
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matter, however, Professor Burgdorf s Article does not support the
Court's interpretation, and in fact, implies quite the opposite result."
It seems the Court is concerned that if it allows courts to make disability determinations without regard to mitigating measures there will
be too many claims brought under the ADA. 85 If that were the case,
Congress could amend the statute. 86As the courts, including members of
the Sutton, majority have pointed out in other decisions, that is not the
Court's job. The Court should not use such tenuous reasoning to limit
rights in a poorly reasoned manner because of a fear of too many lawsuits. In fact, the Court has interpreted other civil rights statutes to cover
even larger segments of society. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19648' in effect covers every employee.'88
There is no reason to artificially limit who is covered under the
ADA, especially because the determination of whether someone is a
"qualified individual with a disability" resolves many of the cases about
which the Court seems concerned. It is not the Court's role to erect artificial gates at the threshold of the ADA. Unfortunately, such a resultoriented approach was inherent in the reasoning in Sutton and Murphy;
and in Kirkingburg, to the extent it follows Sutton and Murphy. Still,
despite the artificial limitations created by the Court, the "regarded as"
element of the ADA's definition of "disability" would seem, at least at
first glance, to provide an alternative means for many eliminated from
coverage to remain protected under the Act.'89 As will be discussed in the
next section, however, the Court significantly limits that option as well."'
B. Defining "RegardedAs" Having An Impairment Under The ADA
Despite the limitations wrought by the Court's analysis of the first
element of the definition of "disability," the "regarded as" element might
help some of those excluded from coverage under the Court's approach.
The Court, however, placed considerable limitations on this element as
well;" ' but, as will be discussed in Part IV, both the "regarded as" and the
184. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 434-35 n. 117, 445-49.
185. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148, 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Of course, the fact that the Congress could do so does not mean it should or would do so.
If separation of powers means anything, however, it is not for the Court to amend a statute that is
within Congress' enumerated powers.
187. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1994); see also MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (applying Title VII to whites, despite Congressional focus on protecting blacks
in passing Title VII).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(a) (1994); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
189. See infra Part IV (evaluating the avenues that remain for people seeking coverage under
the ADA).
190. See infra Part IV (explaining that this element of the definition, although limited by these
cases, may continue to provide several other avenues of coverage).
191. See supra Part I.A-C (analyzing the Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

"record of' elements may still provide coverage for some of the individuals excluded from coverage by the Court's interpretation of the first
element of the ADA definition of disability.
In Sutton, the Court began its discussion of the "regarded as" element by explaining that "[tlhere are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition .

First, an em-

*...""'

ployer or other covered entity could "mistakenly" believe that an individual has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.'93 Second, a covered entity could "mistakenly" believe "that an
actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities.""'9 It is the second point that may be of greatest use to
those denied coverage under the first element of the ADA definition of
"disability," because of the mitigated state of their impairments. The
Court's broad explanation of the "regarded as" element is very much in
keeping with prior interpretations of that provision.'95 While this seems,
at first glance, to be quite expansive, the Court later placed some significant limitations on this provision.
There are two key ways in which the Court limited the "regarded as"
element in Sutton and Murphy. First, the Court examined whether an
employer regards an employee as substantially limited in a specific major
life activity or activities.' 6 Under this analysis, an employer who is ignorant about a particular disability, and therefore does not understand what
major life activities might be affected, can simply stereotype an employee/applicant without regarding that employee/applicant as substantially impaired in regard to any particular life activity. If the disability is
mitigated when the employer learns of it, the employer may be less likely
to recognize a substantial limitation on any particular major life activity.
The employer simply may view some, or all, disabled individuals as generally impaired. It would be in keeping with the purpose of the Act to
allow a disabled employee/applicant in this situation to bring a claim
under the "regarded as" provision, because such stereotyping in employment decisions is a focus of the Act, and specifically of the "regarded as" provision. It is unclear how the Court's interpretation will
affect such claims because the Court does not specifically address this
issue. Of course, what motivates a given entity to discriminate-i.e., a
general bias or one tied to a limitation on a specific life activity or activities-is going to be a question of proof in each case.
The second limitation in the opinions is clearer, and perhaps more
troubling. That limitation relates to the specific major life activity at is-
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194.
195.
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Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1998).
Murphy, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
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sue in both cases-working. The Court is quite clear that in order to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be
limited in regard to "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities."'97 Therefore, the inability to perform a particular job, including the one sought by a complaining employee/applicant, is insufficient.'95 Interestingly, while not deciding on
the validity of the EEOC regulations that it ignored in the mitigation
context, the Court does rely on those regulations for this characterization
of the life activity of working.'99 The Court's interpretation is in keeping
with those guidelines, but it is contrary to the interpretation of Professor
Burgdorf, whose article the Court relies on elsewhere in the opinion.'
Burgdorf specifically states that the EEOC interpretation
of this issue is
0
not in keeping with the intent underlying the Act. '
Significantly, the Court's analysis of the major life activity of working is relevant to the first element of the disability definition as well as to
the "regarded as" element, but because of the way in which the Court
decided the mitigating measures question, the "working" analysis is particularly troubling in the "regarded as" context. For example, if Jason,
the schizophrenic employee from the hypothetical above, effectively
mitigates his impairment through medication, and his employer nevertheless terminates him based on his "disability," he is not considered
disabled. He might be "regarded as" disabled if the employer "regarded"
him as disabled in reference to a specific major life activity, such as
thinking or working, generally, but the employer can simply claim that
he regarded Jason as impaired only with reference to doing his particular
job and not to thinking or working in general. Under Sutton and Murphy
the employer can presumably do so, as Jason is not disabled since he is
able to mitigate the symptoms of his illness.
As will be explained in Part IV, Kirkingburg explicitly, and Sutton
implicitly, recognize that substantial limitations in life activities other
than working might be easier to establish. 2 For example, had the pilots
in Sutton been allowed to assert "seeing" as the major life activity affected, they may have had a very good argument on the "regarded as"
issue. 3 Working is essentially the life activity of last resort in ADA
cases. °' Because, however, most disabilities affect, or may be "regarded
197. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (citations ommitted).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2147.
201. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 522 n.186.
202. SeeSutton, 119 S. Ct. at2151;Kirkingburg,l19S. Ct. at2168.
203. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152. That this would not have helped them under the statutory
definition of disability because their condition was effectively mitigated. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(1994) See note 50, supra, for a discussion of the lower court's reasoning on the life activity of
seeing.
204. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999).
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as" affecting major life activities other than working, the Court's "regarded as" analysis may have more impact on litigation tactics than results. Thus, a possible side benefit of the Court's analysis may be that
claims that would have been based on the life activity of working, when
other more, obvious activities could have been used, will now be brought
based on those activities. Still, it is important to remember that in some
cases working is the only activity an employee can prove is "substantially" limited, and the Court's mitigation analysis may in fact make such
cases more common.
As noted above, the Court's analysis can lead to perverse results. For
example, the employer in Sutton seems to have regarded the pilots as
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, yet because the
employer alleged that it only viewed them as limited in regard to working a particular job, the Court held they were not covered by the ADA
(ironically, even if they had been, they may have failed the "qualified"
test). Thus, if an employer alleges that it "regards" an employee as impaired with respect to that employee's particular job (rather than another
life activity which may actually be the employer's focus), the employer
may effectively remove the employee from ADA coverage. Perhaps this
was not the Court's intent, and the employee might be able to prove otherwise in some cases, but because in a "regarded as" claim the employer's perceptions are at issue, the employer may find it easy to defend
its discriminatory actions.
Finally, while a "regarded as" claim may provide an alternative for
some individuals no longer considered disabled under the Court's analysis, in many cases it will not help those disabled individuals thus removed from coverage. For example, in the first hypothetical above,
Michele is probably not "disabled" under the Court's approach, because
her disability is effectively mitigated by medication. Moreover, when she
is denied the reasonable accommodation she requests, she is not "regarded as" disabled, because the employer is simply denying her accommodation, not taking action against her based on a perception of her
disability. Thus, in order to be eligible for the small accommodation that
would prevent her from having a seizure, she must have a seizure, so that
she can meet the Court's definition of "disabled."20 5 If the employer later
takes action against her based on a mistaken perception of her disability,
she might then have a "regarded as" claim. This is significant because
"regarded as" claims are most likely to be useful in cases of disparate
treatment, but may not be terribly helpful when, as in Michele's case, an
employee is denied a reasonable accommodation. The "regarded as"
element will be discussed further in Part IV.

205. But see Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (suggesting another
possible argument to prove Michelle's disability in the hypothetical discussed throughout this
paper).
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III. MUDDYING THE WATERS: THE COURT'S DEVIATION FROM
ACCEPTED METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND DEFERENCE
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAW
In one fell swoop the Court has used these three cases, most notably
Sutton, to deviate from accepted methods of statutory construction and
precedent regarding deference to administrative agency interpretations.
While the deviations were clearly necessary for the Court to justify
reaching the conclusions it did, they raise questions for the future of
both, with the possibility of consequences far removed from the particular arena of the ADA.
2

A. The Nitty Grittyw
It has long been held that in "all" cases of statutory construction, the
Court must review the purposes promulgated by Congress, and interpret
the words of statutes in light of those purposes.' In the Act, Congress
expressly stated that "the purpose of [the ADA is] to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
2 8 The ADA
against individuals with disabilities.""
also expressly prohibits
covered entities from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability" in any of the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.2' These words, clearly and expressly set out in the Act, would seem on their face to direct the Court's
interpretation of the Act in relation to determining a disability. Until
now, they arguably have. After Sutton, however, the definition of disability itself has changed.2 ' While the Court may argue that it continues
to follow the mandates of Congress, the change in definition and the direction this Court has taken in the determination of disability, the interpretation of "major life activity," and the "regarded as" clause lead toward an approach different from that Congress suggests in the Act..
Statutory interpretation has always begun with an examination of
three things, the result depending on what one finds in each.2 1 Historically, courts have always examined first the "plain language" of the statute to determine if it speaks directly and clearly to the issue at hand. 22 If
206. This section is a basic explanation of general standards of statutory construction, as well as
standards of review for Article III courts and administrative agencies. Although it is no doubt
unnecessary to spend time on these for those familiar with the procedural aspects of court review, we
felt that the far-reaching implications of these cases require us to provide some background for those
who may be unfamiliar. This Article will also highlight the differences in the standards, and
therefore the basic importance of the deviations made by the Sutton court. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct.
2139.
207. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 608 (1979)).
208. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (1994)).
209. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
210. Id.at 2139.
211. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 489 (1917).
212. See id. at 485.
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it does, that is often the end of the examination because the court is able
to determine Congress' purpose and intent directly." '
If, however, the "plain language" of the statute is unclear, or if the
court needs clarification of the language, a court will generally look to
the legislative history of the statute." 4 This will consist of all legislative
parts that became part of the final bill.2 5 Depending on the complexity of
the statute and/or the overall enormity of the struggle to create it, this
history may consist of a number of parts, including, but not limited to,
the original bills from both Houses of Congress, the Committee Reports
from each House, the Joint Committee Reports, any hearings which took
place (including the testimony of witnesses), and, the words of the individual Representatives and Senators themselves, all of which culminate
to represent the intent of Congress.2 6 The court will generally use this
cumulative history to shed light upon vague or missing language in the
statute, or to bolster the plain meaning of the statute."7 (As will be discussed below, the Court in Sutton in fact used favorable legislative history to bolster its holding; however, much of the consternation about the
case is that the Court refused to look at more relevant history.) Where a
court finds that societal changes dictate a change in the current law, it
may also examine the legislative history for support in promulgating a
new policy.2 8
This general statutory construction pertains to all statutes, whether
they are subject to administrative agency interpretation or not. Courts
may differ as to the actual meaning of the "plain language," which may
not be so plain, after all. Similarly, courts may differ as to the meaning
of, and reliance on, different parts of the legislative history.
The real differences in statutory review relate more to where the case
came from that what it says.2 9 Generally, courts review administrative
agency decisions under a highly deferential standard.2 The Court has
based this standard on the general purpose of administrative agencies: to
provide a level of expertise not possessed by courts, in a less formal,
costly, and time-consuming manner.22 Because these purposes would be
nullified if courts were constantly second-guessing the expertise of the
213. See id.
214. See id. at 489.
215. See id. at 489-90.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. There are, of course, key differences in the way in which courts review decisions,
depending on their origin. Decisions from Article III courts are reviewed under a range of standards,
depending on the type of action under review and ranging from little to great deference to the lower
court. However, administrative regulations generally carry a much higher standard of deference. See
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
220. See Chevron,467 U.S. at 843-44.
221. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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agencies, the Supreme Court has ruled that courts should only overturn
agency decisions when they are clearly undeserving of such a high level
of deference.222
This Article will not attempt to discuss the appropriateness of the
highly deferential standard of review afforded administrative agencies;
that subject has been, and likely will continue to be, ripe for academic
debate for years to come.
Or maybe not.
The standard of deference afforded administrative agency decisions
is derived from (1) a number of cases dealing with the growing power of
such agencies, (2) the Court's reluctance to insert itself into the administrative process, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed
by Congress to provide uniformity in administrative agency law. 223 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe224 involved the authorization
by the Secretary of Transportation of federal highway funds for construction of a highway through a city park. In remanding, the Court held
that it would not undertake a de novo review of the Secretary's decision,
and that the Court, while making a "substantial inquiry" into the action,
would nevertheless give the Secretary's decision the "presumption of
regularity." '25 Although Overton Park theoretically stands for greater
review-ability of agency decisions in the absence of a specific statute
precluding review,26 the Court also held that a court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, but may only review the agency decision for reasonableness in light of a required record.2 7 Even while
stressing greater review-ability for certain agency decisions, the case
contributed to the higher standard of deference for agency decisions.
Two years later, in 1978, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which had remanded a case involving the Atomic Energy Commission, with respect to the licensing of nuclear reactors.2 9 The Court
held that Congress had established the maximum rulemaking procedures
it wished the courts to impose on federal agencies. 30 While the agencies
themselves are free to add to those procedures in the exercise of their
discretion, the courts may not impose additional procedures as long as

222. See id. at 843-44.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1994).
224. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
225.

226.
227.

Overton Park,401 U.S. at 415.
RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 133 (1992).
Overton Park,401 U.S. at 416.

228. Id.at 413-14.
229. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
230. See id. at 557-58.
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the agency has provided at least the statutory minimum, regardless of
whether the court determines more would have been reasonable."'
While Overton Park and Vermont Yankee dealt with deference to the
agency decision-making processes, in 1984 the Court spelled out the
precise test to determine if and when a court may interfere at all in this
process." 2 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court held that, with regard to judicial review of an agency's
construction of the statute which it administers, if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, "the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute." '33
In application, this breaks down to a two-part test. First, did Congress speak directly to the issue? In other words, is there plain language
on the subject and is it clear?... If so, the court's inquiry essentially ends,
and the decision of the agency is deferred to so long as it followed the
Congressional mandate.' However, if Congress was silent, vague, or
ambiguous on the subject, the court must then examine the legislative
history of the statute; but again only to determine if the agency's decision
was based on a permissible construction. 36
Congress passed the APA to achieve uniformity in the procedures of
administrative agencies. The APA's provisions, generally read together
with the case law, similarly require a reviewing court to set aside agency
findings and conclusions only when the court finds that they may be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." '37 The APA therefore, in words and practice, strengthens the
deferential treatment accorded to agency decisions by the courts.
Although a quite basic analysis of the recognized deference due administrative agency law and interpretations, the above discussion illumi-

231. See id.
232. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
233. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
234. See id. at 842-43.
235. See id. at 843-44.
236. See id. See also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1990) (holding that the
EEOC interpretation of the statute exceeded the deference allowed); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (establishing that where an agency was not authorized to promulgate rules
or regulations concerning the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, the level of deference afforded "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87 (D.C. 1997) (exemplifying that
even where the agency is not authorized, the courts have used an alternative means to give deference
to their interpretations). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145-46 (1999)
(ignoring any alternative reasoning).
237. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)-(D) (1994)).
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nates the Sutton Court's failure to follow even such basic guidelines. The
Sutton Court offers little or no explanation for the deviation.
B. New Rules, New Results
At first, the Sutton Court appears to follow the Chevron analysis,
laying out petitioners' argument that the ADA does not clearly address
the definition of disability, and that therefore the Court should defer to
the agency interpretations of the EEOC and the DOJ. 23' The Court then
discusses respondents' argument that the language of the ADA is clear,
and that the agency guidelines conflict with it. The respondents contendedtherefore that the Court should merely look at the plain language and
uphold respondents' argument; or in the alternative, if the language is
indeed ambiguous, determine that the agency interpretations are still inaccurate. 239 The Sutton Court agrees with respondents that the agency
interpretations clash with the plain language of the statute, and further
that because Congress spoke clearly to the issue, there is no reason to
even address the legislative history of the ADA.2'
The Court discusses at length just how and why the ADA spoke to
the issue. The Court reads the three provisions of the ADA, which deal
with the determination here, in concert. The Court holds that when read
this way, it is clear that Congress "plainly" spoke to the issue."' The
Court reads the terms "disability" as defined in the ADA to be a mental
or physical impairment which "substantially limits" one of the major life
activities at present-not potentially or hypothetically.24 2 The Court relies
on its conception of the "individualized basis" analysis at this initial
stage to hold that persons should be judged in their corrected state, and
found that any other analysis is contrary to this individualized approach
mandated by the ADA. 23 The Court acknowledges that a person with a
controlled disability still has an impairment, but holds that it does not, at
least necessarily, at present "substantially limit" a major life activity. "
One is faced with the curious question of just how (or if) the Court
actually applied the Chevron test. As noted above, the Court determined
that Congress spoke to the definition of "disability" in the ADA, reading
the three parts in concert 2l' and thus determined that there was no reason
to examine the legislative history of the Act. 24 Yet the Court curiously
does look to the legislative history to strengthen its view of the defini-

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
See id.
Id. at 2146.
See id.
See id. at 2149.
See id. at 2147.
See id. at 2149.
See id.
See id. at 2146.
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tional language and individualized approach of the Act.24 7 It relies on this
history to assert that Congress never intended to cover persons with
"controlled" disabilities, only those who have "substantial limitations"
now. 48 In rejecting the very need to examine the bulk of the legislative
history, which clearly contradicts its holding here, while using the small
portion that nebulously supports it, the Court appears to be having its
cake and eating it too.
The legislative history, which the Court refuses to consider, determining instead that there is no need to do so because the "plain language'
is clear, refutes much of the Court's reasoning here. While the Court
focuses on subsections (A), dealing with the definition of disability, and
(C), the "regarded as" section, the Court speaks little of subsection (B),
which states that the term "disability," with respect to an individual, also
takes into account "a record of such an impairment." ' 9 (In his dissent,
Justice Stevens argues that these words clearly indicate Congress' intent
to cover persons with previous impairments, including those that may be
totally controlled in the present.)25°
Another disturbing aspect of the Court's approach here is the absence of any reliance on its recent holding in Bragdon; or more specifically, on its adherence in Bragdon to the legislative history of the ADA
in reaching its holding.25' While the subject matter in Bragdon is clearly
different (involving an asymptomatic HIV patient), the Court, in holding
that respondent's condition was a covered disability under the ADA,
discussed the ADA's virtual adoption of the definition of "handicapped
individual" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as that in the Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988.252 In discussing the almost verbatim
lifting of language from those Acts to the definitional section of the
ADA, the Court held "Congress' repetition of a well-established term
carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in
accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. ' ' 3 The Bragdon
Court pointed out that Congress not only adopted the virtually identical
definitions in the ADA, but further provided a specific statutory provision in the Act to ensure the construction of these terms in accordance
with those of its predecessor Acts, instructing that "[e]xcept as otherwise

247. See id. at 2147.
248. See id. at 2149.
249. See id. at 2144 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994)) (emphasis
added).
250. See id.
251. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
252. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (1998) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1994)).
253. See id. See also FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65, (1945) (demonstrating the long-held and still valid analysis of statutory construction, an analysis which seems to
be inexplicably missing in Sutton and its companion cases).
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provided.., nothing in this [ADA] chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the previous Acts]."'
As discussed below, the legislative history of the ADA discussed by the
Sutton Court similarly makes clear Congress' intent that the Act cover
those individuals both with a record of impairment and without consideration of mitigating factors." Yet the Sutton Court clearly, though inexplicably, repudiates some of the same legislative history it so clearly embraced in Bragdon, leaving only questions in its wake.
Specifically, because the Court does look to at least parts of the legislative history to bolster its new definition, it is even more confusing
that it would ignore precedent on what history should be considered as
well as the actual history available. Then-Justice Rehnquist stated in
Garcia v. United States 6 that "[i]n surveying legislative history we have
repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill . ..."'
The Committee Reports on the ADA are quite specific as to who
should be covered under the bill, and contradict much of the Court's decision here. The Senate Report states "whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."" The report
goes on to say in pertinent part:
[an] important goal of the third prong of the [disability] definition is
to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control,
and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions....
Such denials are the result of negative attitudes and misinformation.5 9
The House Committees adopted and appeared to strengthen the
wording from the Senate, in that "[t]hey clarified that 'correctable' or
'controllable' disabilities were covered in the first definitional prong as
well. ''2' The House Report goes on to state that "[t]he impairment should
be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in less-thansubstantial limitation. '2 ' The House exemplified that statement by stating that the Act would cover persons such as those with hearing loss corrected by hearing aids.6 2

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
(1989)).
259.
260.
261.
262.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)).
See infra, notes 257-264.
469 U.S. 70 (1984).
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 70).
See Sutton 119 S.Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23
S.REP. No. 101 -116, at 24 (emphasis added).
See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24.
See id. (emphasis added).
See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 29.
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One of the clearest statements comes from the Report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, which states that the assessment of
disability should be made "without regard to the availability of mitigating measures ....""' This report goes on to state the following:
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited
in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with im-

pairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a
major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition
of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication.26

These reports appear to specifically contradict the Sutton Court's
conception of the first prong of the definitional test for disability as an
individualized assessment that depends on whether the individual is
functionally disabled at the present time.
Further, the Court's acknowledgment that persons with controlled
disabilities are still impaired, even though not presently so, is one of the
incongruities of the Court's decision. The Court clearly stated that a person with an impairment corrected by mitigating measures still has an
impairment, the impairment however does not presently "substantially
limit" a major life activity.26 Later, the Court acknowledged that Congress, in passing the Act, was concerned that "society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."2" It goes on
to explain that the "regarded as" prong was designed to cover individuals
"rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and stereotypes' associated with disabilities. 267 Yet the Court's holding here seemingly allows
an employer to freely reject a worker because she has a controlled disability which does not now rise to the level of substantial impairment of
a life activity, but who would need accommodation for the job to continue in a controlled state.
While the Court would argue that technically the employer is not
being given free reign to discriminate in this fashion, the unfortunate
result is likely to be just that. The rejected applicant, like Michele, can no
longer claim discrimination under the Court's approach to subsection (A)
because her disability is controlled by mitigating measures, and thus does
not "substantially limit" her in a life activity right now. Neither can she
claim discrimination under subsection (C), as the Court seems to leave

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
See id. at 2150.
See id.
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open,268 for the employer may not "regard her as" disabled in her controlled state. In practice, the employer is now free to reject an applicant,
because of impairment, whom she would previously had to consider
without her regard to impairment. Even an applicant like Jason, who an
employer may "regard as" disabled even though his disability is controlled, may not have redress if he is offered a lower paying position in
the "broad range of jobs." Justice Stevens points out in his dissent that
the ADA was enacted in great part to address just this issue: applicants,
such as Michele and Jason, are not generally "substantially limited" in
their mitigated condition, yet employers stereotype applicants on assumptions "not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."269 For applicants with
certain physical disabilities, particularly those dealing with mobility,
subsection (A) would appear easier to hurdle, because there is obviously
still a "substantial limitation" on most major life activities. But for those
like Michele or Jason, or the petitioners in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, the claim is far more difficult, and may result in true inequities.
Moreover, the dissent in Sutton points out that the Court has consistently interpreted statutes dealing with discrimination broadly, even
when the class of individuals was beyond Congress' concern at the time
of passage."' When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, its aim was to protect African-Americans."' Yet the Court placed
great reliance on legislative history and accorded "great deference" to the
EEOC's interpretations of the Act to extend it to other groups, including
Caucasians.

'

Thus the Court's interpretation here is not only unprece-

dented, it is actually opposite not only to its previous decisions but also
its earlier reasoning.
In fact, if the Court had agreed with all the entities which have previously interpreted the Act, and looked to the entirety of the legislative
history to determine if the agency's interpretation was a permlssible construction of the statute, the outcome clearly could have been quite different here. The bulk of the legislative history (possibly aside from, or even
despite, the very specific portion cited by the Court in its opinion), would
likely support the agency's interpretation as permissible. The Bragdon
Court relied on just such a "uniform body" of judicial and administrative
precedent in reaching its holding."' The Bragdon Court held that uniformity of precedent was "significant," finding that "[w]hen administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing
statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, [Congress'] intent to incorporate [such] inter268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See id.
See id. at 2159 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
See idat 2157.
See id.
See id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976)).
Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 2208.
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pretations as well. ' 74 Relying on this history to find a protected designation would not even have necessarily given petitioners a victory, however. As noted earlier, each of these cases could have, and very probably
would have, been upheld as applied against each of the petitioners based
on the specific qualifications needed for each of the positions, which
petitioners in each case were still not likely to meet. The Court, however,
appears to have chosen to use these cases instead to ignore years of
precedent and invalidate the statute for whole classes of people.
Another question that arises from Sutton and its instant progeny is
whether then, the Court has signaled a change in the tests and/or levels of
deference due administrative agency decisions. While it might be argued
that that would not necessarily be a bad thing, the application to these
cases shows that there is logic in the "presumption of regularity" given to
agency decisions, based on their presumed expertise and experience in
the subject areas. 7 ' No matter the original intention here, whether to
weaken the application of the ADA, or to affect the wholesale levels of
deference due administrative agencies in general, the holdings here may
well result in both.
One of the justifications used by the Court to withhold deference to
the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the Act is
that none of the agencies was specifically charged by Congress with the
authority to interpret the term "disability," and therefore, none is owed
deference in interpretation. 76 This, again, is somewhat contradicted in the
Court's earlier holding in Bragdon.7 The Bragdon Court, in discussing
its reliance on the guidance of the DOJ and other agencies charged with
administering the ADA, held that the views of agencies charged with
implementing a statute "are entitled to deference. ,7 8 Bragdon follows a
line of cases with similar procedural holdings. 9 Clearly, Congress gave
none of the agencies involved there the direct authority to define the
terms under the ADA any more than they did here. Yet the Court in
Bragdon spoke of the agencies' responsibilities in implementing the Act,
presumably requiring the same determination of terms as was done here,
as entitling them to the deference due under Chevron and its progeny.:O
Most telling perhaps, is that the Bragdon Court specifically cited to
Chevron in arriving at these conclusions; a significant omission in Sutton, and one which, as seen, triggers basic procedural questions about the
case.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
(1984)).
279.
280.
Council,

See id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2145-46.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 645, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2208 (1998).
See id. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift and Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1944).
Bragdon, 524 U.S. 646, 118 S.Ct. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense
467 U.S 837, 844 (1984)).
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There appears to be a clear conflict between the procedural posture
adopted only a year before in Bragdon and that adopted in Sutton. Further, it is a conflict without a clear resolution; one that is likely to leave
the lower courts in confusion over whether Sutton is, indeed, a new direction, or whether the lack of reference to Bragdon is a procedural door
left ajar for applicants. (As noted in Section IV below, Bragdon may also
contain a substantive door to slip through.) It would not be surprising,
perhaps, to see a new split in the circuits over the use and applicability of
Bragdon in the post-Sutton application of the ADA.
While the Court surely clouds the application of the traditional deference tests to administrative agencies here, and arguably misapplies
them, it never actually acknowledges a change in the test. This alone may
well leave the lower courts without guidance, and injured employees
without recourse, in an already highly litigated area of law.
IV. AVOIDING THE POTENTIALLY HARSH RESULTS OF SUTTON AND
MURPHY

The Supreme Court's recent cases may be the death knell for many
ADA claims brought by individuals with impairments effectively treated
with medication or other means. Yet several avenues remain for such
individuals to be covered by the ADA. First, as noted in Part I.A. of this
Article, the Sutton Court left open the possibility that if a mitigating
measure itself causes a substantial limitation on a major life activity, the
individual is disabled."' For example, if an individual has high blood
pressure or epilepsy, and is able to mitigate the effects of the impairment
through medication, but the medication itself causes severe side effects
that substantially limit the individual in performing a major life activity,
that individual is "disabled" under the Court's analysis. Of course, under
the Court's analysis, even if the mitigating measure has no side effects, if
it does not mitigate the effect of the impairment sufficiently to prevent a
substantial limitation on a major life activity, the individual would be
disabled.
Significantly, in Bragdon, the Court recognized that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a disability. Specifically, it found that despite the lack of
significant outward symptoms at this stage of the disease, HIV easily
meets the definition of disability because it is an impairment that substantially limits an infected individual in a number of major life activities
(the one specifically alleged and addressed in that case was reproduction).2"2 Thus, the Court has recently held that an outwardly asymptomatic impairment can be a disability if it still affects the body's systems
in a manner that places a substantial limitation on a major life activity or

281. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 (1999).
282. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 643, 118 S. Ct. at 2207. As explained in Part III, supra, Bragdon also
might limit some troubling aspects of the Sutton Court's procedural holdings.
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activities.283 Thus, while there is a huge difference between epilepsy and
HIV, and between the effectiveness of mitigating measures in regard to the
two diseases-Michele from the earlier hypothetical could argue that despite the fact she is asymptomatic due to medication, since certain types of
flashing lights could still cause her to have a seizure, she does "presently"
have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
One problem with this argument, however, is the language from
Sutton, suggesting that a well-controlled diabetic would not necessarily
be disabled; a situation similar to Michele's."' In both cases the individual is well controlled, is no different from anyone else in most ways, and
will only have a problem if exposed to certain situations or substances
(flashing lights, deprivation of food, or excessive sugar). Therefore, in
both cases, one might argue based on Bragdon, that the individual has an
impairment that affects a major life activity or activities, but whether the
condition places a substantial limitation is called into question by
Sutton.28 Bragdon implies that HIV infection is a per se disability.288
Whether after Sutton other impairments might, as the Kirkingburg Court
suggests with regard to amblyopia, "ordinarily" meet the ADA's definition of disability, (and if so, which ones?) remain open question.:'
Moreover, while the Court significantly limited the "regarded as"
element in connection with the major life activity of working, Kirkingburg suggests that other life activities can still provide a basis for a finding of disability.288 While this may not be terribly helpful in regard to the
first element of the disability definition (the element discussed in Kirkingburg) for those whose conditions are effectively mitigated, it may
prove very useful in the "regarded as" context. If an individual can demonstrate that despite mitigation, he or she is regarded as substantially
limited in a major life activity such as seeing, hearing, walking, etc. The
ADA would apply. Thus, if the employer acts based on a mistaken perception of an individual's disability, the individual would be covered
under the "regarded as" provision. Of course, because this relates only to
the threshold issue of whether the individual is protected under the ADA,
the individual must still prove that he is a "qualified individual with a
disability" and meet any other requirements under the Act for proving his
claim.
Another possible avenue left open by the Court is the "record of" an
impairment element, which is not directly addressed in any of the three
opinions. If an individual with a currently mitigated disability has a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, such
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 629-35.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
Id.
at 2146.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. 635-36, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
Id.
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as a record of the disability in its unmitigated state or from a time when
the mitigating measures did not mitigate the effects of the disability as
well, that individual could be covered. Of course, one would need to
demonstrate that a record exists, and that the employer relied on that
record.'89 Because such records may provide an easy basis for misjudging
a disabled employee's abilities regardless of mitigating measures, an
individual who has such a record could avoid the concerns created by the
Supreme Court's analysis by basing her claim on having a record of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or activities."
But again, this claim only helps an employee if such a record existed and
was relied upon by the employer.
Given the possibilities set forth in this section, it is essential for
those representing disabled individuals in ADA claims to understand
what the Court's recent decisions do and do not permit. In this regard, it
is important that courts applying the ADA remember that despite the
Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, some individuals
with effectively mitigated impairments may still be covered under the
ADA. While the Court's analysis makes it much harder for individuals
with mitigated disabilities to be protected by the ADA, with the proper
proof, many such employees may remain covered for the reasons set
forth in this Part.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of what one thinks of the results in these cases, the Supreme Court's seemingly result-oriented approach appears questionable
given the fact that it goes against Congress' intent as embodied in the
ADA's legislative history, the interpretations of all three agencies
charged with implementing the Act, the decisions of most courts to address the issues involved, and the language and structure of the Act as
reflected in alternative textual interpretations. The Court seems afraid
that too many people will be protected under the ADA, and that employers will suffer as a result. This is very troubling because that is a decision
for Congress to make, and Congress has spoken on that issue through the
Act and its legislative history. Perhaps after these cases, Congress will
more directly speak on the issue to correct what appears to go against its
intent, as it did in regard to several cases interpreting Title VII through
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
What is perhaps most troubling about these cases is that most of the
Court's concerns are already dealt with through the "qualified individual
with a disability" requirement. Thus, there is little risk of unqualified
commercial drivers or pilots taking to the roads or skies with the protection of the ADA. To the extent that such situations are possible, strengthening the application of the "qualified" element would be a method of
289.
290.

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(k) (1999).
See id.
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addressing such concerns that is far more consistent with the ADA's
underlying purpose and structure. As a result of these decisions many
employees who are qualified with mitigating measures, will be kept from
ever proving they are qualified or that they were discriminated against
based on their disabilities, because they are removed from coverage under the Act. This might lower the number of questionable claims that
make it past the initial pleadings stage (an arguably positive result), but it
does so at the expense of the rights of many disabled individuals who
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability, but who are no
longer protected under the Act. This is a classic case of "throwing the
baby out with the bath-water," and to make matters worse, in this case
the Court used the wrong window.

COMMENT

Su7ToN V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.: THE SUPREME COURT
APPLIES "CORRECTIVE" AND "MITIGATING" COMMON
SENSE TO THE ADA

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that it has been your lifelong dream to one-day work as a
global airline pilot. You get your pilot's license. You log thousands of
hours of flight time. You obtain the requisite licenses and medical certificates to fly passenger flights, and you get experience as a commercial
airline pilot. But when your big day comes to interview for a global airline pilot position, the interviewer informs you that your uncorrected
vision does not meet airline standards, and although you can see 20/20
with your glasses, your impairment prevents you from fulfilling your
dream. "That is nonsense!" you think to yourself, and in the pursuit of
happiness, and in the grand spirit of American resolve, you do what any
red-blooded, good-hearted American would do when dreams are
dashed-you consult an attorney. And the comforting words of the attorney assure you that, although life may have dealt you a bad hand in having to wear glasses, Congress has re-dealt the cards in your favor by creating what is known as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA" or "Act").' In other words, you can file a lawsuit claiming that
you are disabled because of your poor eyesight, and that the airline discriminated against you based on that disability
If a hint of sarcasm is detected, it is intended. After all, before the
early 1990's, who among us thought of a person who wore glasses as
being disabled? Although the above-described person is a sympathetic
character and has a legitimate grievance regarding the airline's questionable policy, it seems disingenuous for such a person to claim to be disabled when she can simply slide on a pair of glasses and eliminate the
effects of her impaired vision. When the ADA was under consideration,
Congress heard testimony from people who were considerably limited in
their ability to perform basic, essential activities and who experienced
extensive discrimination because of those limitations.' Those people

1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. This is the essence of an employment discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, i.e.
the existence of a disability and discrimination based on such disability. See discussion infra notes
27-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
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were not able to easily and significantly mitigate the effects of their impairments, as a person who simply needs glasses can.
Nevertheless, many courts have considered whether the ADA covers correctable or treatable impairments such as poor eyesight, high
blood pressure, depression, asthma, and poor hearing, when treatment
considerably or completely diminishes their limiting effects.! Corrective
and/or mitigating measures are available to control such impairments for
many, if not most people afflicted by them.' It is often possible to mitigate the effects of such impairments to a level where the afflicted individual functions equivalently to a person without the impairment. For
example, a person with poor eyesight can achieve 20/20 vision by wearing prescription eyeglasses. Nonetheless, courts have generally concluded that the ADA requires them to consider whether an individual is
disabled without reference to such mitigating measures.' Stated another
way, these courts have ignored the actual effect of the treated impairment
on the individual; instead, they have focused on how the impairment
would normally affect an" untreated person. This was the issue presented
in a suit brought by twin sisters Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (Petitioners). Their case, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' involved facts

similar' to the scenario described above, and is the focus of this Comment.9
Approximately forty-three million Americans suffer from some
form of physical or mental disability." The author of the 1988 version of
4. See, e.g., infra notes 66, 68.
5. For example, it is common knowledge that the use of prescription eyeglasses or contact
lenses corrects vision completely when worn, just as the use of a hearing aid may dramatically
improve the effects of hearing loss. These remedies are readily available to most Americans.
Similarly, various prescribed medications are capable of controlling high blood pressure, asthma or
depression.
6. See, e.g., infra note 68 and accompanying text.
7. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
8. The author admittedly took some creative liberties with the facts of the case in the opening
paragraph of this Comment. For a complete account, see infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
9. In addition to Sutton, the Court addressed the issue in two other cases decided the same
day. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999). All three cases involved the issue of whether corrective and/or
mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled under the
ADA. Sutton expresses the court's reasoning, and the Albertsons and Murphy opinions cite to that
reasoning as resolving the respective cases. Further discussion of the Albertsons and Murphy
opinions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994). The Supreme Court in Sutton traced the likely origin
of this number to a report by the National Council on Disability. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147
(citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 434 n. 117 (1991)):
The 43 million figure was not presented by its source as a number of persons with
disabilities, but rather as a figure representing the number of persons with impairments or
chronic conditions. The author has elsewhere discussed the dubious derivation of this
figure, along with his reasons for concluding that it is nonetheless a useful, rough
estimate.
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the ADA stated, "[b]y almost any definition, Americans with disabilities
are uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer,
much less well educated and have much less social life, have fewer
amenities and have a lower level of self-satisfaction than other Americans."" For centuries, people afflicted with varying forms of disability
faced discrimination in almost every conceivable aspect of public life.'2
Since 1990, the ADA has provided disabled people with a weapon to
combat discrimination.'3 The ADA, however, has also proven fruitful for
people with conditions not commonly regarded as disabilities or with
conditions easily and effectively treated to a degree where the practical
limitations caused by the condition become less restrictive or even nonexistent. Claimants and courts have stretched the statutory definition of
disability to absurd lengths compelling employers to expend resources
litigating frivolous claims and/or retaining unproductive employees.'4 At
the end of its 1999 term, the Supreme Court decided Sutton, narrowing
the definition of "disability," and thus limiting the number of people to
which it applies. Sutton held that when a court decides whether a claimant is disabled under the ADA, that court must consider the extent to
which any measures, employed by the claimant to mitigate or correct an
impairment, diminish the effects of the impairment."
Part One of this Comment presents the background necessary for an
effective examination of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. Part Two summarizes the majority, the concurring, and dissenting opinions in the case.
Part Three analyzes critical parts of the case and argues that the congressional intent behind the ADA's definition of disability is not clearly defined, and therefore, the Supreme Court properly disregarded agency
guidance that required courts to make disability determinations without
11. Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 415 (citing Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped, S. HRG.
100-166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor, Louis Harris and Associates) quoted in
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313).
12. Disabled people have endured centuries of antipathy, segregation, and cruelty. See
FREDRICK WATSON, CIVILIZATION AND THE CRIPPLE 1-2 (1930) (discussing the history of disabled
people in society). Examples date back to ancient Greece where, under the law, "defective" children
were put to death under the assumption that they could never contribute to society. Id. This
assumption endured for centuries and still exists in some societies. Id. The influence of the Old
Testament marked deformity and mental and physical handicap as the "curse of God" and a sure
indication of "spiritual degradation" and evil. See id. at 2. Most enduring, however, has been the
prevalent practice of segregating disabled people from the rest of society. See id. at 4-5. Whether
this was accomplished legally through the mandated admittance to institutions such as almshouses,
or by the simple public wont of treating disabled people with disdain and cruelty so as to discourage
them from venturing forth from their own seclusion, depended on the prevailing notions and
presumptions of the age. See id. at 2. No matter the age, however, the message was clear: if you were
considered disabled, you were unfit for society and, moreover, you were a burden on society. See id.
at 4-5. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2), (7). See generally Symposium, HistoricalOverview: From
Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP L.Q. 953 (1977) (discussing the development of rights for people with
disabilities).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
14. See e.g., infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
15. See, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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reference to mitigating measures. Furthermore, this part suggests that an
adequate remedy exists for those with such impairments not rising to the
level of disability, but who have nevertheless experienced discrimination
in the employment context. Part Four concludes that the Supreme Court
provided a rational and reasoned interpretation of the ADA's definition
of disability resulting in a narrowed protected class that more closely
identifies the intended beneficiaries of the Act.
I.BACKGROUND
I.

The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990

Over the course of the last three decades, society's perception of the
physically and mentally disabled has changed rapidly. Rapid, at least
when compared to the thousands of years through which disabled people
were automatically assumed unable to contribute in a meaningful way to
society, and worse, to be a drain on society's resources.' 6 In 1990, Congress passed the ADA.'7 Congress enacted this comprehensive legislation
in response to a shift in the public consciousness." The ADA recognizes
that disabled people have been the target of discrimination; discrimination perhaps more subtle than for other minority groups,'9 yet nonetheless
carrying the same insidious and devastating results that accompany the
deprivation of basic human rights recognized in American society. '
Having its genesis in the civil rights movement,2' the ADA builds
upon and reflects many of the concepts and language of antidiscrimination legislation enacted during the preceding three decades."
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
18. See Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1418-19 (1999) ("The recognition of paternalism, stereotyping, and failure to
accommodate as forms of discrimination prompted a call for civil rights for people with disabilities.
Activists realized the need to shift the disability paradigm from a quest for cures to a crusade for
rights."); Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 427-28.
19. The proposition that discrimination against disabled people has been more subtle than
against other minority groups is based on society's history of exiling disabled people to institutions
or group homes. This "out of sight, out of mind" approach keeps the situation out of the public eye.
See supra note 12. The sometimes violent and clamorous history (and consequent media coverage)
of the civil rights movement, in contrast, is more disposed to public consciousness and
comprehension.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); supra note 12.
21. See Jonathon C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution
of Federal Legislationand Social Policyfor People with Disabilities,40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1376
(1993) (suggesting that the 1960's civil rights legislation encouraged disabled people to form more
aggressive activist organizations that emphasized the attainment of rights instead of cures). See also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. See Drimmer, supra note 21, at 1397. The concepts embodied in the ADA derive from the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and
national origin in employment, public accommodations and the provision of state and local
government services. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
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The ADA, however, extends beyond animus-based discrimination to
prohibit discrimination based on cost considerations, as for instance,
when an employer refuses to hire a disabled person because it will cost
more to accommodate that person's disability." Professor Erica Worth
Harris describes this effect of the ADA as "a form of supplemental disability insurance" by allowing disabled people to remain in the
workforce rather than forcing them to collect disability benefits. '
The ADA imposes reform in the following four areas where disabled
people endure pervasive discrimination: employment, public services and
transportation, public accommodations and services operated by private
entities, and telecommunications.' The principal purpose of these various
provisions is to provide disabled people access to the same opportunities
26
and services that are generally available to the non-disabled population.
The employment provisions of the ADA seek to deter discrimination
against disabled people by giving those who are qualified for the position
they seek or hold a legal cause of action against employers who discriminate on the basis of a disability in their employment-related decisions, or who fail to reasonably accommodate disability-related needs.
In general, Title I prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees
from discriminating against qualified job applicants and employees who
are or become disabled.28 The Act, however, is not a mandate for affirmative action. 9 In fact, to qualify for the ADA's protections, a dis2000e-17 (1994)). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal legislative attempt to provide
substantive rights to disabled people by prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from
discriminating against people based on their disabilities. See Eichhom, supra note 18, at 1419;
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat..394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1994)). The ADA extends these protections into the private sector. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994).
23. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Searchfor the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 595-96 (1998).
24. Id. at 596.
25. This Comment focuses on the definition of "disability" in the context of employment
discrimination, although the same definition is uniformly applied to the other areas covered by the
ADA. See I HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 36-37 (3rd
ed. 1997). Congress separated these areas in the Act by title. id. at 1. Title I relates to employment.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title II covers public services and transportation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213112165. Title III applies to public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV contains
technologically oriented provisions related to telecommunications. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 711. Title V
covers miscellaneous provisions of the Act such as enforcement, exemptions, liability for attorneys'
fees in ADA litigation and governmental immunity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213. Further discussion
of Titles 1-V is beyond the scope of this Comment.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9); id. § 12 101(b).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 1 PERRITT, supra note 25, at 2; Thomas H. Christopher & Charles
M. Rice, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S.
TEX. L. REV. 759, 762-63 (1992).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
29. See Christopher & Rice, supra note 27, at 763 ("The general principle underlying the
employment provisions of the Act is that, as long as an individual with a disability is able to perform
the essential functions of a job, with or without reasonable accommodation of his impairments, he
should not be barred from employment opportunities because of his disability.") (emphasis added)
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abled person must be capable of performing the essential functions of a
particular job with or without the employer's accommodation of any
such disability." An employer must provide reasonable accommodations
for qualified disabled employees, unless those accommodations would
impose an undue hardship on the employer.' The protected class under
the employment provisions of the ADA, therefore, includes any "qualified individual with a disability."32 Before a court determines whether an
individual is qualified, it must determine if such an individual is disabled.33
II. The Statutory Meaning of "Disability"

To establish a claim of employment discrimination under the ADA,
plaintiffs must first demonstrate that they are disabled within the meaning of the Act.34 The Act does not necessarily require, however, that a
plaintiff actually be disabled or even be presently impaired. This is because it is possible for an employer to regard an individual as disabled
based on a past or perceived impairment that does not actually disable
the individual in a substantial way. The ADA recognizes that many impairments do not rise to the level of "disability" on their own." Often the
stereotypes, myths, and fears associated with various impairments are

(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453-54); R.
George Wright, Persons with Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 152 (1999).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires ....
[Clonsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential
....
.).
31.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA provides a definition of reasonable
accomodation as follows:
The term 'reasonable accommodation' may include(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
"The term 'undue hardship' means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense .
42
U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). This section of the Act further provides factors to consider when
determining the existence of an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See supra note 30.
33. See Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under the ADA: Should
Mitigating Factors Such as Medications be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 268 (1999);
Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 925 (1998).
34. See Bland, supra note 33, at 268; Walsh, supra note 33, at 925.
35. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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more disabling than the actual impairment. 6 With that in mind, the ADA
defines "disability," with respect to an individual, as "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;" or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment."3 The definition of "disability" focuses on the effect of an actual or perceived impairment, and
not the impairment itself.39 Thus, a particular impairment (or set of impairments) rises to the level of disabling only if its effect is substantially
limiting.
The first prong of the definition identifies the presence of a disability
stemming from an actual impairment. The second and third prongs recognize the discriminatory effect that negative stereotypes can have on an
individual resulting from a history of, ' or another's misperception of,' a
disability." The second and third prongs require a heavier evidentiary
burden on a plaintiff because it is typically more difficult to prove what
an employer perceived or thought, than it is to prove the actual state of
an individual's impairment.

36. "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but
could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative
reactions of others to the impairment." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (1999) (quoting Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987)); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 146 (stating that "the
severity of a disability is thus partly a matter of impairment of functioning and crucially of public
response").
37. Because subsection (B) was not at issue in Sutton, it is not extensively discussed in this
Comment. However, one result of the Court's holding in Sutton (limiting the application of
subsection (A)) may be an increased reliance by plaintiff's on subsection (B) as a way of
establishing a disability for purposes of an ADA cause of action. The purpose and application of
subsection (B) is described in the following:
The intent of this provision, in part, is to ensure that people are not discriminated
against because of a history of disability ....This provision also ensures that individuals
are not discriminated against because they have been misclassified as disabled ....
This part of the definition is satisfied if a record relied on by an employer indicates
that the individual has or has had a substantially limiting impairment. The impairment
indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more
of the individual's major life activities. There are many types of records that could
potentially contain this information, including but not limited to, education, medical, or
employment records.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). This is the same definition as used in the ADA's
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). See also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405
(1979). This case, decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, determined that "[a] person who has
a record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment may at present have no actual incapacity at all."
Id.
39. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j).
40. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k). An example would include a former cancer
patient fired because of a fear of recurrence. Id.
41. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
42. "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id.
(quoting Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (referring to the third prong of the
disability definition)).
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While an actual impairment may or may not presently exist under the
second and third prongs of the "disability" definition, the individual must
still be substantially limited in a major life activity.43 This might occur
under the third prong, for example, if an individual with a disfiguring
facial scar is unable to obtain a job because, although fully qualified for
the position, the employer is concerned about its customer's negative
reactions." In this case, if the employer thus regards the individual as
disabled and decides not to hire the individual based on the perceived
disability," the denial of opportunity resulting from the employer's fear
of customer's reactions is the disabling factor.'
What constitutes a physical or mental impairment under the Act is
defined broadly.47 The pivotal inquiry under each prong of the "disability" definition is whether a major life activity is substantially limited by
the impairment (first prong of the definition) or the perception of impairment (second and third prongs). Major life activities include such
functions as "caring for one self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 8 Note that
courts and agencies commonly regard "working," however, as a claim of
last resort. 9 Proving that one is substantially limited in the major life
activity of working is typically more difficult than proving the same for
other major life activities. This is because "[a]n individual is substantially limited in working if the individual is significantly restricted in the
ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes, when compared with the ability of the average person with com-

43. See Burgdorf, supranote 10, at 450.
44. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
45. See id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency
responsible for implementing and enforcing Title I of the ADA, uses this example to illustrate an
instance where an individual's impairment is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of
others. Id. This section of the EEOC Interpretive Guidance describes two instances where an
individual might be regarded as having a disability: (1) an individual's impairment, which is not
substantially limiting, is believed to be substantially limiting by the employer, or (2) an individual
has no impairment whatsoever, but is regarded by an employer has having a substantially limiting
impairment. Id.
46. See supranotes 36 and 42 and accompanying text; Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 449.
47. The EEOC defines "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "This list is not exhaustive. For example, other major life activities
include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §
1630.2(i).
49. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any other
major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially
limited in working.").

1999]

SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

parable qualifications to perform those same jobs."5 Therefore, a plaintiff making a claim under the major life activity of working must show
that he or she was substantially limited or regarded as substantially limited in more than the particular job he or she held or desired."
The extent to which the major life activity is limited determines
whether such an individual is "substantially limited" in that activity.52
Under the second and third prongs of the definition, limitations result
from the employer's perceptions. Under the first prong, limitations are
direct results of the impairment. In determining the extent of a limitation
under the first prong of the definition, courts are instructed to consider
such factors as the nature and severity of the impairment; the duration of
the impairment; and the expected long-term impact of or resulting from
the impairment. 3
Whether courts should consider the effects of corrective or mitigating
measures on the individual's impairment is the source of considerable
disagreement. 4 Obviously, the use of such measures diminishes the extent to which a particular impairment limits an individual. The question
therefore becomes whether the claimant possesses a disability under the
ADA if mitigating measures largely alleviate the claimant's
impairment." When a court, in its disability determination, ignores an
individual's use of mitigating measures, it increases the likelihood that it
will find that a particular impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Therefore, it is less likely that a plaintiff will have to rely on the
more difficult to prove second or third prongs of the definition. Likewise,
the odds increase that a plaintiffs claim will survive summary
judgment. 6
III The EEOC's Position on the Question of Mitigating Measures
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
federal agency charged with the responsibility of implementing and enforcing Title I of the ADA. 7 In accordance with its directive, the EEOC
issued regulations exactly one year after the enactment of the ADA. The
EEOC supplemented these regulations with the concomitant publication
of interpretive guidance to assist covered entities' understanding of the
employment provisions. 9 Agency issued regulations are generally bind-

50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii); I PERRITr, supra note 25, at 41.
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
54. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
55. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 93i.
56. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 932; Harris, supra note 23, at 584-94.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) ("Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Commission
shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter .....
58. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999).
59. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
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ing on courts if the regulations are congressionally mandated and represent a permissible statutory construction. 0 Interpretive guidance, on the
other hand, is not binding, but afforded great deference due primarily to
the specialized nature of agency authority.6'
The EEOC regulations are silent on the issue of mitigating measures. The interpretive guidance, however, specifically provides that
"[t]he existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." This directive makes it possible for certain claimants who would
only qualify as disabled under the third prong of the definition (because
their impairment does not, by itself, limit a major life activity) to claim
protection under the first prong of the definition as well. 3 For instance,
an individual with medicinally controlled high blood pressure might suffer from discrimination, even though his doctor gives him clearance to
work, because his employer regards his condition as dangerous in relation to the position he holds. This circumstance would qualify him as
disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the definition under any interpretation of the Act. Courts that follow the EEOC's guidance ignore the
mitigating effects of the medicine and consider how the limiting effects
of high blood pressure would hypothetically affect or limit the individual.
This results in a court finding that such individual is also disabled under
the first prong of the Act's definition because of a substantial limitation,
albeit hypothetical, on a major life activity.
Courts that do not follow the EEOC guidance consider the effects of
the medicine on the impairment, and if sufficiently controlled, likely find
that the impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity of
the individual. This prevents the impairment from qualifying under the
first prong of the definition. This is significant because qualifying under
the first prong reduces the evidentiary burden upon the claimant when
compared to that of the third prong.' The first prong demands only a
showing that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. A
showing of disability under the third prong requires evidence that the
employer knew of the impairment, or believed one existed, and thought
that such impairment substantially limited a major life activity. 5

60. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
61. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
62. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630(2)(i).
63. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 927.
64. See Harris, supra note 23, at 583.
65. See id. (citing Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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IV. DiscordAmong the Circuits and Lower Courts in Interpreting the
Meaning of "Disability"
Before the Sutton decision, a divisive antinomy developed among the
circuits on the question of whether courts should consider the effects of
ameliorative measures in making the disability determination. The Sixth
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, and consequently the district courts
within their respective jurisdictions (as well as district courts within the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits), concluded that, when determining the extent
of limitation caused by an impairment, the ADA requires examination of
the effects of any ameliorative measures utilized by the individual.'
These courts typically relied on the plain language of the ADA and concluded that the EEOC interpretation is inconsistent with other sections of
the interpretive guidance and with proper construction of the Act. 7
The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and the district courts within their respective jurisdictions,
chose to follow the EEOC interpretive guidance and concluded that a
disability must be determined without reference to the effects of mitigating measures.68 Courts relying on the EEOC's position generally cited

66. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1997) (corrected vision
impairment), aff'd, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th
Cir. 1997) (medicated diabetes); Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 854 (D. Minn.
1997) (medicated depression), affd on alternategrounds, 153 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 1998); Hodgens v.
General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I. 1997) (medicated hypertension and
arrhythmia); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997) (corrected
nearsightedness); Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997) (asthma); Moore v.
City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 1996) (medicated diabetes); Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996) (medicated hypertension), affd, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), aff d, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.
Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (W.D. Wisc. 1996) (medicated diabetes); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F.
Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (medicated diabetes).
67. See Walsh, supra note 33, at 942.
68. See Bartlett v.New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998)
(self-accommodated learning disability); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th
Cir. 1998) (medicated diabetes); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir.
1998) (medicated diabetes); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d
Cir. 1997) (medicated epilepsy); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521-22 (11 th Cir.
1996) (medicated Graves' disease); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.
1995) (corrected vision); Sherback v. Wright Automotive Group, 987 F. Supp. 433, 437-38 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (medicated and treated posttraumatic stress disorder); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F.
Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (uncorrected vision); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F.
Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (treated hearing impairment); Hendler v. Intelecom USA,
Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 204-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (medicated asthma); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State
Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-07 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (corrected vision); Sicard v. City of Sioux
City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (uncorrected vision); Canon v. Clark, 883 F.
Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (medicated diabetes); Finley v. Cowles Bus. Media, No.
93CIV5051(PKL), 1994 WL 273336, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1994) (treated chronic heart
disease); Lift v. Secretary of Transp., No. 93-0118TFH/DAR, 1994 WL 579912, at *3-4 (D.D.C.
Sept. 22, 1994) (medicated depression).
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portions of the ADA's legislative history in order to support this interpretation.69
A cursory review of the relevant portions of the Act's legislative
history educes apparent support for the EEOC's interpretation. For instance, a commonly cited House Committee on Education and Labor
Report (Report) discussing the first prong of the disability definition explicitly states that "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."' A more thorough analysis of
this report, however, uncovers internal inconsistencies that ultimately
detract from the legislative history's usefulness on the issue of mitigating
measures.
For example, the reference to the "availability" of mitigating measures suggests that courts should ignore the fact that such measures may
be available,and disregard whether or not an individual chooses to utilize them.' In other words, the court should not question a person's decision not to utilize available mitigating measures. However, when an individual does decide to employ available mitigating measures, courts
should consider such use. This interpretation is consistent with the
EEOC's mandate that courts consider an individual's limitation on a
case-by-case basis.7 Additionally, the Report suggests that the inquiry is
to focus on the factual and present effect of the impairment on the individual's life. This is made clear by the report's provision that "[a] person
is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first
prong ...

when the individual's important life activities are restricted as

to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most people."" Lastly, this Report describes a
purpose of the "regarded as" prong of the definition as ensuring "that
persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that there-

fore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated
against on the basis of their medical conditions."'7 Taken as a whole, one
can interpret the Report as prohibiting a court's generalized, hypothetical

69. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859; Matczak, 136
F.3d at 937; Harris, 102 F.3d at 521; Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 905-06; Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1437.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 101 -485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334. See
also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (identical quote); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28-29
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation.").
71. See Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Interpretation and Deference in the Judicial Process, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1078
(1999).
72. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
73. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 53 (emphasis added).
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analysis of whether a plaintiff would be disabled if not for the use of
mitigating measures.
Courts have noted similar internal inconsistencies in the EEOC's interpretive guidance.75 For instance, in describing the "regarded as" prong,
the EEOC uses an example of an individual with "controlled high blood
pressure that is not substantially limiting" but who was nevertheless reassigned to a less strenuous position by his or her employer.76 The EEOC
guidance indicates that such an individual would not actually be disabled
under the first prong, but would be "regarded as" disabled under the third
prong." How is a court to determine that an individual's high blood pressure is "controlled" if it is to ignore mitigating measures?
7
II. SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. 1

L Facts and ProceduralHistory
In 1992, Petitioners applied and interviewed for passenger pilot positions with United Air Lines, Inc. ("United"). 9 Petitioners met or exceeded the requirements qualifying them for the position. 7 United terminated their interviews, however, because their uncorrected vision was
below that required by United of a minimum of 20/100 or better in each
eye." In response, Petitioners filed suit, alleging that United violated the
ADA by discriminating against them in the hiring process because of
their disability, or alternatively, because United regarded them as disabled.82 Petitioners claimed to be qualified applicants with a disability
under the ADA because their uncorrected vision substantially limited
their major life activity of seeing. 3 Additionally, Petitioners claimed
United regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working because United's policy has "no rational job-related basis," and
effectively removes them from consideration for global airline pilot po-

75. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), aftd, 119 S.
Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (D. Kan. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1185 (1Oth Cir. 1998), aftd, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
76. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
77. See id. "If an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work because of
unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack if he or she continues to perform
strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the individual as disabled." Id.
78. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
79. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
80. Petitioners are twin sisters, both having fulfilled the Federal Aviation Administration's
requirements necessary to fly all classes of passenger planes. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943). At the time of the interview,
Petitioners were experienced pilots with regional commuter airlines. See id.
81. Neither Petitioners' uncorrected vision was better than 20/200. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at
2143.
82. See id. Petitioners alleged the actual existence of a disability under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A). Petitioners alternatively alleged that they were regarded as being disabled under 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). See id.
83. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F. 3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997)
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sitions. 4 The district court found that with corrective measures, Petitioners were "able to function identically to individuals without a similar
impairment."8 The district court thus granted United's motion to dismiss,
ruling that the Petitioners did not fall within the statutory meaning of
"disabled," because they were neither actually, nor regarded as, substantially limited in a major life activity. 6

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court decision,87 and reasoned that when corrective and mitigating
measures are considered, Petitioners are not substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing. Further, the Tenth Circuit found that United
did not regard Petitioners as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.88 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 9 and affirmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.9"
I. Supreme Court Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court majority, in deciding whether courts should
consider a plaintiff's use of corrective or mitigating measures, focused
on the plain meaning of three separate provisions of the ADA. 9 Petitioners argued that because the ADA does not address the issue of mitigating
measures, the Court should defer to the regulatory guidance, which provides that courts should evaluate an individual's impairment without
reference to mitigating measures. 2 The Court, however, sided with
United's arguments that the agency interpretations conflict with the plain
meaning of the ADA and the ADA's intent that the determination of disability is made on an individualized basis.93 Because it concluded that
reference to the ADA itself resolved the issue, the Court did not consider

84. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
85. Id. at 896 (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996)).
86. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *6 (D. Colo.
Aug. 28, 1996)).
87. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906. On appeal, Petitioners asserted that "they alleged sufficient
facts to establish that: (1) they were qualified applicants with a disability because they are
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, and (2) United regarded them as having a
substantially limiting impairment [in the major life activity of working]." Id. at 896.
88. See id. at 906.
89. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 790 (1999).
90. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined. See id.
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 2152. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. See id. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting
opinion. See id. at 2161.
91. See id. at 2146.
92. See id. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999).
93. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
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the Act's legislative history, nor decide what deference is due the agency
interpretations.9
The Court first examined the statutory definition of "disability. 95
The Court concluded that because the phrase "substantially limits" is in
the present indicative verb form, the Act mandates that a major life activity be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically" substantially limited.96 In other words, although an individual with poor eyesight is physically impaired, once that impairment is corrected, it does not substantially limit a major life activity and a court should not be forced to
speculate as to the potential extent of limitations in the absence of such
utilized measures.97
Second, the Court recognized that the ADA's phrase "with respect
to an individual" commands an individualized inquiry as to whether a
plaintiff is disabled under the Act. Reference to an individual's uncorrected or unmitigated state is in diametrical opposition with this mandate
because, according to the Court, it would often "force [courts and employers] to make the disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals,
rather than on the individual's actual condition."99 This would produce
outcomes based on group generalizations rather than individual considerations.'"
Finally, the Court found the legislative finding, published in the
"[flindings and purpose" section of the Act,'' that approximately fortythree million Americans are disabled to be conclusive evidence that
Congress did not intend to bring people with correctable impairments,
such as the Petitioners, within the purview of the ADA." The Court reasoned that the cited number would be substantially larger if it included,
among others, the 100 million Americans with vision impairments, the
twenty-eight million hearing impaired, and the fifty million with high
blood pressure-all conditions for which corrective or mitigating measures are largely available.' 3 Based on this, the Court concluded that had
94. See id.
95. Id. at 2146-47.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 2147.
99. Id.
100. See id. The Majority further noted that disregard of an individual's utilization of mitigating
or corrective measures would preclude courts and employers from considering any negative side
effects caused by such measures and contributing to a claimed limitation. See id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
102. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
103. See id. at 2148-49. The Court noted that the source of the 43 million figure is uncertain,
but that in earlier proposed legislation, Congress relied on a 1986 report by the National Council on
Disability which estimated the number of disabled Americans to be approximately 36 million. See
id. at 2147. When it passed the ADA in 1990, it is likely that Congress relied, in part, on an updated
version of this report, which estimated the number to be 37.3 million. See id. at 2148. This updated
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Congress intended to include individuals with corrected physical impairments, it would have included them in the figure cited in the congressional findings."'
Considering these three sections' 5 of the Act together, the Court
concluded that the ADA requires that mitigating measures be considered
in making the disability determination." Thus, the Petitioners could not,
"in fact," be considered substantially limited in their ability to see under
the first prong of the definition.' °7
The Court next considered the petitioner's alternative allegation
that, even if not actually disabled under the first prong of the definition,
United "regarded" them as disabled because it erroneously assumed that
Petitioners' impairment substantially limits them in the major life activity of working.' 0 This assumption constitutes a disability under the third
prong of the ADA's definition.'"
The Court first noted that the ADA allows employers to establish
physical criteria for its various positions of employment." An employer
"is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.""' The
Court adopted the reasoning of the EEOC on this issue and determined
that to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an
employer's erroneous assumption must effectively preclude the plaintiff
report, issued in 1988, and others cited by the Majority used a "functional approach" in determining
the number of disabled Americans. Id. A functional approach measures the limitations of people in
performing basic activities such as seeing, hearing, walking, lifting, speaking, etc. See id. Under a
functional approach, if a person usually employs the use of corrective or mitigating measures to
lessen the effect of one's impairment, that person's limitation is measured with the use of such
measures. See id. A "health conditions approach," on the other hand, measures the impairment's
effect on the individual without regard to any corrective or mitigating measures. Id. In other words,
this approach "looks at all conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an
individual." Id. Consequently, the latter approach produces a much higher number than the former
because it includes, for example: people with poor eyesight (although they may wear glasses or
contacts), people with poor hearing (although they may employ the use of a hearing aid), and people
with high blood pressure (although they may take medicine to control it).
104. See id. at 2149.
105. (1) The definition, (2) the individualized basis mandate, and (3) the legislative findings.
106. See id. at 2146. In addressing concerns of Justice Steven's dissent, the Court elaborated on
its holding stating that "[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an
individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an
impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting." Id. at 2149 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 2149.
108. Id. at 2150. Interestingly, the Court noted that Petitioners did not "make the obvious
argument" that United regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. Id.
The major life activity of working, in effect, requires plaintiffs to meet a higher standard. See supra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the EEOC discourages consideration of
"working" as a major life activity, except as a last resort; i.e., unless no other major life activity is
substantially limited. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j).
109. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
110. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
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from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes."' 2
Elaborating, the Court stated, "one must be precluded from more than
one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice."'" The
Court found the position of a global airline pilot to be a "single job," and
that United's barring of Petitioners from that position did not support a
finding that United regarded the two sisters as substantially limited in
their ability to work because of their impairment."4 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit conclusion that the Petitioners had not stated a
claim that they were actually, or were regarded as being, substantially
limited in a major life activity."5
2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court that the legislative findings
are evidence of Congress's intention that the ADA's coverage be limited
to a "historically disadvantaged" class. '6 The Justice added that the large
number of Americans with corrected impairments could hardly be considered part of a "discrete and insular minority," as Congress described
the position of disabled Americans."' Nor have they been "subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society."'8
3. Justice Steven's Dissent
Justice Stevens acknowledged that Congress likely did not intend
that every person who wears glasses be protected by the ADA." 9 He asserted, however, that the Court should generously construe the ADA to
give effect to its remedial nature.'2 1 Justice Stevens charged that it is a
canon of statutory construction that courts give remedial legislation a
broad construction to allow remedies in comparable situations under the

112. Id. at 2151 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Although it noted a "conceptual
difficulty" with the inclusion of "working- in the definition of "major life activity," the Court
deferred to the EEOC because the parties did not dispute the validity of its inclusion. Id.
113. Id.Ironically, a significant illustration noted by the Court was provided by the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance stating that "an individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of
a minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier
service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working." Id.(citing 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2).
114. Id.The Court also addressed Petitioners' argument that if the vision requirement were
adopted by all airlines, Petitioners would be substantially limited in their ability to work. See id. at
2152. The Court declared that simply imputing a valid job requirement to all other employers does
not invalidate the requirement. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring (relying on the language of 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7))).
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
118. Id.
119. See id.(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
120. See id.
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legislation.'2 He argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a
clear example of this canon, as its initial and intended focus on protecting African-Americans from discrimination in employment opportunities
has been enlarged to prohibit other forms of discrimination, and discrimination against other classes.'22
Justice Stevens also questioned the Majority's analysis of the subparts of the definition as mutually exclusive categories.' 23 He argued that
courts should consider the three prongs of the definition together to determine whether a claimant is, or once was, substantially limited in a
major life activity and that, therefore, courts should not refer to ameliorative measures, presumably because it does not change the fact that the
individual was impaired at some point. 24 Justice Stevens determined that
the legislative history and agency guidance support this interpretation.'25
Justice Stevens further disputed the Court's contention that the EEOC
approach creates a system in which courts assess individuals with reference to groups with similar impairments.' 6 He pointed out that "[i]t is just
as easy individually to test Petitioners' eyesight with their glasses on as
with their glasses off."'27 Moreover, the Justice contended that the Court's
approach condoned group stereotypes by allowing employers to discriminate against individuals who control their impairments by some means. 2
4.

Justice Breyer's Dissent

Justice Breyer wrote in dissent to note his broad interpretation of the
definition of "disability," a reading that Breyer argued would ensure that
none of Congress's intended beneficiaries be excluded from ADA coverage.29 He explained that should this interpretation result in an unacceptable number of baseless lawsuits, the EEOC could issue more explicit
definitional regulations excluding classes whom Congress did not intend
to be within the protections of the ADA.'30

121. Seeid.at2157.
122. See id. (noting that Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and as early as 1976,
Caucasians have been included under the protection of Title VII, and that recently same-sex sexual
harassment was ruled to be conduct prohibited by Title VII).
123. See id. at 2153.
124. See id. at 2153-54. (observing that subsection (3)of the disability definition "include[s] in
the protected class those who were once disabled but who are now fully recovered").
125. See id. at 2154-56 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52
(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; and 29 C.F.R., pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999)).
126. See id. at 2159.
127. Id.
128. See id. (explaining that "the Court's approach would seem to allow an employer to refuse
to hire every person who has epilepsy or diabetes that is controlled by medication, or every person
who functions efficiently with a prosthetic limb").
129. Seeid.at2161.
130. See id. at 2161-62.

1999]

SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

III. ANALYSIS
Many commentators perceive the Supreme Court's decision as a
victory for employers and as a major setback for the rights of disabled
Americans.' While the decision will likely decrease the number of unmeritorious claims and the resulting cost to employers, it is doubtful that
it will adversely affect the rights of people who experience employment
discrimination based on an actual or perceived disability.'32 The Supreme
Court's decision merely clarifies the definition of "disability," and imbues the determination of disability with a necessary dose of reality.
After Sutton, a disability produced by a substantially limiting impairment still falls within the first prong of the definition. It is recognized, however, that fully corrected impairments are not disabling but for
the misinformed, mistaken, or unjustly biased beliefs of others."' In other
words, a fully corrected impairment is only disabling if an employer regards it as such. Indeed, how else could a fully corrected impairment
substantially limit a person?
A court properly classifies a mitigated impairment under either the
second or the third prong depending on the facts of the case. If the
treated impairment still results in an actual and substantial limitation, it is
a disability under the first prong of the definition. If an impairment no
longer substantially limits an individual, but a record of such limitation
exists, and an employer has discriminated against the individual based on
a perceived limitation resulting from the corrected impairment, then a
claim exists under the second prong. Similarly, if an existing, but treated,
impairment does not result in an actual and substantial limitation, it is
still a disability under the third prong if an employer bases an adverse
employment action on the perception that the impairment does constitute
a substantial limitation.' If no adverse employment action has occurred
based on the perceived disability, then no cause of action exists.
Arguments that favor disregarding mitigating measures are often
based on the contention that the Court's interpretation fails to give effect
to congressional intent and the regulatory guidance based on that expressed intent. As previously discussed, however, the legislative history
is ambiguous at best. "5 Moreover, the agency guidance, which is argua-

131. See Robert S. Greenberger, Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Disability Act, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 1999, at B 1; Marcia Coyle, ADA: Clarified or Ruined? Disabled Community is Dismayed;
Business Gives a Sigh of Relief, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1999, at AI (quoting Professor Chai Feldblum
stating "[i]t's as devastating a cut to the ADA as one could imagine"); Joan Biskupic, Supreme
Court Limits Meaning of Disability, WASH. POST, June 23, 1999, at Al (quoting attorney Michael A.
Green stating "[y]ou're damned if you don't medicate, but you're damned if you do, because you
lose your legal rights").
132. See, e.g., infra note 205 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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on misinterpreted congressional intent, is not binding on
bly based
13 6
courts.

I.

CongressionalIntent and a Reasonable Reading of the Definition of
"Disability"

Although Senate and House committee reports expressly state that
the disability determination be made without reference to the availability
of mitigating measures, this apparent mandate must be reviewed in the
context in which it is made and with regard to Congress's clearly expressed purpose in enacting the ADA. For instance, Congress follows or
precedes these express statements with examples of diabetics, epileptics,
or people using prosthetic devices.' 7 It is arguable that these were the
situations Congress contemplated when making this declaration, and not
or almost completely,
situations where an impairment is completely,
38
means.
other
or
treatment
with
corrected
This becomes more obvious as the committee reports describe the
purpose of the third prong of the disability definition as ensuring "that
persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated
against on the basis of their medical conditions.""' This language suggests that Congress intended that those whose impairments are controlled, and are therefore not limited in any significant way by such impairments, be protected under the third prong.'" Congress seemingly also
intended that those with substantial limitations that are, however, mitigated to a certain extent, still be protected under the first prong if they
remain substantially limited by the impairment notwithstanding the
treatment."' The Court's holding effectuates this intent. Justice Stevens
136. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
See also S.REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (identical quote); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28-29
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation.").
138. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), stating:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availabilityof mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major life
activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing
aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition
of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlledby medication.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is arguable from this language that Congress intended that impairments that "may be
corrected" by available remedies, but that are not corrected for whatever reason, shall still be
considered disabilities if substantially limiting. Likewise, it is plausible that Congress intended
courts to consider impairments that "are controlled," but which are still substantially limiting
disabilities.
139. S.REP. No. 101-116, at 24.
140. See Bridges, supra note 71, at 1077-78.
141. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; S.REP. No. 101-116, at 23(1989).
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argued that the Court's holding precludes people with disabilities that are
treatable to any extent (such as epileptics, those utilizing a prosthetic
device, or those suffering from hypertension) from obtaining the ADA's
protection." 2 Clarifying its holding, however, and addressing the concerns of the dissenting opinions, the Court stated the following:
The dissents suggest that viewing individuals in their corrected state
will exclude from the definition of 'disab[led]' those who use prosthetic limbs, or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure.
This suggestion is incorrect. The use of a corrective device does not,
by itself, relieve one's disability. Rather, one has a disability under
[the first prong of the definition] if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity. For example, individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still
be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk
or run ....Alternatively, one whose high blood pressure is 'cured'
by medication may be regarded as disabled by a covered entity, and
thus disabled under [the third prong of the definition]. The use or
nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual43with an impairment actuallyfaces are in fact substantially limiting.1

Furthermore, Congress's ideological foundation for the ADA also
does not support the over-expansive interpretation urged by the dissenters. The Court undertook a lengthy analysis of the meaning behind the
number of disabled Americans cited by Congress in the "[flindings and
purpose" section of the ADA." Although there are inherent difficulties
in obtaining an accurate estimate of the number of people with disabilities in America, 4 the forty-three million figure is generally regarded as a
"useful, rough estimate."'"M Justice Stevens cited National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,17 for the proposition that "a 'statement of
congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base' a statutory construction.' '4 ' The full quote from Scheidler, however, reads: "We
also think that the quoted statement of congressional findings is a rather
thin reed upon which to base a . . .motive neither expressed nor, we
think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act."' 49 The Court in
Scheidler referred to a specific quote; not congressional findings in general. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Dole v. United Steelworkers of

142.
143.'
omitted)
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999) (internal cross-references
(emphasis added).
See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2147-49.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
510 U.S. 249 (1994).
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2160.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 260 (1994) (emphasis added).
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America,'5 ° noted that when a court is attempting to interpret or clarify a
statutory phrase, "[p]articularly useful is the provision detailing Congress' purposes in enacting the statute.""'
It is clear when one considers the language used in the legislative
"[flindings and purpose" section that Congress had a particular, although
difficult to define, class of eligible individuals in mind for coverage under the ADA. Congress described individuals "isolate[d] and segregate[d]" by society.'52 Congress further described the intended beneficiaries of the ADA as "a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society."5 3 These congressional findings echo from a stream
of testimonials delivered by disabled people before Congress.' Conspicuously absent from the congressional record is testimony from individuals with fully treated hypertension, or wholly corrected myopia. No
such individuals were present before Congress to relate their experience
of "purposeful unequal treatment," or their consequent "isolat[ion] and
segregat[ion]" from society.
Aside from not being the object of animus-based discrimination,
Professor Harris makes the point that the insurance justification' 5 for the
ADA does not explain why people with controlled impairments should
have ADA protection.' 6 As explained, this justification is based on the
rationale that if disabled people are accommodated, they will stay employed, and collect less in disability benefits.' As for people with corrected impairments:
[tihese individuals would not be unemployed without the ADA. They
do not face any barriers (physical or intangible) to equal opportunity
in the workplace. Their impairments do not impede them because
their impairments are controlled. Because they suffer no substantial
limitation on any major life activity, individuals with controlled im-

150. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
151. Id. at 36.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
154. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(H) (statement of Judith Heumann, at 29-30, 42) (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 311, 324; id. (statement of Marchell Hunt, at 38), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 320; id. (statement of Gregory Hilbok, at 39), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 321; id. (statement of Charles Crawford, at 41), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 323; id. (statement of Emeka Nwojke, at 41), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 323; id.
(statement of Virginia Domini, at 42), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 324; id. (statement of
Sandy Parino, at 43), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 325.
155. See text accompanying notes 23-24.
156. See Harris, supra note 23, at 596.
157. See text accompanying notes 23-24.
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pairments are not precluded from full and equal opportunity in employment.'
Thus, people with fully corrected impairments cannot rationally be
included in the first prong of the definition. People with mitigated impairments, on the other hand, may be included in the first prong depending on the extent of their limitation. Further, people with either corrected
or mitigated impairments may be included under the third prong of the
definition, and thus afforded ADA protection, if they have experienced
discrimination due to any such impairment (either real, imagined, corrected, mitigated, or otherwise).
Sections of Justice Stevens' dissent demonstrate a particular misunderstanding of the mechanics of the statutory definition. For example, in
describing the plight of a man with a prosthetic limb and arguing that
such an individual, under the majority opinion, will have no recourse
under the ADA, Justice Stevens wrote "[i]n my view, when an employer
refuses to hire the individual 'because of his prosthesis, and the prosthesis in no way affects his ability to do the job, that employer has unquestionably discriminated against the individual in violation of the Act."' 59
This is a blinding glimpse of the obvious considering the legislative history, and the EEOC's regulations and guidance describing the third
prong of the definition, notwithstanding the fact that courts may still consider such an individual disabled under the first prong if the disabled
person's life activities are still substantially limited. The employer has
"unquestionably" discriminated against the individual based on a disability because such individual can perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodation ("the prosthesis in no
way affects his ability to do the job"). However, the individual is disabled under the third prong of the definition because the employer "regarded" him as disabled. The employer's fear and/or stereotyping disable
the individual, not the actual impairment, at least as it relates to the essential functions of the job. If the prosthesis "in no way affects his ability," then he is not substantially limited under the first prong of the definition. Justice Stevens omitted any discussion of the third prong of the
disability definition.'" His dissent leaves unacknowledged the fact that an
entire section of the statutory definition is devoted to people whose impairments do not substantially limit them but who are treated as such and
are thus limited because of the denial of opportunity.' 6'
Justice Stevens next contended that, under the majority's interpretation, no reason would exist for the second prong of the definition.'62 In
attempting to demonstrate this, however, the Justice examined language
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Harris, supra note 23, at 596.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2154 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152-61.
See id.
See id. at 2153-54; supra note 37.
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from the majority's opinion, but taken out of context. The dissent reads,
"[i]f the Court is correct that '[a] disability exists only where' a person's
'present' or 'actual' condition is substantially impaired, there would be
no reason to include in the protected class those who were once disabled
but who are now fully recovered."' 63 First, courts are not to examine
whether one's "condition is substantially impaired"; they are to examine
whether a major life activity is substantially impaired.'" Justice Stevens
seemed to focus on the impairment instead of the effect of the impairment on the individual's life.'65 Moreover, the second prong of the definition is "included in the definition in part to protect individuals who
have recovered from a physical or mental impairment which previously
substantially limited them in a major life activity.'"" The actual "disability" essentially arises as a result of people's fears, perhaps of recurrence
for example, that effectively preclude the individual from engaging in a
major life activity. In other words, the individual's past disability is presently disabling, not because of the impairment (which has since been
cured, treated, or has otherwise disappeared), but because of other people's attitudes regarding the past disability. The distinction between the
impairment and the effect of the impairment is a crucial one in understanding the mechanics of the ADA's definition of disability.
Justice Stevens further asserted that:
[t]he three prongs of the statute ... are most plausibly read together
not to inquire into whether a person is currently 'functionally' limited
in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an impairment-present or past-that substantially limits, or did so limit, the
individual before amelioration. This reading avoids the counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals
make themselves more employable 6by
7 ascertaining ways to overcome
their physical or mental limitations.
The EEOC language, however, points to the independence of each part
of the definition. The interpretive guidance, upon which Justice Stevens
relied, describes how the definition is "divided" into three parts, how an

163. Id. at 2154 (internal reference omitted). The portion of the majority opinion from which
Justice Stevens derives the phrase "a disability exists only where" reads in full as "[a] 'disability'
exists only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken." Id. at 2146.
164. See quoted material supra note 163.
165. The EEOC has acknowledged the importance of making the disability determination based
on the effect of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. part 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999). "The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual."
Id. 166.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989). Congress also intended this prong of
the definition to protect people misclassified as disabled. See id.
167. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154.

1999]

SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

individual must "satisfy at least one of these parts" and that an individual
is considered disabled "if that individual either [falls into category (1),
(2)], 'or,' (3) . ,,8 This language is not indicative of mutually dependent subsections. Justice Stevens' conclusion that the ADA's safeguards
will vanish for some individuals under a conventional reading of the
definition is based on his flawed understanding of the separate definitional prongs themselves. 9
II. The EEOC Interpretation- Deference Due and PracticalEffects
Notwithstanding the problematic language expressing congressional
intent on the mitigating measures issue, the EEOC adopted the position
that courts should disregard the effect of mitigating or corrective measures on the impairment. The EEOC, perhaps recognizing the ambiguous
congressional intent, appended this position to the regulations instead of
including it within its provisions. Such a position, relegated to the appendix, is decidedly not binding on courts.'70 Moreover, the guidance
provided by the EEOC contains many of the same internal inconsistencies as the congressional record. 7' Even if the EEOC had included its
interpretation in the regulations, a court could decline to follow it if the
court found its' mandates contradictory to the statute.'72
The ADA distinctly describes its protected class in its "[f]indings
and purpose" section and presents the definition of disability in such a
way as to preclude those with controlled impairments unless their disability results from the irrational perceptions of another. "3 Furthermore,
the ADA clearly mandates an individualized determination of disability
based on the reality of the plaintiffs circumstances. 4 The Supreme
Court's interpretation on the mitigating measures issue is reasonable in
light of this mandate and the ambiguously expressed congressional intent. The EEOC, on this point, seems to have ignored the statutory mandate. As stated by the Supreme Court, an alternative interpretation violates the plain meaning of the ADA. "' Not to mention that such an expansive interpretation is simply unreasonable when its practical effects
are considered.'76

168. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g) (emphasis added).
169. See supranotes 159-166.
170. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
171. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
172. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
174. See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
175. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999).
176. Justice Stevens alluded to many employers' fear that the EEOC's interpretation might
encourage a "flood of litigation." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2159 (1999).
Justice Stevens presented a narrow argument as to why he believes that the EEOC interpretation
should not create such anxiety. See id. at 2158--60. However, it appears obvious that tripling or
quadrupling the size of any protected class will result in increased litigation.
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Indeed, many problems with the EEOC interpretation involve its
practical effects. One illustration is the protection it would afford at-will
employees against termination. 77 Employers would be forced to absorb
additional (real or threatened) costs to fire an employee who claims the
termination is based on discrimination. '7 Most employer-employee relationships continue on an at-will basis. "9 When confronted with a discrimination claim, however, an employer must rebut the claim with evidence of one or more legitimate, justifiable reasons for the termination.'80
Professor Harris describes a typical situation:
Suppose an employee senses he is about to be fired. If the employee
notifies the employer that he is protected under the ADA, he forces
the employer to accumulate a documented record supporting a just
cause dismissal before the employer can take action against him.
When creating a record for just cause termination is too difficult,
costly, or time consuming, an employer may abandon or delay a decision to discharge the employee. Thus, the power to claim protection
amounts to extra protection from adverse employment action.'
The increased likelihood that an unmeritorious claim will survive summary judgment increases the value of "nuisance suits" to claimants.'82
The EEOC interpretation drastically expanded the class of people afforded ADA protection and thus, increased the cost to employers exposed to frivolous claims and nuisance suits.' 3
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that courts should broadly construe remedial legislation to encompass similar situations." He illustrated his point by showing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
has evolved from protecting only African-Americans to protecting several races and varying forms of discrimination.'85 The difference, however, is that the protected classes of the Civil Rights Act are not subject
to manipulation; that is, you either are or are not African-American.'86
The protected class under the ADA, however, is naturally amorphous and
thus ambiguously defined. This makes the ADA unlike other antidiscrimination legislation and therefore encourages manipulation of the

177. See Harris, supra note 23, at 584. Ms. Harris refers to this as "just cause" protection. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 581-94 (presenting clear reasoning as to exactly how and why a plaintiffs
chances of surviving summary judgment increase under the EEOC interpretation).
184. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
186. See Harris, supra note 23, at 586 (describing the unique nature of the ADA's protected
class).
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definition/protected class. 87' Application of the EEOC interpretation exacerbated this situation.
Congress designed the ADA to operate based on reality as opposed
to requiring courts and employers to speculate on the effects of hypothetically untreated impairments. The ADA's mandate to consider disabilities on a case-by-case basis and the EEOC's express endorsement of
this mandate provide evidence of this operative basis.'88 Employers lack
the necessary expertise to speculate on how untreated impairments would
hypothetically affect an employee.'89 Courts that disregard mitigating
measures likewise indulge in fantasy when considering the hypothetical
state of impairment of an individual who consistently utilizes mitigating
measures to control such impairment.'" By holding that the determination of whether an individual is disabled includes consideration of any
mitigating or corrective measures, the Supreme Court removed the
analysis from the hypothetical to the veritable as mandated by the plain
language of the ADA.
IlL. ProperClassificationof a Claim Within the Disability Definition
The statutory definition of disability.is already necessarily broad so
as not to preclude those who require protection. Congress did not attempt
to actually list impairments that qualify as disabilities at the risk of
overlooking impairments and therefore excluding certain individuals.' 9'
The Supreme Court, however, effectively suggested that a line was
of findings. "A statute that protects evedrawn by Congress's statement
92
one."'1
no
protects
ryone
Some authorities, including the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, have argued that the concepts of disabilities ...

are largely

socially determined and that virtually everyone is 'handicapped' for
one purpose or another.

187. See id.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §
1630.2(g), (j).
189. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of
Respondents at 1-2, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
190. For example, after the Sutton decision, in EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th
Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in considering whether a form of blood cancer was a
disability, noted that "[w]ithout treatment, [plaintiff's] condition would have resulted in 'severe
anemia, systemic infection, internal bleeding' and would 'infiltrate other organs or body systems."'
EEOC, 181 F.3d at 653 (emphasis added). Thus, before Sutton, the court might have "assume[d] that
[plaintiff] was suffering from [these afflictions]," when, in fact, the plaintiff was treated and
experienced none of these limiting afflictions. Id. at 653-54.
191. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) "It is not possible to include in the legislation
a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental
impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list..." See id.
192. Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of
Respondents at 7, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
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Nevertheless, federal laws have generally assumed that a distinct
class of disabilities or handicapping conditions exists, and have targeted individuals with such conditions as the principal beneficiaries
of federal services, benefits, and protection.'9
The ADA targets that distinct class by limiting coverage to those
whose impairments (or other's attitudes) substantially limit them in performing major life activities. Millions of Americans have various ailments and impairments that prevent them from certain activities. However, these afflictions are often trivial, temporary, or mitigated by various
therapies or remedies. In short, they do not impede an individual beyond
what a reasonable person might consider "normal." People with disabilities, however, often face daily obstacles in the performance of the most
elementary and fundamental of activities.'94 The Tenth Circuit implied
that Petitioners' claim that they actually are disabled trivializes the condition of being "disabled."' 95 However, a claim that an employer regarded a person as disabled, even if such person is not actually disabled,
does not trivialize the condition of being disabled, but recognizes the
existence of society's discriminatory stereotypes.
That United "regarded" the Petitioners as being disabled was certainly the Petitioners' most cogent argument. It represents exactly what
Congress envisioned when considering the third prong of the definition.
The attitudes and unfounded assumptions about disabled people have
contributed significantly to their subordination in society.'96 Here, Petitioners claimed that United regarded them as disabled in the major life
activity of working because "United presumed without substantiation that
they [could not] perform the function of the job [and that] United disqualified them based on 'myth, fear or stereotype' that individuals with uncorrected vision of worse than 20/100 constitute a safety hazard."'97
The Supreme Court did not require United to substantiate its reasons
for having such a requirement, but focused on petitioner's claim that
United regarded the plaintiffs as disabled in the major life activity of
working.' 8 The Court seemed to suggest that Petitioners might have met
with more success had they claimed that United regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing.'' This claim might
have resulted in the Court requiring United to substantiate the need for its
vision requirement. After all, it is certainly not beyond the realm of possibilities that United's vision requirement is a completely arbitrary re-

193. Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 441.
194. See, e.g., supra note 154 and accompanying text.
195. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1997) (commenting that "the
impairment must be significant, and not merely trivial").
196. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
197. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 903.
198. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-52 (1999).
199. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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quirement with no basis in necessity, safety, or otherwise. However, the
issue did not arise because Petitioners did not claim that United incorrectly regarded them as unable to see. Instead, the Court considered
whether United improperly concluded that Petitioners were unable to
work in a "class" or "broad range of jobs."2' The Court concluded that
United had not.2"'
This may be an overly stringent test for a plaintiff to meet when
trying to prove that an employer regarded her as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working."2 It essentially presents a Catch-22
situation to a plaintiff claiming a disability under the first prong because
if she succeeds at showing that her impairment substantially limits her in
performing a class of jobs, she has in effect argued that she is not a
"qualified individual with a disability" because she cannot perform the
essential functions of the job, and she would therefore not qualify for
protection under the ADA.203 This is a significant hurdle for a plaintiff
claiming an actual disability under the first prong of the definition. Thus
in pleading, such plaintiffs should attempt to identify a major life activity
that is substantially limited other than working when claiming a first
prong disability. On the other hand, when a plaintiff claims that a employer incorrectly believes that an employee or applicant cannot perform
a job-because of a mistaken belief based on a past record of disability
(second prong), or a misperception related to a disability (third prong)the hurdle presented by the "qualified individual" analysis is
significantly lower assuming the plaintiff can actually prove that the
employer's belief is incorrect. This is proven simply by showing that the
plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the job.
It is arguably evident from the above analysis however, that Congress
intended people with largely mitigated or corrected impairments to have
ADA protection from the discriminatory misperceptions of employers
under the second and third prongs and not to claim an actual disability

200. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2151. Although an individual may be limited in his or her ability to
perform a certain job, it is not until this limitation rises to the level of substantial that the ADA
deems it a disability. Preclusion from a class of jobs is simply evidence of a substantial limitation,
whereas courts do not consider preclusion from a single job a substantial limitation. See supra text
accompanying notes 49-50. The EEOC regulations recommend that courts give this evidence great
weight in determining whether one is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)-(C).
201. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151.
202. Additional commentary on this suggestion is beyond the scope of this Comment. But see
Brief of Senators Harkin and Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and Owens and Former Senator Dole
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Kirkingburg and Petitioners Sutton and Murphy at 25-28,
(Nos. 97-1943, 97-1992, 98-591) (suggesting that "[t]he only way to give meaning to the 'regarded
as' prong is to interpret the rejection from the job in question to signify the employer's view of the
plaintiff's ability to perform the class ofjobs to which the job in question belongs").
203. See supra note 30 and text accompanying note 33 (defining "qualified individual with a
disability," and describing how a plaintiff must, in reaching the "qualified individual" inquiry, must
first demonstrate that she is disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). See also supra note 202.
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under the first prong. Properly applied,2' Sutton will sustain the protection afforded by the ADA to America's disabled population, and, as intended, still allow those without per se disabling impainnents to have
their day in court when an employer's discrimination is based on mistaken beliefs regarding an impairment. In fact, since Sutton, courts have
properly dismissed various plaintiffs claims of actual disability under
the first prong when their impairments were substantially mitigated or
corrected, but sustained their claims under the third prong when their
employers nevertheless discriminated against them. 5

IV. CONCLUSION
Left unanalyzed, Justice Stevens' misunderstanding of the intended
mechanics of the statutory definitions of "disability," his focus on the
"impairment" instead of the "disability," his misquotes, and his omission
of any discussion of the inconsistencies in the legislative history, all
combine to nourish a seed that may quickly grow to sprout the leaves of
discontent among an ill-informed public. Such discontent could plausibly
lead citizens to place calls to Congress members who, equally illinformed (most were either not present at the time the ADA was enacted,
or, if present, cannot be expected to recall every detail emanating from
events transpiring eleven years ago), might conceivably present a bill to
amend the ADA' s definition in favor of the EEOC interpretation."°
This need not be the case however. The Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the ADA's definition of "disability" finally clarifies a
muddied area of disability law. It offers a reasonable and practical interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability. When signing the ADA
into law, President Bush declared that "[tihe Americans with Disabilities
Act presents us all with an historic opportunity. It signals the end to the
unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from
the mainstream of American life."2 7 Sutton will return the ADA to those
204. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text (properly applied, and perhaps, with
reconsideration by the EEOC or the Court of the "class of jobs" requirement when the major life
activity claimed to be limited is that of working).
205., See, e.g., EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
although plaintiffs remitting cancer did not substantially limit his ability to work, a material factual
dispute existed regarding whether he had a record of disability or was regarded as having a
disability); Haiman v. Village of Fox Lake, 1999 WL 476973 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs heart condition did not significantly restrict her ability to work, but that she had presented
sufficient evidence to allow a finding that her employer regarded her as disabled).
206. See Greenberger, supra note 131, at B 1 (quoting Professor Chai Feldblum stating "I think
people with disabilities may well need to question whether we should ask Congress to revisit this
issue.").
207. Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 602
(July 26, 1990).
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who demanded and impelled its enactment, 8 and remove it from the
opportunist grasp of those who know nothing of the isolation and powerlessness bred by disability.' While it is true that the definition of "disability" is largely intuitive, congressional testimony exposed its parameters." ' The result was an inevitably imperfect definition that is, nevertheless, workable due to its flexibility. However, courts and claimants
stretched that flexibility to a level that placed an absurd demand on employers..' and courts," 2 resulting in subordination of the Act's ideological
roots. The Supreme Court's ruling should contract the ADA's protected
class back to that which was reasonably contemplated by Congress by
excluding those whose trivial impairments present no practical or substantial limitation on their lives, and by including those who have mitigated or corrected impairments, yet are still regarded as disabled.
Andrew C. Testerman*

208. See Harris,supra note 23, at 608 (arguing that "[a]s [the EEOC in controlled impairment
cases] continues to venture outward from the original model of anti-discrimination legislation to
extend protection to other groups, the dangers of losing sight of the ideological foundations of the
legislation increases").
209. See id. (arguing that the EEOC interpretation "gives an economic windfall to an
undeserving class").
210. See supranote 154 and accompanying text.
211. See supranotes 177-183 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
J.D. Candidate, December 2000, University of Denver College of Law. The
author would
like to thank the editors of the Denver University Law Review for their respective contributions;
particularly that of Susan Kraemer whose selfless and thorough review of this comment at an early
stage significantly and positively affected its quality.

BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA W FOUNDATION,
INC.: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A CONSISTENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW IN BALLOT ACCESS CASES
CONTINUES
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court entered the "political thicket"'
surrounding ballot access cases in 1968 with its decision in Williams v.
Rhodes! Since then, the Court has found itself in the position of deciding ballot access issues that place the right of a state to regulate its electoral process3 against the First Amendment rights of its citizens.' In an
attempt to strike a balance between these significant interests, the Court
has applied varying standards of review when addressing state legislation
that regulates elections.! The lack of a consistent approach by the Court
has resulted in a wide range of ballot access decisions by the lower
courts.' The resulting uncertainty in ballot access law has left states to
question whether their existing election regulations are constitutional,
which has, consequently, subjected the Court to substantial criticism.7
Although the majority of the ballot access cases decided by the
Court involve state regulation of the ability of third-party candidates8 to

1. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
2. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Supreme Court first decided the merits of an election regulation
in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, Baker involved a state's congressional
distributing scheme, not access to a state electoral ballot. Id. at 187-88.
3. "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections ... shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof ... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
4. See Jennifer R. Abrams, Note, The Supreme Court's Disenfranchisementof the American
Electorate: Advocating the Application of Strict Scrutiny When Reviewing State Ballot Access Law
and Political Gerrymandering, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 145, 145-46 (1996) (citing the
right to vote and the right of freedom of political association as First Amendment rights often
conflicting with Constitutional provisions ensuring state sovereignty over the state election process).
5. See Kevin Cofsky, Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict Scrutiny
of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 367-88 (1996) (summarizing the
standard of review applied by the Court in various ballot access cases).
6. See id. at 390-401 (providing a survey of lower court decisions that demonstrate the
difficulty these courts have in determining whether certain state ballot regulations are constitutional).
7. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 890 (13th ed.
1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in ballot access cases "show an especially
pervasive degree of instability regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny."); Darla L. Shaffer, Ballot
Access Laws, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 657, 657 & n.5 (1996) (citing various criticisms of the Court for
constantly altering the standard of review in ballot access cases); Cofsky, supra note 5, at 356 ("In
order to maintain a properly functioning electoral process, the Court must establish a clear standard
of review for ballot access restrictions .... ").
8. For example in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), the Court decided whether
Ohio's ballot access regulations pertaining to independent, also known as third-party, candidates
were impermissible since they differed from those applicable to candidates from the Democratic and
Republican parties.
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appear on its ballot,9 the Court occasionally deals with cases involving
state regulation of the ballot initiative process." Recently, in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that three Colorado statutes regulating the ballot initiative process violated the First Amendment." The Court invalidated regulations that required petition circulators of ballot initiatives to wear identification badges, be registered voters, and, if paid, have their names disclosed by their employer.'" The Court noted that there is no "litmus-paper
test" to determine whether a ballot initiative regulation conflicts with the
First Amendment." It then went on to invalidate the regulations even
though each had a very different impact on speech.' This Comment argues the Court's holding, that Colorado's registration and disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment, further adds to the confusion
over the application of the proper standard of review in ballot access
cases. The Colorado regulations may have made it more difficult to get
an initiative on the ballot or required the disclosure of a greater amount
of information, but they did not violate the First Amendment.'5
Part I of this Comment provides background on the general constitutional framework employed by the Court when reviewing ballot access
issues, the various cases in which the Court attempted to establish a
workable standard of review, and the precedents on which the Buckley
Court relied to invoke the First Amendment. Part II discusses the facts in
Buckley and summarizes the Court's reasoning and justification for its
decision, including the criticisms offered in the concurring and dissenting
opinions. Finally, Part III critiques the Court's application of the standard
of review in Buckley and suggests a pragmatic approach to deciding future ballot access cases, particularly those pertaining to ballot initiatives,
that would allow states to effectively regulate their electoral process
while preserving the First Amendment rights of its citizens.

9. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,
432 (1971); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1974).
10. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415-17 (1988) (holding that the prohibition of paid
petition circulators violated the First Amendment by reducing the potential number of individuals
who could circulate petitions, thereby restricting political speech).
11. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 649 (1999).
12. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
13. Id. at 642 (quoting Storer,415 U.S. at 730).
14. See id. at 642-49.
15. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Robert M. Stem, The FirstAmendment and Paid Initiative
Petition Circulators:A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 175, 210-11
(1989) (criticizing the Court's decision in Meyer by arguing that prohibiting the use of paid
circulators simply limits the ways that petition circulators can gather signatures, which may make it
more difficult to get an initiative on the ballot, but does not impact political speech).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Conflict Between State and Individual InterestsArising in Ballot
Access Cases
Twenty-four states allow citizens to bypass their state legislature to
adopt statutes and amend their state constitution' through ballot initiatives
and referendums. '" In order to ensure that a manageable number of issues
appear on a ballot,'7 and that the initiatives are not simply a byproduct of
well-funded special interest groups,' 8 these states enacted numerous
regulations to govern the initiative process."
The Court consistently recognizes the state, interest in regulating the
electoral process stating, "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."2 Under certain circumstances, the Court has gone as far as to hold
that "a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its
political processes ....
In contrast, however, the Court has equally, and perhaps even more
vigilantly, recognized that some state regulation of the electoral process
may infringe upon individuals' rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.22 In response to this clash, the Court initially applied
the fundamental rights strand of the Equal Protection Clause.2 3 The Court,
however, eventually began to address ballot access cases by reviewing
the impact of state regulations on the First Amendment directly. ' This
16. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:Procedures That
Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 47, 49-50 & n.5 (1995); see also COLO. CONST., art. V, §
1(l)-(2) (authorizing the citizens of Colorado to enact legislation through ballot initiatives). See
generally Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism,28 RUTGERS
L.J. 787 (1997) (providing a detailed description of the history of ballot initiatives).
17. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 201 (arguing that with fewer initiatives on the
ballot, voters will be more educated).
18. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
19. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 16, at 64-77 (providing a detailed description of the
then-existing Colorado ballot initiative regulations).
20. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
21. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (describing the power of the state to protect
its electoral process from "frivolous or fraudulent" candidates).
22. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (recognizing that the right of political
association and the right to cast an effective vote are within the scope of the First Amendment).
23. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 n.7 (1983) (citing as examples: Williams,
393 U.S. 23, Bullock, 405 U.S. 134, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) and Illinois Elections Bd. v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)).
24. In Anderson, the Court explained that:
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on
the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of
equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have considered
the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate state interests.
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change in analysis caused some commentators to observe that "the Court
has suggested that the fundamental rights strand of equal protection theory
may be redundant and slated for cancellation," because the rights of political association and freedom of speech are protected directly by the First
Amendment without regard to Equal Protection." The Court consistently
employs this type of analysis in ballot initiative cases. 6
B. Attempting to Resolve the Conflict: Deciding on a Standardof Review
Although the Court has had little difficulty clarifying the basic constitutional framework in addressing the conflict between state and individual interests in ballot access cases, it has struggled mightily in selecting a consistent standard of review.27 This struggle has resulted in unpredictable outcomes in many cases.
Before deciding Williams in 1968, the Court declined to rule on ballot access issues because it considered such issues non-justiciable political questions. 8 In Williams, however, the Court granted certiorari to rule
on the constitutionality of Ohio election laws making it "virtually impossible for a new political party ... to be placed on the state ballot .... ""
After determining that the Ohio election laws made blatant distinctions
between new and established political parties, the Court ruled that the
election laws implicated both the First Amendment right to vote and the
right of political association. The Court then used a relaxed form of strict
scrutiny to strike down the regulations." The Court stated that "only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."3' However, the Court may have intentionally given itself some
leeway in applying this standard. As one commentator points out, the Court

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 n.7.
25. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 121,
150 (1989).
26. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988); Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 640 (1999) (demonstrating the Court's implementation
of the First Amendment directly in ballot initiative cases without regard to an Equal Protection
analysis).
27. See Shaffer, supra note 7.
28. See id. at 659.
29. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968). The primary regulation focused on by the
Court was Ohio's ballot access regulation that "requires a new party to obtain petitions signed by
qualified electors totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the last preceding gubernatorial
election." Id. at 24, 25. A more detailed summary of all the regulations in question are contained in the
first footnote of the opinion.
30. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
31. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1968)).
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did not actually identify any compelling state interest or address the question
of narrow tailoring, factors typically integral to a strict scrutiny analysis."
After standing in defense of individual rights in Williams, the Court
dramatically changed its standard of review and sided with the states in
its very next ballot access case. In Jenness v. Fortson, the Court upheld
Georgia's electoral regulations that allowed independent candidates to
appear on the ballot only after filing a nominating petition signed by at
least five percent of the registered voters.3 The Court recognized the state
interest "in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the
democratic process at the general election."' Therefore, after holding that
Georgia's regulations did not "operate to freeze the political status quo,"
the Court simply deferred to the state interest and held the regulations did
not invoke the First Amendment.35 In Jenness, the Court applied the opposite standard of review applied in Williams, even though both sets of regulations placed restrictions, albeit in differing degrees, on individuals gaining ballot access. 6 The Court has oscillated between the standards of review used in these two cases ever since.
Shortly after Jenness, the Court decided two cases in which it used a
form of intermediate scrutiny that fell between the strict scrutiny review
employed in Williams and the rational basis review in Jenness 8 In Bullock v. Carter,the Court invalidated a Texas regulation requiring a large
filing fee in order for a candidate to get on the ballot.39 The Court stated
that the law must be "closely scrutinized," but noted that it required a
legitimate, not compelling, state interest to "pass constitutional muster.'"
Two years later, the Court upheld portions of the California Election
32. See Cofsky, supra note 5, at 369. Narrow tailoring simply means that the legislating body
must draft the regulation in a manner that has the least impact on individuals' constitutional rights. If
the regulation can be drafted in a less intrusive manner, the Court will invalidate it. Id at 412-13.
33. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971).
34. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
35. Id. at 438.
36. Id.; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
37. As one commentator explains, Williams and Jenness represent "polar extremes of
scrutiny." Shaffer, supra note 7, at 661; see also Cofsky, supra note 5, at 369, 371-73 (describing
the use of strict scrutiny in Williams and the "[rietreat from [sitrict [s]crutiny" in Jenness). In
Williams, the Court found that the state election regulation for third party access to the ballot was
overly burdensome and employed strict scrutiny to invalidate the regulation. Williams, 393 U.S. at
31. However, in Jenness, the Court found that the state regulation was not overly burdensome and
simply deferred to the state's interest in regulating its electoral process. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
These cases established the two outer limits of the Court's approach to ballot access questions. The
various approaches used by the Court in its subsequent decisions all fall somewhere between these
two extremes. This Comment does not maintain that the final decisions reached in Williams and
Jenness were incorrect, but only that the Court needs to approach ballot access cases in a consistent
and clearly articulated manner.
38. See Cofsky, supra note 5, at 373-74. Under a tiered scrutiny approach, the Court
traditionally employs either strict scrutiny or rational basis, however, the Court more recently added
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 402 n.244.
39. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
40. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
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Code in Storer v. Brown, stating that previous case law did not suggest
that the Court "automatically invalidate[d] every substantial restriction
on the right to vote or to associate."4 The Court found stability in the political system as a "compelling" state interest, "outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in . . . seek[ing] independent ballot
status." 2 In effect, however, the Court only applied intermediate scrutiny as it
did not consider whether the regulations were narrowly tailored.43
In Anderson v. Celebrezze," and to a lesser degree in Burdick v. Takushi,"5 the Court attempted to back away from a tiered scrutiny analysis
and instead employed somewhat of a balancing test that weighed the
interests of the state against those of its citizens. ' Under Anderson, the
Court weighed the "character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate," against the "precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed." 7 In deciding between these interests "the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff s rights." 8 While citing the
"flexible" Anderson test, the Court, in Burdick, seemed to mix tiered
scrutiny and balancing concepts by explaining that "[in cases of] 'severe'
restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance."' The Court went on to find that "when
a state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,
'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify'
the restrictions. '
The Court did not, however, continue to employ the balancing approach developed in Anderson and Burdick in all subsequent ballot access cases. In Norman v. Reed, '0 the Court seemed to abandon the balancing test for a tiered scrutiny approach." The Norman Court invalidated two Illinois ballot access regulations where it found that citizens
have the right to create new political parties which the state can only
41. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974).
42. Storer,415 U.S. at 736.
43. See Cofsky, supranote 5, at 374.
44. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
45. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
46. See Rachel J. Grabow, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Protecting the
Freedom of Speech or Damaging the Electoral Process?, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 565, 582-83 (1997)
(describing the balancing test developed by the Court in Anderson); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 661.
47. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
48. Id.
49. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) and Anderson,
460 U.S. at 788). The Court in Timmons v. Twin CitiesArea New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) also
used this type of analysis.
50. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
51. See Cofsky, supranote 5, at 384.
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restrict if it "demonstrat[es] . . . a corresponding interest sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation."" Additionally, the Court, possibly sugbe
gesting a return to strict scrutiny, held that any severe restriction must
"narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. 53
As can be seen in this brief summary of case law relating to the standard
of review utilized in previous ballot access cases, the Court has had difficulty traversing through the "political thicket'' it once dared not enter. As
the Court anticipated in Storer, "[w]hat the result of this process will be in
any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance.'
C. Aspects of Buckley Invoking the FirstAmendment
The Buckley Court's holding focused on facets of petition circulation
that it considered protected by First Amendment precedent.' Particularly,
the Court focused on the link between protected speech and the following: anonymity,"1 reduction in the potential number of eligible voices to
speak, 8 and compelled disclosure of ballot related expenditures. 9 The following cases provided the basis of the Buckley Court's opinion.
The Court discussed the First Amendment protection afforded to
anonymous literature in Talley v. California,where it held that it is unconstitutional for a city ordinance to prohibit all anonymous leafleting.' In
short, the Court found that the ordinance violated the First Amendment as
it "might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance" because an individual might not speak for fear of identification and
"reprisal."' In 1995, the Court decided McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, where it extended the protection of anonymity to the electoral

52. Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89.
53. Id. at 289.
54. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
55. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
56. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S.Ct. 636, 646-47 (1999).
57. See Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 645-46. See also Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign
Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 168 (1995) (describing the delicate
balance between states' interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the First
Amendment right of individuals to speak freely in the "marketplace" of ideas, whether openly or
under the protection of anonymity).
58. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 643; see also Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 15, at 182
(discussing the Court's holding in Meyer that ballot access regulations cannot limit "the number of
voices who will convey... [the ballot initiative proponent's] message and the hours they can speak
and, therefore, limit[] the size of the audience they can reach") (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414, 422-23 (1988)).
59. See Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 647; see also Grabow, supra note 46, at 577 (summarizing the
Court's decision in Buckley, where it held that compelled disclosure infringed on the First
Amendment interests of campaign contributors and that "significant encroachments on First
Amendment rights . . .cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental
interest." (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976))).
60. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
61. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
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process." The Court held that an Ohio regulation prohibiting anonymous
campaign literature was "a regulation of pure speech"63 that "involve[d] a
limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. ' 64
In Meyer v. Grant, the Court addressed a ballot access regulation
which reduced the number of potential voices to carry the political message." The Meyer Court invalidated a Colorado law prohibiting the use
of paid petition circulators under "exacting scrutiny."' Significantly, the
Court held that "circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive
communication concerning political change that is appropriately described
as 'core political speech."'6 7 From this point, the Court found that the
regulation impermissibly restricted speech by "limit[ing] the number of
voices who w[ould] convey appellees' message," thus making "it less
likely that appellees w[ould] garner the number of signatures necessary to
place the matter on the ballot ....
,6 8
The final aspect of political speech relevant in Buckley is the notion
of compelled disclosure of ballot related expenditures. The primary case
on this topic is Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court upheld the federal disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act.6 9 Noting that
"compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on . . .the First
Amendment," the Court held that in such cases the government must demonstrate a "'substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the
information required to be disclosed" to survive "exacting scrutiny."7 °
However, because compelled disclosure requirements generally serve
"substantial governmental interests," the Court looked "to the extent of the
burden that they place on individual rights."" In Buckley v. Valeo, the federal regulations survived scrutiny by serving "substantial government interests." 2 The Court added slightly to this compelled disclosure analysis in
FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti, where it ruled that a state must show that
its compelled disclosure regulation serves a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn. 3

62. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 344-46 (1995).
63. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
64. Id. at 346 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
65. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22 & n.5.
66. Id. at 420.
67. Id. at 421-22. See also infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
68. ld. at 422-23.
69. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976). The disclosure requirements included
provisions that had candidates record the name and address of anyone contributing over ten dollars
and the name, address, occupation, and principal place of business for anyone contributing more
than one hundred dollars. Id. at 82.
70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm'n., 372 U.S. 539,
546 (1963)).
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 66-68. Significant government interests in the disclosure requirements include the
prevention of corruption and the enforcement of campaign contribution limitations. Id. at 83-84.
73. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
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II. BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION, INC.
A. Factsand ProceduralHistory
In 1993 the American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit public interest organization, brought an action in United States
District Court against the Colorado Secretary of State pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 7 The lawsuit challenged six ballot initiative regulations:
(1) the requirement that petition circulators be at least 18 years old;75 (2)
the requirement that petition circulators be registered voters;76 (3) the six
month petition circulation limitation;' (4) the requirement that petition
circulators wear badges stating their names, if they are paid, and if so, the
name and telephone number of their employer; 8 (5) the requirement that
the petition circulator attach an affidavit to each petition stating, inter
alia, the circulator's name and address;79 and (6) the requirement that the
initiative proponents disclose at the time the petition is filed, inter alia,
the names, addresses, and amount paid to each petition circulator.'
The Court of Appeals upheld that the age restriction, six-month
limitation period, and affidavit requirements as reasonable petition circulation regulations.' The Court of Appeals, however, determined that
the badge requirement, the portion of the disclosure regulations requiring
the release of the names of paid circulators, and the registration requirement violated the First Amendment.82 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling of the Tenth Circuit. 3
B. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Buckley, written by Justice
Ginsburg, began by stating that the circulation of petitions is "core political speech" resulting from the "interactive communication concerning
political change."' In such cases the "First Amendment ... is 'at its ze-

• 74. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 640 (1999). The
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., brought this action against the Secretary of State of
Colorado, Victoria Buckley, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. This statute waives governmental immunity
in certain instances by allowing a lawsuit to be brought against a government official who "subjects.
. . any citizen of the United States .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1999). The American Constitutional Law
Foundation argued that several of Colorado's ballot initiative regulations, enforced by the Secretary
of State of Colorado, violated the First Amendment rights of its members. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
75. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 640-41.
80. See id. at 641.
81. See id. at 642.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 649.
84. Id. at 639 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,422 (1988)).
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nith.' 8. In conflict with these interests, the Court recognized that states
have "considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the
initiative process .... ,,86 Lastly, the Court admitted that in this type of case
there is "no litmus-paper test"87 to determine the validity of these regulamust be made."88 Once the Court
tions and, therefore, "hard judgments ....
established the generally applicable law, it discussed each regulation in
earnest.
1.

Badge Requirement

The Court began by emphasizing that compelling petition circulators
to wear badges stating the individual's name impacted "one-on-one
at the precise moment when the circulator's interest in
communication ...
anonymity is greatest."89 It also noted that the impact of forfeiting anonymity is greater here than in Mclntyre because the individual must attempt to "persuade the electors to sign the petition," as opposed to simply distribute literature.9 The state argued that it needed the regulation to
apprehend,
can identify, and the State [can] ...
ensure that "the public ...
petition circulators who engage in misconduct."91 However, the Court
reasoned that the affidavit requirement provided an adequate disclosure
of such information. 92 The affidavit requirement was permissible because
it provided the information after the one-on-one communication between
petition circulators and potential supporters has concluded, thereby lessening the burden on speech.93
2.

Registration Requirement

The Court addressed the registration requirement in the same manner
as the prohibition against paid circulators in Meyer, stating that the registration requirement placed the same type of reduction in "voter-eligible
population" as the ban on using paid circulators had in Meyer." After
accepting the District Court's finding that Colorado has over 400,000
individuals that are not registered voters, but are otherwise qualified to
circulate petitions, the Court found the regulation an impermissible
means of decreasing the "number of voices who will convey [the initiative proponents'] message."9

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 640 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425).
Id. at 642.
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
Id. (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at730).
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.at 645.
See id.
See id.
Id.at643.
Id.at644 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
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The Court again noted that the affidavit requirement would satisfy
Colorado's interest in ensuring that petition circulators who violated the
initiative regulations would be subject to the subpoena power of the Secretary of State.' The Court dismissed Colorado's reasoning that the registration requirement was not a heavy burden on speech because it was
"exceptionally easy to register to vote."97 It emphasized the testimony
from ballot initiators who claimed that the decision not to register was a
political choice.98 Finally, the Court did not articulate a standard of review in evaluating this regulation, possibly because it implied that this
case was indistinguishable from the one in Meyer where it employed
exacting scrutiny. However, it did state that Colorado failed to articulate
an "impelling" interest to sustain the registration requirement."
3. Disclosure Requirement
In agreeing with the Circuit Court's decision to invalidate the disclosure requirements that pertained to the names and addresses of paid
circulators, the Court followed its decision in Valeo and employed exacting scrutiny."° Although the Court upheld the disclosure regulations in
Valeo, the Court declined to do so here because the risk of "quid pro
quo" corruption is not as great in the ballot initiative process as it is for
political candidates.'"' However, unlike most other ballot access cases,
the Court did not focus on the burden the regulation had on speech, but
simply stated that it felt the additional information provided from the
regulation "is hardly apparent and has not been demonstrated."'"
C. ConcurringOpinion
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas, seemingly frustrated by the way
the majority further added to the confusion of the proper standard of review for ballot access cases, articulated what he believed to be the "nowsettled approach."' 3 Justice Thomas stated that "[w]hen a State's rule
imposes severe burdens on speech or association, it must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest; lesser burdens trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests are typically

96. See id. at 644.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 645.
100. See id. at 647.
101. Id. at 647-48.
102. Id. at 647.
103. Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring). Based on his relatively lengthy concurrence that
describes in detail the approach he feels the Court has developed to deal with the difficult problems
presented in ballot access cases, Justice Thomas appears to be frustrated by the way the Court
addressed, or failed to address, the proper standard of review in its decision to invalidate the selected
ballot initiative regulations. See id. at 649-59.
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enough to justify reasonable restrictions."'" Justice Thomas continued by
stating that, although "there is no bright line separating severe from
lesser burdens," the direct or indirect regulation of "core political
speech" requires "strict scrutiny."' 5 However, regulations that burden
"voting and associational interest" are "harder to predict" and have been
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.'" Following this reasoning, Justice
Thomas stated that all three of the regulations found unconstitutional
should be analyzed under strict scrutiny.'" He argued that the badge requirement regulated core political speech and the registration and disclosure requirements burdened associational interests, and hence were controlled by Meyer and Valeo, respectively. 8
D. Opinion Concurringin the Judgment in Partand Dissenting in Part

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority only in regard to its decision concerning the badge requirement."
Although Justice O'Connor reached a different conclusion than Justice
Thomas regarding the registration and disclosure regulations, she advocated a similar analytical approach. She opined that the Court should
analyze regulations substantially burdening "one-on-one communication" under strict scrutiny and regulations primarily targeting the "electoral process" under a "reasonableness" standard."' Not satisfied by the
evidence that the decision not to register was a political one or that the
registration regulation silenced those "able and willing" to circulate petitions, Justice O'Connor distinguished the registration requirement from
the one in Meyer and argued that the Court should uphold it."' Additionally, Justice O'Connor argued that, while advancing "Colorado's interest
in law enforcement,""' the Court should uphold the disclosure regulation
as it was directed at the "electoral process with an indirect and insignificant effect on speech.""'
E. Dissenting Opinion

In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, noted for his disapproval of
the over-zealous use of strict scrutiny,"' focused mainly on the registra104. Id. at 649. Justice Thomas's summary of the "now settled approach" is one used in
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) and Timmons v. Twin Cites Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351
(1997). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 650.
107. See id. at 651-53.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 654-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id.at 655.
112. Id.at 658.
113. Id.at657.
114. See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny:
Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1049, 1057-58 (1992)
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tion requirement. Stating that the invalidation of the registration requirement "calls into question the validity of any regulation... [that] diminish[es] the pool of petition circulators or mak[es] a proposal less likely to
appear on the ballot,""' 5 Justice Rehnquist argued that "a State should be
able to limit the ability to circulate initiative petitions to those people
who can ultimately vote on those initiatives at the polls.""' 6 In conclusion,
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority regarding the badge regulation, but disagreed over the disclosure regulation, stating that it did not
require any additional information that would impact speech differently
than the affidavit requirement."7
III. ANALYSIS
The holding in Buckley illustrates the difficulty the Court has in
implementing a consistent standard of review and analytical approach to
ballot access cases and the unpredictable rulings that result. The Court
used the First Amendment to strike down the badge, registration and
disclosure regulations that, although each controlled an aspect of Colorado's ballot initiative process, had vastly different impacts on speech.
As a result of the lack of clear guidance provided by previous ballot access cases, the Court, although proclaiming that "[p]recedent guides our
review," "8had to take a disjunctive approach in reviewing these initiative regulations. This approach, in the case of the registration and disclosure regulations, lost sight of what was in need of protection. The following section analyzes the three rulings in Buckley in detail and suggests an alternative approach to evaluating ballot initiative cases.
A. Badge Requirement

The Court's ruling that invalidated the badge regulation is, as all the
Justices agreed, a well-founded use of the First Amendment to protect
political speech."9 The reason for this agreement is that the regulation
directly "involve[s] a one-on-one communication.""'2 It is difficult to
argue that individuals would not be more hesitant to passionately advocate a controversial ballot initiative, such as the legalization of marijuana, if they had to do so without the shroud of anonymity.'2' Recognizing that the badge requirement impacts "the precise moment when the

(describing the debate over the use of strict scrutiny in the Rehnquist Court and noting that the Chief
Justice was the only justice who consistently disagreed with the use of strict scrutiny in certain cases
where the First Amendment right of political expression was implicated).
115. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 661.
117. Seeid. at662.
118. Id. at 639.
119. See id. at 646, 651, 654, 662.
120. Id. at 646.
121. See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995)
(describing the historical treatment of anonymous speech by the Court).
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circulator's interest in anonymity is greatest,"'22 the Court distinguishes
this requirement from the affidavit requirement that it upheld by noting
that "the affidavit is separated from the moment the circulator speaks."'"
After finding that the badge requirement directly impacts one-on-one
communication, the Court applied "exacting scrutiny."'2 " Under this standard, Colorado's interests in law enforcement failed to survive as the
Court did not feel it added much benefit to the affidavit requirement to
justify its burden on speech.'" This approach achieves an equitable balance between state and individual interests because it first identifies and
evaluates the impact the regulations have on First Amendment interests,
and then applies a level of scrutiny proportional to the burden. This approach helps to ensure that the Court will strike down a state election regulation as a violation of the First Amendment only after determining that at
least one of the Amendment's protected interests is truly implicated.
B. RegistrationRequirement
Unlike its analysis of the badge requirement, the Court did not first
determine whether the registration requirement burdened one-on-one
communication.'" Instead, the Court, relying on its decision in Meyer and
the finding of the District Court that over 400,000 Colorado residents
were not registered voters, simply stated that the regulation imposed a
restriction on speech by "drastically reduc[ing] the number of persons... available to circulate petitions.""'2 However, the regulation did
not burden speech when it reduced the number of individuals eligible to
circulate petitions. Unregistered individuals were still able to discuss
ballot issues with anyone they wish.'28 The only limitation was that unregistered voters could not ask supporters to sign petitions. This in no
way limits speech. Even assuming, arguendo, that the regulation in
Meyer burdened speech, the regulation in Buckley is much less burdensome as it did not foreclose a group from circulating petitions, as the
Meyer regulation did against paid individuals. Further, the Buckley
regulation was not a criminal statute as the regulation was in Meyer.

122. Buckley, 119 S. Ct at 646.
123. Id. at 645.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 642-43.
127. Id. at 643.
128. See generally Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 221 (using a similar argument to
criticize the Court's holding that the prohibition against using paid petition circulators was a
violation of the First Amendment in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)).
129. It could be argued that Colorado's registration requirement foreclosed unregistered voters
as a group from circulating petitions. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 216-17. However,
the vast majority of these individuals could easily register to vote that would allow them to circulate
petitions, whereas in Meyer the regulation prohibited any paid circulator from ever circulating
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The Court's reasoning expands the First Amendment to protect an individual's ability to place an issue on the ballot. Consequently, a state
would arguably be in violation of the First Amendment by increasing the
number of signatures or decreasing the time allotted to get a petition on
the ballot.'3 ° Unlike regulations in other ballot access cases already mentioned, the registration requirement does not discriminate against any group
or individual. It is'simply a "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction" that
states are permitted to enact in order to regulate the election process."'
Finally, the Court's reasoning that individuals choose not to register
as a means of political expression is attenuated.'32 Registering does not
require being associated with any political party, but merely shows a
desire to vote. It is also difficult to give the self-serving testimony of the
plaintiffs much merit where they argue that individuals decide not to
register to vote because they don't believe that the "political process is
responsive to their needs," "' yet they use the electoral process to attempt
to get ballot initiatives passed by the support of registered voters. As
Justice O'Connor summarized in her dissent, "the existence and severity
of this burden [on political speech] is not as clearly established in the
record as the respondents, or the Court, suggests."'34 Consequently, the
Court's use of exacting scrutiny to invalidate the registration regulation
was misapplied.
C. Disclosure Requirement
As in its evaluation of the registration requirement, the Court did not
first evaluate if the disclosure requirement impacted one-on-one communication, but applied exacting scrutiny to the regulation because it had
done so in a previous case with seemingly similar facts. Here, the Court
stated that any compelled disclosure regulation was subject to exacting
scrutiny due to its ruling in Valeo.' 5 However, in Valeo the Court only
stated that compelled disclosure statements "can seriously infringe on...
the First Amendment,"'36 but that the Court still needs to determine "the
extent of the burden ....
In Valeo, the Court stated that individuals may not contribute to political candidates if their names and contribution amounts must be disclosed to the public. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the regulation due to

petitions. It seems likely that significantly fewer individuals would decide to forgo circulating
petitions as a result of having to register to vote then from having to forfeit financial compensation.
130. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 218-19.
131. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
132. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 644 (providing no precedence for stating that the decision not to
register is a form of political speech).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 655 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 647.
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64 (1976) (emphasis added).
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
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the significant government interests in fraud protection and the appearance of political integrity.'38 In Buckley, the Court feared that the disclosure requirement would prevent individuals from circulating petitions
because they would lose their anonymity. Unlike the badge requirement,
however, the effects of the regulation would be "separated from the moment the circulator speaks."'39 The only way a potential supporter of a
petition would know the identity of a petition circulator is if she went to
public records.'" Since there appears to be no evidence that this occurred, it
is unlikely that any petition circulator has ever been affected by this possibility. Without establishing that this disclosure requirement actually burdened speech, the Court's use of exacting scrutiny was inappropriate.
D. Suggested Approach
It is apparent from the Court's difficulty in establishing a consistent
standard of review in ballot access cases that the principle challenge
facing the Court is how to resolve the obvious conflict between the
weighty constitutional interests of both the state and its citizens. Although identifying the conflict in such cases may be straightforward,
determining a way to handle each conflict in a consistent manner that
protects the interests of both sides is not. As the Court and commentators
have realized, the "inherent difficulty in election ballot law . . . is that
constitutional infringement in these cases is a matter of degree.""'
In Williams v. Rhodes, for example, Ohio's election laws required
that third party candidates file petitions early on in the election year
signed by individuals representing fifteen percent of the number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, as opposed to ten percent for
major parties, erect an elaborate party structure, and conduct primaries.' 2
Whereas, in Jenness v. Fortson, Georgia's ballot access regulations were
much less restrictive and only required independent candidates to garner
signatures from ten percent of the eligible voters and imposed no requirement of elaborate party structure or early submission
requirements.'43 Although both states had a substantial interest in protecting its own electoral process, the difference in the degree that the
regulations infringed upon the First Amendment interests of each state's
citizens was considerable.
In both cases, the Court achieved the correct result, yet it did so at the
expense of a consistent approach. This is not to say that the Court's use
138. See id. at 66-68.
139. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 656 (1999) (quoting the
majority opinion at 645).
140. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 658.
141. See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 662.
142. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-26 & n.1 (1968); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 7, at 891.
143. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1971).
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of strict scrutiny in Williams or deferential review in Jenness was inappropriate, but simply that the Court needs to clearly establish its analytical process so that there can be a reasonable level of predictability in
subsequent decisions. Without a consistent approach, the Court provides
no way for lower courts and, even more importantly, state legislatures to
reasonably determine whether a state ballot access regulation has overstepped its constitutional bounds.
It is clear from even a cursory review of the facts in Williams and
Jenness that applying one standard of review to all ballot access cases
would lead to absurd results that would tread far too heavily on either
state or individual interests. Moreover, due to the magnitude of the interests involved and the substantial need for consistent results, a balancing
approach, similar to that employed in Anderson, would also be difficult
for the Supreme Court, and especially lower courts, to effectively employ
in subsequent cases with any consistency.'"
The Court could avoid the inconsistency and unpredictability in its review of ballot access cases by adopting an analysis that first determines
whether the regulation involves "core political speech"'' 5 or whether it is
simply a non-discriminatory regulation directed at the electoral process. As
the Court held in Buckley, core political speech involves "interactive communication concerning political change,"''

nication."'47

6

or simply "one-on-one commu-

If the Court finds that the regulation does not involve core political speech, it should apply deferential scrutiny and uphold the state regulation as long as it is not so burdensome that it still ultimately impacts core
political speech.' 8
Conversely, if the regulation does involve core political speech, the
plaintiff should then be required to demonstrate an actual negative impact on
her First Amendment interests. In the case of the registration and disclosure
regulations in Buckley, this requirement would call for the plaintiff to admit
evidence of an actual reduction in the number of ballot circulators resulting

144. As one commentator states:
While a balancing test may appear to provide courts with greater leeway to evaluate
competing interests, courts may also capture this benefit in a system of tiered scrutiny
which accurately measures states' and individuals' respective interests. Furthermore, a
system of tiered scrutiny provides a more coherent and administrable standard to lower
courts and tends to afford a more appropriate level of deference to state legislative
enactments.
Cofsky, supranote 5, at 402.
145. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 639 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 646.
148. For example, in Williams, the state ballot access regulations were so burdensome that they
foreclosed the ballot access to third-party candidates by making it "virtually impossible for a new
political party ... to be placed on the state ballot .. " Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the ballot access regulations were not used uniformly to
regulate the electoral process, but as a way to prevent third-party candidates from appearing on the
ballot, which clearly burdens core political speech.
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from the challenged regulation. 9 This would be a substantially higher hurdle
than simply submitting evidence that the regulation may possibly, or hypothetically, reduce the number of potential petition circulators as seen in
Buckley. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the Court should use exacting
scrutiny to determine if the state regulation is narrowly tailored and serves a
compelling state interest. This would still lend substantial weight to individuals' First Amendment rights, while not unduly restraining the state from
enacting needed ballot regulations.
If the plaintiff does not meet this burden, however, the Court should
simply ensure that the state regulation is a reasonable, non-discriminatory
restriction. 150 This would substantially reduce the amount of uncertainty
presently involved in enacting ballot access laws because individual plaintiffs are currently only required, as evidenced in Buckley, to submit evidence
of ways the challenged regulation may possibly infringe on their First
Amendment interests. While not perfect, this suggested approach to ballot
access cases, particular concerning ballot initiatives, offers protection to the
interests of both the states and individuals while providing a consistent approach for lower courts to follow, greatly simplifying their determination of
the appropriate standard of review."'

149. This assumes, of course, that the circulation of petitions is in fact "core political speech."
Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 641. It could be argued that regulations of the ballot initiative process such as
those in Buckely do not implicate the First Amendment as the regulations do not prohibit individuals
from discussing any political issue and that thus these regulations are simply a way for states to
control the electoral process. It should be noted that the ballot initiative process has not even been
instituted in every state, in fact, the majority of states do not even allow their citizens to enact any
legislation except through the legislature. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 16, at 49-50. This is
not to suggest, however, that simply because states are not required to have a ballot initiative process
that they can regulate the process in any manner they choose without violating the First Amendment.
Obviously, a regulation that states that only Democrats can circulate petitions would certainly be
unconstitutional. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 218.
150. It could be argued that this approach is primarily the one developed in Anderson and later
revised in Burdick. It, however, differs in two significant respects. First, it does not require the court
to weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury" against the "precise interests put
forward by the State .. " Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). This suggested
approach only requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff can show an actual, not simply
possible or hypothetical, impact on her First Amendment rights. This avoids some of the
unpredictable outcomes that result from the use of a balancing test. Second, it does not require the
Court to determine which burdens are "severe" and which are not. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992)). As stated by Justice Thomas in his
dissent "unfortunately there is no bright line separating severe from lesser burdens." Buckley, 119 S.
Ct. 636, 649 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). If the court determines that the regulation involves
core political speech and the plaintiffs First Amendment rights have been burdened, then it should
apply strict scrutiny, if not, it should apply deferential review.
151. See generally Cofsky, supra note 5, at 390-401. This articles provides descriptions of
several lower court decisions to demonstrate the difficulty lower courts have applying the law the
Supreme Court developed in ballot access cases. For example, the author states "the Fourth Circuit
determined that the appropriate standard to examine ballot access restrictions was a 'modified'
Anderson balancing test ....[When] presented with a similar state regulation ... the Sixth Circuit
simply analogized the facts of Anderson to the instant fact pattern and cursorily noted the 'unclear'
standard of review suggested by the Supreme Court ....[Finally,] [t]he Eighth Circuit remained unable
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IV.CONCLUSION

By failing to establish a clear and consistent application of a standard of
review in ballot access cases, the Court in Buckley took a disjunctive approach
to reviewing the constitutionality of Colorado's ballot initiatives. By not first
establishing that the registration and disclosure regulations even burdened oneon-one political speech, the Court lost sight of the limits of protection encompassed in the First Amendment and, consequently, took away power from the
states to regulate the electoral process. This has only added to the uncertainty
of whether many state ballot access regulation run afoul of the First Amendment and leaves lower courts to continue sifting through inconsistent case law
for the appropriate standard of review to apply when these regulations are
challenged. Although the Court has long recognized the dangers within the
"political thicket,"'5 2 it has yet to establish a consistent way to deal with the
conflict between state and individual interests implicated by state regulation of
the electoral process. This Comment suggests a starting point.
DanielS. Young*

to 'resolve [the] ... in
consistent standards of review,' noting that '[in some cases, the Court
articulated and employed a flexible test ... yet on other occasions it suggested that all election and
voting regulations must be subjected to strict scrutiny."'
152. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
J.D. Candidate, University of Denver, 2001. I would like to thank the editors
and staff of
the Denver University Law Review for their dedication.

COMMENT
MINNESOTA V. CARTER: THE TEMPORARY GUEST'S
REDUCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided that an overnight
guest was entitled to protection from unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment.' Unresolved, however, was whether this protection
would extend to a temporary guest.2 In 1998, the Supreme Court examined this question in Minnesota v. Carter.' The Court applied the twoprong Katz' test with special emphasis on the business nature of the temporary guest's visit to conclude, "an overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not."'
This Comment examines the history of the law leading up to Carter,
provides the facts of the case, and argues that the majority improperly
applied the widely followed two-prong Katz Fourth Amendment reasonableness test. The Court refused Fourth Amendment protection to temporary guests in part because it perceived that society recognizes the overnight guest's expectation of privacy as more reasonable than the temporary guest's. This comparative analysis, however, steps over the paramount issue of whether society recognizes the temporary guest's expectation of privacy as sufficiently reasonable to warrant Fourth Amendment protection. Moreover, the Court acted shortsightedly in treating a
private residence used for occasional business transactions the same as a
traditional commercial property, despite the increasing commercial uses
of the private home. Finally, the Court ignored recent cases erasing class
distinctions for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection.
Part I of this Comment provides Carter's factual information. Part II
describes the historical development of Fourth Amendment cases leading
1. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990). Specifically, the Court held, "[the
defendant's] status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of
privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97.
The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See generally State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v.
Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998) (stating "a closer reading of Olson reveals that the Supreme Court does
not require a person to establish his ... status as either a guest or overnight guest before... [he] can
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy .....
3. 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 473 (emphasis added).
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up to Carter. Part I outlines the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Carter.Part IV critiques the Court's holding and the associated
rationale. Part V examines the outcomes of cases subsequent to Carter.
I. FACTS

Acting on information from a confidential informant, a police officer, James Thielen, walked by the window of a ground-level apartment
and observed the defendants, Carter and Johns, packaging white powder
into bags.6 Thielen stood twelve to eighteen inches away from the window and observed the defendants bagging the powder for approximately
fifteen minutes.7 The window's blinds were drawn, but a gap in the
blinds allowed Thielen to view the defendants' illicit activity.8 Thielen
contacted police headquarters to request a search warrant.9 Prior to executing the warrant, however, the two defendants left the apartment in an
identified car.'0 Police stopped the car and noticed a black pouch and
handgun on the vehicle's floor." The officers arrested Carter and Johns,
and a subsequent police search of the vehicle revealed forty-seven grams
of cocaine in plastic sandwich bags.'2
Pursuant to a warrant, police also searched the apartment. There they
discovered cocaine residue and plastic bags similar to those found in the
Cadillac." The police later learned that the two defendants were not lessees
of the apartment, but lived in Chicago and visited the apartment solely to
package the cocaine." The defendants were inside for only approximately
two and one-half hours.'5 In exchange for use of the apartment, the defendants gave the apartment's lessee a small amount of the cocaine.'6
Minnesota charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit a
controlled substance crime and aiding and abetting in a controlled substance crime." The defendants moved to suppress all evidence police

6. See id. at 471.
7. See id. at 480. The area just outside the apartment's window was "public" and frequently
used by families for walking and playing, making it easily accessible for anyone, including Officer
Thielen, to view the defendants from such a close distance. See id.
8. See id. at 471.
9. See id.
10. See id. The confidential informant had previously told Officer Thielen "that there was a
blue four-door Cadillac with Illinois license plates nearby that possibly belonged to the people in the
apartment." State v. Carter, 545 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 569 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1997), rev'd Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
11. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 471.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 471-72.
17. See id. at 472. MINN. STAT. § 152.021, subdivision 1 provides, "[a] person is guilty of
controlled substance crime in the first degree if ...on one or more occasions within a 90-day period
the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a total weight of ten grams or more containing
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obtained in the apartment and the car.'" They argued that Thielen's "initial
observation of their drug packaging activities was an unreasonable search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and. . . all evidence obtained as a
result [thereof] was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree."' 9
The Minnesota trial court held that the defendants were not entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection because they were not social guests
staying overnight, but were merely temporary, out-of-state visitors. 0 The
trial court also found Thielen's observations did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' After trial each defendant was convicted on both counts. 2
The Minnesota Court of Appeals viewed defendant Carter's claim
that he was predominantly a social guest as "inconsistent with the only
evidence concerning his stay in the apartment, which indicate[d] ... he
used it for a business purpose-to package drugs. 123 Because the court
found business was the primary purpose of Carter's visit, it ruled he did not
have standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to Thielen's search.24
The Court of Appeals also affirmed defendant Johns' conviction. 5
In a divided opinion the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed both
convictions and held that the defendants did have standing26 to claim
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine ....
" MINN. STAT.§ 152.021 (1999). The defendants were
also found to be in violation of section 609.05 of the Minnesota Statutes, which provides, "[a] person
is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime." See Carter, 119 S.
Ct. at 472 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1999)).
18. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at472.

19.

Id. See generally 3 CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 677

(2d ed. 1982). The treatise notes:
If an unreasonable search has been made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is not
merely the material seized that cannot be admitted in evidence. The government may not
use the information thus improperly gained as a means of finding proper evidence. In
what the Court has rightly called "a time-worn metaphor," the government is said to be
barred from use of "a fruit of the poisonous tree."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. See Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 472.
21. See id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees security against unreasonable searches and
seizures in "persons, houses, papers, and effects ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See Carter,119 S.Ct. at 472.
23. Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 545 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)). As support for
this proposition, the Minnesota Court of Appeals' only statement was, "[tihis [business purpose]
defeats the 'legitimate expectation of privacy' standard, which requires 'more than a subjective
expectation of not being discovered."' Carter, 545 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Rakas v, Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
24. See Carter,545 N.W.2d at 698.
25. See State v. Johns, No. C9-95-1765, 1996 WL 310305, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11,
1996), rev'd, 569 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
26. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (stating that, "[t]o establish
'standing,' [c]ourts . . . have generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or
possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises
searched"), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). See generally Donald L.
Doernberg, The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

Fourth Amendment protection because they had a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment."27 The state court further held Thielen's
observations constituted a search of the apartment under the Fourth
Amendment and that the search was unreasonable.28
II. BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ... ,29 Courts enforce this right by excluding from
trial evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 ° However,
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies the general
principle that a party will not be heard to claim a constitutional protection
unless he "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection

FourthAmendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 263 (1983) (providing historical overview on the law of
standing under the Fourth Amendment).
27. State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d. 169, 176 (Minn. 1997) rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct.
469 (1998); Johns, 569 N.W.2d at 181. The court supported this determination with facts showing
all three persons worked together to package the cocaine. The defendants remained inside for two
and one-half hours, and one defendant was even wearing bedroom slippers inside the apartment. See
Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 175. In addition, the court stated, "society does recognize as valuable the
right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct
a common task, be it legal or illegal activity." Id. at 176.
28. See id. at 176-79. In applying "curtilage" and "public vantage point" concepts to Officer
Thielen's search techniques, the court noted:
Several courts have agreed ... it is a search whenever police take extraordinary measures
to enable themselves to view the inside of a private structure .... [Elven if we concluded
...the area just outside the . . .apartment window was a common area, the fact that
Thielen left the sidewalk, walked across the grass, climbed over the bushes, placed his
face within 12 to 18 inches of the window and peered through a small gap between the
blinds makes it clear ... he took extraordinary measures to enable himself to view the
inside of a private dwelling.
Id. at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Matthew Frank, A Guest's Legitimate Expectation
of Privacy: A Case Analysis of Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990); 14 HAMLINE L. REV.
231, 240-46 (1990) (providing an overview of cases leading up to Minnesota v. Olson).
30. Cf McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943) (stating, "a conviction in
the.., courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained by disregard of liberties deemed
fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand"). Excluding such evidence also deters improper
police procedure. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). In Mapp, the court stated, "[because]
the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is . . .constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.... to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
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is given."3 Therefore, it must be understood that Fourth Amendment protection applies neither to every person, nor every search."
Jones v. United States33 was one of the first modem cases to consider the relevant question of whether a person was in the class afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.3" The defendant in Jones was using a
friend's apartment when federal narcotics officers, who were executing a
search warrant, entered the apartment and found illegal drugs. 5 The defendant was not the owner, nor the lessee of the apartment, but did have
the householder's permission to be there. 6 Defendant had a key, some
37
clothes inside the apartment, and had slept there for "maybe a night.
By virtue of the householder's consent to the defendant's presence
in the apartment, the Supreme Court concluded the defendant was "legitimately on the premises."38 The Court rejected the government's argument that the defendant's association with the area searched was too
tenuous to confer standing because he was merely an invitee or guest.39
"Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and
'guest,' . . . ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards."' Jones thus established
that persons legitimately on the premises possessed Fourth Amendment

31. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907). See also Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 260 (1960) (emphasizing that Rule 41(e) provides statutory direction in
"governing the suppression of evidence acquired in violation of the conditions validating a search"),
overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Frank, supra note 29, at 240
(emphasizing that the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is "only
available to those.., able to claim the protection of the ... amendment"). See generally FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(e).
32. See generally Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998) (concluding it was
unnecessary to determine whether a search occurred because the defendants did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy to object to any search of the area entered); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
335-36 (1990) (allowing police to conduct a warrantless search known as a protective sweep if they
have a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that.another person who might be
dangerous to officers may be present in the area); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03
(1974) (permitting a warrantless search of the items in an accused's possession, even if the search is
delayed until the accused arrives at the place of detention).
33. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruledby United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
34. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 261.
35. See id. at 258-59.
36. See id. at 259.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 265. Specifically, the court stated, "anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be
used against him." Id. at 267.
39. See id. at 265-66. The government's prosecutors wanted to, draw distinctions between
classes, deeming those such as "guests" and "invitees" with only "use" of the premises as having too
"tenuous" an interest. Id. at 265. Further, although the government acknowledged temporary guests
do sometimes have "some measure of control," it argued that the defendant's short-term dominion of
the apartment should not be afforded the same protection as a person domiciled there. Id.
40. Id. at 266. See Frank, supra note 29, at 241 (utilizing the same rationale to illustrate the
Supreme court's refusal to use class distinctions based on property law concepts to establish Fourth
Amendment standing).
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standing." Jones erased the line of Fourth Amendment protection drawn
between the householder of a premises and the non-owner occupant or
visitor.42 Class distinctions were no longer relevant so long as the claimant of Fourth Amendment protection was legitimately connected to the
invaded area.43
Jones' "legitimately on the premises" inquiry was replaced, however, when the Supreme Court focused on the individual's expectation of
privacy in the landmark case, Katz v. United States." In Katz, Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion proposed a widely followed two-prong reasonableness test to determine whether a person is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. 5 "[F]irst ...a person [must] have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that . .. expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'""
A determination of the standard of reasonableness requires "balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." 7
Although curtilage and plain view issues surfaced in Katz,"5 the
Court emphasized that deciding whether a given area was "constitutionally protected" deflected attention from the real issue-whether the person claiming Fourth Amendment protection had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the area searched. 9 Katz produced the now famous passage
41. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266. Other case law suggested a person with a possessory interest in
the premises searched or the items seized also had Fourth Amendment standing. See, e.g., Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (holding, "[i]f [the defendant] can establish facts showing [a
possessory or proprietary] interest, he will have demonstrated a basis for standing to attack the
search ....
").
42. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266.
43. See id. at 267.
44. 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
45. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (determining the reasonableness of the
warrantless seizure of a suspected drug-dealer's luggage for the purpose of detecting and
apprehending drug-traffickers).
48. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. In Katz, FBI agents placed electronic eavesdropping equipment
on the outside of a public telephone booth from which the defendant, a bookmaker, illegally
conducted his business. See id. See also Joel Schwartz, The Inadvertence Requirement of the Plain
View Doctrine in Horton v. California: A Foreseeable End?, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 225, 225-27 (1992)
(relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-69 (1971), "[t]he plain view doctrine
provides that the warrantless seizure of evidence [in plain view of] ... law enforcement officers does
not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officers have a prior justification for the intrusion,
the article was immediatelyapparent as evidence of a crime, and the discovery of the evidence was
inadvertent").
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. See also Frank, supra note 29, at 242 (noticing a trend in the
conclusions of the Supreme Court with respect to search and seizure cases; i.e., the Court began to
focus increasingly on whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from government
intrusion as opposed to whether Fourth Amendment protection depended upon a property right or a
connection to the premises).
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by Justice Stewart, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."' This resulted in a narrowing of the protections afforded in
Jones;5 1 a person legitimately on the premises would not receive protection unless his expectation of privacy was deemed reasonable."
The Supreme Court expressly repudiated Jones' "legitimately on the
premises" test in Rakas v. Illinois.5 1 In Rakas, police stopped a car in
which the defendants were passengers.' The police suspected it was the
getaway car in a recent robbery." Officers searched the interior of the car
and found a sawed-off rifle and a box of shells.56 Before trial, the defendants moved to suppress evidence of the seized rifle and shells. The trial
court denied the defendants' motion because neither the car, the shells, nor
the rifle belonged to them, and the defendants were eventually convicted. 8
The defendants advanced a "target" theory in their appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.59 They asserted "that any criminal defendant at whom a search was 'directed' would have standing to contest the
legality of that search .... ."' Alternatively, defendants argued they were
"legitimately on the premises" at the time of the search and, therefore
had standing to object.' The Court rejected the target theory on the
premise that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and may not
be asserted vicariously by those whose own Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated. 2 In addressing the "legitimately on the premises" argument, the Court stated it was "too broad a gauge for measurement of

50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
51. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (establishing "that anyone
legitimately on the premises ... may challenge [the] legality [of a search] "), overruled by United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
52. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court reiterated this
analysis in another case, holding the "capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion." Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). See also Frank, supra note 29, at 242.
53. 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978).
54. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 131. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, concluding, "without a proprietary or
other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the
legality of the search of the vehicle. Id.
59. See id. at 132-33. "Target standing would afford a defendant standing when he is the
subject of the investigation producing the search, notwithstanding that his property was not invaded
by the search, that he was not present when the search took place, and that his property was not
seized." Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Ninth Circuit Joint Venture Standing: A Joint Possessory
Interest is Sufficient to Establish FourthAmendment Standing, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 311, 321 (1992).
60. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 133-34.
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Fourth Amendment rights."63 The Court articulated that a defendant could
attempt to exclude evidence derived from a search or seizure only if she
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' This legitimate expectation of privacy test remains valid for determining
whether a person can object to alleged Fourth Amendment violations and
seek its exclusionary redress."
The class of persons considered to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy was subsequently expanded in O'Connorv. Ortega' and Minnesota v. Olson.' In O'Connor, officials of a public hospital suspected
work-related wrongdoing by Ortega, an employee-physician.68 As part of
an investigation, hospital officials searched the physician's office and
seized personal items as well as articles belonging to the state.' The
Court found Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk
and file cabinets as he had been the sole occupant of the office for seventeen years, kept personal items in the desk and cabinets, and was not in
violation of any hospital regulation in doing so.7°
In Minnesota v. Olson, the Court decided that overnight guests have
a legitimate expectation of privacy.7' The defendant in Olson was a suspect in the fatal shooting of a gas station manager." Upon receiving tips
on the defendant's whereabouts the morning after the murder, police
investigated a duplex where the defendant was thought to be staying.73
The owners of the duplex were not present at the time of the investigation.74 Without seeking permission, police entered the duplex and discovered the defendant hiding in a closet.7" Within an hour of his arrest, the
defendant made an incriminating statement at police headquarters. 6
The United States Supreme Court held for the defendant and again
decided that the test to determine if a person has standing to challenge an
entr5 is whether that person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
63. Id. at 142. The Court added, "applied literally, this... permit[s] ... visitor[s] who ha[ve]
never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of another's house to object to a ...basement
[search] if the visitor[s] happened to be in the... [house's] kitchen... at the time of the search." lad
64. See id. at 148 (emphasis added).
65. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (reaffirming that "a defendant's
'standing' to contest an allegedly illegal search in favor of an inquiry... [focuses on whether] he or
she possessed a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the area searched").
66. 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
67. 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990).
68. See O'Connor,480 U.S. at 712.
69. See id. at 713-14. The seizure of the desk items prompted Ortega to bring suit, alleging the
search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 714.
.70. See id. at 718-19.
71. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 96.
72. See id. at 93.
73. See id. at 93-94.
74. See id. at 94.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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entered area." Although the discussion never addressed temporary
guests, it suggested they would receive the same privilege." Minnesota v.
Cartererejected this suggestion.'
Also relevant to the analysis of Carter, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to commercial premises as well as private
residences.8 ' In New York v. Burger,s" however, the Court emphasized
that "[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different
from, nd... less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home."

77. See id. at 99 (emphasis added). The state in Olson, in distinguishing its facts from those in
Jones, pointed out that the Olson defendant was never left alone in the duplex or provided a key with
which he could come and go and admit or exclude others. See id. at 98. The Court, however,
dismissed the state's dominion argument, supporting its decision with a lengthy discussion about
society's views on guest privacy:
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with
the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the
permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his
guest .... The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of
their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that
they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to
determine who may or may not enter the household.
Id. at 99.
The Olson Court added that an individual has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the invaded
place if he has a subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. See id. at 96-97; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (establishing the two-prong legitimate expectation of privacy test). This test, however,
should not be confused with the "legitimately on the premises" test applied in Jones. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 259-67 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
The Jones test was much broader and focused almost exclusively on the defendant's connection to
the premises, i.e., whether he had dominion of the place, possession of a key, consent of the
householder, etc. See id.
78.

See 5 WAYNE

R.

LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE

ON THE FOURTH

11.3(b), at 137 (3d ed. 1996) (stating "[iut is fair to say that the Olson decision lends
considerable support to the claim that shorter-term guests also have standing").
79. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
80. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473 (holding that the defendants, who were in another person's
apartment for a short time solely for the purpose of packaging cocaine, had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the apartment).
81. See generally, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (stating "the basic component of a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment-that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant
procedure-is applicable ... to business as well as to residential premises"); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (noting "[the Fourth Amendment] is general and forbids
every search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as
the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the premises where the search was made and the papers
taken").
82. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
83. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700. The defendant in Burger owned a junkyard and his business
consisted of dismantling automobiles and selling their parts. See id. at 693. Without notice, police
officers conducted an inspection pursuant to a New York vehicle and traffic statute. See id at 69394. After the inspection, the officers determined the defendant possessed stolen vehicles and parts.
See id. at 695. On appeal to suppress the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the denial of
defendant's motion was appropriate, emphasizing the expectation of privacy on commercial
AMENDMENT §
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III. MINNESOTA V. CARTER

A. Supreme CourtDecision

1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion first dismissed the Minnesota
courts' analysis of whether the defendants had a legitimate expectation of
privacy under the rubric of the standing doctrine. ' The Supreme Court
reminded the litigants that determining whether a defendant is able to
show a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is "more properly
placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than
within that of standing."85 Thus, the Court implied the immediate issue
was whether the defendants could satisfy the two-prong reasonableness
test from Katz. 6
The Court did not analyze whether the search itself was valid, instead, it decided the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the apartment." Therefore, the Court's analysis of the defendants' classification as temporary social guests was driven by Katz's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test and the Court's interpretation of
the language in the Fourth Amendment.88

premises is less than a similar expectation in the individual's home, especially where, as here, the
business owner is working in a highly regulated industry. See id. at 700-02.
84. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472-73. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
in the Court's opinion. See id. at 471. A concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas was filed by
Justice Scalia. See id. at 474. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 478. Justice
Breyer did not join in the Court's opinion, but did concur in judgment. See id. at 480. Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented. See id. at 481.
85. See id. at 472 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). This rationale
originated in Rakas:
[T]he question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and
seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect. We are under no illusion that by dispensing with the rubric of
standing used in Jones we have rendered any simpler the determination of whether the
proponent of a motion to suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a search and
seizure. But by frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly
under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of
standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
86. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472. This inference was made from the Court's statement, "to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has
an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable . . .by
reference to ...understandings . .. recognized and permitted by society." Id. See generally Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the now wellrecognized and followed two-prong reasonableness test).
87. See Carter,119 S.Ct. at474.
88. Id. at 472-73. Recall the language of the Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ...
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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After laying the historical framework provided by Rakas,"9 the Court
reiterated, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"; however, the extent to which people are protected may depend on their location.' Given that the defendants were temporary guests at the apartment
building, analysis of Olson was essential.' The Court reprinted its
lengthy discussion from Olson about society's view on social guests and
reinforced Rakas' repudiation of the notion that "anyone legitimately on
the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality."92 In light
of these two cases, the Court concluded that "an overnight guest in a
home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who
is merely present with the consent of the householder may not."9
The Court's rationale was partially based on the fact that defendants
"were essentially present for a business transaction... and were only in
the home a matter of hours."' The Court added, as opposed to the overnight guest relationship in Olson, nothing in Carter indicated a "degree
of acceptance into the household."95 Although the apartment was a

dwelling for the lessee, the Court decided it was simply a place to do
business for the defendants. To justify the different and less favorable
treatment received in commercial premises as opposed to private residences, the Court relied on Burger." In discounting that the business
activity in this case took place inside "a home," the Court noted that it
was not "[the defendants'] home." The Court also distinguished the
circumstances in Carter from those in O'Connor, finding "there is no
indication that [defendants] in this case had nearly as significant a connection to [lessee's] apartment as the worker in O'Connor.. ..""
Finally, the Court regarded the defendants in Carter as falling between the categories of the overnight guest, who may claim Fourth
Amendment protection, and one merely on the premises with consent,
who may not." In this case, the Court decided the defendants' situation
more closely resembled the latter because of the purely commercial nature of the transaction, "the relatively short period of time [spent] on the
premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [defendants]

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
occupied
materials
100.

Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 472 (referring to Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40).
Id. at 473 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
See id. at 473-74 (discussing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
Id. at 473 (quoting and repudiating Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 474.
See id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987)).
Id.
Id. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (reasoning that the defendant
the office for seventeen years and kept materials in the office that included personal
with no connection to the hospital).
See Carter,119 S.Ct. at 474.
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and the householder ....1,01
For these reasons, the Court concluded that
the defendants' expectation of privacy in the apartment was not reasonable, and therefore, it did not decide whether Thielen's observations constituted a search. 0 2
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia expressed his view that case law devoted too little attention to the text and understanding of the Fourth Amendment." Specifically, Scalia pointed to the ambiguity of the "their... houses" phrase
in the Fourth Amendment text.'"0 He suggested the phrase could mean
Fourth Amendment protection extends to each person only in his own
house; or, each person would be protected even when visiting the house
of another. 5 With regard to Carter, however, Scalia argued it was not
plausible to give "their . . . houses" an expansive interpretation without
giving the same interpretation to "persons, papers, and effects."'"0 To do
this, however, would absurdly "give me a constitutional right not to have
your person unreasonably searched."'" Instead, Scalia asserted, "[t]he
obvious meaning of the provision is... each person has the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person,
house, papers, and effects."'"° Therefore, because the Carter defendants
used the apartment solely to package cocaine, they could not successfully
assert that they were searched in "their ...hous[e]" under any plausible
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."0
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion focused heavily on the inability of a person to claim Fourth Amendment protection based on a
legitimate expectation of privacy when his connection to the dwelling101. Id.
102. See id. The Cartercourt dodged a bullet in this case; Fourth Amendment search issues are
often vague and controversial. Determining whether a search has occurred often turns on curtilage
and plain view issues. The plain view doctrine holds that "if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in
a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately,"
without first obtaining a search warrant. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). "At common
law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."' Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1985) (citing
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Curtilage is also defined as "any land or building
immediately adjacent to a dwelling .. " BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 474. (Scalia, J., concurring) "I write separately to express my
view that case law-like the submissions of the parties in this case-gives short shrift to the text of
the Fourth Amendment, and to the well and long understood meaning of that text." Id.
104. Id. "Itmust be acknowledged that the phrase 'their ... houses' in this provision is, in
isolation, ambiguous." Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 474-75 (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
107. Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 477.
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place is insubstantial.' ° Kennedy, like the majority, emphasized that
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and cannot be vicariously bestowed upon a third party with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched."' Kennedy acknowledged that as a general
rule social guests should expect privacy in their host's home."'2 In his
view, however, the defendants "established nothing more than a fleeting
and insubstantial connection with [the] home.""' 3
4. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, strayed from the reasonable expectation of privacy route taken by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy. Instead, he focused entirely on whether Officer Thielen's observations constituted a Fourth Amendment search."'4 Breyer agreed with
Justice Ginsburg's belief that the defendants deserved Fourth Amendment protection.' In Breyer's view, however, the officer's observation
did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights."6 Breyer emphasized that the search was permissible because the officer's observations were made from a public vantage point."7 With regard to the steps
taken by the defendants to create a reasonable expectation of privacy
within the apartment, Breyer added, "[t]he precautions.., the apartment
dwellers took to maintain their privacy would have failed in respect to an
ordinary passerby standing in that place.""' 8 Finally, Breyer found it insignificant that Officer Thielen made his observations from 12 to 18
110. See id. at 478-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 479 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981)); see also Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978).
112. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 479 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Note that
Kennedy's opinion as to a guest's expectation does not appear to comport with the majority, which
held, "an overnight guest... may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is
present with the consent of the householder may not." Id. at 473.
113. Id.at479.
114. See id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
115. Seeid. at480-81.
116. Id. at 480. "[The defendant] ... raises.. . [the] question whether... Thielen's observation
made 'from a public area outside the curtilage of the residence' violated [defendants'] Fourth
Amendment rights. In my view, it did not." Id. (citation omitted).
117. See id. In support of his position, Breyer noted, "[T]he apartment . . . was a garden
apartment... partly below ground level;... families frequently used the grassy area just outside the
apartment's window for walking or for playing; ... members of the public also used the area.., to
store bicycles .....
Id.
118. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Panetti, 547 N.E.2d 46, 48 (1989)
It is one thing to assert that an occupant cannot claim a justified expectation of privacy as
to activities within his dwelling when that conduct is carried out in such a manner as to
be readily seen or heard by neighbors or by the passing public. It is quite another to
declare that citizens cannot 'feel safe in leaving their windows uncurtained to the skies'
or in otherwise failing to seal off each and every aperture in their dwellings ....
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.3(c), at 392 (2d ed. 1987)).
Viewed from this perspective, the Carter defendants were subjected to a Fourth
Amendment search. To argue otherwise would be to require homedwellers to seal every crack and
crevice to validly assert that a police search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
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inches away by looking through gaps in the drawn blinds. "9 Instead, he
placed the burden of maintaining seclusion from the police upon the
apartment's occupants.' 20
5. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Writing a dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, Justice
Ginsburg stated that the majority's decision "undermines not only the
security of short-term guests, but also the security of the home resident
herself."'21 Ginsburg's position was that when householders personally
invite guests into their homes to engage in common endeavors, regardless of purpose, the guests should share their hosts' protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.'22 Ginsburg emphasized she was not
taking a position that would allow a casual visitor who has not been permitted to visit a portion of her host's house to object to a search of that
unseen part of the house.'23 She was concerned, however, that a householder who chooses "to share her home and company" with selected
people would be adversely affected.'2" "People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes in part because they have the prerogative
to exclude others.' 2 . "One reason we protect the legal right to exclude
others is to empower the owner to choose to share his home or other
property with his intimates."'2 6 Ginsburg added that under the majority
opinion, "[a] homedweller places her own privacy at risk" when she opens

119.

See Carter,119 S. Ct. at 481-82.
120. See id. at 481. But see State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1997) (concluding the
investigating officer took extraordinary measures to make his observations by climbing over some
bushes located in front of the apartment's window, crouching down, and placing his face within
eighteen inches of the window). The court added, "[t]he fundamental question ... is whether the
looking intruded upon the justified expectation of privacy of the occupant. This . . . requires
consideration of two factors: (1) the location of the officer at the time of the viewing; and (2) the
precise manner in which the view was achieved." Id. This suggests a Fourth Amendment search
occurred. Justice Breyer, though factually correct in concluding that Thielen watched the defendants
from a public vantage point, failed to consider the extraordinary measures the officer took to make
his observations. With the exception of peeping toms, virtually no one peers through another's
apartment window from twelve to eighteen inches away through gaps in drawn blinds for fifteen
minutes at a time.
121. Carter,119 S. Ct. at 481. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. See id.
123. See id. Ginsburg noted she "would not reach classroom hypotheticals like the milkman or
pizza deliverer," but rather only the case of the homeowner who chooses to share the privacy of her
home and company with a guest. Id. at 481-82.
124. Id. at 482. Specifically, Ginsburg stated, "[als I see it, people are not genuinely 'secure in
their.., houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures' if their invitations to others increase
the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their dwelling places." Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships,75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1618 (1987)).
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her home to others, uncertain whether the duration of their stay, their purpose, and their 'acceptance into the household' will earn protection.' 27
Ginsburg probed the court's logic in *Olson to argue that shorterterm guests also merited Fourth Amendment protection.'" Olson stated,
"[w]e will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in our lives.
From either perspective, we think . . . society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home."' 29 Ginsburg used this rationale in conjunction with Katz to argue "when a
homeowner chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company
with a short-term guest," the two-prong reasonableness requirement has
been satisfied.'30 Ginsburg also pointed out that the criminality of the
defendants' activities did not discard their right to Fourth Amendment
protection.'3 ' Therefore, "the illegality of host-guest conduct . . . would
not alter the [reasonableness] analysis" of the instant case. "2 Finally,
Ginsburg recognized the need to consider Fourth Amendment claims on a
case-by-case basis and that the Court's decision veered sharply from the path
3
marked in Katz, which she considered essential to her view of Carter."
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Overnight v. Temporary Guest
Search and seizure cases have consistently emphasized, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."'" 4 In light of Carter, however,
the Supreme Court has limited Fourth Amendment protection only to
those people in the proper "places" for the requisite amount of "time."
Recognizing that limitations on the Fourth Amendment are necessary
and prevent, among other things, frivolous claims for protection, the
127. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
128. See id.
129. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). Ginsburg built on this rationale, stating
"[v]isiting the home of a friend, relative, or business associate, whatever the time of day, 'serves
functions recognized as valuable by society."' Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 482 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at
98).
130. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 482-83 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). "Both host and guest 'have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;' that 'expectation' [is] one [our] society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable."' Id. at 483 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967)).
131. See id. at 483; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) (emphasizing
"a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has
been committed and ... probable cause [exists to suggest] incriminating evidence will be found
within"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961) (suppressing evidence of
gambling offenses obtained by police who attached an electronic device to the heating duct of
defendant's house, turning the duct into a makeshift microphone running throughout the entire
house).
132. Carter,119 S. Ct. at 483 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
133. Id. at 483-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, "I do not agree that we have a more
reasonable expectation of privacy. .. [in] a public telephone booth ... than when we actually enter
[another's] premises to engage in a common endeavor").
134. Id. at 473 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
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majority stumbles over the rudimentary foundation of the Amendment.
By focusing heavily on the duration of a guest's stay, the Court ignored
the controlling question regarding the reasonableness of the temporary
guest's expectation of privacy in the residence searched-whether society today is willing to recognize the temporary guest's expectation as
reasonable. Furthermore, the Court devoted too little attention to the nature and legitimacy of the guest's activity as relative to him, his host, and
society during his stay.
The Court improperly applied Justice Harlan's two-factor reasonableness test in making its determination.'35 The first element, subjective
expectation of privacy, is clearly present. The defendants were inside the
apartment of an acquaintance with the door shut and the blinds drawn.'36
Moreover, they paid for the right to conduct their activity in what they
believed to be a private setting by giving part of their product to the lessee in exchange for use of her apartment.'37 The Court's analysis faltered,
however, on the more difficult task of determining whether the second
prong of the test was met; i.e., whether society was prepared to recognize
the defendants' expectation as reasonable. In so doing, the Court distinguished between the overnight guest and the temporary visitor. It supported this position by engaging in a lengthy discussion about society's
views on the overnight stay and emphasizing our vulnerability when we
are asleep.'38
While our personal safety is certainly vulnerable when we sleep, this
rationale simply supports the belief that an expectation of privacy is reasonable for an overnight guest. It is not dispositive on the issue of
whether society is prepared to recognize the same standard for a temporary guest. Indeed, assume the defendants and lessee in Carterconsumed
some of their product, became tired, and fell asleep until the next morning. In light of Olson, the Carter defendants would receive Fourth
Amendment protection, merely because they became intoxicated to the
point where they stayed the night. Furthermore, a suspected drug dealer's
expectation of privacy in the home of another surely cannot be viewed as
less reasonable than the defendant's expectation in Olson.' 9

135. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting "there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable').
136. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.
Ct. 469 (1998).
137. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 471-72. Recall in exchange for use of the apartment, defendants
gave the lessee one-eighth of an ounce of the cocaine. See id.
138. See id. "It is for this reason [our vulnerability] that, although we may spend all day in
public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep,
whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend." Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
99 (1990)).
139. See generally Olson, 495 U.S. at 93-94 (recalling the defendant was a murder suspect who
stayed overnight at a duplex to avoid police).
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The Court's perception that society believes the overnight guest has
a greater expectation of privacy than the temporary guest was one basis
for its holding.'" This, however, presumes that society considers the nature of the activities occurring during the temporary guest's stay as less
important than those occurring during the overnight guest's stay. Assuming the priority of the foregoing is true, such analysis still does not
answer the critical question-whether society deems the privacy expectation of the temporary guest as reasonable. The Court merely declares
that society believes the overnight guest's privacy should be protected
from governmental intrusion."' That the temporary guest's expectation of
privacy is therefore generally illegitimate is unexplained and illogical.' 2
The Court could only speculate on whether society views the overnight
guest's expectation of privacy as more reasonable than the temporary
guest's. Even so, the speculation or true answer to that question is irrelevant.
Justice Ginsburg's suggestion that a case-by-case review is better
suited to determine society's acceptance or rejection of privacy expectations is correct because the nature of the temporary guest's activities
would be considered.' 4 As Ginsburg noted, the Court has drawn a "mechanical" line between the overnight and temporary guest.'" Of course,
the nature of the stay in Carter conferred little benefit on society, but
neither did the protected overnight stay in Olson.' 5 Nor will all two-andone-half hour guests engage in Carter-likeactivities; some will be dinner
guests; some will be neighbors; others will be relatives. The point being,
many temporary guests will engage in activities just as, or more reasonable and valuable to society as the overnight guest, yet these guests may
not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court did place some credence on its belief that the defendants
possessed neither a relationship with the householder, "[n]or was there
anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a
degree of acceptance into the household.'"" Recall in Jones, however,
that the Court rejected arcane distinctions between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, noting that such distinctions "ought not to be deter-

140. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473. "To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the every day expectations of privacy that we all
share." Id. (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
141. See id.
142. See id. With little explanation distinguishing the overnight and temporary guest, the Court
plainly held "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but
one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." Id.
143. See id. at 483 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Olson, 495 U.S. at 93-94 (emphasis added). Recall the defendant in Olson was suspected
of murder. See id. at 93.
146. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473.
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minative in fashioning . . . constitutional safeguards."' 47 This is significant because if courts do not distinguish between classes in determining
who is afforded Fourth Amendment protection, then the need for a degree of acceptance by the householder is unnecessary. The more important consideration would be whether the person had the householder's
permission to be there. Thus, Carter'semphasis on defendants' relationship to the householder and the degree of acceptance extended to them is
not consistent with valid case law. Finally, the Court distinguished Carter from O'Connor on the grounds that the Carter defendants did not
have a significant connection to the premises.' 8 However, guests likely
anticipate a greater degree of privacy in the home of a host than at public
or commercial place where members of the general public are typically
free to come and go without permission.' 9
B. The Business-TransactionAspect
The Court classified the defendants' activity as a businesstransaction and relied on Burger to reinforce that an expectation of privacy on a "commercial premise" is less than a similar expectation in a
home.'5° An apartment or home is just that, however, and not a traditional
"commercial premise." Office buildings, restaurants, and department
stores are better examples of true commercial premises because their sole
function is to conduct business and earn profits. Even if the Court's rationale was, a home is "converted" to a commercial premise upon the
commencement of a business activity, it cannot be said it is no longer a
home.
In the century-old case of Boyd v. United States,'5' the Court stated,
"[tihe Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon
'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."" 52 Today is a
time where the interrelationship between the home and business is significant. The explosion of global technology allows for many people to
conduct their business affairs from home. Because a person engages in
business transactions from his home does not mean he does not use the
home for other intimate activities. The internet stock-trader, for example,

147. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). While the "automatic standing" holding from Jones was overruled in
Salvucci, the Jones Court's view on class distinctions remains valid. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 135-36 (1978); see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 63032 (1959) (rejecting class distinctions as inappropriate to law of maritime torts).
148. See Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 474.
149. See id. at 474 (distinguishing from O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711-19 (1987),
where a worker maintained the same office at a public health center for seventeen years and was
granted Fourth Amendment protection).
150. Id. at 474 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,700(1987)).
151. 116 U.S. 646 (1886).
152. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Boyd,
116 U.S. at 630 (1886)).
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still cooks, uses the bathroom, sleeps, talks on the telephone, watches
television, eats dinner, and takes care of his family in his home. Therefore, the Court's broad stance that commercial premises are afforded less
protection than residential areas for Fourth Amendment purposes lacked
caution and insight in evaluating the increasing uses of the private home.
Finally, Ginsburg's logic was on point in reasoning that the restriction of the temporary guest's privacy also affects the householder's privacy interest.' 3 "One of the main rights [that] attach[es] to property is the
right to share its shelter, its comfort and its privacy, with others."'" The
householder cannot be genuinely secure in his home if he is "uncertain
whether the duration of [guests'] stay, their purpose, and their 'acceptance into the household' will earn [Fourth Amendment] protection."'' 5
Even though the householder is granted a higher level of protection than
the houseguest, he cannot be free from increased governmental "peering"
and "prying."'' 6 In short, there is no way to restrict the temporary guest's
expectation of privacy without also infringing upon the privacy of the
householder.
V. REACTION TO CARTER BY LOWER COURTS
Cases subsequent to Carter have consistently referred to it as the
most recent authority reaffirming the expectation of privacy test established in Katz.' 5 Carter's failure, however, to clearly delineate what circumstances are required for a temporary guest to sometimes, if ever,
receive Fourth Amendment protection, has allowed courts to take opposite analytical approaches to cases of a similar nature.' Not surprisingly,
therefore, the results of such cases, i.e., whether evidence obtained
should be suppressed at trial, have been conflicting.

153. See id. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Ginsburg added, "[a]
homedweller places her own privacy at risk . . . when she opens her home to others, uncertain
whether the [nature] of their stay ... will earn [Fourth Amendment] protection. Id.
154. Caner, 119 S. Ct. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
155. Carter,119 S. Ct. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (endorsing Ginsburg's view that "people are not genuinely 'secure in their... houses.
against unreasonable searches and seizures' . . . if their invitations to others increase the risk of
unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their dwelling places") (citations omitted;
alterations in original).
157. See United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687 (1 lth Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 168
F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999); Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 180-81 (D.C. Cir.
1999); United States v. Macias-Treviso, 42 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1211 (D. N.M. 1999); United States v.
Seyfried, No. 98-CV-830-FB, 1999 WL 14681, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999).
158. Carter makes some distinction between the temporary and overnight guest, holding that:
"an overnight guest ... may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not." Carter,119 S. Ct. at 473. The Court, however,
raised the question whether in some instances temporary guests would be afforded protection by also
focusing on the defendants' short stay at the premises, the lack of a previous relationship, i.e.,
whether defendants had a legitimate 'connection' to the premises. See id. at 474.
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In United States v. Gordon,'9 police discovered drugs and ammunition in a warrantless search of a Kansas motel room.'" As in Carter,the
facts of Gordon established that the defendant had been in the motel
room for the purpose of "conducting business" only for a few hours prior
to the arrest.' 6 ' The court first confirmed that an individual may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room.'62 Relying on Carter,
the court determined that the defendant's status was akin to that of a person "simply permitted on the premises" for business purposes (distributing illegal drugs) rather than that of an "overnight guest."'' 3 The court
further concluded that the defendant's possession of the room key was
insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy."
In New Mexico, a federal district court also narrowly applied Carter
in the case of United States v. Macias-Treviso.' The defendant in Macias-Treviso was arrested for drug trafficking after a warrantless police
entry into a garage owned by his brother.'" The defendant moved to suppress all evidence which agents had obtained as a result of their warrantless (and thus allegedly unlawful) entry of the garage.'67 The defendant
asserted a legitimate expectation of privacy inside the garage because 1)
he had helped build his brother's house; 2) his brother had given him
permission to use the garage; 3) he had fixed cars in the garage; 4) he
had stored tools there for nearly a year; and 5) he was the only person
using a key to access the garage.'68
In light of Carter,the Macias-Treviso court rigidly concluded the
defendant was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.'69 The court
determined that although the defendant proved he had his brother's permission to work on cars in the garage, he had not shown he had ever
159. 168 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999).
160. See Gordon, 168 F.3d at 1224.
161. Id. at 1227. After being arrested and asked by a Detective what kind of business he was at
the motel room to conduct, the defendant responded with: "[w]ell, it's pretty obvious, isn't it." Id.
The room was registered to an acquaintance of the defendant, rather than the defendant. See id.
However, the defendant claimed because he possessed a key to the room, paid the registered room
occupant $30 to rent the room, and had clothing and toiletries in the room, he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it. See id.
162. See id. at 1226. (citing United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991)).
163. Id. (quoting Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473).
164. See id. at 1226-27.
165. 42 F. Supp.2d 1206 (D. N.M. 1999).
166. Macias-Treviso, 42 F. Supp.2d at 1210-11. An air surveillance team followed the
defendant's vehicle to the garage because a confidential informant had given police information to
link the vehicle with illicit drug activity. See id. at 1208, 1210. Upon entering the garage,
government agents observed a large amount of cash scattered around the passenger side of the car
and two cell phones in the garage. See id. at 1211. Five hours after the agents had entered the garage,
they obtained a warrant to search the garage and the defendant's car, whereupon they found two
packages of cocaine in the trunk and a pager elsewhere in the car. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1212.
169. See id.
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been an overnight guest in the home or garage. The court used Carter
as authority for the proposition that commercial property is afforded7 a
lower level of Fourth Amendment protection than residential property. 1
Appellate courts in United States v. Chaves7 2 and Morton v. United
States7 1 took a more expansive reading of Carter. In Chaves, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents seized cocaine from a van and
broke into a warehouse without first obtaining a search warrant." The
defendants, convicted after a trial, appealed on the grounds that the warrantless search of the van and entry into the warehouse had violated their
Fourth Amendment rights; consequently, they argued that their motions
to suppress evidence of the cocaine seized should have been granted. 5
In a decision for the defendants, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[a]s
the Supreme Court has recognized ....even where a defendant does not
own the property searched, he . . .may nonetheless have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that place by virtue of his ... relationship with
that place."' 6 The court then directed its focus to Justice Kennedy's concurring Carter opinion, which stated, "almost all social guests have a
legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home ... .'" Although the defendant nei-

170. See id.
171. See id. "[A] person's expectation of privacy in commercial premises is less than an
expectation of privacy in his or her home." Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474
(1999)).
172. 169F.3d687(llthCir. 1999).
173. 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
174. See Chaves, 169 F.3d at 689. A DEA surveillance team, acting on an informant's tip,
followed a defendant to a warehouse and later to a restaurant. See id. While this defendant was in the
restaurant, a DEA agent approached the van the defendant had been driving and observed several
boxes that had not been there before. See id. DEA agents then arrested the defendant and searched
the van, seizing several boxes of cocaine, money, and keys belonging to the defendant. See id.
Shortly thereafter the agents arrested two other persons at the warehouse and broke into the
warehouse, where they observed boxes similar to those discovered in the van. See id. Relying on this
information, the agents obtained a search warrant and found about 400 kilograms of cocaine in the
boxes in the warehouse. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 690 (citing Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474). The court added, "[a]s Carter teaches, 'in
order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable
."'Id. (quoting Carter,119 S.Ct. at 472).
177. Id. (quoting Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 478-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). But see Carter, 119
S. Ct. at 474-75. The dilemma presented by Kennedy's statements is whether they conflict or
comport with the majority's opinion. The majority bluntly held that an overnight guest is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection, but the mere temporary guest is not. See id. at 474. The Carter
majority's analysis of defendants' connection to the premises may bolster Kennedy's analysis; i.e.,
in some instances, depending on their connection to the place searched, temporary guests may be
afforded protection. The majority, however, did not provide even one example of when such a
situation might arise and any reference thereto is plainly absent in its one-sentence holding. Hence,
the black-letter law of Carter seems open to interpretation. Further, note the Chaves court refers to
Justice Kennedy's concurrence for guidance on the connection to the premises issue, and not to the
majority opinion. Chaves, 169 F.3d at 690 (emphasis added).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

ther owned, nor formally rented the warehouse, the court decided his
connection to the warehouse sufficiently established a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Justice Kennedy's Carterconcurrence played an even greater role in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' review of Morton.'79 In that
case, an undercover officer bought two bags of cocaine from the defendant who then walked to a nearby house.'8" Without a warrant, the arrest
team knocked on the door of a house, immediately entered, seized the
defendant, and removed him from the home.' No one consented to the
officers' entry; nor did the prosecution argue that hot pursuit or exigent
circumstances doctrine rendered the warrantless entry lawful.' Although
the defendant did not reside at the house, the owner declared at the suppression hearing that the defendant was there by invitation and frequented the house "[1]ike family."'8 3 The court found the defendant had
achieved "a degree of acceptance into the household" and, therefore,
warranted Fourth Amendment protection." The court rejected the government's argument that "Carter [had] little to say about what showing
of a privacy interest must be made by a guest who does not enjoy the

178. See Chaves, 169 F.3d at 690. The court noted that the defendant seemed to have had the
sole key to the warehouse, and also that he kept some personal and business papers there. See id. at
691. The court found that these circumstances demonstrated the defendant was not merely a guest or
invitee, but was much closer to the kind of person who could be said to be maintaining custody and
control of the premises. See id. at 691 (comparing favorably the facts of this case with those in
Jones). Note, though, this rationale is in fundamental conflict with valid case law that previously
erased the distinction between classes.
179. See 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
180. See Morton, 734 A.2d at 179. The arrest team apprehended the defendant five minutes
after he had sold the two bags of cocaine to an undercover officer. Id. at 180.
181. See id.
182. See id. Exigent circumstances sometimes justify dispensing the search warrant
requirement for conducting a search. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (allowing
warrantless search to prevent destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (permitting warrantless searches if warrant would gravely endanger police officers' lives);
United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D. D.C. 1973) (holding the arrest of a hotel guest in
possession of narcotics invalid because there was no need for immediate action-the court
contrasted such circumstances from more dangerous ones, such as when someone possesses a
sawed-off shotgun); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972) (permitting warrantless
searches in cases of political assassinations).
183. Morton, 734 A.2d at 180.
184. Id. at 182 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 (1999)). Though the defendant
had no ownership interest in the home and lived elsewhere, at the time of his arrest he was there by
invitation and frequented the residence like a member of the family. See id. at 180, 182. The court
found this sufficient to establish a degree of acceptance into the household such that that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 182. In reaching this conclusion, the
court discounted the government's assertion that there was no evidence defendant ever spent the
night at the home, had a key to the home, was permitted to come and go at his leisure, or that he
remained in the home for any length of time when he visited. See id. at 180.
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status of overnight guest.""' In light of Kennedy's analysis, the court
considered itself free to read Carterin a less restrictive fashion.'"
The contrasting outcomes of the foregoing cases exhibit the ambiguities of Carter.Little factual support exists to suggest the defendants in
Chaves and Morton were more connected to the premises than the defendant in Macias-Treviso. The Macias-Treviso defendant, in fact, was not
simply "like family" in relation to the householder as was the situation in
Morton; he was family.' As in Chaves, the defendants in both MaciasTreviso and Gordon were in possession of keys and had personal belongings in the places searched.'88 Tit-for-tat comparisons may help to
distinguish the factual bases of each case, but the widely divergent results suggest the CarterCourt's true intentions are less than obvious.
Carteris ambiguous because the Court did not clearly specify what
roles, if any, connection to the premises, acceptance into household, duration of stay, or purpose of the visit play in deciding whether a guest is
afforded Fourth Amendment protection. Carter's majority considered
factors besides whether one was an overnight guest. Otherwise, the degree of acceptance comparison to Olson was unnecessary.'" Furthermore,
it would not have been necessary for the Court to elaborate on the commercial aspects of the defendants' stay. ' " Carter, however, provided
little direction by way of examples or other verbiage to indicate what
weight should be assigned to which factors in granting Fourth Amend-

185. Id. at 181. "The [government's] suggestion, in other words, is that Carter leaves
undisturbed... prior decisions requiring what might be termed proof of Olson-equivalent statusfacts such as possession of a key, a demonstrated pattern of coming and going, keeping clothes on
the premises, and the like--before a guest may acquire the protected privacy interest of the owner."
Id.
186. See id. The Morton court stated:
Mhe opinion of a fifth justice whose vote was decisive obviously must be taken
seriously. Justice Kennedy . . . joined the majority only because its opinion was
consistent with his "view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of
privacy." If anything, [Kennedy] appeared to be of the view that only someone
approximating the non-guest status the state Supreme Court had assigned the Carter
defendants-who had "nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection" to the
home, . . . -- could be denied Fourth Amendment protection. Nothing in Justice
Kennedy's analysis suggests he would require an Olson-equivalent showing before a
defendant may assert Fourth Amendment rights in a dwelling into which he has been
invited. Our attempt to read the "tea leaves" of how the Supreme Court would decide this
case must be guided by... [Kennedy's] recognition.
Ld.
at 181-82. (citations omitted) (quoting Carter,119 S.Ct. at 473-79).
187. Id. at 180. The witness in Morton described the frequency of defendant's visits as being
"[I]ike family." Id. The defendant in Macias-Teviso, on the other hand, was the actual brother of the
premises owner. See United States v. Macias-Teviso, 42 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1210 (D. N.M. 1999).
188. See Macias-Teviso, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1212; United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226
(10th Cir. 1999). Both Gordon and Macias-Treviso serve as legitimate examples of narrow Carter
interpretations. The Macias-Treviso defendant case presents a more questionable outcome than
Gordon, based on Macias-Treviso's more continuous connection to the premises.
189. See Carter,119 S.Ct. at473-74.
190. See id. at 474 (emphasis added).
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ment protection.' 9 ' For this reason, courts following Carter have taken
the liberty of putting their own spin on what Carterreally means, relying
heavily on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion for some semblance of
black and white guidance.'92
CONCLUSION

In Minnesota v. Carter, the Supreme Court held that a temporary
guest, merely with consent of the householder, may not claim Fourth
Amendment protection.'93 In reaching this result, the Court improperly
applied the two-prong Katz test. The Court's analysis distinguished the
differences between the overnight guest and the temporary guest. The
analysis did not, however, fully scrutinize the value society places on the
ability to invite guests into the sanctity of one's home on a short-term
basis, regardless of the visit's purpose. The Court implied that society
recognizes the overnight guest's expectation of privacy as reasonable,
and because the temporary guest's expectation is somehow less valued
by society, it was deemed unreasonable. The majority's opinion lacks
any critical inquiry as to society's current views on the nature and social
value of the temporary guest's stay. Moreover, the Court's claim that the
defendants lacked acceptance into the household ignored evolving case
law that had erased class distinctions concerning proprietary interests and
sought only to determine whether the guest was granted permission from
the householder to be on the premises.
The Court did not properly apply prior case law related to businesstransaction protection. Carter damaged the sanctity of the home by ruling that a home used for business-transactions is treated like a commercial premise for Fourth Amendment purposes, thereby reducing the
householder's protective status. This is particularly disconcerting in an
age where the relationship between the home and business is so intertwined. The Court further failed to distinguish between transactions conducted on traditional commercial premises and those transactions conducted in the private home used for business. The majority opinion never
addressed the limiting effects of its ruling on an actual householder's
privacy interest within his home that will result from the Court's refusal
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to temporary guests and business activities carried on inside that home.
Finally, the absence of a definitive ruling or even helpful illustrations outlining what exactly is required for temporary guests to receive
191. See id. at 473. This analysis should be considered separately from the author's core
position that Carterfails in its conclusion that society recognizes the overnight guest's expectation
of privacy as more reasonable than that of the temporary guest.
192. Justice Kennedy was the only member of the Court to explicitly state: "as a general rule,
social guests will have an expectation of privacy in their host's home." Id. at 479; see id. at 474-75

(interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
193.

Id. at 473.
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Fourth Amendment protection has produced a stream of divergent results
among district and circuit courts. Perhaps the ambiguities in Carter stem
from the lack of a true consensus among the different Justices. Justice
Kennedy's position is clear: temporary guests should merit Fourth
Amendment protection in most instances. The majority position, however, is less concrete. If the Carter rule continues to produce arbitrary
results among lower courts, perhaps the Supreme Court will be forced to
develop a test that delivers greater uniformity and predictability. Until
then, we can expect more inconsistent results.
Patrick J.Linden*
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COMMENT
RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMMITTEE, ETAL.: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS UNDER THE IIRIRA
INTRODUCTION

Although Congress has power to regulate immigration' and federal
court jurisdiction,2 these powers are subject to an important limitation:
Congress may not completely foreclose judicial review of constitutional
claims.' In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
("AAADC"), aliens challenged a federal immigration statute on grounds
that it effectively foreclosed meaningful review of their constitutional
challenges to deportation. Consistent with prior decisions addressing
judicial review, the United States Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA" or "Act"), and upheld the Act's prohibition against judicial review of non-final orders The Court's interpretation of the Act in
AAADC marks a significant change in immigration law, by severely restricting district court access as a means of challenging the constitutionality of non-final Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) actions.'
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of the IIRIRA, as
well as the process courts used to review deportation claims prior to enactment of the HRIRA. Part II analyzes the Court's opinion in AAADC.
Part III discusses how AAADC is consistent with other decisions addressing jurisdictional restrictions. Part III also outlines the various avenues of judicial review that remain available after AAADC. Part IV asserts that AAADC insulated the exercise of executive discretion from

I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. See id. at art. Il, § 2.
3. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)
(noting that a "serious constitutional question" would arise if an administrative statute were
construed as foreclosing judicial review of constitutional claims (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 762 (1975)); Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 n.l 13 (1984) ("[A]II
agree that Congress cannot bar all remedies for enforcing federal constitutional rights."). See also
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (explaining that Congress must be clear if it intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims). But see McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. 479, 501 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that the Supreme Court has never held
that Congress could not explicitly preclude judicial review of constitutional claims).
4. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 941 (1999).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.).
6. See Reno, 119 S. Ct. at 942-43.
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judicial review, and thereby upheld the streamlined deportation process
intended by Congress.
I. BACKGROUND

Congressional control over immigration has been described as "plenary" in nature. 7 According to the plenary powers doctrine, the judiciary
accords great deference to Congress in the regulation of immigration.
Early immigration cases reflected a strong adherence to this doctrine as
immigration issues were often determined political in nature and therefore outside of the judiciary's power.' These deferential decisions date
back to as early as 1875, when in response to public reaction to the rapid
increase in immigration, Congress began the enactment of restrictive
legislation aimed at the exclusion of certain classes of immigrants.'" Restrictive immigration legislation continued to be implemented throughout
the early part of the twentieth century." For example, the Immigration
Acts of 1917 and 1924 set forth quotas for each nationality, as well as
qualitative restrictions on the types of admissible aliens.'2 Immigration
regulation was essentially controlled by these two Acts until 1952.'
In 1952, Congress overhauled established immigration law through4
the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").1
The INA codified prior immigration laws and established the current
system governing the immigration and naturalization process.'5 Since its
7. For an interesting critique of the plenary powers doctrine, see Maureen Callahan
VanderMay, The Misunderstood Origins of the Plenary Powers Doctrine, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
147 (1999).
8.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

§

3.5, at

207 (1997).
9. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding a statute which
prohibited the return of Chinese laborers who had received certificates from the government
evidencing their right to return to the United States). "Whether a proper consideration by our
government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its
action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from
the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination." Chae Chan
Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding law
requiring aliens entitled to remain in the United States to apply for a certificate of residence). "The
question whether, and upon what conditions ... aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United
States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or the justice of the
measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the Constitution over
this subject." Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 &
50 U.S.C.); see also 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5 (1998) (discussing enactment of INA).
15. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 15 (2oded. 1992) (citing U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN
DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION, 7-12 (1980)).
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implementation, the INA has continued to serve as the basic immigration
law of the United States.16 Prior to enactment of the IIRIRA in 1996,
judicial review of most immigration actions was governed by INA Section 1105a.17 1105a stated that "the sole and exclusive procedure
for ... judicial review of all final orders of deportation" shall be set forth
in the Hobbs Act." Under the Hobbs Act, the courts of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction, 9 and judicial review was limited solely to the administrative record upon which the deportation order was based. 0
The scope of Section 1105a was first interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Chen Fan Kwok v. INS.2' In that case, a final order of deportation had been entered against the petitioner pursuant to INA Section
242(b). 22 242(b) provided for an administrative procedure that determined
the deportation of aliens. 3 Pursuant to Section 242(b), a special inquiry
officer entered an order of deportation based upon a record made before
him. An alien could request various forms of discretionary relief from
the special inquiry officer during the course of the proceedings. At the
conclusion of 242(b) proceedings, INS regulations provided that an alien
under a final order of deportation could apply to the INS district director
for a stay of deportation.
The Petitioner in Chen Fan Kwok conceded deportability in his
242(b) proceeding, and volunteered to leave the country. He did not,
however, leave and eventually a deportation order was entered against
him. He then applied to the district director for a stay of deportation.2627
His request for a stay was denied, and he appealed to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of jurisdiction." The circuit court reasoned that the petitioner was appealing the
district director's denial of his request, and not the order entered against
him in the 242(b) proceeding.29 Thus, the Third Circuit found Section
1105(a) jurisdiction inapplicable as the Section granted jurisdiction to the
courts of appeals only for claims appealing 242(b) final orders.'

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

66 Stat. 163.
8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994) (repealed 1996).
Id.§ l105a.
28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1994).
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (repealed 1996).
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 207.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (repealed 1996).
Id.
See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 207.
See id.
See id. at 208.
See id. at 210.
See id. at 212.
See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 381 F.2d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 1967).
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the INS' argument that
Section 1105a encompassed all appeals from orders directly affecting a
deportation order.' The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of Section 1105a and limited the statute's application to appeals
from determinations made pursuant to Section 242(b) proceedings, or
motions to reopen such proceedings. For denials of discretionary relief
entered by INS directors, the Court stated, "the alien's remedies would,
of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court."32
The Court's narrow reading of Section 1105a gave aliens access to
district courts to challenge various INS practices. Many of these challenges involved constitutional challenges to deportation.33 Because such
claims could not be reviewed on the basis of the administrative record,
courts found Section 1105a's proscription to be inapplicable to various
INS actions and decisions involved in the deportation process. 34 Instead,
courts exercised jurisdiction over these claims under federal question
jurisdiction, .5 .habeas corpus jurisdiction, 36 or 8 U.S.C. § 1329,"7 which
provided federal jurisdiction for all claims arising under federal immigration law."
The Court narrowly interpreted other jurisdictional provisions of the
INA as well, allowing for class action challenges to INS practices.3 9 For
example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center Inc.,4° the Court interpreted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 4 ("Reform
Act") in favor of allowing immediate judicial review for ancillary constitutional claims. 2 McNary involved a class action challenging the procedures by which the INS was administering the Special Agricultural
Workers ("SAW") program enacted by the Reform Act. The court addressed the issue of whether Section 210(e) of the INA precluded district
courts from exercising federal-question jurisdiction over constitutional
31. See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 209-10. "If, as the Immigration Service urges, [l105a]
embraces all determinations 'directly affecting the execution of a final deportation order, Congress
has selected language inapposite to its purpose." Id. at 213.
32. Id.at 210.
33. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 944 (1999)
(claims included "selective prosecution, in violation of equal protection or due process") (quoting 6
C. GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03 [2][h] (1998)).
34. See id.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
36. See id. § 2241 (1994).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994).
38. See David Cole, Jurisdictionand Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress's Control of FederalJurisdiction86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486 (1998).
39. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 490 (1991).
40. 498 U.S. 479, 486(1991) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)).
41. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections 5, 7, 8, 20, 26, 29, 31, 42
& 50 U.S.C. (1986)).
42. See McNary, 498 U.S. at 497-98.
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claims involving INS procedures.43 Section 210(e) prohibited judicial
review of a final administrative determination of "special agricultural
worker" status except in the context of an order of exclusion or deportation."
The Court held that "given the absence of clear congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction and the nature of rewas proper.45
spondents' requested relief," federal-question jurisdiction
The Court stated that it assumed Congress was aware of the "well settled
presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review
of administrative action." 46 In interpreting the statute to allow for judicial
review prior to a final deportation order, the Court reasoned that even in
the context of a deportation proceeding, a court of appeals would not
likely be in a position to provide "meaningful review" of constitutional
claims.47 Judicial review of collateral constitutional claims challenging
INS practices would be limited to the administrative record of individual
applicants, making it impossible to establish a class wide pattern of un48
constitutional practices. Moreover, a court of appeals reviewing a collateral constitutional challenge would lack the fact-finding capabilities of
a district court. 49 According to the Court, restricting review of an individual deportation order to the court of appeals was essentially a denial
of judicial review of constitutional and statutory claims. 50
By the mid-1990's, the topic of illegal immigration began to receive
significant public attention." In 1995, the House Subcommittee on ImClaims held hearings on the removal of criminal and illemigration and
12
gal aliens. According to the opening statement of Chairman Lamar

43. See id. at 483.
44. Id. at 479.
45. Id. at 483-84.
46. Id. at 496 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670
(1986)).
47. Id. at 497.
48. See id.
49. See id
50. See id. In dissent, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia stated that the "strong presumption" in
favor of judicial review of administrative action was only applicable in the absence of a clear
congressional intent to prohibit such review. The presumption was inapplicable because the statute
clearly prohibited review of INS actions outside the context of review of final deportation or
exclusion orders. According to the dissent, Congress clearly intended to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims, which it could rightfully do. The Court had never held that Congress could not
explicitly preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, and, in the instant case, the dissent
believed such a denial was proper. See id. at 502-04.
51. See Jason H. Ehrenberg, Note, A Callfor Reform of Recent Immigration Legislation, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFoRM 195, 196 (1998) (discussing how in the mid-1990's the rising cost of illegal
immigration provoked Congress to overhaul INS proceedings).
52. See Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Congress, 1, 3 (1995) ("We
also need to look at legislative reforms to streamline the removal process, to tighten the criteria for
relief from deportation, and to remove the potential for procedural abuses.") (statement of Lamar
Smith, Chairman of the Subcomm.).
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Smith, the government's loss of control over the deportation process had
caused a "crisis in deportation." " Smith argued that one reason for this
loss of control was that aliens who had resided in the United States for
only short periods of time "often file meritless claims for asylum, dilatory procedural motions, or frivolous appeals, all in an effort to extend
their stay. ' ' 4
During the election year of 1996, United States immigration policy
was the subject of heated political debate, 55 as well as the focal point of
what some have deemed "anti-immigrant sentiment. In the fall of that
year, Congress approved the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,"' which drastically changed immigration law
and the process by which aliens could obtain judicial review of deportation actions.58 According to the Conference Report accompanying the
IIRIRA, the purpose of the Act was to "improve deterrence of illegal
immigration to the United
States by... reforming exclusion and deporS
,,59
tation law and procedures.
One of the most significant changes instituted by the IRIRA was a
restriction on judicial review of challenges to the removal process. 60 Section 1252(g) states that:
[E]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
61
or execute removal orders against any alien under this act.
Members of Congress who believed that the IIRIRA removed judicial
review of many INS decisions and eliminated important safeguards

53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. See Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence,
67 U. CIN. L. REv. 185, 205-06 (1998) (reporting that during this period Congress constantlykept
calling on the Commissioner of INS to defend the naturalization process).
56. Christopher W. Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty, and Migration: A Conceptual
Framework,3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 325, 326-27 (1998).
57. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 8 & 18 U.S.C.).
58. See Cole, supra note 38, at 2486-87.
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1997).
61. Id. § 1252(g). Section 1252(b)(9), another amended provision, entitled "Exclusive
Jurisdiction" provides that:
[Jiudicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.
Id. § 1252(b)(9) (1997).
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against abuse criticized this provision.62 Nevertheless, Congress passed
the IIRIRA, and President Bill Clinton signed it into effect in September
of 1996.
II. RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DIsCRIMINATION COMMITTEE
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory

In 1987, the INS instituted deportation proceedings against eight
aliens because of their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group known for international terrorist activities.63 The INS charged all eight under the provisions of the INA, portions
of which were subsequently repealed, which allowed for the deportation
of aliens who advocate world communism.' It also charged six of the
aliens with routine status violations.' The aliens responded by filing an
ancillary action in district court challenging the constitutionality of the
INA and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney
General, the INS, and various immigration officials.' The INS dropped
the communist-advocation charges, but it retained the routine status violation charges against six of the aliens. It also charged the other two, who
were permanent residents, under another section of the INA, which allowed for the deportation of aliens who were members of essentially
terrorist organizations."
INS regional counsel William Odencrantz publicly stated that the
INS was seeking deportation of the eight individuals because of their
affiliation with the PFLP.' In response, the eight individuals amended
their complaint to include a claim that the INS was selectively enforcing
immigration laws in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.69
The district court preliminarily enjoined the INS from deporting the eight
aliens based on the aliens' showing that INS had targeted them for deportation solely on the basis of their affiliation with the PFLP and because the INS did not enforce routine status requirements against aliens

62. See 142 CONG. REC. HI 1054 (daily ed. September 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mink).
63. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct 936, 938; see also
Brief for Petitioner, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct 936 (No. 971252) (1999), available in 1998 WL 411431:
From its founding in 1967, the PFLP has proclaimed the United States to be one of its
principal enemies .... Among its many acts of international terrorism, the PFLP hijacked
five aircraft in one weekend in 1970, killed 16 United States citizens at Israel's Ld
Airport in 1972, assassinated the United States Ambassador to Lebanon in 1976, and
conducted a campaign of attacks against moderate Palestinian officials during the mid1980's, including assassinations.
Id. at *2 n.l.
64. See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 938.
65. See id. at 939.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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who were not members of terrorist groups. ° The district court also found
that the possibility of deportation, combined with the chill to the aliens'
first amendment rights, constituted irreparable harm.7'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's injunction as to six of the individuals and reversed as to two of
the PFLP members." The Ninth Circuit rejected the Attorney General's
arguments that selective enforcement claims were inappropriate in the
immigration context and that Section 1105a of the Immigration and Nationality Act precluded pre-final order review. 3 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which entered an injunction in favor of the two PFLP members.
While the Attorney General's appeal of this last decision was pending, Congress passed the IRIRA, which repealed the judicial review
scheme set forth in Section 1105a.74 The Attorney General filed motions
in the district court and the court of appeals arguing that Section 1252(g)
deprived it of jurisdiction over the action.75 The Ninth Circuit consolidated the Attorney General's appeal from the district court's denial of
that motion with the appeal already pending in the circuit and affirmed
the existence of jurisdiction under Section 1252, as well as the injunc76
tions.
The Attorney General appealed, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari." The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and ruled that IIRIRA Section 1252(g) deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction over the action.
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reviewed the facts and history of
the case in Part I of the opinion.79 In Part II, the Court addressed the issue
of whether the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the AAADC action
pursuant to Section 1252(g).' ° The Court framed the issue in the context

70.
71.
72.
1995).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
granting
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See id.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm, 70 F.3d at 1048.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed. & Supp. 1 1997).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 939.
See id.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 118 S. Ct. 2059 (1998) (order
certiorari).
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 958 (1999).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 938-39.
See 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) (1994 ed. & Supp. 11I 1997).
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of Sections 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1), two conflicting provisions concerning the effective date of the IIRIRA.8 ' Section 309(c)(1) states that the
revised removal procedures, including the judicial-review procedures of
Section 1252, will not apply to aliens already in exclusion or deportation
proceedings on the Act's effective date. 82 However, Section 306(c)(1)
states that only Section 1252(g) "shall apply without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending or future exclusion, deportation or removal
proceedings."" The Court noted that both the Government and respondents had interpreted Section 12 52 (g) as applying to nearly all deportation claims. 84
The Court found that this broad interpretation was problematic for
several reasons. If Section 1252(g) covered all deportation claims and
incorporated all the other jurisdiction-related provisions of Section 1252,
then Section 309(c)(1) would be rendered meaningless.8 5 If, on the other

hand, Section 1252(g) did not incorporate the other jurisdiction-related
provisions of Section 1252, thus giving Section 309(c)(1) meaning, Section 1252(g) would stand alone. 86, Applying the parties' broad interpretation of Section 1252(g) to this scenario would mean that judicial review
of all deportation claims would be nonexistent, even after the entry of a
final order. 87 The answers to this dilemma that were offered by the Attor88
ney General and both parties where rejected by the Court as implausible.
According to the Court, the "seeming anomaly" that prompted the
parties', as well as the Ninth Circuit's, "strained reading" of Section
12 52(g) was really a "mirage. '' 89 This "anomaly" stemmed from a mistaken belief that Section 306(c)(1) could not be read to envision a
straightforward application of the jurisdictional provisions of Section
1252 incorporated in Section 1252(g).' Furthermore, such an application
of 306(c)(1) would produce in all pending INS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those contained in the IIRIRA.9' Thus, the effective
date provisions of Section 309(c)(1) would be nullified. 2 The Court went
on to state that the belief that Section 306(c)(1) could not be applied in a
straightforward manner rested on another mistaken assumption-that
Section 1252(g) covers all deportation claims.93

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct at 938-41.
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(1) (1996).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(c) (1996).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 941.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 943.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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To the contrary, the Court ruled that 1252(g) applies to only three
separate actions that the Attorney General may take: the "decision or
action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders."' By interpreting Section 1252(g) narrowly to only three distinct
actions, the Court reconciled Section 306(c)(1) with Section 309(c)(1).95
Section 306(c)(1) could thus be applied without swallowing Section
309(c)(1). 6
In support of this narrow interpretation, the Court pointed to other
actions, such as the decision to open an investigation, which it believed
was not encompassed by 1252(g). 97 The Court further justified its interpretation by explaining that 1252(g) serves the purpose of excluding
from non-final-order review those transitional cases pending on the ef98
fective date. Moreover, 1252(g) serves the continual function of excluding from non-final-order review those collateral cases challenging
the Attorney General's choice to initiate one of the discretionary actions
specified in Section 1252(g). 99 According to the Court, 1252(g) was
aimed at reducing judicial restraint of the Attorney General's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion as well as the fragmentation and prolongation of
removal proceedings.' °
Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether the doctrine of constitutional doubt required the Court to interpret Section 1252(g) in such a
way as to permit immediate review of the selective enforcement
claims. 0 ' The AAADC had argued that constitutional doubt applied because the final review under Section 1252(a)(1) was unavailing due to a
lack of factual development, habeas relief was unavailable, and either
review would come too late to prevent the "chilling effect" upon First
Amendment rights. 10
The Court declined to apply the doctrine and noted that as a general
matter, an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to
assert the selective enforcement defense against his removal. °3 The
Court discussed the difficulty in proving such a claim. ' °4 Furthermore,
according to the Court, the interest of the deportation target in avoiding
selective treatment is less compelling than in a criminal context because
deportation is not a punishment but is sought to bring an end to an on94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
See id.
See id.
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going violation of U.S. law.'0 5 In reaching its decision, the Court noted
that it would not rule out the possibility of a case in which discrimination
was so outrageous that its reluctance to question executive discretion
would not be overcome.106
2. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
Although Justice Ginsburg agreed that Section 12 52(g) deprived the
courts of jurisdiction over the AAADC's prefinal-order suit, 10 7 she declined to prejudge the question of whether the AAADC may assert a selective enforcement objection when, and if, it sought review of a final
order of removal pursuant to Section 1252(a)(1).' °8 Part I of her concurrence addressed the question of when the Constitution requires immediate judicial intervention in federal administrative procedures.' °9 As a
framework for addressing this issue, Ginsburg discussed the cases addressing federal injunctions to stop state procedures in order to secure
constitutional rights."0 Ginsburg interpreted these decisions as suggesting that interlocutory intervention in INS proceedings would be feasible,
notwithstanding a statutory bar, if "the INS acts in bad faith, lawlessly,
or in patent violation of constitutional rights.""' This test would be more
stringent then the requirements for a preliminary injunction and would
also require a demonstration of a strong likelihood of success on the
merits.' 2 Ginsburg believed that the merits 3of the AAADC's case were
too uncertain to establish such a likelihood."
This concurrence also addressed the AAADC's argument that the inability to raise selective enforcement claims during the administrative
process made immediate judicial review necessary."1 4 Ginsburg recognized Congress' strong interest in avoiding delay of deportation proceedings and found the opportunity to raise a claim during the judicial
review phase sufficient."1 5 Moreover, she emphasized the Attorney General's position that the reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to
a district court for resolution of pertinent issues of material fact.16

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id. at 947.
Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
See id.
See id. at 947-48
See id. at 948.

111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See id. at 949.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In Part II of her concurrence, Ginsburg disagreed with the Court's
17
approach to selective enforcement claims in the immigration context.
She believed that the viability of such objections should be left an open
question." 8 Under the Court's selective prosecution doctrine, the decision
to prosecute cannot be based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race
or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of constitutional
rights." 9 According to Ginsburg, selective enforcement of immigration
laws should not be exempt from that prescription. " If the Government
sought deportation of an individual based on unconstitutional reasons,
the redress for that violation should not be lessened because deportation
was less significant or harmful than incarceration."' Ginsburg summarized her opinion by stating that if the AAADC were to demonstrate a
strong likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and a chilling effect
on current speech, and if the Court were to find the agency's actions flagrantly improper, immediate judicial intervention would be in order."'
3. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurrence focused on the conflict between the effective date provisions of 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1).'2 3 His resolution to
this anomaly differed from the majority's because he believed that the
Act contained a scrivener's error. 114 According to Stevens, the plain
meaning of Sections 1252(b)(9) and (g) was clear: the former postpones
judicial review of removal proceedings until the entry of a final order of
removal while the later deprives courts of jurisdiction over collateral
challenges to ongoing proceedings. If the word "Act" was substituted
for the word "Section" in the opening phrase of Section 1252(g), the
substitution would remove any obstacle to giving effect to the plain
meaning of Sections 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1). 2 Judicial review of collateral attacks would be effective immediately while aliens already in deportation hearings would not be affected by the Act's revised removal
procedures. 27 Stevens recognized the ambiguity in the text of Section
309 because it refers to the "case" of an alien in deportation proceedings,
which could include AAADC's collateral attack. He resolved this ambiguity by reasoning that because such a reading would be inconsistent

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See
Id.

id. at 950
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
id.
id. at 951.
id.

1999] RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITFEE 255

with Section 306, Congress intended Section 309 to aPply only to the
INS deportation proceedings that it expressly mentioned.
Despite the scrivener's error, Stevens believed that Congress' intent
for disposition of proceedings such as AAADC's was clear and the case
should be dismissed. Stevens agreed with Section III of the Court's
opinion and also agreed with Souter's explanation of why Section
1252(g) applies broadly to removal proceedings."' However, he did not
share in Souter's decision to apply the constitutional doubt doctrine.1
4. Justice Souter's Dissent.
According to Justice Souter, because the Act contains two mutually
exclusive effective date provisions that cannot be reconciled, the doctrine
of constitutional doubt should be invoked to avoid potential constitutional difficulty.I33 According to his interpretation of the statute, Section
306(c)(1) retroactively applies Section 1252(g).1 4 The problem is that
Section 309(c)(1)(A) makes Section 1252 inapplicable to an alien who is
already in deportation proceedings.135 Thus, it would appear that aliens
who did not obtain judicial review prior to the Act's enactment date and
who were in proceedings as of the Act's effective date could never obtain
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders. 1 6 The two effective date provisions appear to remove any form of judicial review of such
decisions by the Attorney37General for aliens in deportation proceedings
between those two dates.
Justice Souter believed that the issue of judicial review was further
complicated by Section 309(c)(1)(B) which provides that in the case of
aliens who are already in proceedings before the effective date, the proceedings, including judicial review thereof, will continue without regard
to Section 1252.' Consequently, he interpreted Section 309(c)(1)(B) as
preserving preexisting judicial review for the same class of aliens to
whom Section 306(c)(1) bars review. 39 Justice Souter concluded that the
found in Sections 306(c)(1) and
conflicting effective date provisions
°
1
reconciled.
be
not
could
309(c)(1)

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id.
See id.
See id.; see also infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id. at 952. (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 953.
See id.
See id.
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Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's attempt to solve the "interpretive anomaly.' 41 In his opinion, the Court interpreted Section 1252(g)
too narrowly. 142 According to Souter, it would be illogical for Congress
to want to preserve interim review of those actions, such as the decision
to open an investigation, but not of the other actions described in Section
1252(g).' 43 Furthermore, Souter noted that there was no plausible explanation of why the exclusivity provisions of Section 1252(g) should not
apply after the effective date to review of those decisions by the Attorney
General that the Court gave as examples.' 44
In support of its decision, the Court suggested that Congress could
not have intended the words "'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
and execute removal orders' to stand for the entire deportation process
because such language, the Court believed, was not precise legislative
drafting. Yet, Justice Souter felt that one could just as plausibly conclude that Congress employed subject headings to bar review of all the46
stages in the deportation process to which challenges might be brought.'
Moreover, the Court's examples, such as the decision to open an investigation, could easily fall under one of47the three stages in the deportation
process that Congress had addressed.
Because the contradiction between Sections 303(c)(1) and 309(c)(1)
was irreconcilable, Justice Souter argued that 309(c)(1) should prevail
for several reasons. First, it seemed highly improbable that Congress
meant to raise a permanent barrier to those aliens in the deportation proceedings on the Act's effective date. 49 Second, such a preclusion of judicial review would raise the serious constitutional question as to whether
Congress may block every remedy for enforcing a constitutional right. 0
Because Justice Souter thought that Section 309(c)(1) should prevail
over Section 306(c)(1), the law afforded the AAADC an opportunity to
litigate its claims in district court. 5'
Justice Souter stated that this approach avoided the problem of addressing the unbriefed issue of whether selective enforcement claims
could be brought in the immigration context. He addressed the Court's
statement that the alien's interest in selective enforcement was less com-

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 954 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997)).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 955.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 956.
See id.
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pelling than in the criminal context.'53 Like Justice Ginsburg, Souter did
not think that there was a real difference in interest between selective
enforcement in either context. 5 4 Therefore, prosecutorial discretion
should not be exercised to violate protected liberties in either context.'
HI. ANALYSIS

A.

The Court's interpretationof Section 1252(g) is consistent with its
interpretationsof otherjurisdictionstripping statutes

The Court's interpretation of Section 1252(g) is consistent with its
interpretation of other statutes that have appeared to foreclose jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that absent clear statutory language
precluding judicial review, such statutes will be interpreted in favor of
finding federal question jurisdiction.'" In AAADC, the Court found express intent to limit judicial review. However, the Court limited this jurisdictional prohibition to only three types of executive action and insured that judicial review was not entirely foreclosed.' 7 The Court's willingness to interpret laws in favor of judicial review has been consistently
demonstrated by its decisions addressing jurisdiction-stripping laws.'
For example, in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,
a group of family physicians challenged the constitutionality of a Medicare Act regulation that authorized different payments for similar physician service. 5 9 The Secretary of Health and Human Services argued that
Congress had prohibited judicial review of all questions arising from
payment of benefits under the Medicare program. The Court began its
opinion by emphasizing the presumption that Congress intends judicial
review of administrative actions to remain available. According to the
Court, the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action "may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory

153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Johnson v Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (stating that where Congress intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear); see also McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991) ("We hold that given the absence of clear
congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction... the District Court had
jurisdiction to hear respondents' constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures.").
157. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct. at 941.:
If, on the other hand, the phrase 'except as provided in this section' were (somehow)
interpreted not to incorporate the other jurisdictional provisions of §1252-if §1252
stood alone, so to speak-judicial review would be foreclosed for all deportation claims
in all pending deportation cases, even after entry of a final order.
Id.
158. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Restrictions
on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM L. REV. 295 (1999) ("[I]t
seems
accurate to say that unless federal statutes completely preclude all federal jurisdiction, congressional
restrictions on jurisdiction likely will be upheld.").
159. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 669 (1986).
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scheme as a whole."' 6 The Court stated that a "serious constitutional
question" would arise if it interpreted
the statute to foreclose all judicial
61
review of constitutional claims.

Similarly, in Webster v. Doe, the Court narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional provision of a statute in favor of allowing for judicial review
of constitutional claims. 62 In Webster, a discharged employee brought
suit against the Central Intelligence Agency, claiming that he was fired
because of his sexual orientation.'63 The government argued that the discretionary termination decisions of the CIA Director, made pursuant to
Section 102(c) of the National Security Act ("NSA"), were barred from
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The
Court held that the statutory language and structure of NSA Section
102(c) sufficiently precluded judicial review under the APA of the Director's discretionary termination decisions." The Court narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional prohibition contained in Section 102(c) as inapplicable to constitutional claims arising from the Director's actions.'"
The Court emphasized the need for a heightened showing of Congressional intent to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims in order
to avoid serious constitutional concerns.'" Because the Government did
not make such a showing, the Court found that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the discharged employee's constitutional claims."'
B

Available Forums after Reno v. AAADC

The Court's holding in AAADC effectively foreclosed the loophole
created by Chen Fan Kwok v. INS for parallel challenges to deportation.
After AAADC, an alien's access to district court is significantly restricted
if the action is deemed to fit into one of the three categories of discretionary action enumerated in Section 1252(g). In the context of federal
laws regulating immigration, the substantive due process accorded aliens
is only that of rationality review. 68 Yet, aliens are still protected by the
procedural due process requirements set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge.'69
In light of AAADC, aliens have several options for obtaining judicial
review of constitutional claims that satisfy procedural due process.

160.
161.
162.
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165.
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168.
169.

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,476 U.S. at 673.
Id. at 681 n.12.
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
See Webster, 486 U.S. at 596.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 9.5.4 at 621.
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976).
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1. Appeals from Final Orders of Deportation
As an initial option for obtaining judicial review, an alien may appeal from a final order of deportation. 7 ' In INS v. Chadha,"' the Court
ruled that an appeal of a final order encompasses all matters on which the
final order is contingent, including constitutional claims. Once the appeal has been filed, the reviewing court of appeals may remand the case
for further fact finding.'73 Although an alien may receive judicial review
of constitutional claims at the appellate level, it is unclear whether claims
of selective prosecution can receive review at all.
In AAADC, the Court noted that their ruling generally denies aliens
the defense of selective prosecution. 7 4 According to the Court, when the
INS has not held a hearing, Section 2347(b)(1) authorizes remand to a
district court. 75 The Court declined to address the issue of whether the
language of the statute could be interpreted to require a hearing on a particular issue, such as selective enforcement. 76 Justice Ginsburg believed
that such review was available, and stated that if a court of appeals could
not review selective enforcement claims, the statute may be unconstitutional. 77 Moreover, she noted the Attorney General's position that the
reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to district court for further
fact-finding. Justice Ginsburg as well as the Court found the opportu79
nity to raise a collateral challenge at the appellate level sufficient.
2. Flagrant violations of constitutional rights
In extreme circumstances, aliens may have the option to obtain immediate judicial review. Although the Court declined to directly address
the issue, it appeared to suggest immediate judicial intervention, prior to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in a situation involving "outrageous" violations of constitutional rights.' 0 In her concurring opinion,
Justice Ginsburg stated that if the respondents were able to demonstrate a
strong likelihood of success on the merits, a chilling effect on current

170. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (1994 & Supp. In 1997); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1997):
Judicial review of a final order of removal (other than an order of removal without a
hearing pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of this title) is governed only by chapter 158 of
title 28, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and except that the court may
not order the taking of additional evidence under section 2347(c) of such title.
Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938 (1983).
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (1994).
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 947 n.10 (1999).
See American-ArabAnti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. at 947 n.10
See id.
See id. at 948.
See id. at 960.
See id.
Id. at 947.
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speech, and "flagrantly improper" administrative action, "precedent and
sense would counsel immediate judicial intervention."'"' Although the
Court criticized Ginsburg's analysis of cases involving immediate judicial intervention'82 the majority, combined with Ginsburg's concurrence,
seems to suggest immediate, prefinal-order judicial intervention in extreme situations.
3.

Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction

Depending on the jurisdiction, habeas corpus jurisdiction may
be a third option for obtaining judicial review. In AAADC, the Court
noted that the circuits were split as to the availability of habeas corpus in
the wake of IIRIRA.'83 The Court did not directly address this conflict
and the circuit courts remain split. It now appears that the availability of
habeas corpus jurisdiction is contingent upon the jurisdiction, as well as
whether the court views a constitutional claim as fitting into one of the
three categories under Section 1252(g) that the Supreme Court declared
to be insular and discrete.' u
For example, in Jurado-Guitierrez,the Tenth Circuit held that the
IIRIRA did not preclude traditional habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2241 .18 Jurado-Guitierrezinvolved the consolidated appealINof four
•• immigration
186
N cases challenging the constitutionality of an
INA provision. The INA provision at issue allows aliens in exclusion
proceedings to apply to the Attorney General for a discretionary waiver
of their deportation order, but does not permit the same opportunity for
aliens in removal proceedings. 87 The Government had argued that Section 1252(g), among other sections of the INA amended by the IIRIRA
and AEDPA, precluded habeas corpus jurisdiction over the aliens' peti188
tions. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Governments argument, and citing
AAADC, held that Section 1252(g) only barred challenges to three dis-

181. Id.at950.
182. See id. at 945 n.10. The majrity critized Ginsburg's analysis of cases involving immediate
judicial intervention, but seemed to suggest that pre-final order judicial intervention is appropriate in
extreme situations.
183. See id. at 939.
184. Compare Hypolite v. Blackman, No. 99-0549, 1999 WL 499146, at *3 (M.D.Pa. July 13,
1999) (holding that Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. and the IIRIRA did not
preclude habeas corpus jurisdiction over collateral constitutional claims because no express denial of
habeas jurisdiction existed) with Zawadzka v. INS, No. 96 C 8398, 1999 WL 417357 (N.D. 111.June
16, 1999) (holding that the IRIRA and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm
effectively removed habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims specified in § 1252(g) but that direct
appellate review was still an available option).
185. Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999).
186. Id.
187. Id.See 8 U.S.C.A §1182(c) (1997). This provision of the INA was amended by the
AEDPA to prohibit aliens, deportable because of their conviction for certain offenses, from applying
to Attorney General for a discretionary waiver of their deportation order).
188. Id. at 1144.
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tinct actions by the Attorney General. 9 Because the aliens were not
challenging one of these three actions, but were instead requesting review of final deportation orders, Section 1252(g) did not bar habeas corpus jurisdiction. According to the court, aside from challenges to the actions enumerated in Section 1252(g), traditional habeas corpus jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains a viable source for judicial review.'
Similarly, in Mustata v. Department of Justice, the Sixth Circuit
found that Section 12 52(g) did not bar the petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus.'9 ' There, petitioners filed a writ of habeas corpus the day before
their deportation order took effect and claimed Fifth Amendment violations due to ineffective assistance of counsel.' 9' The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter pursuant to Section
1252(g).' 9' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Section 1252(g) as well as the Court's statement of
other administrative actions not covered by Section 1252(g).' 94 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel did not fall within one of the three discrete actions listed in Section
1252(g) and therefore habeas corpus jurisdiction was proper.195
Yet, in Singh v. Reno, the Seventh Circuit found habeas corpus jurisdiction to be generally unavailable after the enactment of the
IIRIRA. 96 Singh involved issues similar to those in Jurado-Guitierrez.
In Singh, the petitioner had been convicted of second degree reckless
homicide. 97 Following his conviction, the INS had issued an order to
show cause as to why the petitioner should not be deported.' 98 Two years
later, in 1994, an immigration judge closed the proceedings because the
INS paperwork was incomplete.'" In order to finalize the matter, the pe189. Id. (Quoting the Court's language in Reno v. AAADC that section 1252(g) did not apply to
all claims arising from the deportation process).
190. Id. at 1144, 1145. ("We find that the lack of any mention of §2241 habeas review in the
plain language of the statute, combined with the long historical precedent surrounding habeas corpus
review in immigration cases establishes that traditional habeas review under §2241 survived the
enactment of... [the] IMRIRA.")
191. Mustata v. Department of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999).
192. See Mustata, 179 F.3dat 1018.
193. See id. at 1019.
194. See id. at 1020.
195. See id. at 1022.
196. Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999). See also LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035
(7th Cir. 1999), holding habeas corpus jurisdiction unavailable to alien challenging the denial of his
application for a waiver of deportation:
If, as we believe in agreement with the government, the deportee can seek review of
constitutional issues in the court of appeals directly, as under the prior regime governing
judicial review of deportation, then the layering of judicial review is avoided, judicial
review is curtailed as Congress intended, but enough of a safety valve is left to enable
judicial correction of bizarre miscarriages ofjustice.
Id. at 1040.
197. See Singh, 182 F.3d at 507.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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titioner had requested that the hearing be rescheduled. 20 ° Because of INS
"foot dragging", the matter was not heard rescheduled until 1996, and
rescheduled again several more times.2" During this time, Congress
passed the AEDPA and IRIRA, which authorized deportation for the
criminal convictions, such as the petitioners, and barred such individuals
from applying for a discretionary waiver of deportation.20' Following
entry of a final order of deportation, the petitioner filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus jurisdiction in district court. The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court and held that habeas corpus jurisdiction was
not proper pursuant to Section 1252(g)." The Seventh Circuit noted the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1252(g) in Reno v. AAADC
as limited to those listed discretionary actions. Yet, according to the Seventh Circuit, Section 1252(g) prohibited habeas review of challenges to
removal orders, such as the petitioners.
4. Class Action Challenges to INS Practices
In light of the streamlined review process, class actions, such as the
suit in McNary v. HaitianRefugee Center, may be an important means of
204
challenging INS practices. In McNary, the Court acknowledged that to
establish unfair INS practices, the respondents had adduced a substantial
amount of evidence that would have been irrelevant to an individual determination on appeal.2 5 Furthermore, the Court noted that the court of
appeals reviewing an individual case would not likely have an adequate
record as to a pattern of INS abuses. 2 6 The Court acknowledged that in
"pattern in practice" cases, district court fact-finding is essential.20 In the
wake of AAADC, the feasibility of such actions may depend upon
whether the particular jurisdiction views the underlying claim as a challenge to executive discretionary action.0 8
For example, in Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, the Fifth Circuit found that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a class action claim of fifty illegal aliens because the action essentially challenged executive discretionary action. °9 On the other hand, in Tefel v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between the implementation of a program affecting an entire

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. id. at 509.
204. McNarry v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
205. See HaitianRefugee Ctr., 498 U.S. at 497.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Compare Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, 180 F. 3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over aliens' class action because the action challenged
essentially discretionary decisions) with Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1297 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(determining that district court jurisdiction was proper for class wide challenges to INS practices).
209. Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F. 3d at 206.
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class of individuals and individual challenges to INS actions."' The court
of appeals found jurisdiction to be proper because the aliens were challenging a program, pattern or scheme by immigration officials that allegedly violated the constitutional rights of aliens."' In Tefel, neither
AAADC nor Section 1252(g) altered jurisdiction over the class-wide allegations of constitutional violations committed by the INS. 2
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court's holding in AAADC is consistent with its history of interpreting jurisdictional restrictions in a manner that does not foreclose
all judicial review. In the wake of AAADC, judicial review of claims
arising from the deportation process has been significantly streamlined.
However, aliens continue to have narrow opportunities for judicial review. Individuals may still raise constitutional claims at the appellate
level in the context of a final order of deportation. Also, AAADC appears
to suggest that immediate judicial intervention remains available in
situations involving gross violations of constitutional rights. Because the
circuits are split on the availability of habeas corpus review under the
IIRIRA, aliens may have this option in certain jurisdictions.
Although judicial review has not been completely foreclosed, the
key to obtaining review may lie in how a claim is framed. The Court has
emphasized that claims based on the three discretionary actions listed in
Section 12 52(g) are reviewable only as an appeal from a final order of
deportation. Yet, because the concept of what is included as one of the
three discretionary actions is subjective, courts will vary as to whether an
alien's claim fits into one of these categories. Consequently, aliens
should characterize their claims so as to not challenge one of the three
discretionary actions in order to have the best opportunity to obtain judicial review in the wake of AAADC.
Meghan Dougherty
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